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1BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
1. FUll bibliographical details are given whenever a work is
cited for the first time. Subsequently, the author's name is
followed in the footnotes by just the pace and. - when appropriate
- volume reference. In cas.es where more than one of the same
author's works are mentio1ied, his name is followed by an abbrev-
iated. title of the particular work. This procedure is adopted
for both primary and. secondary material, and. is adapted to refer-
ences to archival material where feasible.
2. The names attributed to authors of primary sources (and. for
proper names in the text) are those by which the people were
known at the time (eg. Nontesquieu rather than Secondat). French
Christian names have been hyphenated consistently. The particle
has not been included in the noble titles, or used for alphabet-
ical purposes, except in a few special instances (es. Du Barry).
Names have been standardised to what would seem to be their con-
temporary norm (e. Psay for: Pesay, Psai, Pzé, Ps(, etc.).
3. The eighteenth-century lan,iage has not been altered. except
for the brinin of the use of capitals into line with modern
practice.
I. The fo1lowin abbreviatione have been used in references to
archival material:
A.E.N.D. - Archives du Departement des Affaires Etranres
(Nenoires et Documents).
A.N. - Archives Nationales.
B.N. - Bibliotieque Nationale.
B.M. - British Museum.
S.P. - State Papers (Public Record Office).
St John - Archives of the Order of St John of Jerusalem (in
Valletta, Malta).
2ABS TRACT
This is a political and institutional study of
a decade of political activity in the old régime 1768-
1778. It assesses its strengths, weaknesses, and re-
forming potential, ana seeks to establish it as a
viable and credible political culture. The study
moves from a description of the regime in actuality,
through various o1 its institutions, and. on to an in-
terpretation of Necker's reforming vision in 1778.
The political dimension is provided by an analysis of
politics over the decade using much new material, and
by describing the political experience of one mdiv-
idual.
I. defines the regime's geopolitical differentiation,
administrative-cuin-legal structures, social compos-
ition, and areas of stress and potential change.
It identifies the robe as the dominant force in
society, and devolution as the main pressure for
reform.
II. examines theorists of the monarchy, especially
Louis Xvi's tutors, and thence his practice of
kingchip to show that he believed he wac foil-
owing a blue-print for success.
III. shows that ?4aupeou's reforms were not a firm base
for wider reform and restructuring, but that the
exiled magistrates had developed a coherent id-
eology of institutional conservatism which oper-
ated in opposition to a reforming monarchy.
IV. the States - whether lapsed, hypothetical, or
extant - were the most viable alternative adminis-
trative structure to the decaying 'Administ;ative/
Absolute Nonarchy' based on the Councils and Inten-
dants.
V. sampLes the mass of alternative thinking about
the regime, and describes the major reform schemes.
'VI. Necker hoped to become the dominant minister of the
century by drawing all the political themes of the
period and breaking the power of the robe.
3Appendix
I. analyses ten years of ministerial instablity inter-
preting the background to the institutional devel-
opments.
II. shows Linguet's career exposing most aspects of the
regime and challenging many of its basic assumptions.
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INTRODUCTION
The years 1768-1718 are the focus for this study. kithough they
link the end of one reign with the beginning of the next, they form a
surprisingly homogenous period. It 'will be claimed. in this thesis
that the last serious efforts at reform led. by the crown took shape
in that period, that behind changing policies and personalities lay
a single unchanging political feature: the crown retained. the mit-
, ative throughout, whether to sweep away the parlements through
?4aupeou's offices, or to institute more positive measures under
Turgot and Neoker.
It is clear enough that the monarchy faced mounting problems
after the War of American Independence, but why had the crown been
taking no active interest in reform in the decades up to 1768?
}Iachault's experiment with a reformed parlement 1750-54 had ended in
defeat for the government, and ministers were for a long time reluct-
ant to risk repeating this experience. The struggles fought out in
the parlements between the Jansenists and Jesuits had occupied the
political limelight, and left the crown as spectator rather than pro-
tagonist. The king personally had not been interested in the day to
day process of ministerial politics - being content to leave it ii ti
hands of ministers such as Choiseul - and the Dauphin (Louis XVI's
father) had withdrawn from politics. The military defeats and finan-
cial dislocation caused by two successive wars had weakened the crown's
confidence and. authority. This allowed the parlemente to fill a power
vacuum at the centre, and. give the appearance of dominating the regime.
While the need for reform had been recognised, it was still only in
an abstract sense, and with no feeling of urgency. As yet, no pract-
ical or comprehensive reform programmes had been formulated which
could be taken up by a ministry as public policy. The ministers and
administrators who would be motivated to undertake major restructur-
ing had not yet reached the political scene; they would emerge in the
1770's as a new generation borrowing from the Enlightenment to seek
new solutions to the regime's problems. Choiseul's style of politics
itself militated against any serious reform. Bis administration
through a consensus of vested interests offered stability rather than
innovation.
Several forces operated to change this political environment
and to set up a new scene in the early years of Louis XVI. Both 'the
causes and results of this change will be considered at length in
this work.
6Wherever possible the study has drawn on primary sources.
One previously unknown archival source has been used: the re-
cords of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (the 'chevaliers de
lIalte'). These archives in Valetta were traced through cor-
respondence between the Order and the States of Brittany. They
shed new light on the problems of a privileged corporation op-
erating in the old regime, and contain more general political
correspondence, which extend our understanding of various events.
The Archives Nationales and the archival sources in the
Bibliothque Iationale have been used selectively to explore
particular problems (eg. the administration of Corsica).
The problems of the late old regime can not be confined to
a decade, but taking a limited period has a methodological ad-
vantage. It allows the comprehensive researching of the more
important printed sources and some archival ones. This reveals
all contemporary concerns and political activity. Sources thus
consulted are: the British embassy papers (Public Record Office),
the archives of one Department of State, and the main journals,,
diaries, and commentaries of the time. As far as possible, all
relevant printed material originating in the period was consult-
ed.
Secondary material has been used, when an area has been re-
searched satisfactorily, and where new work would only 'be dup-
lication. Some secondary sources have been treated as pricises
of primary material (eg. Viollet on the structure of the adrnin-
istration). Secondary material has also been used to define the
point at which fresh research needed to start. Some historians
have reappraised the regime, but in limited areas, such as
Louis XVI as Dauphin by G-irault de Coursac, or the French Right
by Roberts. Few of these reappraisals have been followed through
or integrated into a wider context. The study acknowledges a
debt to Tocqueville, who opened up the regime to historiograph-
ical analysis. Certain contemporary historians have been used
to provide essential frames of reference, notably Behrens and
Cobban 1
Aspects of such a study on the late ancien regime might
seem to overlap Dr. Hardman's recent work. That study, however,
takes a different slant on. the regime's politics, and explores
the process and operation of ministerial politics 1774-87
(eg. the Prime Iiinistership), while the examination of politics
here will be to demonstrate the continued credibility of the
regime's institutions and political culture 2
7The analysis of politics here also has a different basis
in primary material from any previous studies. Dr. Hardman,
for example, has taken the abbe' Vri as his basic source and
has accepted his framework of political analysis. The reason
given is that no body of French documentation exists similar
to English Cabinet Papers, and in their absence the abbe" a.
record is the best available guide to ministerial politics
under Louis XII. The objection to	 using Veci uncritically
is that his link :with ministerial politics was second-hani
and heavily biassed in favour of IIaurepas and Turgot. He ex-
aggerated their importance, tried to transpose their short-
comings and faults onto others, credited their opponents with
badness of heart, and at some points indulged in wishful
thinking. He could not take Necker seriously.
The primary source which provides the staple for political
analysis in this study is the British embassy's record. These
papers do seem to go some way towards filling the gap left
by the absence of Cabinet Papers. They yield pre"ises of
Council meetings and give background intelligence to ensure
that the reader can interpret the Council's decisions correct-
ly. They even contain interviews with ministers on matters
of French constitutional interest.
The embassy's staff's attitude towards political report-
age is revealed in this remark made to the Secretary of' State
in St. James's, "It is my duty to acquaint your Lordship with
everything one hears or sees more or less interesting"
They had a vested interest in recording accurate and objective
information. They wrote for an intelligent but uninformed
audience, so that institutions and individuals taken for
granted by French commentators were described and explained.
By comparison with memorialists, members of the embassy staff on
occasion seem to have been better informed than even some
ministers on the Council. Their only real faults were an
occasional tendency to confuse rumour with fact (eg. on forth-
coming ministerial appointments), and an obsessive fear of
Choiseul's return to power after 1770. The embassy's papers
are supplemented by the records of the Under Secretary of
State's network of agents who operated through the embassy.
This included espionage reports, although these are a sur-
prisingly disappointing source for future historians.
8The two potentially most important recent publications on
this period are: Professor gret's 'Necker, Ninistre de Louis
XVI' (Paris 1975), and Henri Grange's 'Les Ide'es de Necker'
(Paris 1975). Professor .gret's book also bases its analysis
on Ve'i, and as a result fails to provide any deeper
	 in-
sights into Necker's place in the regime in his early minister-
iaj. years. Henri G-range'smagnificent treatise is not designed to
place Necker in any wider context or to examine his ministerial
action. It also makes a fundamental assumption, that Necker's
ideas on provincial reform were sui generis and fully formed
when he took office. It will be one of the objects of this study
to describe the background to these provincial reforms and to
show how Necker borrowed from theorists such as Letrosne.
The material in the thesis has been organised to progress
systematically outwards from a close scrutiny of the monarchy
and central institutions to the provinces and their institutions.
In a similar way, the study extends enquiry from the existing
institutions and conventional theories of the regime into areas
of contenrnorarv s peculation on reoranisation. The first c'hapt-
er established the structure of the regime as a whole. This
provides a context for the institutions, reforms, and political
activity studied subsequently.
Chapter II examines the focal point of the regime: the mon-.
archy and the monarch himself. The information on Louis XVI as
Dauphin had not previously been integrated into the ministerial
context of the regime. With almost the sole exception of Gir-
ault de Coursac's work, secondary sources followed the old ster-
eotyped patterns too far to be of value. The chapter relied heav-
ily on primary sources to provide, firstly, the dvoi and more
general intellectual background to Louis in 1774,
	
secondly,
reactions to his kingship actually written 1774-8, and, thirdly,
speculations about new means of exploiting and strengthening
the institution.
* In the context of this study, the term d6vot is used both gen-
erally, to indicate a "devout" Catholic, and specifically in
a political sense. This second meaning embraces the first, but
also includes those who used the defence of.institutipnal rel-igiôn as a political weapon against the Choiseulists and philosophes.
9Chapter III considers what have always appeared to be the
principal institutions of the regime: the parlements. Although
many useful works have been written on the parlements themselves,
we still know comparatively little about contemporary reactions
to them on a systematic basis. primary sources have been used, to
discover these. The concern of this study is to research the
narrow field of the parlements' "constitutional" role, and how
tUs was interpreted at the time. One of the findings of the
study will be that the parlement after 1774 was being squeezed
out between the reforming monarchy, the call for an assembly of
the States General, and the trend towards devolution of power
to the provinces - which will form a major theme of this thesis.
For these reasons, the recent work on the parlements by Drs.
Doyle and Rogister has not been regarded as directly relevant
Chapter IV looks at the assemblies of States. An account
is given of the "constitutional" position of the States General
in the long period when they were not convoked. It is shown that
great interest was displayed in them during the century, to the
point where it can be argued that they underwent a hypothetical
constitutional evolution. The chapter then looks at the surviv-
ing assemblies of States in the peripheral provinces. They are
integrated into a wider view of the regime, and shown as a source
o± encouragement and inspiration to reformers who were concerned
to preserve the essential qualities of the regime while eradic-
ating its abuses and. inefficiency. Secondary sources here have
been used as prcises of local research, but the more important
evaluations have relied on primary material.
Chapter V explores contemporary speculation about new struct-
ures, ideas, and directions In politics and society. The guide-
lines for selecting material were that it should contribute
either to the general political climate of opinion or be avail-
able to (and be noticed by) ministers of the period. The ideas
and. schemes presented show a cross section of the political tal-
ent and speculation which the ministries could - and did - draw
on. It will also be evident that a great many of these ideas
were to be taken up by Necker, and in particular the theoretical
background to his provincial reforms is examined in some depth.
10
In chapter VI we see the working out in reality of many
of the ideas from previous chapters during Necker's first
two years in office. This draws together the various themes
in the study. Necker attempted to identify the strongest
elements of existing structures and the most practical sug-
gestions for reform. He wanted to unite these with new social
groups and with new provincial institutions to re-establish
the monarchy on firmer foundations. He generated controversy
of an historiographical nature as early as the 1780's, and
this dispute is evaluated. The existing secondary studies of
Necker have tended to be either biographical or intellectual,
but the approach in this study has been to place Necker back
into the context of the 1770's, and to watch his interaction
with the politics and institutions of the day. Exceptionally
in this chapter, one incident from outside the period has been
brought forward and integrated into the pattern of earlier ev-
ents: the Compte Rendu, which is analysed in this very limited
context, The conclusion reached is that Louis as king and
Necker as reforming minister had succeeded in taking the regime
to a new point of departure. Successful experiments had been
ciiductd iii reformed provincial adnthListration. Public opin-
ion had been mobilised to support the ministry. The Control
General had been reorganised, and gave the appearence of op-
erating with smoothness and efficiency. New institutions and
social groups were being invited to join with the monarchy
to regenerate the kingdom.
Appendices have been added to give greater depth to the
study. The first reassesses the political scene itself 1768-
1778, largely in the light of the "Cabinet Paper" type of ev-
idence provided by the British embassy. The second examines
one individual's experience of the regime, and his reactions
to it. This was the turbulent barrister Linguet. The over-
all picture of patronage and political allegiance is provided
in Appendix III, and a glossary is added to provide the reader
with definitions both of the regime's technical terms arid in-
stitutions, and of words used in a special way in this period.
At various points maps and diagrams have been inserted to am-
plify or demonstrate points made in the text, or to unburden
the text of factual description.
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Any study of the late old regime must take into account
the Revolution. As background to this study, Cobbaii's view of
the Revolution has been accepted. Greatly simplified, this ac-
count says that the financial crisis of the 1780's provoked a
political crisis 1787-9, which caused three separate revolutions:
of the aristocracy 1787-9 (the "pre-revolution"), of the middle
classes in 1789, and of the peasantry at the same time in 1789.
t was only the latter peasant revolution that had the depth,
cope, and shock to destroy the regime, and it was the burning
of the chateaux rather than the storming of the Bastille that
issued in a new political and social order. Ideologically, how-
ever, this peasant attack on the regime was aimed at putting
the clock back to the time before capitalist means of exploit-
ation (especially those disguised as feudalism) had penetrated
the country-side. It bore little relation to its ultimate re-
sult - the creation of a society which looked to middle class
liberal democracy and capitalism for its ideals . Leading back
from this interpretation of the Revolution, we can reappraise
the rest of the eighteenth century along the lines laid down by
Behrens in her 'Inaugural Lecture for the British Society for
Eighteenth-Century Studies'. Reduced to its basics, this reapp-
raisal frees the ancien regime from teleological interpretations
and establishes it as a phenomenon in its own right, as worthy
of study as the Revolutionary society which followed it 6,
Was there a chance, however, for	 reform to succeed?
If such a chance did exist, it was at the accession of the new
king in 1774. The prophets of doom were drowned out in the clam-
our of hope, enthusiasm, and acclaim for the king. The British
ambassador wrote at the onset of Louis XV's final illness,
"Nany I suspect secretly wish a new reign. Few, very few, seem
to dread it". Six weeks later he reported widespread hopes of,
"...halcyon days, and a new golden reign" 7. At the least his-
toriography had judged 1774 "a fleeting moment of real oppor-
tunity", where the regime had an even chance of survival 8•
New options seemed to have opened up , and over the summer of
1774 something of a public debate was allowed to take place on
the directions the new reign should follow o. In September
Horace \lalpole wrote, "Think, how contemptible the end of Louis
the Well Beloved (xv), how bright the dawn of Louis XVI"
12
The focal point of this study is to examine the options
opened up at the accession and to follow them through. The time
span taken has been the decade 1768-78. 1768-74 defined the sit-
uation Louis XVI faced at his accession. The years 1774-8 were
those of real opportunity. 1768 is a convenient starting point,
for it was the date of Choiseul's first ministerial crisis which
gives the opportunity both to study Ohoiseul's "system" and the
ternatives to it. 1778 was a watershed for the regime. Necker
had settled into power as a successful reforming minister, but
France had embarked on the last war of the old regime. The war
caused further reform to be postponed and created a hopeless dis-
ruption of finances, which resulted in a wholly different political
environment. Consequently, we cannot accept the orthodox judgment
"The history of Prance from the death of Louis XIV to the end of
the Seven Years War was really part of a larger period which cul-
ininated in the outbreak of the Revolution..." 12, The period
1715-89 was highly structured, and,whatever long-term factors
can be discerned, the political break-down of the regime can
only be dated from 1781 at the earliest, and perhaps even as
late as 1787.
Ther.e were five themes in political life in 1774. The first
was the potential resurgence of the monarchy (as opposed to power-
ful ministers) under a young, conscientious, and determined king.
The second was the development df an. institutional conservatism.
The third was the desire for a greater devolution of power to
the provinces, this had as many raotives as manifestations but
was a major reforming impulse. Fourthly, a new generation was
emerging which rose to the challenge of a reforming monarchy.
The fifth theme was the changing structure and balance of the
nobility. These themes are followed through to their exploit-
ation by Necker.
The last four of these themes are integrated into the study,
but the first stands out as requiring some preliminary explanat-
ion. The leading ministers in the seventeenth century had, seemed
at times to exercise unbridled power, but had created the "Admin-
istrative lionarchy", where the king enjoyed an absolute control
over politics and administration on a day to day level. None
13
of the eighteenth-century commentators examined for this study
advocated powerful ministers per se to solve Prance's problems
- most actively denounced them. They had, very definite ideas
about the specific qualities to be possessed by ministers, but
always limited their competence by circumscribing their juris-
diction either under an active monarch or within a constitutional
structure. Xiaupeou's example reinforced this climate of opinion.
Consideration of ministerial power in the ancien regime
begs the questions of how great that power was, and how effect-
ively it was used. Stereotyped interpretations of the regime's
administration shoi it to possess such inertia and corruption,
that no constructive use could be made of it. Prance did possess
ar enormous, sophisticated, but very diverse political and
administrative machine which generated its own logic and
inertia. This machinery did inspire men to seek to dominate
it for the sheer exercise of power, but the opportunities for
political advancement with this motive were limited by the
practice known as "survivance". This practice allowed high
office to become legal property which could be willed to a
successor. .i'iaurepas, for example, never needed to struggle for
mirtiaterial power, he inherited it at the age of fifteen and it
became a way of life. Such men had no motive to do more than
safeguard the status quo; many did,though, genuinely seek to
serve the crown at the risk of personal political discomfort and
hard. work. Such men (eg. St.-Plorentin) formed the ministerial
and, administrative bedrock of the regime, against which both
Naupeou and Turgot could be judged.
The thjjfll) also inspired those who wished to capture it
and use it to redirect French politics and society. These men
were not concerned to serve q,uietly, or to survive by- trimming.
Their careers were, therefore, briefer and more turbulent. One
of the questions the late regime poses is whether such a minister
ever enjoyed security. If the king, or dominant minister, did
support and co-operate with a reformer, then no resistence could
seriously impede him. Buj by having to rely on outside support,
a reformer could not act independently, and thus the really power-
ful ministers who survived tended to be those who did not have
any wider vision or ideology. Such men left no monuments, and.
enjoyed no great reputation even in their own life-times. The
powerful minister, therefore, tended not to strengthen the monarchy
but to let it drift. The most interesting figures in this study
14
will prove to be the men who saw themselves as true servants
of the crown, and were prepared to play that role, and rely,
for example, on. the king managing Council to support policies.
Taking Louis Xvi's desire to intervene directly in. politics
in 1774, we find that very- much the same situation had. obtained
in England a decade earlier at George III's accession, tinder
George I and II the Whig oligarchy had produced able ministers,
but ones who had neither sought reform nor needed to rely on the
crown for day to day support. George III then stepped into
the political arena and reasserted royal authority in Parliament
and Cabinet. This royal initiative produced the symptoms of a
succession of weak and transient ministries. In France the
same symptoms emerged under Louis XVI. The political process
which operated to produced these symptoms was for the king to
manage his Council directly. This could be done either by
changing the personnel to find men willing to follow a particul-
ar course of action, or by regulating attendance to exclude
opponents of any given policy until it had been accomplished.
This did not guarantee support for a policy in other in-
stitutions, but it does.demonstrate that the king and reforming
ministers could hold the politiel liii iative whenever tiy de-
sired, Louis XVI did choose to exercise that initiative, and
did choose reforming ministers. It is bearing these factors
in mind that we should not assume that the monarchy was weak-
ened and losing the initiative during the ministerial "inter-
regnum" of 1768-78; far from it - Ultimate control rested with
the crown, even if vacillating policies betrayed indecision.
Space has not allowed the full exploration of all possible
relevant topics. The study has had to be strictly limited to
political institutions and reforms with an institutional base;
and areas touching on the social, economic, or cultural side
of the regime have had to be given at best the briefest treat-
ment, These areas include: the development of a political con-
sciousness among the "classe" of "militaires", institutions ex-
ploited by the Court nobility, the Enlightenment as it affected
politics, and the changing structure of agriculture and estate
management.
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THE FRANCE OF 1774
Any study of the old regime must start with definitions; there
is too much that cannot be taken for granted. The single most basic
and useful definition is Mthivier'e that it was: Catholic, Corpor-
ate, and Customary - three qualities destroyed by the Revolution
Geographically France was not a unified kingdom; half the prov-
inces possessed some degree of autonomy passed over by the seventeenth-
2century centralising absolutism, There were, however, more important
and. wider divisions which assumed increasing importance in the late
century. Initially the division was between the oceanic and oontin-
enta]. provinces. The provinces defined as oceanic were those which
lay within the economic spheres of the great sea ports. Easy access
to water transport and the Atlantic commercial community dictated their
economic forms. The geography of France meant that the upland regions
- the ?lassif Central, the Alps, and the Pyrenees - which we would ex-
pect to be the least interesting politically, formed the oceanic prov-
inces' hinterlands. They looked to the oceanic provinces, therefore,
rather than the central lowlands for political structures. It will
be seen in chapter IV below that, except for the north-eastern prov-
inces which formed a category of their own (see below), all. tne ex-
isting provincial States fell within the oceanic provinces. Nore sig-
nificantly, all those oceanic provinces without States were the sub-
ject of political action or speculation about their creation. The
greater economic strength of the oceanic provinces had enabled them
to retain all or part of their medieval autonomy, as opposed to the
agricultural central provinces which had been brought more firmly
under centralised control.
The old regime's military and postal road system was not suit-
able for bulk transport, and left much of the lowland central area
remote. The economic activity of the two areas was diametrically
opposed& the oceanic based on commerce with the outside, while the
continental economy was localised. and agricultural. A free market
economy worked well in the oceanic provinces because of the nature of
their commerce and the speed with which large quantities of goods
could be transported. In the continental provinces the paucity of
communications made a controlled economy essential, the law of supply
and demand causing interrupted supplies and fluctuating prices.
Government policy under the Bourbons fluctuated between the inspiration
of the central and of the oceanic provinces. With Colbert predominating,
the period 1660-1750 saw the attempt to co-erce the oceanic
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provinces into continental patterns, after 1750 inter
centred on the oceanic provinces, with the attempt to impose
a free market in grain and to create assemblies in all
provinces 2
A subsidiary division not immediately rounded on economics
was between the continental provinces and those in the east
• acquired since the middle ages. This latter category, includ-
ing the duchy of Burgundy, had retained its political institu-
tions while remaining largely agricultural, though with
pockets of manufacturing in the Rhineland area . A fourth
division must be accounted the Court and capital, linked
inextricably by politics, economics, and culture, the Court
in its isolationist arrogance called itself "Ce paysci" as
opposed to the rest of the realm "ce pays-la". This area was
the focal point of all activity in the regime, particularly
political and financial. The elite of the nation resided
there for at least some part of every year, and many were in
permanent residence. This, as shown below, was reckoned to
be a debilitating influence on political life, the realities
of the country could be ignored and the power of vested
interest was unbridled. Duclos saw the capital as an island
of sophisticated civilisation a century ahead of the surround-
ing country-side . The Court and capital were noted for
their frivolity, and their thirst for novelty, as expressed
by a greater interest in fashion than in politics. Mercier
devoted a detailed study to the capital, and decided that
despite a veneer of political awareness, it in fact bred an
enervating indifference, as witnessed by a lack of vigorous
pub-brawls . The bureaucracy below ministerial level,
equally, lived in an isolated world which led them to delay,
distort or discount information from the provinces 6, The
classic analysis of bureaucracy, that it causes "...anaemia
in the extremities and apoplexy at the centre" ', applies
to the old regime. Yet we have already seen that France
lacked uniformity or cohesion, and was therefore suffering
from the administrative defects of both centralisation and
decentralisation; this paradox formed one of the bases of
Tocqueville's analysis of the regime, and he extended this
concept of paradox to embrace the whole regime.
These divisions show the remarkable persistence of
developments set in motion over a thousand years earlier,
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when the Franks colonised the central-northern areas leaving
the south and west to the Burgundians and Visigoths, which
in turn allowed these areas to be more susceptible to Roman
Law coming up from the Mediterranean. In the north, Brittany
and Normandy were separate nations founded on separate
invaders. In the east the third group of provinces, with
the exception of Alsace-Lorraine, were all part of the
medieval state of Burgundy and had inherited the institutions
of the Holy Roman Empire confirmed by the dukes of Burgundy
and then the Habsburgs. This digression leads us back to
Tocqueville's second major contribution to our understanding
of pre-Revolutionary France and Europe, that all political
institutions and social structures were only intelligible in
terms of these ancient influences. This was no abstract con-
cept for the eighteenth century, but a very real choice
between the Germanic and Romance heritages of the regime;
the Renaissance and Bourbon absolutist monarchies had
emphasised the Latin over the Teutonic, but in the regime's
final century Boullainvilliers, reinforced by Montesquieu,
created a climate of opinion favourable to the reassertion
of Germanic values. The point was made forcefully and
emotively by the comte de Buat-Nancay, "...je ne suis ni
Grec ni Romain, je consens qu'on me nomme barbare, et
recueille avec vn 'ration les dbris de l'antiquité..." 8,
The choice of heritage became institutionalised in the
noble and royal theses. The noble thesis held that Clovis
and the Franks invaded Gaul as pagan conquerors who formed a
new ruling class whose descendants were the eighteenth century
aristocracy, which was, accordingly, genetIcally distinct
from the rest of the population. The royal thesis held that
Clovis had invaded as a Christian ally of Rome, and that
there had been a smooth de jure transfer of sovereignty
from the Roman Empire to the Frankish monarchy, which should
lead eventually to a politically and socially, integrated
state • The noble thesis' s genetic argument may have been
misconceived and the historiographical irresolvable, but
they exercised a hold over the imagination transcending
logic or empirical analysis. An important twist to the noble
thesis was the parLement of Paris's assertion that the Frank
ish annual military assembly - the Champs de Mars - had
evolved not into the States General but into the parlement,
and was in either case a consultative institution limiting
the monarchy. This twist enabled the robe to share in the
noble thesis where otherwise it might be limited to nobility
of race . This dispute ramified throughout politics and
society, and forms an intellectual background to the decline
in absolutism in the eighteenth century.
The trend towards seg'regation in society which Palmer
develops as a prerequisite of the aristocratic reaction 10,
was reflected in politics in the trend towards devolution.
Both trends began to crystallise in the 1750's as Louis XIV'S
absolutism, kept alive by Fleury (1726-43), began to decay
and to fail to meet the regime' s needs. (Behrens puts this
date at 1748, the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, after which the
regime tried and failed to adjust to the consequences of
military defeat, but Linguet gave 1750 as the date the regime
itself recognised as a new point of departure, and Puysgur
dated recognition of the old regime's problems and the
urgent need to solve them, at Machault' s ministry 1 ]), The
Mirabeaus' biographer described 1750-87 as witnessing the
trIumph of decentralisation, and the movement has been
described as essentially aristocratic 12 Administratively
the decentralisation recognised the greater success, particu-
larly economic, of the peripheral provinces. An importhnt
feature of	 devolution was the transfer of allegiance by
local authorities, notably intendants and parlements, from
d?'ndng the interests of the government in thG provinces
to representing the interests of the provinces to the govern
ment 13
Financially the divisions were between Court and capital
and the rest of France, and between those provinces with
some degree of local fiscal determination and those exposed
to the full force of the fiscal buraucracy in Paris and the
tax farms. All provinces resented the Parisian tax collector,
an arbitrary and remote figure with immense power 14, and
the continental provinces' history of over-takation and
fiscal mismanagement left them chronically impoverished
relative to those provinces able to bargain for better
treatment. The economic prosperity of the early century
glossed over these contentions, but once the economic
climate began to change a clear division of interests arose
between the provinces and the central authorities, which led
to the full-scale implementation of provincial reform in
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1787 and the unilateral setting up of some States Countries
in 1788 15, Unfortunately the old adage that the Bourbons
learnt nothing and forgot nothing blighted these reforms by
the government's failure to come to terms with them and reform
appropriately elsewhere. The scope of government increased
during the century, causing a provincial reaction in itself
and building up the vested interest of the bureaucracy in
the centre. The increasing tax burden caused greater
questioning of the use of the money and the efficiency of the
government. The capital became regarded as an abyss into
which any amount of money could be sunk without trace 16,
One reaction to this was the reawakening of interest in
local customs and culture sometimes to the extent of xeno-
phobia 17	 .
A useful guide to the type of administration practised in
the old regime is provided by Armstrong, who proposes five
criteria for "pre-modern" bureaucrats 18, Although the object
of his study is the intendants, his remarks are of relevance
for all the administrative personnel in our study from bishops
to subdelegates. The pre-modern period presents the distinct-
ive feature that those fulfilling the role of bureaucrat are
also the political 1ite. Within this 4lite we should watch
fori "bureaucratic regression", characterised by, "recruit-
ment.., through family connections", "in service-training",
arid the, "minimisation of training rcquired for cntrance";
the autonomy of the office; the absence of a career struct-
ure; and the, "attachment to a specific locality". Arguing
largely from Gruder's research, Armstrong proves the case
for intendants, showing how any regulations imposed by the
government were relaxed out of existence. At two points,
however, the old regime intendants display "modern" features
family connections were declining during the century, and a
definite career structure existed. The problem of career
structure was of great importance in the late'century as the
conventional practice of appointing intendants to high office
was mitigated by ministerial recruitment from the peerage,
the governors, the administrative bishops, and the parlement.
Recruitment to high office was also an important indication
of the changing social balance within the regime as the Great
reasserted themselves and a new group, in part composed of
erstwhile robins, the militaires, began to act on the regime.
(Belle-Isle's breakthrough to a Secretaryship of State in
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1758 illustrated most aspects of this changed recruitment
he was a Great, a militaire, but of robin origins 19), The
changes in the regime, of which changed ministerial recruit
inent was a symptom, will form the themes of some subsequent
chapters.
At the head of every structure of administration was the
king. Absolutist theorists started from the premise that
Les rois sont la plus vive image de Dieu sur la terre", and
answerable only to God. More secularly Suier declared,
WLe roi et la loi ne font qu'un". The philosophe 'Encyclo-
pdie' gave this definition of the crown's competence, "Le
pouvQir de faire de nouvelles ordonnances, edits, ou
declarations, de les changer, modifier, n'appartient en
France qu'au roi, dans lequel seul reside tout le pouvoir
lé'gislative". The crown reserved to itself the ultimate
initiative in all spheres 20, "En France", commented
Linguet, "le roi est ce qu'il y a de plus grand, aprs Dieu,
aux yeux du peuple, et mm avant, a ceu.x des courtisans.
Au nom du roi, tout marche, ou tout s'arrte; rien ne se fait
que de la part du roi, tout rayonne autour de lui du faste
le plus b1ouissant..." 21, There was an edge of satirical
bitterness in Linguet's words, because the sovereigns after
1715 were unable to provide the necessary inspiration from
the centre to "animate" the regime as a whole and unify it
behind th monarchy 22 Th dArots, however, denied the
very existence of the problem, Proyart said that being des
tined to be king precluded human fallibility - a belief
Louis XVI held 23 A classic dvot statement of the monarchy
-was made by SSguier in 1771, "Les rois sont les images de
Dieu sur la terre, et la Divinité' ne craint pas d'tre
importune par les prires" 24, The king, however, was
neither above the law nor free from obligations. Ra1 and
Choiseul both made out the case for an absolutism within
the law, but the most interesting comment was.made by Bertin,
who, when asked to intervene in the case of an imprisoned
British merchant, spoke of, "..the impossibility of the king's
interposing his authority, to over-rule any legal decisions...
were he to make that use of his power, he would not be a
monarch but a despot" 25, Of obligations, Real insisted that
the king be just arid reasonable, and was obliged to protect
and feed his people, and to uphold the rule of law, religion,
and justice - Turgot's apparent breach of the second and
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fourth stipulations was a foundation of the opposition to
him. Ral accorded the monarchy absolute competence over;
legislation, appointments,war and peace, justice, currency,
and taxation 26
The concept of mores formed an integral part of the
regime and. Its thinking. R6a1 and. Moreau both proposed that
states fell more from moral decay than from any more obvious
factors, and the converse was argued 27 1Ioving on from
I'iontesquieu's geographical determinism, Duolos defined mores
as a country t s "natural" traditions and customs 28• The great
fear in the second half of the century was that mores were in
decline, a process highlighted by IIaupeou's riding rough-
-shod over every political convention. One commentator even
attributed the deterioration of finances to a decline in
mores '. A foundation of the rogime's political mores was
the ignorance of the people. The dvot attitude was that
public debate fuelled by up-to-date information was inherently
bad, an attitude parodied by Malesherbes as administration
as a "mystery", and the recognition of grievance as incitement
to revolt 30
The crown itself recognised no limitations on its power
except religion and custom. This custom took the form of a
code of political mores forbidding the crown to Infringe on
the so-called fundamental laws. This illusion of limitation
was recognised as important. I•iaurepas told Augard, "Ii
faut bien que le roi soit maitre du parlement, mais que
personne ne le croie, sans cela tout serait perdu", and.
Regnaud wrote, tt..po1 que les peuples en effet soient
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heureux, l'exercise de cette autorite dolt toujours etre teinp(re
31,, G-rimm, Lvls, Buat, and Seahac de Nelihan saw the monarchy
as limited by mores, and Levis believed that freedom waa safer
protected by mores than by institutions 32• A specific conven-
tion had grown up that while the monarchy might encourage a cor-
)oration. to lapse, it could not abolish one. The dispute of
1749-54 with the clergy and parlements encouraged this belief
when the government capitulated.
The majority of political commentators, however, had a much
more definite idea of a limited monarchy. This idea centred on
the fundamental laws of the monarchy, which Linguet defined at
the time as, "...des coutumes devenues respectables par ].'anti-
quite1' 3, and which have been dismissed subsequently as shadowy
relics of the medieval monarchy without substance or any possib-
il...ty o enforcement	 Por all hii, we have already setzi Ui.L
the monarchy seemed prepared, from political expedience, to ac-
quiesce to these fundamental laws and customs. A case in point
was the decision to create a peerage for the archbishop of Paris
in 1690. Louis XIV did not feel that he had the constitutional
authority to create a seventh ecclesiastical peerage as the or-
iginal six still functioned, and he contented himself with the
creation of a lay peerage. Even Re'al, an absolutist, could
write, "Quelque auguste que soit le pouvoir des rois, ii n'est
pas au-dessus de la loi fondamentale de 1'tat", and, that the
king enjoyed an "heureuse impuissance" when it came to this law
This phrase "felicitous impotence" was to be much bandied
about in the pamphlets of the late century.
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If the British constitution was unwritten, the French was also
unspoken. There was no coherent account of fundamental lawr, but a
list can be put together. The first, and most important, was the
Bourbon succession by Salic law. A second was the preservation of
French territorial integrity, whereby the king could not treat the
whole realm as domaine royale. A third was the upholding of estab-
lished religion. Fourthly, the States General should be consulted
when the succession was In dispute. A fifth, which had the most im-
ortant Implications for political life, was that the king, as an ab-
olute and not despotic ruler, could not alienate the lives or prop-
erty of his subjects 56 The structure of office holding put most of
the magietracy under the protection of the fifth law. It was thus
that Montesquieu could set up the magistracy as an autonomous corpor-
ation limiting the monarchy.
The problem of the king ignoring fundamental law was not discussed
in the eighteenth century. The debated of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries had never resolved it in the face of political real-
ities. Rousseau's 'Contrat Social' was one last outpost of contract-
ualism in a new century. Political thinking in the late century div-
erged between representative democracy - as practised in the United
States of America - with its insituiunl 	 d dcfccc aaIt d.c
potism, and a belief in the primacy of force as the basic political
reality. This latter belief arose out of the de 'vot critique of Rous-.
sean the fear that once the Enlightenment had. removed religion from
politics there would no longer remain even moral barriers to despotism.
It was developed as a coherent d4vot philosophy by the Old Dauphin
(see Chapter II) and as nihilism by Linguet (see Appendix II).
Leeiaire, the historian of fundamental laws, shows that they were
an Important and evolving part of eihteeht-century politics. The two
major developments of the early century were the "rehabilitation" of
the States General by Boullainvilliers and the promoting of the par]e-
ment as the institutional basis of a constitution by Montesquieu. In
the mid-century Rousseau introduced ideas of popular sovereignty, which
he labelled a "social contract". Introducing this concept into the
debate over medieval institutions finding a new role in the eighteenth
century greatly confused it. On top of this Rousseau's discussion of
total democracy in the context of a city state was - mistakenly per-
haps - transferred into the mainstream of French political culture.
Throughout the century absôlutists made out defences of the monarchy,
culminating in Gin, who was as royalist as Bod.in (see Chapter II). The
most radical and synthesising account of fundamental laws was to be
found in 'Maximes du Droit Public Français' (Anon.kmsterdam 1775).
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This brought the social contract and national sovereignty
into fundamental laws, and listed them as: the first and
second of our list above, thirdly the prerogative of the
States General to assemble (if necessary without the crown's
permission) and be consulted by the crown, security of
tenure for officers in the inagistracy, full parlementaire
prerogatives of registration, and the parlements' preroga-
tive of limiting the monarchy as an intermediary corporat
tion '. This book lent heavily on Rousseau, Boullainvillie
and Montesquieu, and posed most of the constitutional pro-
blems of the late century.
While Montesquieu was not primarily a fundamental law
theorist, his influence dominated the century, and he laid
down most of the lines of thought other political theorists,
of all shades of opinion, would have to follow. Where his
ideas affected politics Montesquieu was neither as original
a thinker as Rousseau nor as legalist as Maupeou. His
achievement was to shift the whole emphasis of French polit-
ical thought away from subservience to seventeenth-century
absolutism. He looked to classical republics - motivated by
"Virtue" - for inspiration, but recognised that monarchy was
the regime of the day in eiqhteenth-century north-western
Europe. Monarchy was motivated by honour, but Louis XIV'S
absolutism had undermined honour in politics, and threatened
to turn nionarchy into despotism, whr'h was government based
on fear and lacking in mores. To combat this Montesquieu
raised the presumed constitutional position of the institu-
tions of the "limited monarchy" into fundamental laws. These
institutions Montesquieu defined as: the Church, the nobility,
and the parlements. The Church could exercise spiritual and
political restraint over the crown; the nobility - through
exercise of justice - could limit the monarchy; and the
parlements - through control of law - could achieve a con-
sultative role in the state as an intermediary body between
king and people.
Montesquieu never mentioned the States General, and this
must be accounted the major political flaw in his thought for
it not only ignored what all other coristitutionalists regarded
• as a basic reality, but also opened the door to parlementaire
theorists usurping States General's prerogatives. This threw
27
the constitutional conflicts of Louis Xv's reign of f
balance, and then left the magistracy without guidance
1788-9 on the States General from a writer who had acquired
the stature of an Old Testament prophet. Nontesquieu is
best remembered for his eulogy of the British constitution
and its separation of powers. ?'fbntesquieu carried two ideas
from Westminster across the Channel: that liberty can be
based on legislation, and that the king's true role was as
head of the executive. Montesquieu was writing a commentary
on political and legal practice, but he was taken up as a
handbook of political action and this was to pose the regime
difficulties it could not solve 38
The parlementaire theorists did indeed claim for them-
selves the consultative capacity of the States Gerral.
Without. the parlement strong enough to limit the monarchy,
"Chaque citoyen ne peut e'lever sa voix; sa resistance 'a la
volont du prince est rvolte, le parlement rduit juger
les contestations entre les particuliers, la t'te appesantie
sous le joug de la ruine des peuples, en promulgant les
volonts absolues du'un souverain aussi injuste qu'imprieux!'
Against this Maupeou convinced Louis XV in 1771 to
exert his fullest prcrogatives in abolishing the venal sruct-
ure of the parlements, thus violating the fifth fundamental
law; the same happened in 1776 when Turgot pursuaded Louis
XVI to sanction the dbulition 0± the guilds and again in
1777 when Necker was allowed to dissolve the intendants of
finance. Maupeou's incursion, however, was the more serious,
threatening the whole delicate relationship between ruler and
ruled - "l'harmonie heureuse de notre constitution" 40, Cro
told Naupeou that he had made Louis XV "monarque Si absolu,
qu'il n'avait plus de bornes" 41• The,renau cle Morande, in
words reminiscent of Darigrand's, defined Maupeou's France
as, "...un stat, o'ii le prince a le droit de vie, et de mort
sur tous ses sujets, ou il est propritaire d toutes les
fortunes de son royaume..." 42, Reality was rather more
prosaic, but Morande described not so much the actuality as
the mythology of old regime politics, and people reacted to
Maupeou from Morande's assumptions. The principle Patriot
organ, the ournal Historiq , called Maupeou's reform a,
"renversement des lois fondamentales de l'tat", and saw
in it the potential for the dismantling of the corporate,
a8
Catholic, and customary structure or Lhe tegime	 This
period is described as the "authoritarian monarchy"
What is shown is a keen awareness of some sort of con-
stitutional basis for royal authority which both confirmed it
as absolute and limited it from being despotic. Maupeou's
breach of this nascent constitutionalism was the signal for
interest in a fully constitutional monarchy, and the failure
to achieve this was the central theme of Louis Xvi's reign
before the Revolution. Having examined the crown, we must
now move across our diagram to see how the various overlapp-
ing and parallel structures of administration worked and
interacted.
The Church was the oldest structure in the regime, pre-
dating the Frankish conquest, and was an important adminis-
trative adjunct to the monarchy. There were some 135 sees
and 35,000 parishes, though only 31,000 cures. Estimates
of the clergy ranged from 190,000 to 130,000, but all author
.ities agree that the numbers declined during the century,
dramatically 1766-70 when the Commission of Regulars closed
down lax convents and monasteries containing up to 9,000
celibates. The division between pastoral and non-pastoral
clerics was 70,000 : 60,000 '. Administratively the Church
operated at the diocesa.i level, with pastoral letters
instructing on matters which frequently infringed on the
civil sphere, and at the parochial level where instructions
on almost any aspect of local affairs could be delivered.
In the late century the government began to exploit the curt
as the most local agent of authority. The parish, ideally,
contained 500 souls whose needs were ministered to by a cure'
and a vicaire 46• There was, however, a chronic shortage of
curó's, as revealed by a grievance from Provence that several
communities no longer had enough priests to cope with
baptisms, marriages, confessions or burials, and that one
remote parish had not seen a priest for forty..years 	 An
inquiry into the constitutional position of the Church in
1751 confirmed a strongly Caesero-Papalist relationship with
the king, though only the absolutist Real saw fit to comment
on this 48
The social composition of the Church displayed the
sharpest divisions of the regime as a whole. The episcopate
was almost exclusively aristocratic under Louis XIV, but by
Louis XVI'S reign the bishops were more noble quantitatively
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and qualitatively, of the 99% noble composition only 24%
were from families of less than 100 years nobility
Further-more, those nobles entering the Church retained all
their privileges of the Second Order, and were known as the
clergy of the Second Order. The Church was the single most
effective bastion of aristocracy, and the episcopate, "hors
de pair dans i.e royaume"
	 The Church as landowner
defended the feudal structures remaining in society. On the
other side of an uxicrossable juridical divide were the curës,
one example of whose composition was 25% noble, 60% middle-
-class, and 35% artisan or laboureur 51, It is evident immed
iately that the middle-class was the back-bone of the pastoral
clery, and, as will be seen when we look at the Church's
political role
	 below,	 were an impoverished and
disenfranchised group.
	 -
The Court as known in the eighteenth century was a pro-
duct of Louis XIV'S reign, the "gilded cage" to keep the
nobility in check. This stereotyped image is partly modified
by Marznontel's analysis of two separate societies within the
palace, one displaying all the extravagance, vices, and
ambition generally associated with the Court, but the other
an uppublicised world of hard, unremitting, but rewarding
labour z2 The real interest in the late century passed to
• those who were trying to break down the Court and return the
nobility to the provinces. The Court was a world all of its
own with its own career structure from young courtier to
colonel via the regiments attached to the King's Household,
and from Great Officer of State to minister. The Great
- Officers of State enjoyed the privilege of communicating
directly with the king, and accordingly could influence
ministers and measures; this was to become tLnexpectedly
important under Louis XVI with political battles being waged
around the Grand Chamberlainship in 1775 and a mismanagement
of high office by the Inspector General of Coasts in 1777
• Moving down to the provincial level, the governors and
their deputies had several military and administrative
functions, more in the peripheral than continental provinces
the map of the gouvernements (qv.)	 is a more
exaggerated version of the geo-economic map. Although it
was a subject of some dispute, the internal police force,
the marchausse (mounted constabulary or marshalcy) came
under the jurisdiction of the governor. This force was
.2;o
largely composed of army veterans and was efficient but
pathetically inadequate, there being only 3,883 of them
throughout the kingdom 	 Although the most important,
the marsha].cy was only one of many police forces. Troops
undertook many of the larger tasks, such as escorting grain
convoys and controlling crowds. -The various courts maintained
staffs of serjeants whose tasks infringed on policing. In
the seigneurie some aspects of public safety, such as the
control of wolves, were the responsibility of the seigneur,
though this was a sharply declining role in the eighteenth
century. The General Farms, finally, maintained their own
police to control customs and excise, and to catch smugglers.
The States General and provincial will be dealt with in
their entirety in a separate chapter, but it should be noted
here that they were providing the most comprehensive alterna-
tive system of administration
It was the parlements, however, which attracted the most
public attention, because they had their focal point in
Paris. The parlement of Paris had three functions: to be,
firstly, the Court of Peers, in which capacity the peers sat
in the Grand Chamber as counsellors, and matters pertaining
to the peerage could be judged. The parlement, secondly, was
the final court of appeal. Thirdly, the parlement was the
depositary and interpreter of law, in which capacity it had
the prerogative of regiz3tcrirag royal ecicts (but only eilcts),
of issuing remonstrances, and of debating and issuing rulings
on "grands objets ". The process of registration was mostly
concerned with checking new legislation against old to
prevent inconsistency, and only a very few measures received
more than the briefest attention.	 -
The procedure for remonstrance was for a committee to
examine the edict in question, and prepare a resolution with
two alternatives for debate. In the debate speaking was in
order of seniority, giving the youngest and mcst junior magis-
trates the last word. If remonstrance was decided on, the
first president had to draft the protest himself and deliver
it to the king. (Usually this was a hasty and tense occasion,
involving only a few people, but Louis XVI sanctioned the
full panoply of a Grand Deputation of magistrates travelling
to Versailles for an audience with the king). Normally the
government rejected the remonstrance, and issued jussive
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letters to force registration. If the parlement refused to
acquiesce and reiterated its remonstrance the crown brought
its full weight to bear on the court in a lit de justice.
In the lit de justice the king or a viceroy, with ministers
princes and peers, would address and instruct the assembled
chambers; the matter usually rested there. If more protest
followed, the government replied with lettres de cachet
exiling the recalcitrant magistrates and setting up	 ad
hoc machinery to cope with the situation, as in 1754 or
1771 56
The parlement's structure varied according to its func-
tion, but the important chambers were the Grand Chamber,
various criminal law chambers, three Chambers of Inquests,
and two Chambers of Requests. The parlement's counsellors
controlled their offices through "survivance ("la soeur
cadette de la venalit"	 whereby an officer could will his
post to whomsoever he desired, either at his death or during
his lifetime. This autonomy of office was so compelling an
idea that it began to creep into almost every post before
the end of the seventeenth century, the provincial govern-
ment posts had established a tradition of survivance by the
late eighteenth) 58•
Magisterial office prices fluctuated over the century
No one parlement can be representative, but the history of
prices in Bordeaux sex.ves to i11usrate prices and the rnirket
forces operating on them. Between 1710 and 1734 prices
doubled, from 1734-1770 they fluctuated around this level,
but were halved by Maupeou's reform, and were depressed by
the policy of more aristocratic recruitment in the late
century. In 1774 a provincial counsellorship would cost
around 20,0001. The political importance of an office went
in inverse ratio to its value, because of the fear of exile
or confiscation. Presidences tended to cost four or five
times more than counsellorships. In theorythe venality
of office did not affect the entrance qualifications (age
and training), but in practice magistrates tended to enter
the courts underage through familial patronage, and to gain
legal experience only when in office. There was still
plenty of room, however, for advocates to work their way
up the legal profession and buy their way into the chambers.
By the eighteenth century all offices in the sovereign
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Courts were ennobling, thus ensuring that no nin need be
judged by his juridical inferior
	 .y the mid-century
some 100,000,0001. were tied up in offices, and this level
•of capital was maintained 60, though transferred after 1774
from counsellorships in the parlements to King's Secretary-
ships. The power these offices gave was enormous, to the
point of effectively limiting the monarchy. The parlements,
Snac de Meilhan commented, played the right role for the
wrong reasons 61,
Dependent upon the crown were the "gens du roi", the
advocate(s)-general, procurator(s)-general, and clerk(s) of
the court. Most important of all, the first president
was a royal nominee. Almost without exception the 'king's
men' identified with the magistracy as a whole, and at best
the government could hope to use them as informal channels
of communication. The advocates formed a separat& corporation
independent of both crown and parlement, and were the group
who bridged the gap between nobility and bourgeoisie. In
all there were some 2000 lawyers associated with the pane-
ment of Paris and, some 1,100 1ite of counsellors across
the kingdom. These were the single most aware and active
members of the political nation. Below the men associated
directly with the parlements came the "bourgeoisie de robe",
• defined and studied by Dawson, these fell into four cate-
gories: notary, procurator, advocate, and judge, the two
latter of lower courts • These were the 'iangers-on" of the
legal profession, susceptible to political and economic
vicissItude, and who tranformed themselves into the Revolu-
tionary Siite 1787-9 62,
Separate but dependent on the parlement were the Courts
of Aids, Accounts, and Moneys, which dealt with cases of
fiscal appeal. These courts were generally in decline in
the century, although the Court of Aids began to reassert
itself after 1750, and under Malesherbes (first president
1750-71, 1774-5) it did much to alert public opinion to the
abuses in old regime administration. Below the provincial
level came the mass of lower courts bailiwick, seneschal,
provostal, consular tribunals (dealing with commerce), con-
stabulary courts (dealing with local criminal of fences), and
courts covering specific jurisdictions such as the admiralty
courts or the tribunals of the waters and forests. At the
lowest level was the seigneur's jurisdiction over the feudal
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rights in his demesne, which could impinge on civil or even
criminal law. Separate but independent of the parlements
were the Grand Council and Presidential courts, a structure
of non-venal officers directly under the control of the
Chancellor. It was of no real relevance to the adininistra-
tion of the regime, but its inclusion in our diagram is
required both because 1768-70 and 1774-89 it was deliberately
maintained as a possible substitute for the parlement if it
vent on strike, and because it became regarded as the
potential foundation for a reformed judiciary, and because
there was a growing trend towards the recruitment of inten-
dants from it.
The inspiration for reform from the Grand Council and
Presidial courts was realised in full under Maupeou, when it
was hoped to bring in the peers to create the structure of a
Chamber of Peers in Paris and Superior Councils in each
province. This was only partially implemented 1771-4, but
even so it formed a distinctive phase of the monarchy, the
"authoritarian monarchy" 64
We next come to the heart of the monarchy, the conciliar
and provincial structures finalised by Colbert. Directly
beneath the king were the four Secretaries of State (five
1763-80) who directed the Departments of State. The Control
General was not, theoxetically, a Department of State, but
for all practical purposes it can be treated as one and the
Controller General had all the political competence of a
Secretary of State. The princip council was the Council
of State (or conseil d'en haut) known to contemporaries as
"the Council" which was analogous to the British cabinet, and
was run by a prime minister 1726-43, 1774-81, 1787-8. The
king in Council was the highest legislative, executive, and
judicial authority. Louis XV allowed himself to follow only
policies approved by a majority on Council, but Louis XVI
relegated the institution to a consultative function. It
is difficult to attribute specific competence to the Secret-
aries and their Departments because of the confusion in the
system, a confusion whose resolution was one of the themes
of ministerial politics in the late century, but generally
the competences of the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, the
War Office, and Admiralty were self-evident, while the
Secretary for the King's Household regulatedthe Court and
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capital, and the Controller General dealt with all fiscal
matters. Each of these five men supervised a fifth of
the generalities and each had various other spheres to deal
with which did not readily fit into a category. (Bertin
was unofficially Secretary of agriculture and communications.)
Below the Council came the councils of: Dispatches
(Dpches) which dealt with the intendants, of Finances (also
known as Conseil de Direction) which dealt with taxes and
public works, and the Private Council (conseil prive'or
consei]. des parties) which was a court of executive appeal.
The councils controlled a mass of bureaux which were directed
by masters of requests. The conciliar system was the heart
of the administrative or absolute monarchy
	 not only
because of the flow of information to the king and the con-
sultative and deputising influence on authority from the
crown, but also because of the fiction they preserved of a
limited monarchy obeying fundamental laws. Zaurepas presented
an eloquent defense of the system: "L'habitude d'un conseil
te l'ombre du despotisme, c'esta dire de l'arbitraire d'un
seul. Elle prsente au citoyens lses un ressource contre
l'oppression d'un ministre que craindra les plaintes qu'on
aurait droit d'addresser'a d'autres que lui. Elle met,
finalement ce ministre en considération pour ne pas proposer
des ope'ations ses confrres pourraient critiquer en presence
du souverain"	 . This was a vei)cd attack on Maupcou, and
what Maurepas was saying was that the coup d'etat of 1771
was made possible only by a partial break-down in the con-
ciliar system.
There is evidence for a definite change in the nature of
• the councils between the time of Maurepas's first period in
• office (1716-45) and his second (1774-81). Under Louis XIV
ministerial posts were becoming susceptible to survivance
like any robe office - Maurepas himself assuming ministerial
off ice at the age of fifteen while the 1750.'s and 1760's
saw the triumph of patronage over patrimony. The Private
Council became wholly dependent on ministerial patronage 67,
The important appointments, therefore, became the secretarial
posts, whose policies were rubber-stamped by the politically
committed councils. By the 1770's the rrivate Council,
"...a l'apparance de d6cider de tout, mais dans le vrai, il
ne fait qu'approuver ce que proposent les ministres" 68
Louis XVI was to succeed only in replacing ascendant 'minis-
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ters with prime ministers by 1789.
Below the councils and ministers .came the intendants,
"par excellence l'homzne du roi et de son Conseil" 69, Ever
since Tocqueville reinforced Law's comment, "Believe it or
not, the French kingdom is ruled by thirty intendants. Your
parlements, States, and governors simply do not enter into
the picture" 70, historiography has accepted the predominance
of theintendant. The most definite recent statement of this
belief is Sagnac's of the administration 1763-70. "Les
-	
,	 ,intendants des generalites sont des hommes devoues, travail
leurs, pSntre desnouvelles ides d'utilitsociale ou
meme des doctrines economiques que leur ont inculquees les
physiocrates et los philosophes. Leurs bureaux, aux chef s
lieus des generalites , sont a cette date, bien organises,
pouvus cl'un personnel hierachis, sous les ordres d'un
scrStaire gë'riral a demeure, blanchi sous le harnais, gui
sconde l'interidant, le supple 'a l'occasion, et qui corres-
pond avec les nombreux subd14ue des villes seondaires de
la geralite'. A cette eoque, le systrne monarchique est
parvenu, dans les provinces, 'a son apogee. C'est wi mecan
isme au rytbme re'ulier que se perfectionne, d'ailleurs
entre les mains d'un Turgot ou d'un Caumartin, tant mis
en mouvement par une juste intlligence des besoin de la
• socit6, et non plus par la seule routinelt 7l
The intendant's . duties were defined by Ral to
maintain harmony, law and order, to keep the government inforiir
ed of the state of the province, to represent its interests,
to ensure that justice, administration, and taxes were run
equitably, to act as a local appeal judge, and to uphold
religion and mores 72• With more of an eye 10 administrative
detail, historians had added; poor relief, public works,
food and prices, militia, municipal government, parish admin
istration, liaison with local institutions, supervision of
the detail of fiscal administration, public health, veterin-
ary services, agricultural research and development, commerce,
anufacturing,. communications, dissemination of governmental
r technical information, and acting as a local ombudsman
These two lists, however, reflect the intendant a the height
of his power, prior to 1750; in the second half of the cen-
tury several changes occurred in the nature of the post.
The emphasis began to shift from the intendant douri to the
subclelegate as the generality became more a bureaucracy and
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less a royal commission, and the intendant became the
province's representative at Versailles. These trends are
confirmed by both Ardasheff and Bordes in their studies of
the intendants . A third trend in the post was away from
its political attributes towards its legal competence as an
appeal judge for cases arising out of administration
This last function recognised that the intendant was still a
magistrate as a master of requests, and in general the masters
of requests began to identify more closely with the parlement
than the crown 76	 -
• One special area of administration was that of Paris
which enjoyed a unique system. The city was run by a lieut-
enant of police whose powers were a cross between those of
a minister and an intendant. Paris in effect had a separate
Department of State sub-divided into bureaux with a separate
police force. The areas the administration concentrated on
• in the late •
 century were s food distribution, public health
engineering (including Street lighting), and political con-
trol of the populace. Food distribution was largely well
run, but the failures of 1775 and 1789 were spectacular.
Political control was efficient in ordinary times, but
• failed to cope with emergencies. Illegal assembly, the
carrying of weapons, and censorship of newspapers were well
• controlled, but the fundamental problem of economic distress
and political discontent - sometimes exploited by parlement
or the Palais Royal - lay beyond the scope of the most corn-
prehensive system of spies or informers fl.
The recruitment of intendants was a political subdivision
of the wider social problem of the recruitment of the magis-
tracy (see below). Intendants were exclusively recruited
from sovereign courts, either from the masters of requests
or Grand Council. In the late century 80% of intendants had
passed through the parlernent of Paris, but this figure had
declined from Louis XIV'S time. Nonetheless there was a
strong feeling that the intendant was an outsider from the
capital imposed on the province. Gruder has found that only
19% of late century intendants were following their father's
careers, as opposed to 50% in 1700; thus survivance was
dying out by default in this area. This falling of f of
dynastic interest in the post reflects its decreasing desir-
ability as its political role changed. The intendant was
falling between the two stools of the renascent local mag-
nates and corporations and the development of the subdele-
gate; the Espion Dvalis wrote, "Les subd&gue en France
78se trouvent dans le fait les veritables intendants' 	 • The
famous intendants of the late century only served to rein-
force this observation, Turgot as a supersubdelegate or
Etigny as a stand-in for the absent governor (Richelieu).
Furthermore, the recognised career structure of intendant
to Secretary of State was under pressure by the late century,
the intendant was facing for the first time the prospect that
had always faced the subdelegate, that his first promotion
would be his last in a job that would have to be its own
reward.
• The late century saw a mounting campaign of hostility to
the intendants to some extent based on a decay of the instit-
ution towards the abuses of other branches of administration.
These abuses included: appointment by patronage, shorter
training period, closer connections with the province com-
promising loyalty to the crown, younger appointments, and a
relaxation of the regulations meant to move the intendant
around from one province to another. The intendant was
following in the footsteps of the gouvernement's staff, and
his change of role from the extirpater to the perpertrater
of provincial abuse was a decisive one for the regime in the
countryside. Borde shows how even under Louis XV the inten-
dant consistently lost ground to local institutions, added
to this the duke of Burgundy's circle's criticisms, rein-
forced by Mirabeau, were being taken increasingly more
seriously. In 1756 Goudar accused the intendant of derelic-
tion of duty in agriculture, and in 1765 Argenson's papers
portrayed the intendant as a viceroy under whose administra-
tion the people had been alienated from the government and
decay had ravaged the countryside 	 The physiocrats had
won over several intendants to their way of thinking but
generally it was the other local authorities who gave them
the greater help.
The attack on the intendant under Louis XVI expanded to
include the personnel. The appointment of Terray's nephew
as intendant of Moritauban in 1773 was an archetype of abuse
founded on nepotism, compounded by inexperience, the waiving
of most regulations, and incompetence 80, The previous year
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Aubusson had laid the foundations for the-later attacks on
the post, accusing the intendant of playing God in his
generality and passing consistently partial judgments. He
expressed surprise that people were prepared to tolerate so
abusive a system 8l Bachaumont was constantly reporting
anecdotes about the personal vices of intendants, as were
other periodicals to a lesser extent. The strongest
attack on the intendants came from the Espion D4va1is who
still -interpreted the intendant as the "key" of govern-
ment 82 Of the thirty-three intendants in 1782, only ten
were of any worth, "Tous ont ou l'esprit tortu, ou une
inapplication, lejeet, pre'somption, insolence, id6es
gauches, etc. pires qu'une nullite'absolue". He described
the existing generation of provincial administrators as
"lost", and could hope only for a long-term change in recruit-
ing policy. He analysed each intendant and his faults, usir
such terms as "brute", "incapable", "imbecile", "abhorrarit",
"idiot", "rogue", or "inexperienced" 83 This attack was the
finale to Necker's offensive against the intendant, and the
robe in general 84, and demonstrated how low the esteem of
the intendant had fallen. Yet up to 1787 the intendant,
however discredited, remained the primary agent of royal
authority in a majority of the provinces.
•	 Taxation was the principal concern of the councils and
•	 the intcndantz, and under the Contrl General, by 1788, came
thirty-eight bureaux containing 256 men 85, to whom the sub-
structure of elections, generalities, and subdelegations were
responsible. Prior to 1776 a hierarchy of venal officers
controlled the flow of money up to the Treasury based on the
election, the administrative unit prior to the generality.
Although there was intent to fiscal reform under Turgot, it
was not until Necker's Direction General that the amateur
officer began to be replaced by the salaried bureaucrat.
The lu collected taxes through a council, "urie compagnie de
bourgeois ignares", who were supposed to negotiate with
parish assemblies for the highest viable amount of taxation
86 Both systems were breaking down by the eighteenth cen-
tury, and needed all the help the generality's administra-
tion could give them. The taxes vere the taille, the
"tribut ordinaire", which was levied on people from medieval
tax rolls in the continental provinces, and in the periphery
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on income from land from up-to-date tax rolls - respectively
the taille personelle as opposed to taille r4iie, while both
observed privilege the latter tended to be less abusive 87,
the capitation which was founded in 1695 and was the first
attempt at fiscal reform, was a poll tax based on twenty-
two classes each paying n appropriate tax, but the privi
legies managed to opt out of the tax, and after Machault's
failure to make it universal 1749-51 it decayed into an
adjunct of the taille 88; the twentieth which was based on
Vauban's plan for a "dlme royale", a 10% tax on income, was
a sporadic tax imposed to pay for the wars of the century,
and re-ratified by the parlement every four years, (from
the Seven Years' War onwards there were always two twentieths
in operation); this tax had a separate and more efficient
machinery of assessment 89, (The respective contemporary
British names for these levies were: land'tax, poll-tax,
and twentieth penny 90),
These above taxes were direct, but the indirect taxes,
customs and excise, internal customs, colonial taxes, and
taxes on salt and tobacco, had been hived of f to private
enterprise. This private sector was run by, "a syndicate
of financiers", organised into five General Farms, who con-
tracted to pay the government a fixed sum from the taxes
raised. (It was these General Farmers who formed the back-'
bone of the "Financiers", that is those :hcse vested inter-
est in finance made them powerful in politics) 91, By the
end of the regime some sixty tax farmers employed 30,000
people (the largest single group outside the Church or
army) to collect 250,000,0001. The tax farms were more
tightly organised than the royal bureaucracies, and were not
so fragmented at the centre, but to offset this the farms
were devolved into each province with far more competence
at this level than the direct taxation agencies. The inter-
nal customs barriers divided France between-those directly
subject to the tax farms, those "reputed foreign", and those
"foreign". Each area paid a varying sum, from the heaviest
burden at the centre to a redemption (don gratuit) paid by
Languedoc to keep all tax farmers out of the province. The
repeated failure to reform this irksome and abusive system
was a microcosm of the failure of reform in general 92
The Gabelle, the salt tax, was similarly organised with
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the economically and politically powerful periphery able to buy off
this tax, while the continental provinces suffered a crippling bur-
den from it. (Salt was a vital necessity for the mass of the pop-
ulation who depended on it to preserve perishable foods) 	 The
Gabelle is like Norande's or Sade's political commentaries in that
it allows us to see the regime's political mythology in action. The
peasant reacted to society not in term's of Turgot's vision of a free
market economy as the means of solving France's ills, but in terms of
real or imaginary injustices reaching down to him. The motive force
of the jacqurie was abuses and fears magnified out of all proportion.
As an example of this mythology and these fears we can look at a
reconstruction of Revolutionary street drama, where the Gabelle is
portrayed in its most melodramatic light as the single harshest, most
abusive, and cruellest of the regime's impositions. In one recon-
struction, a, "...salt- merchant claimed to own the sea. Also he had
it guarded by brigands". He is drowned by a peasant woman trying to
take some fish and salt water for a stew. n another even more em-
otive scene a peasant tries to write out "Gabelle" in the petition of
grievances for the States General using a handkerchief, a freshly
plucked feather, and his own blood for writing materials. He is
cheated oven	 fhis redress by hia own illiteracy and by the curd's
abrogation of his rights
Other taxes were the seigneurial dues, which, though not necess-
arily heavy, were particularly immediate and irksome. In the Garonne
region Forster has found that they accounted for only 5% of landed
revenue 95. An adjunct to feudal dues were the banalities, whereby
the seigneur monopolised milling, grape-pressing, or baking in the
seigneurie. This privilege was sometimes contracted out to townsmen,
and. the proceeds taken out of the countryside altogether.
The Church still possessed the right t. take its tithe from the
peasantry. This tax was not always so universally applied or so on-
erous as its name implied. Other taxes paid by commoner land owners
were occasional impositions such as 'lods et ventes' (paid on prop-
erty transfers), the 'cens' (quitrent), or the 'marc d'or' (paid by
a commoner buying noble land). Specific taxes were levied on the in-
habitants of the domaine royale.
	 -
A final subdivision of the royal bureaucracy was the RJgie
Gnrale, which swept in all the odds and ends left over from other
structures. All old regime fiscal administration shared the vices
of links with vested interest - very close links with the
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Court in the case of the General Farms, of accounting
chaos with no budget and book-work two years in arrears,
and institutionalised abuse beyona any ability to reform
it . Furthermore, in the provinces the cumbersome struc-
tures of fiscal privilege allowing one region monopolies
over another were fiercely defended by the local commercial
middle-classes who benefited from them, thus preventing any
unity of interest emerging in this group before 1787
The course of eighteenth-century finances was stormy
starting with the collapse of Law's system of paper currency
backed by colonial commerce in 1720. This was followed by
the economic recovery of Fleury's period, which created an
oasis of solvency. The European and colonial war of
Austrian Succession 1741-8 exhausted the Treasury and
forced firstly, the unsuccessful experiment by Machault to
raise taxes and attack fiscal privilege, and, secondly, the
appointment of Controllers General friendly towards vested
financial interest 98• The Seven Years' War l756-63 caused
the total depletion of cash and credit and the appointment
of a succession of Controllers General whose sole task was
to find some solution to approaching bankruptcy. Their
approach was either economic or political Invau, Turqot,
and Necker believed the answer lay in pushing through long-
term economic reform in the face of short-term political
opposition, relying on evenl-ual solvency. The problem her'
was that credit dried up and the Court became hostile at
the first hint of reform; Invau fell at the financial
hurdle, while Turgot fell to the Court opposition. Laverdy,
Terray, Clugny, Taboureau des Reaux, and, again, Necker (w1
believed in trying every option simultaneously) preferred
to create an environment of financial credit in the hope
that if politics were correctly managed the finances would
look after themselves. This approach was both more realis-
tic and more successful; Terray was the only Controller
General of the late century to even appear to halt the
slide towards bankruptcy. Laverdy fell to an unforeseeable
change in the economic climate, Terray because of Louis Xv's
death, Ciugny because of his own death, Taboureau because
of competition from Necker, and Necker, finally, fell
because of the financial problems of the War of American
Independence and his attempt to foist a budget on the
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regime through his 'Compte Rendu'
Cogent analyses of French finances can be found in the
papers of the British embassy. Lord Harcourt had established
close relations with Choiseul and Bertin; he reported a
conversation with the former who had explained the options
open to Terray in February 1770, "The Controller-General may
by a bankruptcy , raise the revenues to be equal to the
King's expenses; but he (i.e. Choiseul) foresaw that if the
Ring should hereafter happen to stand in need of a loan,
nobody would ever advance a livr upon the public faith".
In June 1771 Lord Harcourt analysed Choiseul's financial
record, "...to the general corruption and want of economy
that have prevailed here of late years. The Duke of
Choiseul was supposed to have a very moderate knowledge
of the finances: his chief attention being turned towards
the means of gratifying his own ambitious pursuits. The peo-
ple on whose skill and knowledge he chiefly relied frequently
proved unworthy of the confidence he reposed in them and
the very frequent changes of controller generals, occasioned
as frequent alterations in the system of finances, as each
Controller General adopted some favourite scheme of his own.
Thus the debts and distresses of government have been
gradually increasing since (the Seven Years' War)". A final
crushing remark came in March 1774, the "evils" of finan-
cial mismanagement, "...are so deeply rooted in this
country, and depend upon such a variety of causes, that
one may fairly say they do not admit of a cure" 100 This
remark is so crushingly accurate because the period after
1763 saw the regime struggling to avoid breaking the basic
rules of public finance accounting, namely the paying of f
of loans and interest charges an the paying of salaries fran
new loans instead of from revenues. This set up an accelera-
ting slide towards indebtedness which could only be solved
by declaring a state bankruptcy. The problem was that once
a bankruptcy had been declared no loans could be raised, which
meant that all the regime's commitments would have to be met
from its immediate revenues. The changes and reforms required
to achieve this were so frightening and far-reaching that
muddling through towards inevitable disaster seemed pre-
ferable. Turning this round, reformers who proposed schemes
to make the regime self- sufficient on its Revenue Account
could never defeat the combination of vested interest and
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apprehension it raised up.
A problem of eighteenth-century administration, which
made itself most felt in finance, was the lack of an institu-
tionalised bureaucracy. Necicer was the first minister to
begin building machinery which would function automatically
irrespective of political changes or the quality of
personnel. On a higher level the same line of thought lay
behind the plans for a mechanistic monarchy.
Fiscal reform was the single most urgent task facing
the regime, but it remained the most difficult. The regime
could not hope to balance its books while some of its
poorest subjects were paying up to 50% of their income in
taxes 101 By the late century 4,500,000 of the poorest
families were paying the bulk of direct taxes 102, Noheau
described the taille as the worst of all possible taxes
because it fell most heavily on those least able to pay,
and could be most easily avoided by those best able to
pay it 103, The most obvious solution was the implementa-
tion of Vauban's dime royale, but an impenetrable nexus of
vested interest - Nay's "Nur d'Argent" - stood between the
taille personelle and the d'me royale 104, There was a
host df other schemes for reform 1.05, but destructive criti-
cism of the tax farms was easier and less demanding. From
Darigrand's 'Anti-Financier' in 1764 to Nalesherbes's Court
of Aids remonstrance in 1775, Glnnires could commnt,
"Apre avoir examine"les diffrents projets sur la rforma-
tion des finances, on n'y trouve que de vaines dc1aznations
contre les Fe'miers Gneaux..." 106, The point the defainers
of the tax farms were making was that corruption, privilege,
and inefficiency reresented apoolof wealth which if
released, by a process Necker labelled "bonification" 107,
could solve all the regime's problems. This bred a fatal
complacence, and the longer reform was delayed the greater
store was set by this eventual panacea. This. complacence
was expressed in PuysSgur's observation that while everyone
recognised the need for reform, no one recognised its urgency
or scope 108• The other side of this coin was the sense of
permanence and stability experienced in the regime, a
sense which pervaded all commentators 109,
Even at the time some dissenting voices doubted that
the privileged classes were in reality escaping all fiscal
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obligation. Letrosne believed that by the time taxes had
been paid by tenant farmers, fiscal privilege only cost
the Treasury 4,000,0001. on the tail].e (or 1% of an official
estimate of revenue) 110 Behrens has found that the
French nobility was the most heavily taxed in Europe; this
is confirmed by Meyer in Brittany, and in Languedoc Forster
quotes a tax bill of 8% on noble income
	 Privilege,
furthermore, was not absolute, and was not always exercised.
A case in question arose in Auvergne in Nay-June 1775, when
local people sequestered a knight of St. John's property
against a debt of 300,0001. While the Order could claim
absolute legal immunity, "...il faut donc concilier ces
mmes loix (ie. local civil jurisdiction) avec nos privi
1ges particuliers" 112, Ne are left with the paradox that
the privi1gii loudly announced exemptions, which might
occasionally be glaring, but which were
and were non-existent compared with other European countries,
It came easier to be hated for privilege than to admit that
there was no cause of this hatred.
We come finally to the plans for a mechanistic monarchy.
This wc*. political theory unique to the 1770's and 1780's,
and only one small part of it was implemented before the
Revolution. This "institution" is explored in depth in chapter
V below. Itsessential element was the construction of an ad-
ministrative machine based on: rationality, checks and balances,
devolved (partly democratic) power, and. a career of talents open
to all. The machine would be self-regulating, and would reflect
in administration the physical universe described by Galileo or
Newton. The king would play the role of hereditary president of
the executive - having powers analogous to the U.S.A's president.
Sovereignty would reside in some national assembly. An able king
could lead and direct the administration very positively. The
system would fully mobilise France's resources while eradicating
abuse and. injustice. It implied more a reorganisation of the
political nation than an expansion of it.
In the practical politics of the regime positions were de-
fined by the process rather than the content of political activity.
This was demonstrated above all by Naueou. where the process
compromised all the reforming intent of 1771-4. The mechan-
istic monarchy sought to establish a basic political content
beyona the reach of day to day political activity. The
crucial change in thinking was a new role for the king as
hereditary president of the executive. One very distinctive
feature of this new system was an institutionalised career
structure bringinq talent up from the lowest to the highest
level; no where else did the regime have any concept of a
career of talents 113
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An inform1 structure of administration, which had
attracted attention, is that by notables. The government
resorted to this system in 1787 when Calonne convoked an
assembly of notables; it proved a bitter disappointment
by calling for the States General 114 A detailed study
of the origin and function of government by notables was
made by the Ephecnrides in a eulogy of Sully 115, thus this
type of administration was part of the regime's political
currency. The idea of an informal structure of administra-
tion in the provinces remained alluring, and the term
"notable" occurs in the writings of most provincial reformers.
As far as the concept of administration by notables can be
tied down, it was informal co-operation between the intendant
and the seigneurs, though it also has implications of admin
I	 - .	 .istration through an "elite" (see below) without reference
to formal office or status.
The political dominance of nobility in the late century
was absolute in that the nobility and the political nation
were almost identical. The only significant exceptions were
small pockets of bourgeois municipal privilege which were
none too secure (see below Chapter'f ). From a political
point of vier, therefore, we need only concern ourselves
with the nobility in terms of social composition and rui.
Other groups, however, operated on politics in the background,
and require some preliminary account.
The middle-classes were the most integrated group out-
side the nobility, but were essentially apolitical before
the late 1780's. Their attitudes of respect for throne and
altar, belief in social structure, concern for marital
virtue and family life, and pursuit of money, careful manage-
ment, and stability made it impossible for them to be a
revolutionary group until the regime showed signs of collapse
and of threatening their every interest 1787-9. The Journal
Encyc1opcdigue distilled out a political message from 'Les
Causes du Boriheur Public' (Ablx^Gros de Besplas. 2 vols,
Paris 1774), a book directed to preserving the middle-classes
from philosophie, "La tranquillitepublique est la souveraine
101". Roustan places their intellectual position as a
narrower version of Voltaire's 116 Bosher concludes that
to call the middle classes revolutionary prior to 1789 is,
"...irreconcjlable with the evidence", and Cobban's advice
is to look to the aristocracy for the inspiration of all
'to
major old regime political activity - these observations are con-
firmed by Young's at the time 117. The problem the middle class-
es faced before the .evolution was that while they may have felt
an internal sense of identity, they had no external reality.
The middle classes were just any other commoners in the juridical
hierachy. The British embassy made only one direct political
mention of the middle class, when the Parisian commercial classes
were displaying extreme diseoant against Choiseul's and Laverdy's
mismanagement of the economy '°. It was still the commercial
back-bone of the regime, and ministries thought twice before an-
tagonising this interest. In the country-side, the Physiocrats
were advocating the development of a rural middle class of men
producing a surplus of food and trading in it to exploit the ben-
efits of a free market economy. The middle class, therefore,
firmed one of the objective realities of the regime. During the
century we will see their progressive disenfranchisement by the
anoblis, leaving it without any political voice.
If the middle-classes had no objective sense of identity,
the peasantry lacked even a subjective identity in the regime.
The peasantry was the fundamental "problem" of the regime,
and the problem whose failure to be solved ultimately des-
troyed the regime 119 This "problem" was caused by the
peasants' inability to produce a surplus of food or cash.
This led to high food prices, occasional shortages and
famines, lack of resources for agricultural improvement or
innovation, higher demands on government and charity while
rcvcnc :cr in slow but chronir d1ne, and the growth of
discontent arid despair among millions of economically depress-
ed peasants. The reasons behind this were varied, but the
single most important was the conservatism of the country-
side, whether caused by absentee land-lords who instructed
their çents to raise revenue to the exclusion of all other
considerations, or by the peasants' refusal to relinquish
their communal rights (eg. vaine pture or parcours) and
general structure of economically unviable small holdings.
This situation was made worse during Louis Xvi's reign by a
jurisprudential climate of opinion which heldthat this con-
servatism was socially desirable, and was the peasants'
bastion against exploitation by bourgeois or feudists 120
The peasant problem made itself felt in the 1770's by
rebellions jacquries - in 1773 and 1775 (see Appendices
1 and IX. Cro claimed to have heard the catch-phrase, "Les
chiens de laboureurs n'auront plus le dessus et les pauvres
indigents l'auront ieur tour" 121 - it was the laboureurs
whom Turgot hoped to use as the social base of physiocrat
reform. The regime defined the jacqurie as an "emeute", an
unarmed and unpremeditated attack on private targets, for
which the recommended punishment was exemplary executions
rather than mass arrests. The parlement of Paris put this
"1
attitude into operation in 1770 when it resolved to treat
leniently refugees from high grain prices, who had moved
into its jurisdiction, if they committed crimes as a result
of their plight l22• The commonest form the jacqurie took
was for an "attroupement" of peasants (of both sexes) to
invade the local market. There they would requisition the
foodstuffs and sell them of f at a low price, but then return
the money to the merchants; this was "taxation populaire".
In May 1775 the whole of Paris' was placed under a regime of
taxation populaire for a few days to reverse the effects
of physiocrat high grain prices. Violence was obviously
latent in such situations, but generally remained covert
unless the authorities offered resistance — which they rarely
did - or unless there was some specific score to be settled -
which there generally was. This was the last apolitical revolt
of the regime. Both Rud ' and Faure show that 1775 was the water
shed for peasant action in society. By 1789 the government re-
acted to any disaffection as ideologically motivated, and the
peasants for their part attacked what they saw as the causes
and not just the symptoms of their distress. In 1775 they comm-
andeered market stalls; in 1789 they burned the chateaux 123•.
The problem of the peasant was recognised at the time
and must be remembered as a constant background factor in
all political activity. In the preface to his political
history Regnaud explained to his future readers that the
economic straits of the peasantry reached up through society
and the economy to force expedients on the Control General
to find money where none existed, the failure of these
expedients caused political and ministerial instability 124•
Pursuing the same point 'Les Vues Sirnples d'un Bon Homme'
(anon. Paris 1775/6) warned that society would collapse from
the bottom upwards were the peasant problem not solved. The
• Mercure de France stated that the misery of the people was
•	 the greatest obstacle to reform l25 This last remark
reveals the cruel paradox of the political problem of the
peasantry: in order to initiate the firm administration
• and reforms needed to help the peasantry stable government
had to obtain, but stable government could not establish
•	 itself until the peasantry became prosperous thus affording
it a solid base for political and social action.
We must now return to the nobility. Here, in a socio-
logical sense, we face the problem of definition because pre
and post- Revolutionary methods of social analysis and cate-
I	 - I	 .	 .•__	 •	 ••_._ -	 ______i___s___•.
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analysis has been to place the liberal, capitalist,
revolutionary middle-class against the conservative, landed
aristocracy (supported by the monarchy), but this analysis
can not be supported by recent reappraisal of the late
regime l26 A number of new options are opened up;
the most basic suggestion, put forward by Mousnier, is that
we should take the old regime's juridical divisions at
their face value as the crucial factor, and political
behaviour in the States General would support this, particu-
larly the way that the clergy divided between noble and
commoner. Mousnier calls the nobility the only true Order
wit1 an internal sense of identity, and bound by bonds of
honour and of loyalty to the crown l27 This is useful as
a first step, but the breakdown of the system of Orders -
'where the nobles fight, the clergy pray, arid the people work
- without the development of a recognisable class-system was
the background to many obvious socio-political problems in
the late regime (as described by SiSys). In his study of
the problem Richet says that the society of Orders had
broken down by 1560, and that society divided up into lites
thereafter 128
The analysis of socicty by lites is taken up by Lucas,
who starts with the initial division between the vast
majority who had to work with their hands - even if only
by eç39 irg - and th minorily who did not have to. Within
this minority the division was between those who traded and
those who could live of f landed income, even if at one or
more removes. The trading elite was united by obvious econo-
mic interests. The landed 6iite was united by the land itself,
privilege as social superiority, and, by and large, a relativ-
ely recent origin. Another &lite was that of the professions
arms, law, medicine, or office-holding. In all these cate-
gories Lucas shows how the possession of nobility was irrele-
vant. The hobraux were a distinct pressure 'group of nobles
forced t work with their hands who were pressing to enter
the &ite of the profession of arms. Equally there were
bourgeois "vivant noblement" who had more in common with
the landed aristocracy than the urban middle-class, and con-
versely the anobli who continued trading shared the political,
social, and economic interests of the middle-classes. Within
this schema social mobility took the form of moving
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from trade to land, a process which might or might not go
hand in hand with the acquisition of nobi1it 129•
Lucas then states that by the end of the old regime the
differences between robe and sword had diminished to meaning-
lessness following on the major restructuring of society
under Louis xiv 130, This brings us to the one blind spot
in the analysis by lites, that neither Richet nor Lucas has
examined in any detail; how the concept of Orders reacted
against that of 6lites to try to give juridical force to new
social divisions, and bring them back into line with the old
regime's traditional classifications.
Lucas's analysis forces him to re-examine the crisis of
1787-9, and the conclusion he reaches is that the crisis was
political rather than social, ixtuuediate rather than chronic,
and that the bourgeoisie was made by the Revolution and not
vice versa l3l This analysis, however, of the old regime's
politics operating only at a juridical level applies to the
whole century, and it only shocked those 1787-9 who had been
brought into political life for the first time namely the
hitherto disenfranchised Third Order and cures. If we
return to the landed 1ite, those bourgeois members of it
must be accounted a submerged group in the old regime, wher
ever land is concerned with politics, eg. representation in
local States (see ChapterV ). Within an 1ite, therefore ,
theris the politically potent noble group and the sub-
merged roturiers - nowhere is this clearer than in the legal
profession where the noble counsellors dominate the mass of
legal bourgeois without necessarily denying them nobility.
In Linguet, the subject of Appendixll,we find a man at the
interface of submerged and enfranchised groups moving
through the regime at this level and reacting violently
against it. If we are to make any sense of the old regime's
politics, as opposed to its social and economic structure,
we must come back to the nobility as the one group that
matters. It was not till 1787-9 that people within the
regime challenged this concept and found it wanting.
A crucial element in the nobility's hold on politics was
its conservative view of society, which was accepted by all
but a few reformers and renegades. One aspect of this con
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servatism was sanction by antiquity; when hearing that
Seuier had defended the corvé'e because it waS, "consacre
par l'ancienriete",Horacewalpole exclaimed against such
abuses, "..thus the length of their pedigree renders them
respectable!" 132	 far more important aspect was Miro
mesnil's famous contention that, "Chacun (des) Ordres a ses
droits, ses privile'ges" 133, This contention led to the
belief that the interests of one Order could not be compared
or juxtaposed with those of another because political and
social activity should be internal to each Order. Follow-
ing on from this was a well thought-out rejection of
equality. The conventional late century position was given
by Chenaye Desbois, "Dans le droit naturel, les hommes
sont gaux; mais la force et la vertu ont fait les dis-
tinctions de la libertd et de l'esclavage, de la noblesse
et de la roture" 134, This account takes note of Rousseau
while arguing that social and moral factors invalidate him.
The standard philosophe interpretation of society was
Caraccioli's, "Les hommes par des distinctions souvent chime'-
riques et des prtentions encore plus ridicules, ont mis une
Si graride disproportion entre les uns et les autres, qu'on
les croirait presque d'une espce diffeente", but if
required by social function or sanctioned by antiquity, the
juridical divisions of society remained justified 135
a1mota1one wa the abbe' Jaubert's 'Eloce cle
la Roture' (London 1766), which looked back to a hypothetical
past when the monarchy had recognised the true worth of com-
moners and not allowed them to be oppressed by their privi
leged superiors. The gap between Jaubert and Sie"ys (both
abbots given a political training in the Church) was the
difference between political quietism and revolutionary
discontent. This discontent was itself generated by a hard-
ening of juridical barriers in the closing decades of the
regime. The need to stress old over new nobility was as old
as the institution itself, but in the late eighteenth century
it became translated intG action, especially apparent in
both theory and practice in provincial States 136, Over and
above this some writers believed that only by increasing the
number and rigidifying the structure of Orders could social
137stability be guaranteed	 . There was also some realisation
by the parlements that the juridical structure of society
could be harnessed to serve the regime's interests as a
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basis for institutional conservatism (see Chapter III).
Although theoretically undifferentiated, 'the nobility
was highly structured. At the top came the royal family
and Princes of the Blood, below them the peers, the Grands
d'Espagne, the ducs-non-pairs, marquises, counts, viscounts,
and barons. Baron was sp'cified as the lowest title needed
to sit in the Second Order of several local States. Below
baron came the untitled nobility. Courtesy titles in this
group were chevalier or 4'cuyer. These were the divisions in
rank - the divisions in time were primarily between the
nobility of race, whose origins were lost in the deeps of
time (or at least predated 1400), and the nobility of birth
whose nobility could be traced to some specific date after
1400. Within this latter category caine three further sub-
divisions: the first generation of nobility (ie. the man
who has bought an ennobling office) could call himself an
'anobli", his son could call himself "noble s', but only his
grandson could call himself "gentilhomme". Given roughly a
twenty-five year gap between each generation the great
grandson a century later would at last be eligible for the
fullest prerogatives of the Second Order such as preferential
treatment in the Church and army, a seat in the Second Order
in local States, or entry into the prestigious lay Orders
such as that of the Holy Ghost 138, This last division was
1arce1y an innovation of the late eighte :int-h century to cope
with the influx of 10,000's of new men into the nobility,
roughly doubling the nobility over the century to 400,000 by
1789. 139
The privileges shared by all nobles were: some fiscal
exemption, notably from the taille personelle, wearing a
sword, displaying a coat of arms, rights of hunting, fishing,
and game keeping, definite exemption from militia, road
building and billetting soldiers, preferential treatment in
law, in entry to approved careers, and in social relation-
ships (eg. special pew in church) 140, There were several
methods of acquiring a title, the most prestigious was by
direct order of the king, particularly for bravery in action.
Several careers, notably military and legal, led to auto-
matic ennoblement at a specific rank. A method which had
been made illegal in the eiqhteenth century, but which was
still practised, was to buy a noble estate, and take title
from that 141 This was the classic example of a "false
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title". A back-door method of certifying dubious or false
titles, which had to be given the full force.of law in
Corsica, was when twelve proven nobles signed affidavits for
the appropriate parlement that their protcg was himself
noble. (This was the established method of proving nobility
for the royal military sciool or for a Lay Order, accurate
documents being rare 142,) The commonest means of ennoblement
was by purchase of office, mostly in the law courts, but some
in royal or municipal administration. Municipal ennoblement
was a declining instituiori in the eighteenth century, as
against the politically safer King's Secretary (a sinecure)
which gained ground over the counsellorships and presidencies
in the sovereign courts. Necker's total of 4,290 ennobling
offices has been accepted as the most accurate estimate 143,
The problem of tensions within the nobility became acute
during the century. Neyer describes the King's Secretary as
the means of ennoblement, "...le plus connue, le plus moque',
le plus vi1ipend, mais aussi le plus sol1icit' et plus
efficace" 144, The diarists, journalists, and chroniclers
of the Parisian scene were forever recording anecdotes of
the gcc c.: qul.te (ie. Cou
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nobility of race, and those of the more recent nobility who
had managed to be presented at Court) or the militaires snub-
bing robins 145, At the same time the greatest tension of
all occurred where the anoblis separated themse1ve from th
middle-classes, and this was deteriorating during the century
146, Turgot's resounding phrase, "la tche de la roture"
illustrates this tension and gap 147, The.custom re-bridging
the gap between noble and commoner was derogation, which was
demotion from noble to commoner for behaviour unbecoming to
a noble. The classic cause of derogation was trading, (or
retailing after 1767), but this was a myth, the only publi
cised case of derogation in our period was one du Luc d'
Andilly, a Picardois militaire, who lost his title for cheat-
ing at cards in November 1778 148, Force des choses meant
that as the numbers of the nobility increased so the scope
of their activities widened, so that by the 1770's nobles
were dominating through direct involvement, or by providing
the necessary capital investment: metal industries, glass,
mining, civil engineering, shipping, and manulacturing 149,
Indeed by the end of the reciime there was a trend
towards the lite in every sphere becoming noble, thus
excluding the middle-classes entirely. We thus have a pro-
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gression from the British model of the nobility as a
peerage, to the early century's French model. of nobility
as aristocracy, to the late century's pointers towards
nobility as lite in the sociological sense 150,
Some remarks above tend to contradict the picture -
painted by Ford of the nobility as a socially and politically
unified group shoving a united front against Louis XIV'S
absolutism, a picture accepted by almost every subsequent
commentator 151, The explanation is simply that those
sharing this unity of outlook in 1715 continued to do so
throucth to 1789, but took pains to differentiate themselves
from the 200,000 or so anoblis of the century 152• w'iiile
the old distinctions were blurring - old robe and militaires
becoming differentiated only by function and no longer by
birth 153 - there were new ones coming in to replace them.
If Bluche can make out a case for continued upward social
mobility into the inagistracy, which is accepted across the
breadth of society 154, he does not necessarily prove that
these men were accepted with good grace by their new peers.
The nobility, however, can be taken as a single group as
the political nation, or "oligarchy of notabilities" 155,
Implicit in all contemporary writing was the know1edcic that
nobility gave entry to the political world as a birthright
156, Taking up the point reviewing Mably in 1776, the
Journal Encyc1opdique complained that the politicz1 nation
did not reach down to embrace those whose industry supported
it, thus presaging Sxeyes's lament that the Third Order
was everything but counted for nothing 157,
The essential problem for an eighteenth-century noble
was birth 158, but money could not be ignored. Money was the
prerequisite for political ambition and for any successful career-
without it he might never be presented at Court, he might
never receive a post or a pension, neither entertain patrons,
nor buy protege, nor equip a regiment 159, Within the
nobility fortune ranged from the fabulous in the case of the
house of Orleans to abject destitution among younger or
bastard sons 160 The norm of noble wealth was the small
well-managed estate which kept the family solvent but which
did not give scope for wider action in society 161, Of
great assistance to the nobility in general was the enormous
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rise in land values during Lhe century, caused by a land
famine, the spare cash to chase the land, and the need for
new building land around the expanding towns.
The robe was the wealthiest section of the nobility,
and its money came from two immediate visible sources:
the £pices, institutionalised bribes paid by both plaintiff
and defendant, and the office itself, which represented a
poolof capital to draw on in need. In his study of robe
money Bluche analyses three categories of vealths finance,
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marriage, and good management/resources. The first cate-
gory covered a wide range of investment and enterprise,
which ties in with Meyer's observation that the nobility in
general was beginning to dominate the economic scene. This
point, however, covers the bulk of robe wealth which was
tied up in land. This opens up two of the most important
problems of the late regime, that much land (and hence many
peasants) were managed by men who knew how to squeeze all
possible revenue out of their estates without being concerned
in investing capital or in technical improvement in return,
and that the robe was a major landed interest in its own
right thus extending its position in society from the towns
into the country-side 162• it was important, however, to
recognise that money was regarded wholly as a means to an
end by the nobility and neither as an end in itself nor as
any measure of moral worth 163
A discussion of society and the nobility must lead to
the phenomenon of the aristocratic reaction. The very con-
cept of this reaction, however, must be qualified by the
—nature of the regime in the late century and the effect that
Louis XIV'S restructuring of society had had a century
later. The Sun King's legacy was a social and political
predominance of the robe; Snac de Meilhan quoted one of
Louis XIV'S political maxims as, "...de ne confierl'exercise
du pouvoir qu' des magistrats" 164, In the seventeenth
century, and briefly again under Maupeou, the robe was used
as the principal agent of royal absolutism, but the periods
1715-70 and 1774-89 saw the magistracy itself evolving
towards a very different appreciation of its role. Inspired
by Montesquieu, the magistracy saw its role as that of limit
ing the monarchy through dominance of law and administration,
moving eventually towards the Venetian model eulogised by
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Gibbon as, "...wise and jealous aristocracy, which reduced
the doge to a pageant, and the people to a cipher" 165.
To understand this we should look to the EflCyciopdje's
definition of magistrate,which covered all those who were
involved in the conciliar administration, all involved in
the law courts (including the peerage), municipal adininis-
tration, and down through all administrative personnel to
the curd and seigneur 166w The magistracy, then, covered
all types of nobility and up to 1% of the population. The
failure of the regime to create a separation of powers meant
that the administration en bloc had to be regarded as part
of the magistracy - loyal to the crown, rather than its
own esprit de corps only by choice. Soulavie defined the
regime as dominated by fifty robe dynasties, "...et telle
tait la forme et la re"gularit des habitudes, qu'un esprit
juste suffisait pour conserver nos antiques institutions
intactes. Ces cinquantes families avait d'ailleurs, en
administration, un ton de timiditS et une crainte des
irinovatiorsqui. en conservait l'esprit" l67 This was an
important analysis which contributes much to our understand-
ing of the inertia which gripped the regime. Another
analysis of the robe's grip on society was made by Coqucreau,
"...par ses alliances avec la plus haute noblesse, par ses
relations avec les diverses Ordres de 1'tat, par ses membres
repondues dans chaque province du royaume (elle) forrait
de sa propre caiamitd une calamite"gé 'nra1e" (of 1771) l68
The most succinct comment was made by the Ephmeides refut-
ing Rousseau in 1767, "...les magistrats, cet stat Si
recommandable par la saintet de ses fonctions, qul ne doit
point 'tre un Ordre dans Ia socite puisqu'il en est 1'li€e,
par les lumires et par la droiture" 169• Finally, the
advocate-general of the parlement of Aix called the magis-
tracy, "Ce corps indivisible de la constitution salique,
essentiellement. charge du dp2t de la 101 du contrat entre
le peupl.e et le souvain ... le magistrat considere selon
toute l'tendue de l'expression, est un juge, pontife,
170legislateur..."	 -
The conclusion we must draw is that the robe was the
basic conservative force in society, the old regime's polit-
ical, social, and administrative bedrocJc. The most basic
socio-political theme of this study will be the attempts by
various groups or individuals to break this robin grip On
society, whether feudal magnates or middle-class radicals.
Conversely, the robe's political behaviour over the century,
from the claim to form an aristocratic senate to the preten-
sion to be guardians of a Rousseauist Social Contract, was
the attempt by an already dominant lite to retain its posit-
ion against attack. .The conventional interpretation of the
robe as a"liberal" force set against the "conservative"
monarchy creates far more problems than it solves; the kind
of political divisions and outlook it implies, also, are
inapplicable to the old regime. Equally unhelpful is the
suggestion still being made that the robe was a fifth column
of Revolution 171; any change in the status quo could only
harmthe robe. "La magistrature", writes l'thivier, "Se
dresse contre le courant du sic1e" 172 The true position
of the robe in society was described by Condorcet writing to
Turgot in the autumn of 1774. The recalled parlezpent would
block legal reform because the existing "cruel", "oppressive",
and "secret" laws benefited the judges' position in society
against the judged. No independent tribunal could be estab-
lished to act on grievances against the robe. Fiscal
reform and essential financial policy would have to be dropped
because of the power of parlementaire opposition. Ministers
would find public opinion inflamed against theni and reform
•vould be subverted. The government would then be seen to be
weak; impartial justice and administration would be abandoned;
the Frondeur, and gothic attitudes of the past would reappear;
and finally the robe would exploit its power to prevent the
militaires from challenging its position l73 This was an
extraordinarily important analysis which described the
pattern Louis XVI'S reign was indeed to take.
An aristocratic reaction has long been assumed for the
late eighteenth century 174, a reaction implying that common-
ers were excluded from posts in favour of nobles. For such
a reaction to have taken place, however, assumes that the
France of Louis XIV had not been aristocratic. This assump-
tion has been made on the basis of St.Simon's memoirs. More
recent research, however, has shown it to be a myth; both
Gruder for the masters of requests and Ravitch for the
episcopate have shown that the same groups of people were as
noble in the seventeeth century as in the eighteenth. Yet
to dismiss an aristocratic reaction is not feasible because
there is too much evidence that contemporaries were behaving
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as though an aristocratic reaction were taking place 175
The problem only unravels itself when we stop regarding the
aristocracy as a unified group sharing the same interests
and outlook and using the parlements as its spokesmen.
An illustration is the episode of a proposed "ariétocr-.
atic reaction" in the French Knights of St John. This	 -
shows not only the pressure for such a reaction, but also
shows how the regime was unable to satisfy it because of
a clash of interests within the aristocracy. During the
late 1760's opinion was canvassed around the knights on
changing the existing entry qualifications which, along with
all other such Orders, were 100 years or four generations
(on the male side) of nobility. The knightsin Malta sub-
mitted their own plan to the "justice knight", which would
have maant that future applicants would have to prove four-
teen quarterings or 200 years of nobility on both sides,
and furthermore prove that no ancestor had ever been a com-
moner. The avowed aim was to,	 ... portera l'avenira un
plus haut de"gr d''1evation la noblesse de vos membrea," and
"... de n'avoir dana votre corps que de la plus pure, et
same noblesse 176, (This phrasing i3 reminiscent of that
of the marquis de Crno1le in a letter to Choiseul in 1764,
asking for the officer corps to be composed of, " ... la par-
tie la plus pure de la nation ...
The justice knight was dotbtfu1 as to the viability of
the scheme, but his deliberations were overtaken by a veto
from Choiseul. This was on 14 December 1770 and Choiseul's
argument was that it was too importanta regu1tion to meddle
with and that the old regulations were the best of all poss-
ible regulations because they were the old regulations - a
classic old regime ploy 178, Choiseul never had an opportun-
ity to discuss the matter further, but the debate on the reg-
ulations in the Chapter of Provence fills in the social and
political background for us. The Chapter rejecte& the pro-
posals unanimously, but on grounds of political expedience.
The Chapter had noted a growing hostility towards its ex-
clusive ai3 privileged position from the parlement of Aix,
andit feared the introduction of any new measure which might
further antagonise the robe, who would, of course, have been
excluded from the Order by these regulations 179
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It is clear from the foregoing description of the regime
that the crown had lost the initiative after 1715. The last
years of Louis	 and the first years of Louis XVI saw a series
of attempts by the monarchy to regain this initiative within
ministerial politics. In the longer perspective, none of these
enjoyed success, and ie should look now at some of the salient
reasons for the monarchy's weakness vis-hvis its own political
system.
Firstly, the robe had ucurped the role of guardian of pout-
ical orthodoxy. This had the effect of isolating the monarchy
from the political process. From this position o± strength,
secondly, the robe's political culture after the mid-century ac-
quired a logic and evolution of its own:, best seen in the diss-
olution of the Jesuits 180 £his was an event of cultural signif-
icance, which seemed to undermine the Christian foundations of
the regime in the eyes of both phulosophes and de'vots. IL caused
a shock equalled only by the Revolution 181• This was because
the Jesuits had controlled the education of the young and. the con-
fessionals of the G-reat, and had been a leading force in the in-
tellectual world. Removing their guiding hand seemed to disarm
institutional religion i-n the face of attack by the: philosophes,
Jews, Protestants, and the niasses. What made this disarming so
shocking was the government's apparent connivance in it. Christ-
ian apologists felt that they could no longer see the Church as
an invulnerable bulwark. It encouraged phulosophes to believe
that an officially condoned demise of organised religion might
be at hand.
Following the dissolution, politics polarised between those
who had allied to destroy the Society, and its deferiders 182•
&ts latter group was in the political wilderness except for the
period 1771-4. The uneasy alliance of parlements and philosophes
dominated the 1760's under Choiseul's loose guidance. Philosophic
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became the cultural orthodoxy. 2wo elements of instability ex-
isted in tbis environment: the falling out of previous bedfell-
ows and the cycle of attack aria, counter-attack between dd'vots
and hoiseuiists in the ministries 1768-70. in this struggle
the wider interests of the regime were enlisted into day to day
factional politics. Politics seemed to be dominated by the pan-
ements in their pretension to be a force equal to the monarchy;
Choiseul generally received the blame for this style of politics
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During this period the magistracy set up the theory of the
unite des classes as a rival to the monarchy's absolutism.
hree quotations serve to sketch in the essentials of the theory:
Il n'est qu'un seul unique parlement de )?rarice divise' en plus-
ieurs classes absolument 'ga1es quant leurs fonctions, attributs,
droits, et prerogatives, et qul, sans preinence entre elles,
ne corina.issent qu'une mme onigine, un seul principe, Un centre
unique de la pensonne du seigneur roi" (panlement of Grenoble).
Unitdes classes "...ce corps indivisible de la constitution
saliq,ue, essentiellement charge' du dSpt de la loi, du contrat
entre le peuple et le sov'1.Ter9i." (pr1ement of Aix). "Ti
faut done un corps repre'sentant la nation; elle a choisi le
panlement..." (Darigrand) 184 Building on these constitutional
pretensions, the parlement of Paris issued this arr gt 7 January
1771 in extreinis; the court claimed competence over, "...la dir-
ection des faits par lesquels est police et entretenue la chose
publique (du) royaume, dont us sont les ministres essentiels
comme membres du corps dont (le roi) est le chef..." 185
One reason why the monarchy did not feel able to challenge
the magistrates within the normal framework of politics was its
financial weakness. Cobban quotes a figure of the national debt
being 93,000,0001. in 1774 rising to 300,000,0001. by 1789, but
a leak from the Control General in 1768 was summarised thus,
"Thus the debts and distress of goiernaent ha.r e been gradually
increasing since (the Seven Years !ar), and by the mismanagement
of Iji. de Laverdy while he was Controller General, the debts of
the crown, as I have been assured were increasej. to the amount
of 900,000,0001., which is considerably more than two years in-
come of the crown." 186• The structure of the nationa. debt,
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the structure of finance in general, and the added discourage-
ment of economic recession after 1768 all combined to ally every
vested interest against reform or experiment.
The .nlightenment can be seen as a lost opportunity for the
monarchy. Both in 1771 by Lebrun, and in 1774 by .t3reteuil, it
was appreciated that the ailightenment and the talent it repres-
ented should be harnessed to the monarchy 187 In the event,
the Eiflightenrient diverted its energies into either defending
the institutions in the tradition of eiontesquieu, or into
undermining the regime in the tradition of Sade with material-
ism, cynicism, or pornography. The nlightenment led into
democracy (in its modern sense) either in
	 theoretical
speculation or directly in the revolutionary American context.
he nlightenment clearly samped the politics of the
period 1774-8. Philosophes themselves took office. This was
the culmination of a trend extending forward from the 1760's.
Under Turgot and liecker the concept of a bureaucracy of talented
men steeped in the Enlightenment began to emerge. The quality
and intellectual talent of the regime's administrative per-
sonnel improved greatly in the last few decades of its existence.
It was disappointing, though, that they directed their main
energies towards defending the aristocratic institutions, and
working to ensure the continued survival of a society based on
privilege and inequality. They did make the administration both
more humane and more efficient. Even these limited reforms
were enough to alarm conservative opinion, ,
 and alert it against
further reform,
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Po11owin on Crom the mid-century turning point, the
regime began to alienatc various graups so as deprivo itsoif
of support by the time of the Revolution. One example is the
Rug'uenots who were patronised by Turgot, but rebuffed by
Louis XVI in a familiar late regime pattern of hopes being"
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raised and then left unrealised	 • Another example is the
militaires who became disaffected wit1ia regime that had suff-
ered military disaster, allowed its educational system to
collapse, had made its armed forces a battle field for mm-
isterial faction, and allowed corrupt parvenus to undermine
old Tirtues in all areas of public life. ksa result of this
disaffection groups such as the marshals sometimes tried, to
improve their position with independent initiatives. These
weie gener.1ly interpreted as a threat to the monarchy and
suppressed l89 As a result groups able to act in society on
behalf of the monarchy were transformed into its enemies, or
at best discouraged from helping i'. On an individual level
the provixcia1 governors found themselves acting as bulwarks
of the monarchy and central government while being treated with
hostility and mistrust by most ministries and bringing odium
upon the monarchy when they were successful'9.
The Church ought to have been a i11ar of the monarchy,
but in practice it was a milisone around its neck, and. this
must be explored. Tie Church was a perennially easy target
for the philosophes both for the faults of its individuals
and for the abuses of the institution (eg. the early age at
which holy orders could be taken 191)
At the bottom the cure's were disaffected having seen their
economic, social, and cultural position eroded since the mid.
century 192 What help was forthcoming was too little too
late to prevent expressions of discontent being publicised.
In 1775 the curh, "Cette classe d'eccldsiastiques si maltrait-
• e'e, met sous les yeux du roi son extrme indigence, et inter-
esse 1'humanit, ainsi que la religion, 'a venir 'a son secours,
193.par lea details ou ils entrent de leur misere" 	 • In the
same year -.the cürs of Dauphin submitted a detailed com-
plaint to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asking
for a guaranteed 1,5001. a year to maintain a standard of
living which would enable them to dress well, keep a servant,
keep a horse, buy books for religious instruction, eat meat
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every day, and offer accomodation to travellers (eg. Arthur
Young) 194• It was at this period that Turgot and: Nalesherbes
were recruiting the clergy into the administration as the most
local agent of royal authority, as had been pioneered in Lim-
ousin	 The eventual result of the failure to redress
grievance on the one hand and. the involvement of 1he curé's in
the political process on the other was to po]iticise them, and
they came to see their true role in society as to champion
rather than to control the oppressed.
The parts of the Church inside the political nation were
the episcopate and the General Assembly of the Clergy. The
Assembly had competence over not only QbVious spiritual mat-
ters - including the continual if sometimes .disingenuous att-
acks on philosophes and Huguenots - but also over the internal
financial, administrative, and. judicial direction of the Church.
The .power and autonomy this conferred on the Church caused it
to be likened to a state within a state1. The Church ranked
with the armed. forces and the tax farms ,as great privileged.
corporations, but it was also an Order in its own right, and
in its e'lite an adjunct of the nobility. For these reasons
the magistracy could often deflect attacks onto the Church by
claiiuing it alienated a third of the realm from its king and
force him to negotiate for his fiscal due 197
The organ of this autonomy was the quinquenial Assembly.
It was eoiposed in half of bishops, who invariably dominated
the proceedings; the other half were generally abbots and.
Glerics of similar rank, generally of noble origin, and. never
jnclded cure1s 	 There were lesser intermediary sessions
with an eyen higher proportion of bishops, these met to debate
the dongratuit. The don gratuit averaged 4,000,0001. a year
, The Assemhly was a power to reckon with after its victory
over Machault's attempt to destroy its fiscal autonomy. Its
influence pervaded the political nation through the ecclesias-
tical peers in the parlement, through Great Officers of State
at Court, through philosophe bishops in the capital, and through
bishops in the provinces exçrcising important functions in
assemblies. It controlled fiscal income, large amounts of
land and property, and acted as a bastion of aristocratic priv-
ilege. At the same time a Christian monarchy could not dis-
own its Church, or even be seen to attack it too strongly. The
faults of the Church reflected also on the monarchy.
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Snac de Nelihan reckoned that their political autonomy
allowed the clergy to pay only half the taxation that even
priviigiSs would expect to 20° . This caused bitterness and
contention in society because there were also complaints that
the Church was not pulling its weight in charity and poor-
relief 201• This produced one of the most compelling myths of
the late regime, that the Church represented a vast untapped
pool of wealth which, if released, could pay off the national
debt 202• The wealth was indeed there, but only as land and
property, not as liquid capital. The Church's lands, further -
more, ha& been mismanaged to the point of chronic and irrev-
ersible indebtedness. In 1772, "The debt of the clergy amounts
to about 130,000,0001.; their revenue as a body corporate is
something more than 3,000,0001., which not being sufficient
to answer these demands, all d.eficiences must be made good by
an assessment that affects the ecclesiastical benefices' t . By
1784 the debt had risen to 134,000,0001. and the cost of fin-
ancing it 5,860,0001. a year 203
The Church was faced with the nightmarish situation of its
revenue being insufficient even to stabilise its liabilities
- the old regime's finances in microcosm. This situation, how-
ever, affected the 'ordinary' revenue, and to raise the extra
funds needed to pay the balance of the debt charges and the
don gratuit. A 'decime' to raise the 6,000,0001. or more was
levied most heavily on the lower cievy, 9dded to their ecnn-
omic distress and. political discontent 204
Civil and ecclesiastical authority were closely linked.
The Gallican Church was an adjunct of the "police" of R.14.C.N'a.
realm. The bishop Lefranc de Pompignan stated, "... lee peines
ni lee recompenses temporelles ne suffirent pas pour graver
dane I.e coeur de l'homme la ve'nration due aux loix" 205
In his cirlar letter to bishops pacifying the provinces
affected by the Flour War Louis XVI wrote, "Le maintien de
20 6	-].'ordre public est une loi de l'Evangile"	 . Feron comm-
ented that the much reprinted 'Des Causes de Bonheur Public'
(Abbe' Gros de Besplas) showed, "... dane le clergil'union
intime du ministre des pasteurs avec l'ordre public" 2C7
Some of the more divot parlementaires responded to this call,
/
most notably Seguer who hoped to build a 'throne and altar'
ideological base for the monarchy. The judgment against Sdg-
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uler was that he, "... sets up the odious interests of the
nobility and clergy against the cries and groans of the poor"
208• Loss of faith in the Church and its religion, and. the
exposure of Its abuses and its bias in favour of the nobility
weakened one of the monarchy's main supports.
Royal authority as transmitted down through the adminis-
tratie structures was fatally flawed by the phenomenon known
as ministerial despotism. This meant in practice that the
crown had lost its day to day grip on government, and never
regained it 2O9 Ministers acted with the full and explicit
authority of the crown, sometimes to settle personal scores,
but without ever having to account to the authority they op-
erated under. Lettres de Cachet were the most glaring example
of this abuse. The crown had to carry the opprobrium for ev-
ents it knew nothing about. Much of the bitterness generated
in .l3reton politics in the l76O' derived from the suspicion
that Aiguillon had abused royal authority.
The realm Louis XVI inherited suffered from three major
flaws. The most obvious to the young king was that the crown
had lost the initiative, and much of the rest of this study
will concern the attempts to regain it. The second problem,
only tentatively recognised at the time, was the vast Increase
in the number of nobles at the top of society, and the var-
ious pressures, imbalances, and conflicts this set up. Levis
warned of a &isintegratlon in the political nation, "Lea
militaires s'occuperaient d'adminietration, lea magistrats
abandoñneraient lea procs et rvaient politique, les gens de
].ettres voulaient faire lea lois, lea abbds parlalent finance,
et lea fenimes de tout" 2 l 	 The third problem was the crushing
poverty of the peasantry, "Plus de deux tiers (du peuple)
vivent dana une infortune qui fait gJznir ].e gouvernement", and
the relationship between this and government insolvency was
recognised 21
We must credit Louis XVI with an awareness of these prob-
lems and a desire to solve them. There was room at many
points in the regime for reform and development within the
existing frameworks, and Louis was to try to exploit these
especially through Necker's Control General.
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S IJFII IARY
This chapter has provided definitions of the regime as a
base of data from which to present subsequent lines of enquiry.
In this chapter some aspects of the regime are reappraised very
broadly: its geopolitical and economic divisions, the pressures
for devolution, and the changes taking place within the nobility.
The structure of government and administration shows how the
relics of a medieval constitution co-existed with new forms being
introduced during the eighteenth century. It is shown that a
constitution can be said to have existed, which throws new light
on the opposition to reforming ministers to be examined in fol-
lowing chapters. The study of the political elite leads to the
discovery that the robe had become the basic "conservative"
force in society. Changes in the structure of the nobility
men.t that in Prance the "aristocratic reaction" took place with-
in the nobility as a process of readjustment to the influx of
tens of thousands of new nobles since 1715.
he crown in 1774 faced four broad areas of challenge: to
regain the initiative in ministerial pnlitics, to harness the
energies of changes within the hobility, to establish a more con-
structive relationship with the institutions, and the "peasant
problem".
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1600-1750'. P. Goubert. London 1973, which follows the
same line of thought in the divisions of France. 'TJ
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II
LE PHILOSOPHE DEVOT: LOUIS XVI AND THE MONARCHY
- ..
Louis XVI called himself "Louis le Severe" or "Le
Restorateur des Moeurs", and the nation dubbed him, briefly,
"Louis le Desire". However ironic these titles now appear
Louis showed more promise 1774-8 than he is usually credited
with of living up to them and of creating a new distinctive
era of the monarchy
Louis XVI can not be understood without reference to his
father, the Old Dauphin , who laid down most of the patterns
of thought Louis was to follow. The Old Dauphin was an
ambiguous and shadowy figure who was an enigma even during
his own life-time. There are two conflicting accounts of
him. The first, from his divot biographers, showed him to
be an able, intellectual, pious man who regretted bitterly
not being given the chance to rule France and restore her
fortunes 2 Most contemporaries held this view, and Louis
XVI himself certainly did. Against this is Horace Walpole's
account, via the usually reliable Nivernois. Horace Walpole
credited the Old Dauphin with, "Good sense and ... freedom of
sentiments", "he had a good undcrstandinq, had carefully,
thought secretly, cultivated it, and was a modern philosopher
in the largest sense of that term". (Walpole elsewhere
defined a "true philosopher" as a "legislator" 3,) While
maintaining the outward forms of religious observance, he
lacked inner conviction and was close to Hume in his private
outlook. His failure to play any prominent public role was
the result of a fear of arousing his father's jealousy, and
hence it was partly by design that he remained anonymous
If accurate, this account would be a rare ins.ight into the
private character behind the public façade. It does not,
however, explain the Old Dauphin's d4'vot writings nor the
de'vot company he chose. The very fact that such divergent
accounts of the Old Dauphin exist is indicative of his equi-
vocal reputation.
Two detailed modern accounts of him are both unsympath-
etic. Padover's attitude is expressed in a remark by Louis
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XV he quotes, to the effect that such were the Old Dauphin's
political talents that he had better wish his father a long
and healthy life. Padover judges him flawed by bitterness
at a life of political impotence in the face of ministers
and policies which were anathema to him . More recently
Girault de Coursac portrayed him as an obese, imperious,
ungrateful and indolent man whose futile life was absorbed
in austere piety, implying that as king he would have fared
no better than his son 6 Both accounts accept him as a
dSvot.
The Old Dauphin's early career was in the army, where,
as far as his dvot biographers can be trusted, he disting-
uished himself. As the sole heir to the, crown in the senior
Bourbon line, however, he could not be allowed to risk his
life, a point brought home even more forcibly by Louis XV'S
illness at Metz in 1744. Forced to live at Court, he spent
some time on Council learning the art of kingship. The
policies of 1754-8, however, caused him to withdraw from
public life; he could not tolerate the capitulation to the
corporations, the ascendancy of philosophie, the power of
mistresses, the Austrian alliance, and finally Choiseul.
Choiseul convinced Louis XV that his son vas making the
process of government difficult. The Old Dauphin allied
himself with the exiled ministers: Maurepas, Argenson,
Machault, and Bernis. In his last 'edL h sank into
depression which took the form of schizoid religious mania
in which he was troubled by apocalyptic visions . He
became associated with a divot circle including: Beaumont,
Muy, and Vauguyon; Se'iac de Meilhan described this period
of his life "...les dvots s'eznpressrent de le capter, et
il se trouva ainsi, sans en avoir forme'le projet, et mme
sans le savoir, chef d'un parti de Frondeurs, que le repre-
sentaient cornme le protecteur des moeurs et le zl dfenseur
de la religion" 8• (This account goes part way to reconcil-
ing the divot with Walpole's.) The Old Dauphin died in
1765 of complications from a minor ailment in such a way as
to suggest a loss of will to live.
The Old Dauphin was the ablest exponent of royalty in
the period, bringing up to date the monarchism of Louis XIV
and reconciling it with the duke of Burgundy's ideas. He
defined the crown's prerogatives ass religious affairs, the
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Councils, justice, and all fiscal matters. The crown
reserved to itself the final decision on ministers and employ-
ments, war and peace, the Court, police, commerce, money5,
weights and measures, privilege, and social mores. It was
also the king's duty to be his own Prime Minister . Answer-
able Only to God, the king's absolute power was limited only
by the inviolability of his subjects' lives and property.
To match the absolutism of his power the king should be
possessed of inflexible resolution, "Je pense qu'une fermet
inbranable est le seul moyen de conserver et vos jours et
10votre autorite", he told Louis XV • In another context
he wrote, "La faib].esse dans un roi rend toutes ses vertues
inutiles", and to temper resolution, "Tout bon gouvernement
dolt avoir pour base la justice et la raison". The monarchy
was paternalist; the king must, "...se regarder comme le
chef d'une nombreuse famille. Ii doit aimer ses peuples,
non coitime un maitre aime ses esclaves, mais comme un pere
aime ses propres enf ants"	 He doubted, however, that
any mere mortal could fulfil these conditions 12,
From the vantage point of the royal family he analysed
the constitution. "L'tat monarchique est gouverrie'par Un
seul; mais les pouvoirs interme1iares et subordonne y sont
nSce'ssaires. Le premier et le plus naturel, est celui de la
noblesse, non pour 'tre le terme entre le pouvoir du prince.
et celut du peuple, mais pour 'tre
	
lirt d tons 1e dex.
Le pouvoir du clerge' y est trs-convenable; ii sert de
bornes au despotisme sans y opposer de violence. Il faut
encore dans une nionarchie un corps de dpositaires des
loix" 13 The corporations were to reinforce and strengthen
the monarchy not to be alienated from it. In this analysis
the Old Dauphin has moved on from the duke of Burgundy to
Montesquieu, but while the form of their respective constitu-
tional ideas was similar, the content and underlying assumpt
ions were very different. Where Montesquieu harked back in
time to classical republics or across the Channel to Britain
for political models, the Old Dauphin saw divine right
absolutism as the French political ideal. Any corporation
or political philosophy was a mere transient adjunct to the
monarchy, and Nontesquieu's ideas were apposite to the mid-
eighteenth century.
The Old Dauphin was worried by the potential threat to
the monarchy from philosophie. Referring in particular
to Rousseau he wrote, "Suivant les principes de nos riouveaux
philosophes, le tr6rie ne porte plus l'empreiLe de la
divinite us dcident qu'il fut l'ouvrage de la violence;
et que ce que la force a le droit d'lever, la force a le
droit de l'abattre et de le d4truire ... alors toutes lea
ide'es du juste et de l'injuste, de la vertu et du vice, du
bien et du mal moral, seraient effacd'es et anenties dana
l'esprit des hommess les trnes deviendront chancelants,
les sujets seraient indociles et facteux, les mattres sans
bnfaisance et sans humanit4. Les peuples seralent donc
toujours dana la rvolte ou dana l'oppressioni" 	 The same
analysis was put forward by several de'vot writers includings
Pinault, Frron, and Ral; it anticipated Talmon's by two
centuries l5 it was also taken up by Linguet (q.v.) (whose
ideas Louis XVI was known to have taken an interest in), but
Linguet accepted this "violence" as the most basic reality
of political science, and the justification for his proposed
despotism of justice. Linguet was therefore to unite the
presumed political "atheism" of the philosophes with the
practical de'vot politics of the Old Dauphin and his prote'ge.
He took great interest in the detail as well as the
ideology of kingship. Taxation was a particular concern;
here he had been converted to the ideas of the duke of
Burgundy's circle by Machault and claimed to know 'L'Ami
des Homines' by heart l6 "Toute imposition sur les peupls
est injuste lorsque le bien g6neal de la societe' ne 1'
exige pas". Given, howevr, the need for taxation, the
king's function was that of, "L'eonome des revenus de 1'
£tat"	 Like the physiocrats, the Old Dauphin saw that the
nation's prosperity lay with the laboureurs, to this end he
patronised Agricultural Societies and refused to hunt over
growing crops. An anecdote, which made him a hero of the
peasantry, was that after accidentally killing a peasant he
renounced hunting altogether. He was mourned by the people,
as opposed to the Court and capital, and they believed, "Ce
bon prince aurait diminue'nos tailles" 18
The Old Dauphin's sense of social justice led to irre-
duceable but unresolved conflict with privilege. On the one
hand he believed that the nobility and clergy should be
preserved in their true forms, recalled to their "moeurs
antiques", and remain privileged in property and person 19
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On the other hand he lamented that fiscal privileges, "...
font retomber sur le pauvre peuple tout le poids dont la
faveur soulage Un petit nombre" 2O Among his maxims were
that a king should prefer tobe loved by peasants than by
courtiers, and that the simplest Catholic peasant should be
able to confute the w.sest heretic 21 From such attitudes
the Old Dauphin acquired the reputation of a potentially
great monarch; he was remembered as the Germanicus of his
day.
He wanted to set out his political philosophy in a
didactic history of the French monarchy, a compilation of its
accumulated experience since Clovis. This was to be the
monarchy's equivalent of the Encyclopedia. The direct result
of this plan was 'Princi pes de Morale de Politigue et de
Droit Public' J-NMoreau (21 volumes Paris 1777-89), and
an indirect one 'La Science du Gouvernement' Curban de Re"al
(8 volumes Aix-la-Chapelle 1761-5). These two works form
a comprehensive study of the monarchy, and although Moreau
did not be j
 publishing his work uniti 1777 he was able to
impart its contents to the Dauphin as a protege'of Vauguyon.
At the risk of repetition we must become acquainted with the
ideas of this school of divot philosophers not only because
Louis XVI was to attempt to rule by their precepts, but
also because of the more general contribution they made to
the late rcima's political culLre through to Necker's use
of their ideology.
Ral was more a divot than a conservative - as Palmer
imprecisely suggests 22 - but both he and Moreau went a long
way towards reconciling the monarchy and the corporations,
a process culminating in Gin's work. Real dedicated his
volumes to various members of the royal family and destined
them to the education of their children. RSa1 acknowledged
his debt to the duke of Burgundy and was attempting to bring
that body of thinking up to date for the late eighteenth
century 23, One of his basic beliefs was that people should
no longer be kept in ignorance of government but should be
taught public law and thereby learn the virtue of "enlight-
ened submission" rather than blind obedience 24 This
advice was taken to heart by Louis XVI, and the explanatory
preambles to his edicts reflect one of Re'al's maxims, "I].
faut gagner les coeurs pour soumettre les vo1onts" 25
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1e'al's account of the monarchy and constitution was
absolutist (but not'despotic'). While the king should be
guided by reason, he, "...n'a que Dieu au-dessus de lui" 26,
and his power was indivisible, inalienable, and divinely
ordained by reason of its excellence 27, Ral dismissed
any contractual origin of government or society, and dis-
counted any direct constitutional opposition to the crown,
or even any true political autonomy for the corporations 28•
Society's three Orders were juridically dependent on the
monarchy and, like the corporations, incapable of existence
separate from it; when endowed with the fullest privilege,
they were its pillars of support 29 The crown's function
here was to regulate the interaction of the different parts
of society. Fundamental laws alone could limit the monarchy;
in such matters as the Salic law it enjoyed a "felicitous
impotence" 30, and Ral followed Piganio]. de la Force's
analysis of the States' General function in the constitution
(q.v.) (eg. succession) 31• The king should impose such
limitations on himself as to ensure his subjects' welfare,
happiness, food, safety, justice, religion, and the sanctity
of marriage and the family 32, While unquestionable, taxation
had to be just and fair	 Ministers had to be fully depen-
dent on the crown and should be chosen for experience,
loyalty, and integrity and should not be allowed to become
indispenszblc	 The kinc should preside it his Council,
and should not encourage a Prime Minister 	 The king
must be sure of a free and full flow of information to him-
self 36 Re'al hoped to see reform of taxation and of the
—law; for the first he recommended implementation of the
duke of Burgundy's programme, and for the second he hoped
for thorcxigh rationalisation	 although he agreed with
Montesquieu that the existing structure was the most suit-
able 38
Advising the monarch he wrote, "Heureux les peuples
gouvernis par des rois gui consultent... (le g ) plu3 pures
maxiines de la raison, de la religion, et du droit"
	 a
remark echoed by Louis XVI to the Marchal de Noailles,
"Avec de bonnes intentions, de la justice, de la fermet,
de la religion, je ne crams ni Molinistes, ni Janse'nistes,
ni Ericyclop4distes, ni. e'&,nomistes" 40, R6a1 condemned the
Court, and warned against its vices and dangers, though he
recognised it s a necessary evil to contain the Great 41•
Harking back to the Louis-quatorzitne period he still feared
the Great, warned against allowing Princes of the Blood to
be ministers; he still saw the governors as a political
threat - as did Mirabeau in his first pamphlet on provincial
government 42• All things being equal, however, the king
should patronise higher birth above lower	 Ral's con-
cept of the regime was rigidly aristocratic. The bulk of
the populace were to be taught that disloyalty to the king
was disobedience to God, but once secured this loyalty should
be rewarded by ensuring the people's understanding of, and
consent to, government . He was wholly Gallican in areas
where religion and state met, condemning the Jesuits for
putting their first loyalty in Rome; he wanted education to
more secular
He did not fear, as did some dvots, that increased
wealth would disrupt society, and urged the government to
encourage commerce 46• He did, however, fear that the mon-
archy could be endangered by this idea, and Moreau was to
devote much thought to it. Louis XVI showed an appreciation
of the danger of the moral rot in society, addressing Sartines
at his accession he declared, "Chargez-vous, Monsieur, de La
rforme des moeurs dans La capitale, et moi je me charge de
ré'former celles de la Cour" 48• The bulk of Ral's work was
information on war and international relations, the Church,
and former political philosophers 	 RAI was a jurist in
the seventeenth-century tradition, and from this standpoint
he attempted as near a sociological analysis of society as
the method allowed. He distinguished three groupss the
Great, the notables, and the people. The notables comprised
the bulk of the nobility, the magistracy and office-holders,
and the professional and commercial classes 50, The Great
were at Court and around the king, the people did not count
in political life, so the notables were the group to whom
government must be directed.
Moreau, described by Pitri as the "reactionary ultra"
of absolutism 51, was a generation ahead of Real. Noreau
had a background of the Parisian robe and had worked his
way through the parlements as a barrister. He started as
a Jansenist patroriised by Choiseulists, but moved under divot
patronage 1761-2 after quarrelling with Prasliri. His concern
over the Jesuits brought him under Beaumont's and then
Vauguyon's patronage, and thence to the Old Dauphin's
attention. Moreau's training and inclinations fitted him
to become a government propagandist (for Laverdy) against
the parlements. He pursued an active parlementaire career
reaching its zenith in Provence in 1771 when he organised
the reforms under Maupeou.. From meeting the Old Dauphin
Moreau was commissioned to write the didactic history of
the monarchy, and he was successively appointed librarian
to the Dauphine (1770) and, in a specially recreated post,
historiographer royal (1774) 52•
Realising that his magnum opus could not be completed
before Louis XV'S death, Moreau had published 'Le9ons de
Morale, de Politigue, et de Droit Public' (Versailles
1773), which was a synopsis of 'Principes de Morale...' and
set out all the major conclusions he would draw from French
history. The conclusions were, in essence, that the monarthy
served its interests best by working for social and political
harmony through just and resolute absolutism. In a letter
attached to a manuscript of the book Moreau wrote, "Feu
Monseigneur le Dauphin voulut que dans l'éducation des
princes ses enf ants la politique et le droit public ne
fussent jamais separis de la morale" 	 't,es Devoirs du
Prince' was a separate treatise on the monarchy in the eight-
eenth century. It reads as a blueprint for the reign of
Louis XVI	 Addressing the Dauphin, Moreau &scribed th
bQok as, "Un ouvrage qui a pour objet de vous faire parcourir
tous les cas dans lesquels vous serez oblige'd'appliquer,
l'gard de vos sujets, les principes de justice que vous
dcouvrier dans votre coeur"	 The monarchy was absolute,
"Les rois enf in sont rev&tus d'une puissance absolue, dont
us ne rpondent qu"a Dieu" 56, The crown alone possessed
legislative authority, and in this was the image of God on
Earth '. "La parole des rois doit tre sacre comme celle
de Dieu mme" 58, a more extreme statement than Ral's.
Moreau countenanced no checks on absolutism, "Ii est de
l'essence de la monarchie française, que toute espce de
pouvoir reside sur la tète du roi seul, et qu'il ny ait
ni corps ni particuliers gui puissent se mainteriir dans 1'
ind'pendence de son autorite"
	 Louis XVI'S relations
with the parlement and the States General were to show his
inability to recognise them as direct political threats.
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The greatest ill for the monarchy was weakness, the
same point the Old Dauphin had made, and it was the under-
lying cause of every ill in history. For all his absolute
power, however, the sovereign had human limitations, "Ii
est impossible qu'un seul homme gouverne une nation par ses
vo1ont's particu1ires" 69 The method of government which
best overcame the difficulties without vitiating the kings
power was conciliar, "Les conseils sont de l'essence de la
monarchie, parce qu'il est de la nature de tout gouvernement
de consulter la raison et d'interroger la justice" 6l
Councils, however, must advise but not rule, and to guaran-
tee this their members must be carefully chosen from, "...
des hommes justes, blanchis par les anne'es, e'rouve's de bonne
heure par le travail" ...from, "des hommes e'claire's et labor
ieux, mais justes et bienfaisants, et dont le public ait en
lui-mme occasion de connaitre et de louer l'inte'grit",
from modest men not afraid of honest poverty in disinterested
service 62 This advice brought all Louis's early ministers
to office, Maurepas, and Turgot above all fit Moreau's des-
cription of the ideal minister. The appointment of St
Germain was held to be a deliberate step towards the creation
of a, "Ministry of men of general reputation, and avowed
ability, but totally unconnected with any party, and free
63	 .	 -from Court intrigue"	 . Like Real, Moreau stressed the
need for a constant and accurate flow of information, in
return for which the king should treat his servants openly
and justly 64
Society was a hierachy of corporations each part guard-
ian of the constitution and all strengthening the crown 65,
Confined to their true roles the parlements were wholly
beneficial organisations; remonstrances were meant to be a
consultative not participative part of government 66,
Moreau warned against the Great, and associated them with
forces of dissention, if not kept in check 67, Perhaps this
advice caused Louis to upbraid Beaumont for being a force
of discontent and unrest 68, Moreau, however, gave one funda
mental piece of advice against which all others must be
judgeds a strong king would find himself surrounded by
allies more than enemies - Louis sincerely did believe he
was resolute 69,
Finance was the greatest problem posing three dangerss
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negligence and depradatiori (in which Moreau in-'luded over
taxation), the over-ease of loans, and tleprodigality of
State and Court expenditure. Any of these could cause a
breakdown of government. The danger of loans was apparent,
but to the immediate fiscal evil Moreau added the moral one
that one generation should not burden the next with its
debts 70, Moreau did add that loans were justified if
short-term expenditure, as in war, must exceed revenue, or
if further current increases in taxation could not be toler-
ated 71, Between this varied advice on finance Moreau
opened up the appointments of Turgot and Necker, and his
wider advice on ministers brought Clugny (erroneously) and
•Taboureau des Reaux to the Control General. Expanding on
the problems of taxation, Moreau maintained that fiscal
privilege was both unjust and ruinous to the state- with
qualifications 72, In the present and foreseeable scheme
of things the cultivator would have to bear the brunt of
taxation, which sapped the strength of the state, for
Moreau followed the physiocrat thinking that for society
as a whole to be affluent each individual in it must be pros-
perous, and that the necessary wealth could only spread from
the soil upwards . Moreau, however, parted company with
the physiocrats on how to solve the problem. He suggested
two answers, the first that the rich and privileged should
renounce their exemptions and shoulder the "laboureur's"
burden. The second was that indirect taxation should re-
place direct, being less vicious 	 The argument here was
that he who consumed most and handled the most specie would
automatically pay the most tax and as the poorest tax payers
rarely saw cash, and had little use for it, their burden
would be relatively less than from the uniform taille.
Once wealth and equitable taxation had been established,
the crown, as protector of property, would in turn be immea-
surably strengthened by the loyalty of grateft1l property
owners
Moreau was an advocate, even more strongly than Real,
of the sanctity of marriage; the family was a foundation
of social stability and it was the crown's duty to uphold
the institution 76, For Noreau, as for Louis XVI, women had
the definite but subordinate role of being housewife and
mother in total obedience to the husband and father 77.
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Louis was obsessed by the need for male dominance, even
though in the 1780s he failed to live up to it. In May
1774 he told Marie-Antoinette that, "...women ought not to
meddle with politics", and in August 1777 he quarrelled
openly idth her, laying down the law that, "This country
can have but one master ET CE MAITRE MADAME CE SERA MOl" 78•
The reassertion of the woman's subservient role was charact-
eristic of the period as a reaction both to the mistress
politics of Louis Xv's reign, and to the illusion of eman-
cipation that the Enlightenment offered. Aubusson, Besenval,
and Rtif de la Bretonne, amongst others, made it important
parts of their critique of society
The 'duties' referred to in the title of Moreau's book
can be reduced to ones justice, "La perfection de notre
libertd consiste 'a clevoir ses esciaves" 80• A despotism of
justice was the one point where Noreau and Linguet agreed.
Echoing a point made by the Old Dauphin Moreau exhorted,
"Rappellez-vous quelque fois qu'une partie de cet argent, que
vous destineriez 'a payer ou la pompe d'une fete, ou le luxe
d'un palais, fut peut-atre arrach6e des mains d'uneveuveplore
'a qui le maiheureux enf ant demandait du pain" 81, Perhaps
this piece of advice prompted Louis to forbid pomp and
ceremony at Mine. Clotilde's wedding 82• Of war Moreau
commented, "La defaite et l'humiliation de vos
pourraient-elles jamais vous consoler de la ruine et du mal-
heur de vos sujets" 83, This may well have prejudiced Louis
in favour of Turgot's overtly pacifist policies.
Moreau did not just say that justice should pervade
every aspect of royal authority, but went on to say that a
combination of justice and resolution would enable Louis to
overcome any obstacle. Given this combination no corporation
would oppose him, no individual would not love him, "Soyez
juste; Monseigrieur, et soyez assure'que, suri.e trne de
France, vous serez et i.e premier, et i.e plus puissant et le
plus aim des monarques de l'univers" 84 Moreau's advice
was reinforced by Louis's iother-in-1aw, the empress Maria-
Theresa 85, Louis accepted this advice implicitly, "Un roi
de France," he paraphrased Moreau, "s'il est toujours juste
sera toujours et le premier et i.e plus puissant des souver-
am s de l'Europe" 86 Moreau casts one of the longest
shadows over the early reign by telling Louis what he most
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wanted to hear; it was Louis's tragedy that he accepted
the flattery of Moreau's advice without implementing the
substance: he gloried in the public acclaim at Turgot's
appointment, but shrank from giving him support through
thick and thin.
From his posthumously published exercise books it is
obvious that Louis had absorbed all that his father, Ral,
and Moreau had taught him. The pages are full of worthy
maxims on the need for justice and resolution, most of
which are inferior paraphrases of Moreau. Louis, however,
read beyond the limits laid down for him by his tutors.
One of the most important, and most underrated, moments in
his development was the dismissal of Vauguyon in 1772. Louis
had conceived it his duty to be informed of all shades of
political opinion concerning Maupeou and had been found by
Vauguyon reading patriot pamphlets. Vauguyon reprimanded
the Dauphin, and was dismissed on the spot for exceeding
his authority. The shock is said to have killed him 87 The
importance of this episode is that it forces us to take
every book or pamphlet into account as having been read by-
and perhaps even having some influence on - the Dauphin.
While every reformer addressed his work to the king
(or Dauphin), there were some schemes which could not hope
to attract ministerial patronage, whether because an appeal
to mores rather than policies, whether too visionary, or
whether because written by men too dangerous for any minister
to patronise. Some of these schemes which could only hope
to be implemented if directly patronised by the king will be
examined here; the schemes more closely associated with
ministries will be examined in Chapter V 	 in detail, though
mention will also be made of them in this context. An
influential and noticed book was the Abbe'Crillon's De 1'
Homme Moral' (Paris 1771), which described the private
virtues to comp1ment Moreau's public ones. It caught the
antiphilosophe mood of 1771, and enjoyed a considerable
vogue 88, Crillon's vitues weres beneficence, humanity,
love, friendship, prudence, justice, courage, piety, modesty,
and hope; his vices weres
	 fear, shame, weakness, self
love, vanity, pride, ambition, licence, anger, and irreligion.
Religion was the prerequisite of justice, which in turn was,
"L'Ensemble de toutes les vertus". Conversely, excess was
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the culmination of all other vices and irreligion its hall-
mark. The greatest of all evils, Crillon called irreligion
a, "..fle'au redoutable qui boulverse les tats" 89
Whether by coincidence or emulation Louis tried at least to
follow these precepts. In 1772 a companion volume, 'L'Homxne
Sociable', was published and which elaborated on the role
of virtues in society 90,
In 1773 Guibert's 'Essai General sur la Tactigue' was
overtly meant to foreshadow the coming reign. Guibert
expressed his dream of a king who would be a synthesis of
Louis XIV and Napoleon, "Un jour... ii selevera sur ton
(France's) tr6ne un prince qui... changera nos moeurs, ii.
retempera nos ames; ii redonnera du ressort au gouvernement;
il portera la flambeau de la vrit dans toutes les parties
de l'administration
Following on from Moreau several writers in the first
years of the reign attempted to influence the young king.
They fall into two groups. The first was the more philo-
sophical and consisted of Holbach, Mably and Gin. Holbach'
authorship of 'Systme de la Nature' and his known atheism
precluded his ideas being taIen up directly by Louis XVI,
but he hopeito exert iifluence through Turgot. He prefaced
'Ethocratie, ou le Gouvernement fond sur la Morale' (Paris
? 1776), which was dedicated to Louis XVI, with the eulogy,
"Les premiers monteiiL U	 yne de Louis XVI ... seinbient
promettre 'a ee royaume, accable'par deux rgnes ti?es longs
et tres funestes, le retour d'un bonheur totalement inespe're
I]. n'est rien d'heureux que la nation française ne soit er.
droit d'attendre d'un prince rempli de bonte, de justice,
d'amour et de la paix, de mépris pour le faste, entourde
ministres clairé's et vertueux...". This passage touches
on every royalist philosopher from Fe'ne'lon to Moreau, and
was well judged.
Holbach proposed an eighteen point political programme.
This programme, for which 'Systeme de la Nature' and '
Bon Sens' had been prefaces, was disappointingly little more
than a restatement of physiocracy. While it trotted out all
the usual clich6s of conomiste reform, it did present a
coherent programme of reform more radical and integrated
than most of the genre. The programme included representa
tive democracy based on the States General, educational
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reform, changing the relationship between the armed forces
and the state, the abolition of all privilege (including
corporate autonomy and hereditary titles), legal reform,
the disestablishment of the church, the emancipation of
women, and complete fiscal reorganisation. His eighteenth
point was a proposed "Tribunal de Censure" which would have
had the two functions of safeguarding public mores and of
limiting the power of the Great; it was a suggestion
remarkably similar to Monsieur's Chamber of Forfeiture 92•
The programme was Holbach's belated attempt to regain the
political limelight.
The book was well received by Bachauinont, who comment-
ed dryly that it had been banned for being too good. Me'tra
reviewed the book and found it non-revolutionary; it tended
towards an aristocratic constitution by insisting on the
right of political assembly without the monarch's consent
Throughout it must be remembered that for Holbach poli-
tics were of secondary interest to philosophy, and were the
means to the end of creating a secular society; it was
therefore to be expected that 'Systme de la Nature' would
be the stronger of the two books. Another, and more cynical,
explanation for the 'Ethocrtie' is that Holbach was trying
to at-one for the savage reaction against 'Systeme de la
Nature' by writing a placatory physiocrat work to curry
favour with Turgot.' Whatever his motives, hocvcr, Holbach
• had written a book in tune with the thinking of the day, and
reinforcing many ideas appearing in Aubusson, Letrosne,
Linguet, or Mably. Had he not made himself a political
pariah in 1770, 'we might be regarding Holbach as a major
source of political inspiration in the new reign.
'Ethocratie' influenced Mably, who started from Moreau's
premises but tried to reconcile him with philosophie. Mably
has attracted attention as a proto-Marxist philosopher, who
pioneered concepts of equality and the aboliiion of property
leading to a perfected social environment. Within the
narrower context, however, he was taking Moreau's ideas a
step further and suggesting that they could not be imple-
mented without a far more radical, philosophe, but practical
approach. He did not believe that Moreau's hope for a just
and equitable society could be realised in an environment
which encouraged avarice and made a necessity of vice
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For Mably ambition arid avarice were the fundamental political
vices with their root in private property. In his final
chapter Mably attacked organised religion in Holbachian
terms, but unlike Holbach he remained resolutely deist.
He stated that religion alone made men moral beings. His
concept of men was one of the primacy of passions, where
inherent morality and reasonableness were at the mercy of
prejudice and ignorance . The role of the legislator was
to structure society to enable men to realise their higher
qualities. While Mably was too extreme to receive official
patronage, his insistence on religion kept him within the
pale of the regime.
On more specific issues Mably was closer to Moreau.
He condemned an expansionist foreign policy
	 Paris he
dismissed as a worthless political environment corrupted by
money and corrupting the rest of society with idleness and
extravagance Like the parlements he exhorted government
to reduce not increase expenditure 98• The greatest injust-
ice was to make the poorest bear the heaviest fiscal burden.
This injustice, and the other problems and abuses of society
gave the magistracy the opportunity to interfere in govern-
ment . He wanted reform of the mdgistrdcy with higher
standards of training, of disinterest, and of accountability
100 The whole system, he claimed, was at fault, and would
spread its vices through socicty in intensifying viciuu
circles; the need was to change the institutions not just
the people in them 101•
Mably was keenly aware of abuses - the corvee and lettre
de cachet for example 102• He championed the poor who were
excluded from the political nation by the mystification of
government, and who were oppressed by the rich to such an
extent that society was punishing them for the situation it
had forced them into 103• This same point was made by
Thvenau de Morande in 'Gazette Noire', Moran'de also made
a point which lay behind most of the writing which attacked
abuse, that publicising the problem was the first step
towards curing it lO4 Mably, however, did not go on from
this critique to suggest government by the people; he feared
that Rousseauist democracy would break down the last barriers
against "passion" and allow the masses to overwhelm reason lO
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Unlike Linguet, however, who had come to the same conclusion,
Mably did not succumb to nihilism.
To create the perfect society all inequalities between
men had to be abolished. By removing the barrier of pro-
perty all men would perceive that their true interests lay
in service to the community instead of to self 106, The
state would best be served by representative democracy which
balanced political stability with popular participation 107,
In the traditional style of the old regime Mably looked back
to a mythical past for inspiration, he claimed to be recreat-
ing Charlemagne's empire which had been a federation of a
hundred autonomous republics (ie. States Countries) 108, In
this ideal society laws would be few and simple, penalties
mild and increasingly redundant, and its mores the cement of
society loge Like Guibert and the small late 1760's school
of civic virtue writers, Mably looked to the development of
civic spirit, possibly inculcated by compulsory military
service 110 In many of these points Mably comes close to
militaire thinking, and to some of Louis's own ideas - for example
on the need for government to be understood.
The Annie Litte'raire sw Mably not as a revolutionary
but as a latterday plagiarist of Plato. ' . 11 faut corLvenir
du nioins," sneered Frron, "qu'il tait difficile de rajeu
fir avec plus d'art et d'esprit un systeme antique et
surar1nt. The fournal Encyc1opdique was more charitaøie,
claiming to see it as an up to date version of Montesquieu,
and as good as any other of the new systems
Mably was refuted by Gin in 'Les Vrais Principes du
Gouvernement Française!'. Antoine groups Gin with Moreau
and Ral as the most effective apologists of absolutism 112,
The "true principles" were those of the Louis-quatorzfète
monarchy, as opposed to the republican fanaticism of Mably.
Gin, like Linguet, attacked British institutions for their
failure to ensure political and social stability. On juris-
prudence Gin rejected Montesquieu's political analysis but
equally insisted that only an hereditary closed caste of
magistrates could prevent laws becoming trans-lent and relat-
ive. Although Gin could admit of only moral restraint on
the king, he hoped the magistracy could have a softening
effect on absolutism 113 Gin made a concession to Louis
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XVI'S style of government that freedom of the press was
beneficial to the monarchy, "On n'a rien a craindre sous
un gouvernement qu sait que le bien ne peut naitre que de
la runIon des luniires; que les fausses vices et les
erreurs ne peuvent etre ecartees que par la contradiction;
et que les vrais principes ne peuvent acqurir l'autorit
qu'ils doivent avoir, que par la discussion publique,
libre et impartiale" 114
In return the Mercure de France declared that Gin's
discussion of political institutions could not but strengthen
the monarchy by the self-evident truth of his assertions.
The Anne Littrair was not so enthusiastic about making so
much information public, but approved an attack on Mably in
particular and the philosophes in general 1l5 This was
in contrast to Moreau who was receiving neutral or even
hostile reviews at this date. The Journal Encyclopdique
accused him of pushing the monarchy too far towards despot-
ism 116 The reason for this different reaction to similar
ideas was that Gin had captured the political spirit of the
reign. While he believed in free speech and in institutional
conservatism he used them to reinforce the monarchy. Moreau
may have been Louis Xvi's Bible, but Gin interpreted him
for the nation in a way of which it approved.
The second group of writers who hoped to influence or
describe Louis XVI'S reign were those more closely associat-
ed with the ministry: Turgot, Albon, Letrosne and Necker.
The first two were writing asphysiocrats hoping for the en-
lightened despot who would implement their programme; the
two latter were more interested in the mechanistic monarchy,
and both their ideas, and the wider school, are examined as
a separate political tradition in that context (Chapters
V and VI ). Turgot's ideas on the monarchy were made
clearest in his memoir on the municipalities, "Vous tes
forc6 de statuer sur tout, et le plus souvent par des
volonte's particulires, tandisque vous pourriez gouverner
comme Dieu par des loix g 'nra1es; Si les parties interan
tes de votre empire avaient tine organisation rgulire et
des rapports connues" 117, Writing directly under Turgot's
patronage Boncerf exhorted Louis, "Il est au pouvoir du
lnonarque chri bienfaisant et bien servi, qui nous gouverne
d'tablir la 1ibert re1le" ll8 , The type of monarchy
103
envisaged by Turgot' reforms was one where each individual,
protected by the law and by a constitution, stood directly
before the king with no corporate barriers or legal restrict-
ions beyond the absolute minimum.
The comte d'Albon was of interest not merely for what
he wrote, but also for the type of person he was. He was a
French count, a prince of the Holy Roman Empire, and captain
of the regiment of cuirassiers. He, "..offre Un bel
exemple 'a la noblesse, celui d'un seigneur des plus disting-
ue's qui, dans la saison des plaisirs lge de vingt-et-un
ans, cultive avec sucd'es les lettres et la philosophie". The
coincidence of his having the same age as Louis makes this
comment, part of a lengthy eulogy of the man, an oblique
reference to the king himself. The next month his 'Eloge
Historigue de M. Quesnay ' was reviewed favourably, and as a
disciple of Mirabeau, he was described as a, "vertueux
citoyen', and, "conomiste zle', mals sans fanatisme"
Although this was the only remotely political mention made
of him, it is an important statement of the type of man
Louis XVI liked to have about his Court. Albon developed
his ideas in 'Discours Politigues, Historigues, etcritigues
de guelgues Gouvernements de l'Europe' (3 parts Neuchtel
1779), which was largely an inaccurate and extreme attack on
the non-monarchic governments of western Europe. He 3ooked
continuously to French absolutism as the measure against
which other regimes were found wanting. "Riende plus facile,
en effet, que l'art de bien gouverner par la prince qui
gouverne seul, et qui ne trouve entre lui et le peuple
aucun corps, aucune puissance, dont ii ait 'a craindre les
contrarits'	 a restatement of Turgot's position 120,
Letrosne looked to Louis XVI more than any other
Bourbon to legislate a new society into existence, because
the late eighteenth century was a unique moment when the
knowledge of how to achieve reform coincided with the opport-
unity to implement it l2l He included the ironic prophecy,
"Puisse l'administration de Louis XVI former l' 'poque la
plus intr'ssante de la monarchie" 122, The minister who
might have created Letrosne's society was Necker. Necker
still believed in Louis's potential to the bitter end, and
in 1784 he wrote that he believed Louis could be his own
Prime Minister and create a constitutional regime which
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could conern itself with the poor and oppressed 123 Necker's
description of the monarchy was a masterful blend of de'vot
and philosophe ideas, at points reconciling the Old Dauphin
with Turgot. Necker must be regarded at several different
levels as the culmination of Louis XVI'S monarchy, and his
failure as the beginning 'of the end.
Such,then, were some of the political ideas presented
to Louis. we must now examine the person who was the object
of this advice, and understand the influences on him arid his
character. Much of what follows has been said before, some
of it may seem like the old clichs of the shy fat king, but
in a monarchy there comes a point where events are only
intelligible in terms of the personality of the monarch and
his interaction with his Court, government, and society.
The first relationship Louis was probably aware of was his
elder brother's, the duc de Bourgogrie. The young duke out-
shone Berry in every way, and promised to emulate his great
grandfather, the duke of Burgundy. He worshipped Bourgogne
and his unexpected death in 1761, when Berry was seven, was
a savage emotional blow. By this time, however, the king's
two younger brothers, Provence and Artois, were both showing
more promise than Berry, of whom it seemed the most was
demanded but the least expected l24 From the immediate
family, with the later exception of Artois, Louis received
the strongest reinforcement of devot monarchism. The only
member of the royal family, however, whom Louis really liked
was Louis XV, whom he called "Papa roi". Although Louis
respected his grandfather, he was never able to accept his
politics, which were alternately too lax and too despotic.
An important influence on his character was the successive
loss of his family: the duc de Bourgogne, his father, mother,
grandmother, and grandfather over thirteen years. It
seriously undermined his ability to form satisfactory relat-
ionships, which in turn jeopardised his politics.
The first overtly political influence was his governess
Mine. de Marsan. "Un prince," Louis was taught, "est vrit
ablement l'image de Dieu lorsqu'il est juste et qu'il ne
rgne que pour faire la vertu... le prince est tabli de
Dieu pour tre aux autres hommes I.e mod1e de toutes les
vertus... Vous tes absolument e'gal par la nature aux
autres hoxnmes et par cons4quent vous devez tre sensibles 'a
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tous les maux et 'a toutes les miseres de l'humanite... Un
prince ne doit se divertir et s'amuser qu'aprs s'tre
exactement acquitt de ses devoirs" l25 Although Cro
later believed that Marsan had little influence over Louis
126, (she never played any role -in Louis XVI'S Court), there
is nothing in the king's actions Or words to suggest that he
had not accepted her ideas.
In 1760 Berry was transferred to Vauguyon's charge.
Vauguyon's most importan contribution to Louis's education
was his patronage of Moreau. Owing his position to the Old
Dauphin, Vauguyon was a constant reminder to Louis of his
father, but by 1772 Vauguyon had made himself sufficiently
odious to Louis to counter the memory. (In July 1770 he
angered the Dauphin by being caught listening at a key-hole
127)• Vauguyon had determined to create a king no matter
what the cost in human terms, and when he died in 1772 he was,
"... as little lamented by the Dauphin and his brothers, as
by the rest of the Court" 128w
In 1774 Mesdames made a determined and overt effort to
sway Louis simply to put the clock back. In 1772 Lord Harcourt
observed that, "Mme.. Lr uise with all her appearance of piety
and devotion is known to be artful and intrIguing" l29 Their
influence has been overrated to such an extent as to be
called the, "...cvil gcnuisc3" f Louis XVI; buL while they
undoubtedly helped Louis to choose Maurepas, as early as
August 1774 they were finding themselves out of place in the
Young Court and withdrew from Versailles 130,
The person whose influence has been assumed to be ascen-
dant over Louis is Marie-Antoinette. Her influence 1770-8,
however, was minimal. Louis's previously quoted remarks on
the evil of women meddling in politics held true for the
early part of the reign. Vri described this phase,
"Plusieurs personnes, qui connaissent le vide' de la t'te de
la reine, voient sans peine qu'elle prend la route de se
discrditer auprs de son marl", but he did foresee future
danger from her 131, Her continual attempts to have Choiseu].
or his proteges appointed to high office were rebuffed con-
sistently until 1780 132, The change	 was made possible
by the operation in 1776 which enabled Louis to enjoy sexual
relations with her. A minor physical deformity had prevent-•
ed this 1770-6, with several consequences there was appre
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hension about the succession, Louis was the object of some
degree of ribald derision (though he may not have known
this), Louis himself felt aggrieved and humiliated by his
failure to fulfil his maritial and dynastic duties and
directed his energies to the Council and the chase as com-
pensation, and the lack of physical contact prevented the
king and queen becoming truly close. The success of the
operation led to the queen's pregnancy in 1777, after which
Louis felt it to be more important to please and placate
her as well as becoming increasingly susceptible to her
suggestions as he discovered the previously unrealised
pleasures of marriage. Snac de Meilhan believed the queen
to be the dominant partner after 1781 133,
The dominant influence in 1774 was still the Old
Dauphin. At his accession Louis was given a box of docu-
ments which amounted to his father's political testament.
He recommended the following men to his son: Maurepas,
Aiguillon, Machault, Bernis, Nivernois (as an ambassador),
Castries (as a soldier), Muy, Mm. de St-Priest, Prigord,
Mm. de Brogue, Estaing, Bourcet, Vergennes, Ogier, the
bishops of Verdun, Limoges, and Orleans, and Beaumont 134
Since 1765 Aiguillon, Beaumont, the bishop of Orleans, and
Mm. de Broglie had become politically unacceptable. Bernis
and Machault were stiil unacceptable. Nivernois became an
elder statesman and adviser (patror!isinq Turqot, St-Germain,
Malesherbes, and Necker) but was too ill to take high
office despite being tipped as Naurepas's successor 135, As
Stormont had realised in May 1774, Nivernois was never seri-
ously in the running for high office because of his out-
spoken opposition to Maupeou; he had failed to meet Louis's
high standards of unequivocal loyalty 136, Naurepas
became Minister of State without portfolio and then Prime
Minister. Castries, Muy, and Vergenries became Secretaries
of State earlier or later. (The remaining names on the list
remained in their offices). Albertas appreciated the
importance of this document, "Bien de gens croyant gue le
rappel de N. de Naurepas est l'un des premiers effets de cette
lecture" 137, This remark illustrates the importance of look-
ing at Louis the man; while an account may be given of any
minister's accession to power in terms of intrigue or patron-
age, many of Louis XVI'S early choices can be accounted for
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by looking at Louis's temperament or heeding of advice,
adding a new and very potent dimension to politics.
Another influence on the young man was public opiniOn.
Once the unflattering childhood anecdotes were over, the
reports of the Dauphin reaching the capital were wholly
laudatory: he despised Court etiquette and extravagance,
he had a beautiful and loving wife, and so On 138, In 1773
he and Marie-Antoinette made their first official visit to
Paris; their reception was tumultuous 139, It was a heady
draught for Louis, and one from whose intoxication he never
recovered. He was unshakeably convinced that his people
loved him for the rest of his life. This also had the unfort-
unate result of Louis's longing for public acclaim at the
cost of political wisdom. To this end he renounced the tax
of joyous accession, "He is very ambitious of the popularity,
that is to be acquired by lessening the burthens of his
people", reported Stormont in May 1774, and Stormont went on
to predict that only the recall of the parlements could
sustain this popularity to which Louis had become addicted
140,
The man upon whom these ideas and people operated has
rarely been taken seriuusly in historiography. Three
schools of thought have developed. The first, as set out
by Soulavie, of a helpless spectator in his own reign 14l
The d 'vot school CLeaLU Liz iuyth of a man too pious and
holy to be able to cope with the wickedness around him 142,
The third school of thought is that adopted by most histor-
ians, that Louis was snowed under by conflicting advice from
which over-powerful - or justly enterprising - ministers
rescued. him 143,
A consensus of opinion held that Louis's virtues were
of a private rather than public nature; "...leve'p1ut6t,
maiheureusement, pour le ciel que pour le tr6ne", or '...
pieux, humble, il sera bori poux, bon pare, raais mauvais
roi" 144, The one person who would have disagreed with all
the c±iticisms of him was Louis himself. His piety forbade
him to believe that the throne could be entrusted to a man
not fitted for it. When he heard of Louis XV's death he
said, "Je vois bien que Dieu le veut: 11 l'a decide.
Ii ne me reste plus qu" proteger la religion gui en 'a
grand besoin, écarter de moides vicieux et les fripons,
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et a soulager les peuples" 145, In this context Louis was
a royal Candide believing that all must be for the best on
this best of all possible thrones; his tutors had done
nothing to cast doubt on such a belief.
Riche].ieu dismissed Louis as, "Sa vertueuSe et obse
'146Majeste"	 , and this. inthcates one of the great flaws of
Louis XVI's monarchy, that the king himself was subject to
ridicule. The strength of royalism within France prevented
such a phenOmenon becoming publicised at the time, so we
must rely on an outside observer - Horace Walpole. As early
as July 1771 he called Louis, "an imbecile; both in mind and
body," and in September of that year it would difficult to
find, "...a Dauphin more unpromising". By May 1775 he was
describing the king as, "the newwell-beloved", and in July
1777 as a "Rehaboam". His public speaking was a disasters
when addressing the parlement in May 1775 he had to make four
attempts before he could start. Such incidents, unknown
under Louis XV, detracted from the mystery and veneration of
royalty. When Marie-Antoinette finally became pregnant his
delight was undignified, "...the king talks rapturously of
it, to anybody - he has had qualms", reported an Amorican,
a if he himself were still recovering from tho unnerving
experience of encountering this a-bullient father to be.
Taking up the American's final point, Walpole made the
cruclle3t cut of all - he doubted that Louis ws the rather,
"I have little faith in conceptions that have been so long
immaculate". In such a derisory climate of opinion it was
thinkable to launch a political attack on the institution of
monarchy 147,
Louis was not unroyal in aspect, acquiring a dignity
with obesity which offset his shyness 148, He lacked, how-
ever, the graces which made royalty acceptable on a personal
level. He lacked the ability, or desire, to put people at
their ease and soften the impact of abso1utim, qualities
which both Louis XIV and XV had possessed. He was an
uncomfortably vituous man with an absolute belief in his
own righteousness and the sacredness of his person 149,
This produced an extraordinary insensitivity, as when he
dismissed the Huguenot plea for toleration with the observa
tion that, "us ont un moyen sur pour tre comxne les autres
citoyeris, c'est de reconnattre la veitable re1igion' 150,
In this early part of the reign, before riarie-Antoinette
had begun to patronie favourites such as the Polignacs on a
large scale, louis regarded service in his courtiers and ministers
its on reiard.. Tn its day to day dealings he made the
monarchy an inhuman institution. This was shown in his
treatment of Soubise whose presence at Court he insisted on
only to•make no secret of his dislike of the whole family
and to exclude him from important policy making 151, Mtra's
account of him in the field suggests he carried his faults
with him there, and treated his animals no better than his
human servants, being gauche, inept, inconsiderate, and
ungrateful 152, This harshness masked a shy, lonely, some-
times bewildered character.
Louis was a pious man who showed his religion more in
inner conviction than in external ceremony. This enabled him
to cope with Turgot, whose spirituality was obvious, though
not expressed in religious observance, or the protestant
becker. (As a Genevan, Necker did not suffer quite the same legal
problems oi' toleration as did indigenous Protestants). Louis AVI
found that he could not tolerate the lackof any religous impulse, h
determined to stamp out irreligion in the army 153, In tue
church he tried to undo the progress philosophie had made,
blockinq the careers of bishops kr own to be atheists or L
be uncelibate. This led to one of his few memorable remarks
when he refused Lomnie de Brienne the archbishopricof ParIs
on the grounds that, "Il faut que du moms, 1'archvque
de Paris croie en Dieu" 154,
Louis's piety, shyness, and dislike Of extravagance
made the Court an inimical environment for him. "Il avait
l'esprit juste, l'me droite et froide, avouant n'aimer que
la chasse", was Cror's judgment of him 155 This cold and
righteous heart kept him in the saddle rather than on the
throne. All his interests - hunting, shooting, carpentry,
geography, paleography, mechanics, physical labour - kept
him away from pomp and ceremony. He disliked military
display; Ligne considered that his failure to show himself
in uniform as head of his troops was a serious mistake,
possibly contributing to the army's failure to act in 1789
156 His reaction to and relationship with the Court was
negative, he neither used nor enjoyed it and allowed it to
diminish in importance 157, For the first time since the
Fronde people began to think in political terms outside the
Court 158, and as a result of Louis's attitude the political
initiative began to shift from the Court to capital during
his reign 159
. A man of Louis's character was something the
Ho
institution of the monarchy could not cope with. A ruthless
despot at least ensured a strong government, •a wise and just
king could be respected and loved, a weak king who surrender-
ed power to an able minister could be excused, or even a
thoroughly disreputable king could be accepted if he played
the part of king, but in Lous XVI France, eventually, faced
a weak and incompetent king who refused to recognise his
own limitations, while also refusing to act like a king.
For all the later reports of his incompetence and lack
of interest in government, the evidence of the early years
shows that he worked hard. Montbarey spoke of his, "...
occupation continuelle des affaires de son royaume, dont ii
ne s'arrachait qu'avec peine" 160• On 24 May 1774 Albertas
noted that the new king worked seven hours a day with his
ministers 161, and Mercy reported that in the first month
of his reign only the entreaties of Marie-Antoinette and
the admonitions of his doctors pursuaded Louis that state
business required only six days a week 162, In May 1774
Stormont reported that the young king was concerned about,
"his inability, inexperience, and total ignorance", but
that he was redeeming himself by his honour, application,
sense of business, and understandiny, and alone among many
observers at this date Stormont noted some youthful intoler-
ance 
163, The Espion Anqlais assessed the new king, "Ii
a prouve'qu'i2. est capable de rf1exion, et e s'occuper
de choses plus importantes que les niasseries de son age.
Ii. a naturellement 1e caractre, les principes austres;
ii est l'ami de l'ordre, et l'on ne doute qu'il ne le
maintienne de toute son autorit" 164 Not all commentators
were so enthusiastic, Sallier described him as, "...exempt
des vices qui marchent a la suite des passions, (ii) inanquait
aussi de 1'enrgie qu'elles font naltre" 165, The same
idea was taken up rather more favourably by Target in a
speech to the parlement on 21 November 1774, in which he
described the 1770's as the "age of passions", but praised
Louis for ignoring them and heeding only reason 166, These
remarks echo an Enlightenment ideal of royalty, when Gibbon
praised the emperor Maurice for, "...expelling from his
mind the wild democracy of passions, and establishing a
perfect aristocracy of reason and virtue" 167,
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His greatest faults were lack of resolution and intell-
ectual stamina. V 'rL defined his political failings as
"timidity" rather than indifference or incapacity, and com-
plained as early as June 1775 that Louis "...manque un grain
de fermet' sans lequel toutes ses bonnes qualitd's seront
sans effet" 168, Within a year Re'al's and Moreau's warnings
on the lack of resolution were proving only too necessary.
A variant on the theme was provided by Mirabeau and Soulavie
in a libellous history of the period, Louis had, "...un
caracthre trs dur ettrs decidequand ii s'agit de la jus-
tice, mais sans suite, parce qu'il n'a point encore assez
de volonte' pour faire exeuter ses ides complexes" 169,
Montbarey reduced his faults to two: lack of resolution
and being too easily led 17O Talleyrand believed that,
"..une fermet soutenue n'tait pas dans le caractre du
roi" 171, The worst charge was that of moral cowardice;
Muy levelled it at Louis when he pensioned off FitzJames
with a baton in 1775 172, and no one even needed to point
it out over his abrupt withdrawal of confidence from Turgot.
Louis could always be caught off-balance when he presented
some scheme filled with good intentions, Maurepas tricked
him out in a thorough attack on immorality in May 1774,
but leaving Louis with the impression that his intentions
would still be implemented 173 After this false start
Louis never came to qri ps with the probm nf mor1 rgci-
eration.
A final quality for which Louis was noted, associated
with his need for popularity was his desire to be understood.
Here he seems to have followed directly Re'al's maxim that
enlightened submission was better than blind obedience.
Louis's edicts were always prefaced by an explanatory pre-
amble. Necicer wrote that Louis, "...appel ses sujets '
connaitre la purete'de ses motifs, la bierifaisance de ses
intentions, la justice de ses volonte's, la sagesse de moyen'
174, The desire to be understood also prompted Louis to
allow the freedom of the press: total 1774-6, limited 1777
89. While this matches Gay's concept of the 'politics of
decency', it did not receive contemporary acclaim. The
practice of consulting public opinion as opposed to the
decisive exercise of absolutism was thought rightly - to
be weakening the monarchy l75 Louis never understood
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that what seemed justice from the throne could be interpret-
ed as weakness in the country.
Besides his childhood loathing of Choiseul, the Dauphin's
first known political statement was to congratulate Maupeou
in December 1770 for proscribing the unitd des classes,
"Cela est trs beau, voil le vrai droit public, je suis
enchants de M. le Chancelier" 176	 The picture of the Dau
phin that emerges from this period is one of a sullen figure
repressed by and fearful of his divot tutors. His natural
shyness was becoming accentuated into coldness. Mercy was
unable to avoid the conclusion that Louis was deeply resent-
ful of all those around him, and that beneath an indifferent
exterior he possessed a disturbingly astute judgment of his
associates. In the event he chose to hide his feelings both
as regards personalities and policies 177 Although
Vauguyon's dismissal should have warned of Louis's future
policies, no one seems to have seen beyond the immediate con-
flict of personalities. He had been bullied into accepting
Maupeou as a saviour of the monarchy, and to reject the
Chancellor was Louis's revenge against his dreadful child-
hood and adolescence. While there are a host of other
reasons here we can interpret a policy decision in terms of
Louis's personality; in a letter to Vrillire on 23 August
1774 he made it clear he had chosen Miromesnil to implement
a policy already decided on 178,
Before he came to the throne the only quality he was
known to possess was "conomie", and Stormont expected a
swift change in Court expenditure, which happened most
dramatically with the selling of 2,000 horses 179• Louis's
aversion to ostentation probably dated back to the disaster
at his marriage celebration when over a hundred people were
killed falling into a ditch. Louis believed that he could
reduce conspicuous consumption by his own example, and that
some revenue at least could be dispensed with It was for
this reason that he waived the tax of joyous accession,
'which was at one and the same time an "conomie" and a
measure of great popularity. Economie was not an obsession;
on pensions, for example, it took second place to justice
when two years' worth of the five years' arrears on small
pensions were paid off 180, and where lavish display bene-
fited the monarchy it Was authorised - hence the formal
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coronation at Rheims while the area was still recovering
from famine. The Mercure de France described the corona-
tion as the occasion when the "lite" of the nation could
see the monarch at his most august and splendid l81•
It had been feared that Louis would allow himself to
be dominated by priests, as his father had been 182, but
this proved groundless. Louis found thatthe fault of auth-
oritarian d4vots was that they sought to extend their
authority over the king, for this reason he had dismissed
Vauguyon, and subsequently Beaumont was excluded from
politics. The political company Louis chose in May and
June 1774 was that of Great or dvot elder statesmen, the
marcha1 de Broglie, Nivernois, Orlens, Maurepas, Muy,
Castries, P4rigord, the mareihal de Noailles 183, Louis
enjoyed the company of the Great, although he never formed
close friendships the way Bourbons before him had. The
Young Court was as much his creation as Marie-Antoinette's
and its typical courtier was a young, illustrious Great,
possessed of wit rather than frivolity and loyal to the
monarch 184
Louis wanted to create a new ministry based on men
recommended by his father, and tempered by advice front Ral
and Moreau. He did not dismiss Maupeou's ministry immediate-
ly, instead he phased it out over a year, perhaps heeding
Ra1's advice, "Uii flOUvèdU £01 qui clicinge tout 'a i.oup leb
miriistres de son pre'décesseur, manque aux rgles de la
bonne politique" 185, Louis had more than absorbed Moreau's
teaching on justice "La justice des rois droit ressembler
'a celle de Dieu m&ne", and, "La justice est l'me du gouverne-
186merit" he had parrotted
	 and both the new ministry and
the recall of the parlements were meant to reflect this.
He judged that the benefits to the monarchy from Maupeou's
reforms were more than offset by their patent injustice.
While his treatment of the restants was insez'isitive, and
inconsiderate, it was an absolute condition of recall that
they be reinstated to their 1770 positions. Other than a
few doubts voiced on the wisdom of the recall, the first
year of the reign received universal acclaim, "Toutes les
opSrations du nouveau rgne pendent le sceaux de la justice
et de 1'humanit" 187, Even Linguet was moved, in an obse-
quious moment, to write, "On s'est flatt avec tout de
114
raisons du voir refleurir la justice 188,
Louis's impulse to justice moved him to talk of an
amnesty for political exiles months before the recall of
the parlements 189 An innovation of the reign after the
dismissal of Maupeou's ministry was that dismissed ministers
were generally no longer disgraced and exiled, which prompt-
ed Soulavie to call him the least hateful of all the Bour
boris	 He did disorace and exile Aiguillon for his
association with du Barry, and he disgraced Joly de Fleury
junior for maltreatment of prisoners	 He authorised the
payment of 100,0001. to Chalotais as compensation for his
suffering followed by a pension of 8,0001. 192• A year
later Vri11ire owed his dismissal to an earlier incident
when he had denied all knowledge of a lettre de cachet
bearing his signature 193, ThroughOut the reign Louis was
concerned to prevent persecution whether of Huguenots or
Jesuits, although he always insisted that observance of the
true religion was a better safeguard against persecution than
any change in the law.
Louis's justice, humanity, and sense of duty led him
to make a speech to the Council on 20 May 1774, "Comme je
ne veux que m'occuper que de la gloire de mon royaume et
du bonheur de mes peuples, ce n'est qu'en vous conformant
'a ces principes que Votre travail aura mon approbation" 194
At his coronation Louis declared, "Ii est bien juste que je
travaille ' rendre heureux un peuple qui contribue tout
mon bonheur, je vais maintenir m'en occuper tout entier 195,
He patronised legal and penal reform, an easing.of the corvee
(after abolition had failed), and of slavery, a complete
review of lettres de cachet, the abolition of legal torture,
and the abolition of serfdom. On a personal level he
acquired a reputation for good works, whether by not riding
over growing crops, by giving doweries to peasants he
encountered while hunting, or by lighting public bonfires in
cold winters. One of the most instructive comments on
Louis's style of politics, on the return to older and higher
standards, comes from Vergennes. On 13 August 1776 he wrote
to the Order of St. John's bailie in Alsace complimenting
him on a letter he had addressed to the king. This letter
was sure to meet with success because it showed an openness
motivated by honour alone 196, Louis XVI managed to create
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a new style of monarchy in which the crown allied itself to
the individual against the corporations; Turgot and Necker
helped create this monarchy and Guyot proclaimed its
success 
197, Ardasheff noticed that the emphasis had chang-
ed from the duties of the subject to the rights of the
citizen during the reign
One of the most striking aspects of the reign was its
re-emphasis of privilege and honour. Louis heeded Ra1's
dictum that the Great could be good friends but dangerous
enemies 199, Under Louis the peerage became an agency of
government. To qive substance to this a declaration was
made on 31 May 1775 that peers should enjoy the same position
in provincial parlements as they did in the parlement of
Paris; Louis himself explained, "...que les Princes et
pairs sont ministres essentiels de toute Cour souveraine".
The measure was deliberately meant to weaken magisterial
opposition by compromising it against ducal prestige, as
had happened in Paris over the Fitz-James affair in 1763-4
200 In Paris the peerage was used on 10 December 1774 to
thwart possible remonstrance by the recalled Chte1et and
on 20 January 1775 to prevent remonstrance against a prolong-
ed twentieth 201, Louis took care to keep a firm grip on
the peerage by reasserting that the king, and the king alone,
could summon (as opposed to invite) the peers to attend the
pr1ement 202 Also in 1775 it was ruled that forfeiture
proceedings could be heard only before peers, a pale echo
of Monsieur's Chamber of Forfeiture but still an assertion
of the peerage's political prestige and power 203• The
Mercure Historique et Politigue warned that the peers were
in danger of being reduced to "super-counsellors" 204,
In the aftermath of the Flour War the Greats' dual
authority as peers and provincial governors was exploited;
seven of them were specifically ordered to operate in both
capacities 205, StGermain's reforms reorgarilsing the army
also had the effect of upgrading gubernatorial dignity and
bringing the Greats' various types of authority into greater
concert. The advice that men of high birth should be pre-
ferred to men of lower was implemented to the full, reaching
its zenith with Seur's 1781 military regulations. Louis
believed that privilege in its rightful role was a pillar of
support for the monarchy, a point the parlement was at pains
116
to stress from its side. This patronage of birth ties in
with the second militaire ministerial, offensive, and must
have done much to facilitate it.
A new approach to government and the exercise of power
was made evident in his attitude to the Council. Another
part of his 20 May 1774 address to the Council made it
clear that he was no longer prepared to accept a Cabinet
system and would deal separately with each minister,
"Indpendemment des Conseils...". Montbarey went as far
as to claim that Louis wanted to dismantle the conciliar
structure of government, but that the plan had fallen by
the .wayside by the time the recall of the parlements had
been dealt with 206 Despite his decision to avoid a
Cabinet system, which Louis did avoid with his more import
ant ministers, Maurepas managed to edge his way into a
Prime Ministership for the bulk of government business.
Louis's choice of counsellors showed a decisive break
with Louis XV'S system, which had been to choose men Louis
XV trusted and then rely on a majority on Council to govern
the country. Louis XVI chose men to implement policies he
had already decided on (eg. Miromesnil for the recall),
and then managed the Council to ensure that the measures
were passed. Where a policy, such as the recall, would not
muster a majority Louis excluded the hostile counsellors.
So much did Louis use the Council as a consultative instead
of ruling body that Ardasheff judges it to be "decorative"
in this reign 207 None of the important policies impi.e-
mented during Maurepas's first ministry could have been
passed by a majority on Council - only.the king could fill
this gap and maintain this situation. Louis commented
over the Six Edicts that opposition on Council might give
him food for thought but would never make him change his
mind 208
In his relations with the parlement Louis adopted a
different approach to either Louis XIV or Xv. Maurepas
and Miromesnil helped foster the illusion in a willing Louis
that the parlements would be grateful for their recall to
the point of not offering any serious opposition throughout
the reign. Given this confidence, and one of Louis's
maxims, "Quand on est fort, ii. faut tre modr' 209, far
more dialogue was allowed between parlement and government
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than previously. Another reason for this wa 1-he parlement's
function of publicising and explaining the edicts it regis-
tered; the courts could guarantee public acclaim for the
government if they were sympathetic. Under Louis XVI the
parlement issued fewer remons trances and more supplications
and representations, a sign of less friction between magis-
trates and ministers. On issues of great importance Louis
felt a remonstrance was justified. During the debates on
the recall Stormont felt he could detect something of a
'loyal opposition' attitude from the throne 210, On the
Six Edicts Louis even allowed a grand deputation to present
the remonstrance at Court, something Louis XV never dared.
Once a decision had been .taken, however, absolute
obedience was required. In May 1774 Stormont had predicted,
"Those who pretend to know the present king's temper think
that he carries his notions of (royal) authority as far as
any of his predecessors" 2ll When the Grand Council remon-
strated more than Louis thought fit in January 1775 he deliv-
ered a crushing assertion of his will, "Je veux tre ob4'i,
et ce ne sera que lorsque vous exe'cuterez punctuel].ement I'
4dit qui vous concerne, que je pourrai examiner vos demandes"
212, This was almost a revival of the Louis-quatorzi'e
practice of not receiving remonstrarices till after the regis-
tration of the edict; probably Maurepas and Miromesnil
talked Louis out of such an extreme assertion of royal
authority. (The abrupt assertiveness of such words shows
that they are Louis's and not the subtler Maurepas's or
Miromesnil's.) Over the Six Edicts Louis forbade discussion
of even the most tangential issues once the lit de justice
had been held. In 1778 the parlement of Rouen
threatened to resign en masse over a twentieth; Louis
simply forbade disobedience to his will and ordered the
magistrates back to work 213, In 1787 Louis made a state
merit of royal absolutism which trespassed into the definition
of despotism it was so extreme, "C'est ].e'gal parce que je
le veux" he told Orleans in the parlement 214, (Whether by
coincidence or design, probably the former, these words
were an abrasive paraphrase of Gin, "Les loix, daris la
monarchie, sont la volonte'du monarque..." 2 -5 ,) Not even
Louis XIV had dared flaunt his power so openly. Le'vis
judged, "La monarchie tait aussi fort sous Louis XVI
tlki
que sous son aiu1" 216
Louis's absolutism, however, was more petulant than
resolute. He was unable to resist long-term pressure. He
was particularly susceptible to the idea that a minister was
damaging the monarchy. His preparedness to bow to the
opposition to Turgot spelt the doom of all his good intent-
ions, of all the lessons he had been taught, and of all the
potential for his reign - or so it seemed at the time 217,
Necker gave Louis a second chance, but the war, Necker's
ambition, and the effectiveness of Court opposition conspir-
ed to end the reign's reforming impulse.
The most interesting account of the still-born poten-
tial of Louis XVI's monarchy came in a study of where the
monarchy's best interests lay commissioned by the king in
the summer of 1774, arid which was circulated to the Secret-
aries of State. (Louis's dilemma, as expressed by the
Journal Historique, waS that he both feared the old pane-
ments and distrusted the new 218) "Telle est la nature de
la xnonarchie franFaise", began the first memoir, "qu'elle
ne doit tre temp6rée que par les moeurs", (one of Gin's
points), "La pleine autorit du monarque est donc la base
de la monarchie, lasauvegarde des peuples, le garnt dc lj
libert4 nationale". Later, "Il n'y a en France qu'un ld'gis-
lateur, qu'une autorit temporelle", all reinforcing the
d6vot tutorS' ideas.
•	 In this theoretical study, which Louis did, not choôsé to Lol-
ow ) . political programme for 1774 was drawn up: confirm
Maupeou's work, consult the nation by convoking an assembly
of three deputies from each province (one from each Order),
initiate extensive legal reform, order the bishops to reside
in their sees and abolish usuary. The recall of the parle
ments would cause irreparable damage to the monarchy and
church and would open up the way for the intermediary cor-
porations to usurp power 219, The advice was too favourable
to Maupeou to be taken up, but several parts find echoes in
Louis's attitudes or subsequent policies (eg. the fourth
and second items respectively). Such ideas were part of a
brief climate of opinion predicting new and glorious
policies; one commentator picked up a rumour that Louis
intended to visit a different province each year so as to
acquaint himself fully with his realm 22O In the event the
only two journeyc of any note Louis was to make were a
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royal progress to inspect the naval yards at Cherbourg and
the flight to Varennes - a sad analogy of the promise of
the reign as a whole.
It was Louis's tragedy that he consistently sacrificed
the lesser principle to the greater. Over what to do in
1774 he chose to follow the advice of another study of the
problems, "Le bien du service du roi et l'utilit de ses
sujets paroissent tre de rtablir l'ancien parlement, sans
en loigner les off iciers qui l'ont remplace1' 221, Soulavie
put the blame for his failure on his good intentions which
made it seem that he followed rather than led pzthlic opinion
222g. Worse, he failed to gain the popularity which might
have compensated for the loss of authority, "Habituellement
enclin'a la severite'et sans avoir le courage d'aller jusqu'
au but, le roi se montre dur, injuste" 223 - the most ironic
of all condemnations. He appeared alternately weak and
despotic - a paradox whose disastrous consequences Tocque-
yule made a theme of his account of the regime.
Louis hoped to see the end of intrigue, but instead his
irresolution allowed it to reach new heights. "The throne
he fills, far from raising him above intrigue, places him
in the centre of it", Stormont warned in May 1774 224• He
confided to the mareha1 de Noailles, "Je ne veux pas que
les honntes gens m'abandonnent" 225, yet his very treatment
of them made it impossible for them to stay. The most succ-
essful Court careers of the reign were those of men like the
parvenu trickster Pesay.
The dream of Louis Xvi's monarchy was a just, absolute,
resolute king supported by the corporations on the one hand
and the citizenry on the other. A virtuous and thrifty but
excellent Court would set an example of moral and intellect-
ual leadership. A government of honest, enlightened, indus-
trious, and disinterested ministers would govern in social,
political, and economic stability and harmony, implementing
the king's good intentions. Each part of society would
discover dignity and community of interest in service to the
state, each in its rightful place. The parlements would
protect the individual while administering a reformed legal
code. The provinces would enjoy a greater degree of
autonomy. What is surprising, considering the force des
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choses and Louis' personal limitations, is how much of
this programme was implemented. It must never be over-
looked, for example, that Louis had the courage to appoint,
and for a time support, philosophe ministers, something
which delighted public opinion, was beyond the reformers'
wildest dreams, and was distinctto the Louis-seizime
monarchy. Possibly, again taking one of Tocqueville's
themes, the very success of a reforming monarchy was the
germ of its own destruction.
The reality of Louis XVI'S monarchy was that it did
fail. From 1778 Louis lost his grip. The shock of finding
minister after minister unacceptable destroyed his faith
in politics; "Je crois que nous nous sommes encore trompe's"
226, he observed wearily to Maurepas as Clugny's incompetence
became apparant. The support for insurgents in America
rebelling against a fellow monarch undermined the ideological
foundations of the monarchy. The financial problems caused
by the war became complex and overwhelming; they passed
beyond the comprehension of the king, and, given his refusal
to countenance a bankruptcy (because it would be unjust),
beyond the capabilities of his ministers to solve. Finally,
Louis became bored and took increasingly to hunting. In the
end all the potential fell against the ominous comment in a
memoir demanding Urgent provincial reform drawn up either by
or for Necker, it arfl, "Lo changement qu'il y a eu dans
l'attachement du peuple pour leur maitre a diminue' sensible-
ment de nos jours" 227
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c'TiL)L)ili *L1 _
.his chapter examines the focal point of the regime: the
monarchy and the monarch himself. It looks at the influences
on the king and Louis XII's monarchy in practice.
Studying Louis XJI's tutors, mentors, and family influences
shows that he ascended the throne with very definite ideas on
politics and kingship. Ihe political programme that can be de-
fined was an intelligent and sensitive reworking o± seventeenth-
century absolutist ideas to fit the context of the "enlightened"
late eighteenth. Its central concept was the creation of a pol-
itical environment, analogous to that of "confidence" in flnan.e,
thro h th exercise of the virtues of "justice" and "resolution".
For the early period of his reign, many of the stereotyped
interpretations of Louis XVIcharacter do not stand up to close
examination: laziness, domination by IIarie-Antoinette, or lack
of interest in politics. ñe did possess faults and did make
mistakes, but up to 1778 these had neither compromised the crown's
authority, nor jeopardised. the reforming impulse. Louis himsell'
led this reforming impulse and achieved some remarkable successes:
two major reforming ministries, humanitarian reforms, personal
popularity, policies followed through against the opposition of
a majority on owicil, and an atmosphere of reconciliation and
debate in politics.
Linking forward to chapter 1, some reform schemes are ex-
amined in this context. These were the schemes presented by
men either already enjoying direct access to the king, or by
men who had to by-pass the normal filter of ministerial politics
to have a serious hearing.
Louis's preparedness to give the institutions.a hearing
while supporting reforming ministers gave the promise by 1778
of the monarchy leading the regime towards tha solution of
many of its problems.
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III
THE PARLEMENTS 1771-8.
It has been argued that the parlements' politics 1765-89 were
no more than a reworking of the actions and ideas of the period
1 757-65. This was the period of Jansenist opposition to the Jes-
uits, and, by implication, the absolute monarchy. This opposition
generated theories of constitution, a recognition of shared inter-
sts with the Gallicans, and even attacks on the philosophes 1•
In this study it will be shown that there are a number of distinct-
ive features in our later period: a more determined monarchy, an
unaccustomed experience of the political wilderness by the pan-
ementaires, and a raising of the panlements' sights from the smaller
target of the Jesuits to the larger one of all forces of change and
disruption in society.
We can start to look for signs of opposition to the parlements'
political power of the 1760's within the robe itself. Many robins
believed that this political power was an "abuse" of the Admin-
istrative Monarchy. A classic example of such an attitude
• was in Bertin, "pouvantai1 des parlements" 1, who would not
envisage a "Venetian" government based on a robin oligarchy.
Re described the the parlements in the 1760's as, "Un complot
et association gnrale, ou comme une secte tr' s animc(e gui
voulut d6truire le systme monarchique, pour le faire passer
en aristocratje , dans la main seule de leur compagnie. Ainsi
c'Stait une rvolution complte et sourde, gui ttit bieri
avance dans son plan" 2, The problem of parlementaire
political power disrupting government became urgent in the
Breton crisis of 1765. It "nnvincd Lvrc3y to op . e th'i
parlements even though he was a former counsellor. A committee
of: Bertier de Sauvigny, Joly de Fleury, Aguesseau, Fresnes,
Gilbert des Voisins, and Calonne was set up to investigate
means of controlling the parlements within the regime's
existing political framework . The problem, as Bastard
put it to Blancmesnil, was that ten hot heads in each parle
ment could bring government to a halt, and that administration
could not function 'when remonstrance replaced discussion
These "pro-government" robins, however, were loathe to upset
or change institutions, which, for them, would have been as
great a political crime on the government's side as it was on
the parlements'. Noreau and Ra1 suggested that a return to
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the style of monarchy practised by Louis XIV or proposed by
the duke of Burgundy would in itself solve the problem, but,
however much hope might be cherished f or a Dauphin, the prob-
1cm of how to act during the remainder of Louis XV'S reign
persisted.
On the theoretical side Montesquieu, though he had
advocated retention of the status quo, first opened up the
possibility of reform. This was simply because Hontesquieu
"id analyse the parlements and made them conscious of their
structures, origins and potentials. In 'Esprit des Lois'
)4ontesquieu showed that the par]ments as they were then con-
stituted were the most suitable of all institutions to limit
the monarchy. Moritesquieu went a step further by equating
the parlement of Paris with the British Parliament in a general
scheme of the uniformity of north European institutions. When
his magisterial friends in Paris explained this to Horace
Walpole he was horrified, "But the parlements of France were
not only nothing but courts of judicature, but the pretension
was too early and too untimely to be yet pushed" . It was
the
 conflict. betccn the p.rlcnLs aii £IIuarchy over politicai
pretensions which provoked the institutional crisis of 1770-1.
From Montesquieu's lead the philosophes began analysing
the regime, and while they were largely favourable to the
parlements, in the 1760's a body of hostile opinion did begin
to arow up. Vri summed up the conomiste attitude to the
parlements, "us furent anim6s ur des liens qul n'importaient
point 1'6tat. Ils vcndirent 'a Ia Cour leur silence pcur
tout ce qui concernent les impts, les droits des peuples et
le bonheur des citoyens; us surerit cependant emprunter le
fern du biozL public dzinc toutes las rsiStan.es qils
firerit sur les privi1ges de corps, sur des juridictions person-
elles et sur des haines particu1i?res contre les commandants
de province" 6 Voltaire called the parlements "les tyrans
—bourgeois" and likened their role in 1770-1 to that in the
Fronde, except that it was more ridiculous and less dangerous
Condorcet told Turgot that no new parlement could possibly
be worse than the existing one 8, In his 'Discours sur l'Etat
actuel de la Magistrature' (Orleans 1763) Letrosne warned
of impending disaster if the magistrates continued to follow
the same patterns of judicial abuses and political opposition
to the crown
133
• Naupeou's reform of the parlements was no bolt out of
the blue; the only surprise was its apparent permanence.
Machault had instituted ad hoc reforms with the Royal Chamber,
but no one had expected the experiment to last, and a weak
government had capitulated in 1754. l3etween Machault and
Lebrun all the possible variations were worked out; the
middle ground was most thoroughly explored by the phmrides
in 1768. ".., la magistrature civile ne doit point appartenir
'au magistrat; elle ne peut 'tre le patrimoine de personne,
une telle proprit ne peut tre 'tablie sur aucun titre
licite, ce serait une usurpation et un rglement, dont les
funesres effets sont faciles comprendre... La justice ne
doit point tre paye'e; la magistrature civile doit tre
exerce par de digries et riches citoyens, dorit la noblesse
dme et de sentiments est suprieure a 1' 'molument" 1O
This would have been an adaptation of the English Justice of
the Peace system, which would allow the advantages of the exist-
ing system without the demerit of an autonomous judicial
corporation.
In Octo.ar the Eph&ncirides crri	 less .oisLiuLive
attack on the parlements: the size of the parlement of
Paris's ressort, the number of customary laws within it, the
refusual to reform from self-interested motives, the encour-
aging of discord to stimulate litigation, and the flouting
of the spirit of justice by the letter of the law were con-
demned as "ses vices tnbreuses". The polemib and rhetoric
led to the near Rousseauist conclusion: "... que la justice
dolt t.re gratuite, souveraine, simple COmu la ziaur&'
Throughout, the Ephmeides wanted the .law to be removed
from a caste of magistrates and entrusted to men of propert'
in society. The rich should be in judgment over trie poor ana
should exercise this function as a dimension of their pro-
pertied and privileged position - all, of course, as an -
extension of Physiocracy.
The government, however, had always chosen to move in a
more direct manner - to coerce personnel rather than to
change existing institutions, and the lesson from this in
1754 was that the magistrates could always call the govern
rnent's bluff if it lacked substance. It was not till 1768
that action was taken, when Naupeou, helped by Bertin and
probably ct-Florentin, began to reform and build up the
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Grand Council. From a near-defunct relic of medieval
jurisdiction the council, which, although a part of the
magistracy, had retained independence from the parlement,
was promoted to art active court with free justice, and a
wider competence directly subservient to the Chancellor 12•
A development of great potential has been analysed by Gruder:
its counsellors began to be created intendants, against the
usual custom of appointing only masters of requests 13 This
trend did not have time to become significant, but it is
difficult not to draw the conclusion that a politically more
reliable intendant was being sou ght. These developments did
notgo unnoticed: the parlement persuaded the peers to lend
their support to representations against changing the struct-
ure and balance of the judiciary. The parlement called for
the Grand Council to be abolished as ordered by the States
General in the sixteenth century 14,
There is no evidence that the Grand Council was being
groomed to replace the other chambers; its role 1768-70
was the same it had played after 1774: to be a sword of
Damocles over the head of the parlement to force moderation
of its actions. The friction between the parlement and the
Grand Council continued through to 1771, the former fearing
that the latter would be promoted into an equal jurisdiction.
From its side the Grand Council reacted aggressively to its
new importance. "Votre Grand Cortseil", it addressed Louis
XV on 30 March 1770, 'aprs avoir porte au pied de V.M.
ses respectueuses repr'sentations stir les obstacles multiplids,
qu'il prouve de la part de plus ieurs de vos parlements dans
l'exercise de ses fonctions, attendait avec confiance que
votre sagesse et votre autorit' lui rendissent l'activit4,
sans laquelle ii ne peut pas vous servir utilement" 15•
The balance of evidence suggests that it was Boines who
put forward the idea of using the Grand Counci1 as a substit-
ute parlement, and not Maupeou, whose limited political
vision had not seen such potential for his creation 16 By
late 1770 the idea of replacing the parlement had gained
widespread currency; Condorcet and the British embassy had
noticecIit 17, In the provinces the parlement of Rennes wrote
to Louis XV on 28 January 1771, "La magistrature ne connais
salt que depuis trop longtemps le projet form' d'anantir
les loix et d'avilir leur ministres", and a month later the
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parlement of Toulouse spoke of its, "tristes pre'sentiments"
l8 After the event Thveriau de Morande described the coup
d'tat as, "L've'nement prdit depuis si longtemps" 19
Maupeou's method of operation against the hostile courts
does not suggest a step by step implementation of a master-
plan, rather a desire, "... to change the political relation-
ship between the crown and the law courts" 20• Maupeou's
efforts were first directed to coercing the chambers in Paris
to accept political limitations, and when this failed he
attempted to reform not the institutions but the personnel.
In other words, Maupeou was treading the same old ground as
his predecessors, the big difference was in the outcome when,
for once, the ministry was strong enought to face up to the
magistracy when it resisted. Maupeou's unprecedented political
strength in 1771 gave impetus to reform more through force
des choses (in reverse) then through true reforming intent.
By his own admission in a speech to the Grand Chamber - by
then composed of the counsellors of the Grand Council - he
said it was his intention to retain the old forms, but with
counsellors more loyal to the crown 2l If the process of
exilikici must of the Parisian magistrates, and replacing them
with Gzand Council counsellors and Beaumont's lawyer clerics,
could be described as a revolution by most commentators from
1771 onwards, it seems to have come as a surprise to Maupeou.
FUL iiaupeuu politics were an irrelevant footnote to the
important legal business of running a judicial system. Yet
it was the very political nature of his actions which meant
that Maupeou's reforms had to be reacted to as a political
reform with implications for the whole regime, and not just
as a matter internal to the judiciary.
After Choiseul's fall many commentators confidently
predicted that Maupeou and the parlement would have no need
to oppose each other arid that relations would return to normal
22 Maupeou, though, would make no concessions on royal
prerogatives in the parlement, which in turn continued to
remonstrate against the government's "despotism". Lord
Harcourt now accurately foresaw the course of conflict
leading to confrontation, "if the parlemerit does not comply
with the king's commands, some people think it will be dis-
solved; and a new one formed of the king's appointment" 23
The "ill-humoured" magistrates would make the country
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ungovernable as long as Naupeou and Aiguillon remained in
office, they could not forgive Maupedu his treatment of them
th oust Choiseul. Maupeou had always foreseen this possibil-
ity, and had spent 1768-71 building up the Grand Council to
the point where it could stand in for the parlement. If there
was any plan here it was that Maupeou intended ref ighting the
political battles of the 1750's, when Machault had set his
Royal Chamber against the parlement, only this time he intend-
ed the crown to win.
Even given so definite an aim, Miromesnil's correspondence
January-February 1771 shows Maupeou misjudging, miscalculating,
and xnishand1ing until he was faced with a situation whose
scope far exceeded Naupeou's expectations 24 1'laupeou met
remonstrance with threat culminating in the events of the
night of 21 January. Three musketeers called on each recal-
citrant magistrate to force him to swear loyalty to the
• Chancellor, in effect at gun point. The next day the thorough-
- ly shaken magistrates repudiated their oaths and remonstrated
again.	 Naupeou replied this time by exiling the majority
of magistrates in the Grand Chamber in the hope that a show
of force would coerce their colleaques into submission.
Maupcou had been counting on being able to execute a simple
reshuffle of chambers by substituting the Grand Council for
the Grand Chamber and keeping all the remaining chambers under
ti;ht contrc,i. IIC iad, however, underestimated the uepth of
opposition he had incurred throughout the magistracy 25
The harshness of the exiles )laupeou imposed hardened
opinion against him to the point where opposition became a
matter of honour. Only a rump of magistrates of suspect
quality and integrity could be bribed or coerced into going
along with his plans - nowhere near enough to make the exist-
ing judicial structure viable 26 The magistrates' resolution
in adversity astonished every commentator: by October 1771
throughout the kingdom 700 counsellors had been exiled, and
in all 100,000 people had been exiled or made redundant in
Paris alone; by 1774 27 (This second figure was Walpole's guess;
he was well informed and a reliable commentator with no reason to
provide inaccurate information. In the absence of any other estii-
ates, it can serve as a potent indication of contemporary belief).
Naupeou had	 hoped to win back support by showing that his courts
dispensed quicker, less partial, and more rational justice, but aziy
advantages in this direction were more than balaxiced by the allegeu
attack on property and subversion of fundamental laws. His miscaJ
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are evident in the judicial interregnum which occurred
between late January and mid-March as he bargained, threatened
and negotiated to avoid a full scale confiscation of offices
and attendant reorganisation of the courts. Not even Maupeou's
defenders could argue that he was a man motivated by gener.
osity in this delay. On 17 March Maupeou accepted the inevit-
able and called a lit de justice to install the new courts,
the parlement Maupeou as it was dubbed. For its part the
patriot opposition was equally loathe to accept the magnitude
of the changes; day to day Hardy expected to hear of the
recall of the exiles, and even in August the Journal Historique
could still record that the patriots believed Maupeou was
bluffing 28
Maupeou's method of operation dictated the course of events
in both Paris and the provinces. His failure to credit his
opponents with any strength of purpose or will to resist,
possibly even his failure to believe magistrates would want
to resist his reforms once they understood them, meant that he
was always initially checked by some obstacle he had not f ore
seen, and for which he had made no provision, which forced
him to act more drastically than he had intended. This in
turn meant that he urul1y und he had to clear a?zay o much
of the existing structures that he and his allies had a much
freer hand than they had originally anticipated. In Paris a
now generation of a;itratz came forward to replace tlioe
exileds Joly de Fleury (Omer-Louis-Franois, the new procur-
ator general), Vergs (advocate general), and Aguesseau, whom
one commentator believed was Maupeou's niinence grise in 1771
29• It is for this reason that the reforms Maupeou did
achieve seemed so disappointing, because from the Chancellor's
side there never was a grand scheme to be implemented.
At the point where Maupeou found he would have to exert
.politica]. action to implement his reform of the ressort of
Paris, the evidence points in two different directions. The
first is that Maupeou wanted to make a clean sweep of the
existing chambers and set up a Chamber of Peers in Paris with
Superior Councils in each province	 The second was that
Maupeou tried to cow enough maqistrates into submission to
form a rump parlement 31• This dichotomy can be reconciled
if Maupeou was prevented from carrying through reform to its
logical conclusion and forced to compromise. Having alienated
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almost all the magistrates, he found himself in a, "cruelle
perplxite4', for "II n'avait jamais compt sur une dfection
totale (des magistrats) ", and had to hawk round all the
chambers f or men prepared to serve under him. He was only
rescued by Boiries's suggestion of using the Grand Council 32
At the same time many of the Great supporting him, particularly
Aiguillon, were far from whole-heartedly in favour of such
drastic reform.
This interpretation is reinforced when we analyse the
Chancellor's only real reforming impulse. This was in the
ressort of the parlement of Paris. The size of this ressort,
and the attendent abuses, had attracted attention from the
middle ages onwards, but in wholly legalist terms. Maupeou
was the last in a long line of jurists to concern himself
with this problem, relatively unencumbered by political
corporations, but against this it contained a host of customary
jurisdictions based on the Frankish heritage. Maupeou could
hark back to a recent plan of Mirabeau's 	 for support for
his concept of breaking up the ressort into smaller more homo-
genous regions based on local centres. The centres Maupeou
chose as the seats of the Superior Councils, as the newly
credLed courts were named, were Blois, Chlons, Clermont
Ferrand (Court of Aids), Lyon (Court of Monies), and Poitiers
(a former Jesuit centre). The structure of the Superior
Counciis was of a first president (salaried at 6,0001.),
two presidents (4,0001.), twenty counsellors (2,0001.), one
advocate (3,0001.), one procurator (4,0001.), and two sub-
stitutes (1,0001.). The Superior Council of Blois, however,
shows how the reality failed to live up to the intent of the
reforms. It could only muster ten counsellors on top of its
three presidents, and half of these thirteen were related.
The structure of the new courts was similar to the Presidial
courts, but their jurisdictions were rationalised baili-
wick boundaries; around Lyon the attendant zeform of the
bailiwicks proved contentious and difficult 	 The Superior
Councils were never allowed any political competence and the
magisterial posts were revokable "charges" as opposed to
venal "offices"
This then was the structure of reform in which }laupeou
was truly interested. In 1773 one Mallebay-de-la-Nothe could
publish 'Questions de Droit, de Jurisprudence, et d'Usaqe des
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Provinces de Droit crit du Ressort du Parlement de Paris'
(Paris 1773), which welcomed the beginnings of a rational and
uniform codification of laws. Its reviewer added, "Il est
superflu, sans doute, d'observer ici que la circonscriptiori
du parlement de la capitale ne peut diminuer l'utilit4' de ses
recherches; les provinces qui ne venaient y plaider qu'
si grands frais, forment aujourd'hui, pour la plupart, les
ressorts des conseils supéieurs de Clermont et de Lyon...".
Such definite and specific praise was rare, because it was
Paris which lost out to the provinces, and such comments help
redress the literary balance, which was otherwise universally
hostile. Maupeou's other great aspiration was the new legal
code Mallebay referred to. By 1774 Haupeou could announce a
definite plan to produce a uniform legal system 36•
These were the very limited reforming objectives Maupeou
had set himself, but in the process of attempting to implement
the restructuring of the ressort, Maupeou precipitated polit-
ical crisis culminating in a near clean sweep of the previous
magistracy and its replacement by a new judiciary recruited
from the Presidial courts or exjesuits. This process started
when Maupeou failed to coerce the magistrates in Paris to
accept his personal dominance in the parlcment and fziiled to
persuade the existing magistracy to accept his new direction
of the judiciary. It was from this point that the intent of
Maupeou's reform becamc completely 'ubservent to the methods
he used to control the courts, and the analysis of Maupeou's
role in the regime comes down to his day to day political
management. As we shall see below, Stormont's account of this
management shows how it compromised the long term hopes for
reform and meant that, after 1774, there remained nothing to
show for four years of effort and conflict.
From this start, the patriots feared that Maupeou's reforms
would acquire a logic of their own leading to the dismantling
of the corporate, Catholic, d customary natue of the regime.
Progressively, after the parlements, the other independent
corporations would be attacked	 There were constant scares
that one corporation or another was in danger, in June 1772,
for example, the demise of the King's Secretaries was predicted
38 The Espion Anglais foresaw another danger - the crown had
used the parlement to destroy the States General, now the
parlement in its turn was to be disposed of. With the
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parlement would also disappear the remaining provincial
States	 Maupeou was certainly no friend of provincial
autonomy, and Aiguillon was an active enemy of local States;
corroborative evidence for the ministry's hostility to States
came from Provence where the Chancellor forced plans to
recreate the States of Provence in their seventeenth-century
form to be abandoned 4O	 The fear of Maupeou's rule was
best expressed in E3esanon where the parlement believed that
the people would be reduced to, "l'instinct, l'obissance, le
chtiment" 4l• A more interesting observation about Maupeou's
effect on political life was made by Miromesnil, who saw that
the old patterns of the Great in opposition to the clergy in
opposition to the magistracy would be replaced by a struggle
between the crown and the political lites in which the people
would be the losers 42• A letter from the nobility of France
(i.e. the patriots) to each Prince of the Blood spoke of the
same fear that the old patterns would be replaced by, "...un
stat de guerre entre le faible et le fort, entre i.e prince et
ses sujets"	 (This was, paradoxically, the most important
criticism the Old Dauphin had made of Rousseau's philosophy.)
In the event Maupeou either stayed his hand - or had never
intn&d to act in the first place - and attacked only the
parlements. The false-alarm, however, proved to be good
practice for the debate over Turgot's six Edicts when the same
argcnt crc to bc used to great effect.
An analysis of the reform of the parlement by Stormont
in November 1774 reinforces much of what has been said above,
and draws together much of the contemporary thinking on
Maupeou. "I am inclined to think that if the Chancellor,
when he made the Great Revolution, had acted with temper and
moderation, had abolished the parlement, but treated all the
individuals with clemency , instead of adding violence to
violence, cruelty to cruelty, had shewn himself solicitous
of putting the new parlement upon the most respectable footing,
had endevouredto consolidate his work more and more, instead
of shewing the greatest indifference to it, after his personal
resentments were gratified ... the Revolution so favourable
to royal authority, would have rested upon such a foundation
as no minister would have attempted to shake, no sovereign,
in his senses, have suffered to be shaken'
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Not even the most favourable commentator has been able
to do more than excuse the personnel Maupeouhad to use. Rg-
naud made the bitterest and most damning comments it was now
the man rather than the office which was for sale '. Condorcet
had foreseen the greater risk of corruption in the new parle-
ment, but the reality mus't have been a sore blow to Maupeou 46•
The reformed parlement, the"parlement Maupeou", was at first,
"contemptible", then, "ridiculous", axifinally, "the subject
of popular derision"	 singled out for vilification was the
new procurator-general Joly de Fleury, "... abme'de dettes,
esclave d'une femzne avare". In June 1774 he was disgraced for
his part in a plot to discredit Sartines - he had deliberately
maltreated prisoners to provoke discontent in the capital 48,
The only dissenting voice from otherwise universal condemnation
is Bisson, the family's historiographer. He claims that Omer-
Louis-Franpis did not deserve the slanderous treatment he
received and that in reality he set higher standards of cons-
cientious apolitical administration in the law courts, a devel-
opznent continued in the new reign, and by implication attribut-
able to Maupeou's reforms as a whole
The use of priests added fuel to the flames of a supposed
Jesuit ploi whereby Maupeou was taking revenge for Choiseul's
abolition of the Order in 1764. This interpretation allowed
the patriots to link Maupeou's reforms with the century's
earlier battles over Unigenitus. It was very obvious that
Jansenists were out of favour and magistrates who had defend-
ed the Jesuits were in favour 50, Maupeou, however, like every
other high ranking magistrate, had participated in the dis-
solution of the Jesuits, and if former Jesuits were associated
with the new courts it was not so much from premeditated plot
as expedience after the event - these were the only men
Maupeou could find to serve under him. That there was no plot
is further demonstrated by the unreliability of Maupeou's
magistrates. Of the 400 "renegades" and "gens de fortune" in
the new parlement 200 gave Maupeou trouble 51, as witnessed
by his problems over the twentieth in 1772
Another direction in which Maupeou's quest for counsellors
took him was the decline in the noble nature of the magistracy.
The abolition of venality destroyed the magistrates' ability
to be a self-regulating 1ite, but more to the point was that
not enough ennobled magistrates were prepared to serve to
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preserve the former juridical complexion of the courts. This
change meant that other nobles were nOt prepared to have cases
judged before men they did not regard as their peers; this
diminution in the volume of litigation was a serious defect
in the system which Maupeou could only hope to have rectified
U Louis XVI had supported him in 1774. Regnaud described
the new chamber•of the Chtelet as, "... coxnpos4 pour la plu
part, de gens ports de la plus vile extraction et gui en
prennant ces charges veulent se tJ.rer de l.a bassesse d'origine
o' .i est plonge'leur famille" 52, The Journal Historique
accused Maupeou of deliberately recruiting commoners in the
Superior Council of Compigne, and the new parlement of Rennes
was largely commoner "faute de mieux"	 The Espiori Anglais
believed that Maupeou was appealing to the Third Order in every
aspect of his reform	 These three sources (and four com-
mentators) were all patriot, and their attempt to show a
deeper motive behind ad hoc expedient gives us an insight
into much of the contemporary reaction to Maupeou on both sides.
A group alienated by Maupéou was the philosophes. Their
resounding and unexpected defeat in 1770 had left them in
great disarray, split between the proscribed radicals following
'Systme de la Nature' and the eclipsed lite who had tried
to repudiate it. Voltaire had given a lead by penning swift,
fulsome, and continuing praise of the Chancellor. To him was
attributed the paean that Fleury had gained France Lorraine,
Choiseul Corsica, but Maupeou, "... supieur encore 'a des
ces deux grands ministres, rend au roi Ia France entire"
Voltaire attempted to lend the reforms an ideological respect-
ability with his play 'Les Lois de Minos' in 1773, in which
the mythical king was equated with the only too real Maupeou.
The play was badly received butsuch was Voltaire's standing
that he survived the episode 56• Maupeou certainly did not
return the compliment: censorship was reimposed, the Ency-
clopedists proscribed, and all the barbarities Voltaire had
condemned in the old parlements were even more present in the
new. Hardy kept a catalogue of outrages: for January 1772
there was a public breaking on the wheel, an execution was
carried out without the crime being named, and the "question"
was openly used	 This was a simple sacrifice of a weaker
interest group to a stronger: the philosophes to the church.
The clergy in return noted the patronage they enjoyed under
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Maupeou 58, and from the patriot side came the analysis,
"Le xninistere actuel leur est devoue .. • non par une zlé
veritable pour l.a religion, mais pour une politique nEccessaire"
59
The miscalculation Maupeou made with the various courts
and chambers in Paris was repeated in the provinces as he
turned from one parlement to the next without finding support
sufficient to avoid drastic reform. As early as 23 January
1771 Lord Harcourt could write, "The other parlements will
follow the example (of the parlement of Paris) and be sent
into exile, which will throw this kingdom into the greatest
confusion and disorder" 60, This was confirmed in April from
a commentator with a different political outlook, "La forme
du gouvernement française est totalement changd Si l'ori doit
regarder comme solides les oprations de M. le Charicelier".
Ressé'guier predicted that their love of the "lIbert des
citoyeris" and their fondness of harking back to Cicero and
Demosthenes would force the provincial parlernents into
opposition leading to exile. The chevalier concluded that if
the king ordered it "200,000" men would rise against Maupeou
Though baseless, this last remark illustrates the polit-
ical mythology of the day that the Icing had been tricked into
relinquishing power by evil men who kept him in ignorance of
the state of his nation.
The most easily followed account of upcou's actions
in the provinces is Albertas's diary - which was also the only
account favourable to Maupeou. In January the parlement of
Rennes led the provincial attack on Maupeou, in February it
was Rouen, and in March Toulouse, Roueri and Besanon took up
the issuing of remonstrances against what wa happening in
Paris. These remonstrances struck at the heart of French
absolutism; they called on the unit6des classes, fundamental
laws, and the States General. to curb the government. In some
provinces the reform was easy in Rousillon and. Corsica
where the institution had no depth, or in Aix and Eordeaux
where local supporters of the Court Party (Albertas and
Richelieu respectively) had prepared the ground. In the
majority of cases, however, the new courts had to be made up
of new personnel of suspect quality and often in the face
of bitter local hostility. Over the summer lits de justice
were held in every par].ement or provincial council turning
them into "parlements Maupeou". Reaction varied: in Besanon
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and Douai the public welcomed the changes, in Rennes and
Rouen there was discontent, and in Pau street-fighting broke
out 62	 Croj"s political chronology of 1771 was of stiff
resistance January to May, but after May the government's
victory was assured and the remainder of the year was a
period of mopping up and consolidating; the commonest
reaction of those not immediately concerned was apathy 63•
The extension of the reforms into the provincial pane-
tkie
ments produced far less of interest than the events of,centre
where the issues had been thrashed out. The political process
differed between the areas where Maupeou had set up new
Superior Councils (Bayeux, Nimes, and Arras) and those where
he had to preserve existing structures; in these latter polit-
ical opposition could more easily cause administrative and
judicial disruption. As a result Maupeou had either to act
with greater ruthlessness or from surer ground, eg. the
preparation of the Court of Aids in Aix to take over smoothly
from the parlement whose counsellors were exiled. Generally,
the change over was smoother in the provinces and more readily
accepted such that
	
by August 1772 Albertas could comment,
"Le parlement de Bordeaux va le mieux du monde. L'ctdministra
, ,
	 64tion de la justice n'a ete jarnais plus active ni meilicure"
The reform of the parlements involved the rest of the
old regime's provincial administrative structures. While the
governors stole the limelight by the use of troops to overawe
the magistrates and any possible popular support the detailed
administrative work had to be done by the intendant. The
intendant was brought into much closer co-operation with the
local legal structures, a development noticed by both sides 65
A feature of Maupeou's reforms was the attempt to make the
intendant the first president of his local parlement or
Superior Council. This may have been another of Boines's
suggestions as he himself had been simultaneously intendant
of Besaripon and first president of the parlement before being
called to the ministry. In Paris Bertier de Sauvigny, and
in Chlons, Rouill d'Orfeuil held both posts. The trend
was not uniform, but it attracted comment and seemed to
point to some future upheaval
	 . Maupeou did not disgrace
more than a handful of stoutly Choiseulist intendants, but
he shuffled them round to avoid opposition to the new
courts. Maupeou returned to the intendants the political
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power vis--vis the political corporations that they had been
losing over the previous two decades, but in the process he
made them bitterly unpopular and made them vulnerable to
Necker's attack later in the 1770's.
Even more than for most political issues in the regime,
objective reporting on the new courts is almost impossible
to find. Where a new legal centre was opened up, or more
employment brought into a provincial backwater, the reforms
were well received 67• In general, though, the great legal
centres such as Paris, Rennes, or Toulouse were plunged into
economic recession because of the reduced volume of litigation,
the reduction in the number of personnel, and the reduced flow
of money through the "free" legal system 68; here, of course,
the reforms were hated and reviled. The key to Maupeou's
success, though, was internal tranquility; he had come to
power on the accusation that Choiseul could not provide it.
This came down, in the last resort, to the price of bread.
Many patriots believed that the parlement had been deceived
even if unwittingly, by the conomistes into adopting physio-
crat policies of high food prices 70, Maupeou made no such
mistake 1771-3, and a policy of government controlled low
bread prices kept the internal peace 71, Given internal
tranquility the bulk of the population was apathetic towards
what they regarded as an "affaire de robe" 72, and while the
disruption within the robe was immense there was no revolution-
ary confrontation in society.
Maupeou did promise very genuine achievement: magistrates
were now servants of the community and crown, had no constit-
utional defence of autonomy, justice was free, litigation
took far less time, lower courts and jurisdictions - notably
the bailiwicks - were reformed, and the abusively large
ressort of the parlement of Paris dismantled. In Arras a
reform pointed to a possible futures the Superior Council in
1772 ordered that a charge of murder could not be brought
unless a post mortem proved that the crime had been committed
And finally, we have Maupeou's own assurance that Louis
XVI'S reign would have seen a "Code Naupeou" bringing France
under a unified legal system. Given the opportunity,
however, Maupeou's performance disappointed most people who
desired genuine reform, and he failed to capture the support
of men who had detested the old parlements (Voltaire
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excepted)	 The faults of the old parlements were trans-
mitted to the new because in most cases the institution
remained unchanged, and by a cruel paradox the magistrates
of true integrity had been forced to join the exiles. An
example of how little had changed came with the renewal of
a twentietft in 1771-2; several parlements remonstrated
against high taxes. It really seemed that the right hand
did not know what the left was doing when the Gazette de
France published a supplement praising the local States for
ratifying the tax where the parlements were refusing; the
parlement condemned the supplement to be burnt
Maupeou was caught in a quandry which goes part way to
explaining the paucity of reform. Haupeou was driven forward
by the logic of the events he had set fri motion, he had to
create a viable alternative parlement if the crown was not
to suffer the same defeat as in 1754; behind him also were
men like Lebrun who saw visions of revolutionary reform.
Holding him back were not only his own inclinations against
drastic change, but also the refusal of the Court to allow
some of the most important reforms, culminating in Louis XV'S
veto against transforming all parlements into Superior Councils.
The focal point of the reformed judiciary was to have been the
Chamber of Peers, which would have been the ultimate court of
appeal and would have assumed all the political functions of
Lht o1I pdLlemerlts. The Journal Iiistorique believed that
the creation of this Court would have been the confirmation
of all previous reforms 76, (The structure and implications
of this chamber are explored in a note below). Maupeou was
not allowed to create the chamber, it might well have been
the price Louis XV and Aiguillon were prepared to pay to have
the Princes of the Blood reconciled to the reforms to date.
We are left to speculate whether, had Maupeou been given
support by Louis XVI, he would have created a Chamber of
Peers, demoted every parlement to a Superior touncil, and
implemented the plan Lebrun claimed for him, or whether,
having completed the change in the relationship between crown
and magistrate, he would have rested on his laurels.
Louis XVI'S refusal to ratify Maupeou's reforms takes
them out of the mainstream of the old regime's development.
The majority of the men who rere to make up the parlement
1774-90 had spent three gruelling years in exile; they
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needed to produce some coherent body of thought which would
prevent the government from confiscating their offices in the
future; Grossclaude proves the point for Nalesherbes
The nature of Maupeou's reforms was analysed in great detail
and the lessons drawn. The exiles realised that the unite'
des classes had been a mistake, just as Horace Walpole had
predicted; they accordingly looked to the States General,
rather than the sum of the parlements, as the counter balance
to the monarchy. They also realised that Maupeou had managed
to isolate one area of privilege from the others. They
realised, thirdly, that as long as the corporations and privi
1gie"s set themselves up as rivals to the crown they were in
danger, so just as Maupeou had tried to readjust the relation-
ship between crown and parlements, so the exiles for their
part reached the same conclusion though to different effect.
Allthree of these realisations were to form themes of parle
mentaire activity after 1774. 	 -
In the wider context the parlemerits were moving towards
a conservative political philosophy. Roberts, however, warns
against interpreting pre-Revolutionary politics as right
versus left, and suggests instead that in the late old regime
the division was between a reforming government possessed of
the political initiative and the parlements reacting defensive-
ly to it, the political process, then, is more important than
its content for establishing political definitions. The
major flaw in the development of a conservative ideology was
the parlement's reluctance to forego its appeal to the mob,
a fickle ally at the best of times, and a disaster 1788-9.
The elements of a conservative philosophy were all present in
the late century, many of them derived from seVenteenth-cen-
tury absolutists such as Boussuet, but despite tentative
efforts they failed to coalesce. In his comparative analysis
of British and French politics 1763-1789, Jarrett sets out
to prove that Burke succeeded in Britain, where Malesherbes
failed in France, to create a coherent conservatism. Much
of the rest of this chapter will be concerned with gathering
together the disparate elements of the abortive French
conservatism 78
The 17614 anti-Jesuit alliance was defunct by 1771,
there could no longer be a rapprochement between the magis-
trates and the radical philosophes. The parlement, however,
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had imbibed some Rousseauist ideas, and the link with the high
Enlightenment remained, notably through St-Fargeau . The
ideological heart of the patriot opposition was the Jansenists,
"Le Jansnisme ayant perdu son grand m6rite, son intrt
veritable, par l'extinction des Jsuites en France, s'est
transforms dans le parti du patriotisme" 80	 The forced
alliance of enlightened opinion with political opposition was
noticed by Bachaumont, who drew his readers' attention to it
as an important development 81
The dvots accused the patriots of being in alliance
with the freemasons 82 Montbarey blamed Maupeou for giving
the freemasons and "anarchists" the opportunity to present
themselves as defenders of privilege and fundamental law 83
The masons attracted attention in 1771 as an outlet for the
political ambitions of the Great now the parlement, and to
some extent the Court, were closed to them.	 In 177]. Chartres
was elected Grand Master, and he undertook a vigorous re
organisation of the masons and members of the most illustrious
families joined openly (eg. Rohan, Noailles, Polignac,
Montmorency, Bouillon, Séqur). The masons had already
entrenched themselves in the Enlightenment, Voltaire and Mira-
beau were members, and some evidence suggests that the Ency-
clopedia itself was the focus of a lodge 	 . It would,
however, be a mistake to overestimate the masons' effectiveness,
and by implication the validity of the plot theory of the
Revolution - the fallacious theory that the Revolution was
caused by, "... a crew of freemasons and philosophes egged
on by Jansenists and Protestants" 85 Although there were
up to 50,000 masons in over 600 lodges by 1789, their true
role in the Revolution was to serve as a scape-goat for the
traumatised Royalists of the 1790's;	 they in fact experienc-
ed a crisis of relative political ineffectiveness in the late
century. The plot theory can be disproved on every detail,
even though the overall idea has retained a compelling
fascination for the right 86, The freemasons' real import-
ance was not in direct political action, but in the more
nebulous dissemination of ideas and formulation of opinions.
The masons showed an overt interest in politics in
Bordeaux in 1775 when the local lodge led the celebrations
at the recall of the parlement 87, By the late 1770's their
influence and scope was widely reported, and they were
149
identified as a political elite associated with the parle
ments 88 The freemasons ran in the Frondeui tradition of
French politics, although unwittingly on the part of most
members. With the Hellfire Club in Britain, they formed an
important link in the cosmopolitan nature of Europe's (and
America's) aristocracy. '(The British embassy probably gained
much of its intelligence from this source.) The difference
between the masons and any other organisation was their
ability to operate simultaneously at all levels of society.
They should be seen as a clandestine aristocratic pressure
group following the Choiseulist policies of opposing Maupeou
and favouring a war with Britain.
Aiguillon attempted to bridge the gap between old and new
parlements using Malesherbes and the psychological crisis of
the third anniversary of the reforms. This attempt, fore
doomed first by the intransigence of the exiles and then
by their knowledge of victory in the fulness of time, contin-
ued through to September 1774. When Malesherbes refused the
first presidency of a partially.recalled parlement in Septem-
ber 1774 Stormont analysed, "He never adopted all the principles
of hi corporation, never went the same length that mctny of
Lhe:a did, being convinced they carried things £uch too tar,
but when he found them oppressed by a violent exertion of
power, he united with them, and shared their fate" 89, This
pazsa cGSc1ibes nut only the process whereby the patriot oppos-
ition to Maupeou became resolutely cemented, but also the
integrity of the magistrates involved.
The actual recall produced, naturally, fears that the
parlements would simply take up where they had left of f in
December l770 this eventuality had even been foreseen by
Miromesnil in February 1771 o. Stormont predicted that the
parlement "... would plant many thorns upon the king's pillow
before he dies'	 The Court party was in despair at the
decision which they feared would cause the reime to decay into
a Venetian republic 92, 6tra warned of the danger of "Un
gouvernement populaire, en mettant le roi dans l.a dpendance
d'un corps qui a souvent excd les bornes de son autorit"
The various courts Maupeou had set up protested that the
king was sacrificing his authority to short-term political
gain, but their advice was too self-interested to be heeded.
In the short-term these fears proved to be groundless, and the
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immediate concern was the relationship between the restants
and rentrSs.
It was at Louis XVI'S own insistence that the magistrates
who had served under MaupeoQ were reinstated on the same terms
as the exiles. When this idea first made its appearance in
early July 1774 Stormont dismissed it, it, "... would breed
endless jealousies and disputes, and poison the sources of
justice more and more" 	 Louis, however, insisted that a
display of royal justice and resolution would reconcile all
magistrates to the crown and to each other. The Journal
Historique reported hostility between the groups as early as
October - before the parlement had even been reinstated 95
The Espion Dé'valis predicted a generation of bitterness and
dispute 9b This proved to be correct in the case of some
provincial parlemerits, particularly Grenoble which was para-
lysed by faction and dispute for years	 In Paris, however,
while rancour and dispute remained, affairs of state forced
the magistrates to ignore them. The motives behind Louis's
action also precluded using the restants as a pressure group
favourable to the government; under the impression of sacri
ficinq lesser interests to the greater (justice), Louis threw
away every advantage which could have been extracted from the
recall
The patriots in December 1774 had to come to terms with
their er'rience atMaupcou' s hac1s • The formula was express
ed in the Journal Encyc1opdique that Maupeou's very actions
had demonstrated the need for a strong parlemerit and the need
for the crown to act through it 98, The man who came to the
fore as the founder of new patterns of thought was S'guier,
who had only joined the exiles at the last minute (like Male-
sherbes) and was eager to prove his patriot zeal against the
charge of being a crypto-Jesuit	 On 11 December 1774, in
his address to the assembled parlement, S'guier had already
consigned Maupeou to the same reviled category of man as
)lachault, "Ce n'est pas la premire tentative de cette nature
dont l'histoire nous a conserve le souvenir. Les vnements
politiques se succdrent et se ressemblent, les mmes pr
textes servirant toujours de motif aux mimes revolutions" lOOt
According to Moreau this speech must have been Sguier's mild-
est for the future ones shocked even hardened men 101,
It was the innovation of three years in exile to show
the parlements, when based on venality of office, to be the
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guardians of the constitution, the basic conservative force
in society against which rash reform would always fail in the
end, Cobban describes this idea as ",.. the final crystallis
ation of the constitutional doctrine of the parlements", and
Capefigue enlarges, "Un esprit de conservation, un besoin
incessant de prserver les vieilles formes de la soci6te'
coritre les novateurs qui cherchaient "a en boulverser les
bases", was developed. The parlement invol^ed the States
General as the ultimate authority for their claims 102• This
call for the States General is accounted for by the idea that
the magistrates expected them to behave as the Assembly of
the Clergy did, that is as a defender of privilege l03 The
parlements became the defenders of property and privilege
against the crown and the philosophes 104• Such a position
automatically bears comparison with Burke's in Britain. It
is not that the magistrates copied Burke, but that Burke brought
back his ideas on institutional conservatism from France. From
his correspondence it is obvious that Burke, like so many of
the Whigs of the day (eg. Horace Walpole), had links with
French political life. When he visited Paris in 1773 his
arguments with the philosophes were such an unexpected - and
successful - novelty that he set a fashion l05 Many of the
ideas in 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' were borrow-
ed directly from speeches in the parlement as far back as 1759,
and the debate on the Six Edicts produced a wealth of preced-
ents for Burke, who was in France at the time 106•	 In Burke's
ideas of 1790's in Britain, therefore, we see a consolidation
of the conservative political thinking of the previous half
century in France.
Excluding the problem of grain where the parlement
of Paris had already established its position in 1770, there
was relative peace between the parlement and the government
for the first year after recall. The time was taken up with
debating the recall, and with the case of Richelieu against
Nme. de St-Vincent 107w The political scene according to
Soulavie, was split between royalists and reformers with the
parlements holding the balance until 1776 when the debate
over the Six Edicts forced the parlement to adopt a 'royalist"
position l08	 This debate was coincided, deliberately, with
that over "Inconvnients" and "Le Moriargue Accompli". The pane-
ments were thus able to unite the issues of privilege, property
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fundamental law, custom, religion, tradition and defence of
the monarchy. One specific part of the reform of the guilds
attracted particular notice, this was the intent to create a
free market economy. The parlements had already been caught
out by injudicious, support of a free market in grain in 1768
70, and were hence predisposed to be wary of it, a wariness
confirmed by the Flour War. The exile gave the patriots time
to work out a rational opposition to the free market, and the
Six Edicts gave them a chance to express themselves on this
as well: the freeing of the grain trade in the 1760's had been
an unfortunate mistake based on the coincidence of half a
dozen exceptionally good harvests keeping supply well above
internal demand, which masked the demerits of the policy.
Turgot had had published, Essai sur la Liberte'du Commerce
et de l'Industrie' (Bigot de SainteCroix. Paris 1775), to
explain his ideas on a free market economy, which were, briefly
that once freed from artificial restriction the laws of supply
and demand would ensure adequate distribution, would ensure
a sufficiently high price to the supplier for adequate profit
while ensuring a sufficiently low price to the consumer to
enable him to afford the commodity. Such a belief was a class-
ic expression of physiocracy: rule by natures The par1.ement,
however, could not agree; only a minor fluctuation in the
price of food was needed to place it beyond the economic reach
of mi1lioi' with the consequence of insurrections suU as the
Flour War. The consumer was always at the mercy of the supplier
because prices would not fall to the lowest tolerable profit
margin but rise to highest point the market would bear, inevit-
ably leaving the poorest to starve. The profits of speculation
would not be ploughed back into the economy but widen the gap
between rich and poor.
On the specific issue of guilds the parlement adapted the
divot critique of Rousseau to the problem at hand. The jour-
nalier would now be at the mercy of his emploer, and would
no longer even have his guild's limited welfare services to
fall back on. State or Church charity would be inadequate to
fill the gap which would be left by the guilds. Professional
standards would be sacrificed to profit following the abolition
of the last vestiges of quality control. (This was a specious
argument as the guilds had decayed away from most of their
original functions.) The arguments over the illegal abolition
1S3
of property were those raised over Maupeou's reforms, as
was the fear that once one corporation had been attacked none
could be safe. The parlement expressed the fear that once
the juridical structure of industry was broken down the true
economic relationship of exploitation between employer and
employee would be laid bear. The parlemerit had no objection
to one social group exploiting another - magistrates exploited
everyone who used the legal system - but it feared the con-
sequences of this exploitation being realised and seen for what
it was. The parlement failed to see how class warfare, sooner
or later, could be avoided. Serious short-term consequences
would be an exodus from the land in an illusory quest for
jobs in the towns. This would depress agriculture, it would
also depress wages in the towns and throw incalculable numbers
onto inadequate public charity. The parlement showed up every
weakness of capitalism before it had become the official econ-
omic system; they shared Linguet's opinion of free marketeers,
"us tueritles homnies pour les rendre heureux" 109,
The political issues of the Six Edicts will be explored
in Appendix I, but they formed just the focal point for a
coherent ideology dominated by seven leading figures in the
parlement. The first was Malesherbes who remained first presi-
dent of the recalled Court of Aids until becoming a reluctant
minister in June 1775. As the president Malesherbes kept up
a stream of attacks on abuse; the famous May 1775 remonstrance,
which was widely noted and published in July 110, was in part
devoted to provincial autonomy and the problem of States in
general. Malesherbes showed that until the States General
were convoked the parlement had a duty to stand in for them.
In the provinces he praised the States Countries, and asked
the government to set up States in all the pays d'6lections.
He confided to Augéard a remark which became a cornerstone
of patriot ideologys "Sans parlement point de monarchie" 111,
Miromesnil was an important figure up to 1777, though
like Malesherbes he had compromised his reputation with the
parlement by serving in the ministry. Miromesnil had con-
demned Maupeou's reforms, saying that the interests of the
crown were better served by longterm policy than short-
term shows of strength 112 Over the Six Edicts Miromesnil
led the opposition within the ministry. On the other hand
Miromesnil did not favour a politically strong parlement.
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In August 1775 he was accused of allowing the privileges of
the parlement to be eroded, and that, while subtler than
Maupeou, he was just as dangerous to the courts 113• A man
of similar political pursuasion was Joly de Fleury; accord-
ing to Georgel it was he who drafted the edict of recall in
1774 114
Acting wholly within the parlement were two men of
identical outlook: Eprmesni1 and Conti. After the departure
of Malesherbes in 1775 Eprmesnil was regarded as the leading
orator of the parlement 115, His career had begun as a young
opponent of the Jesuits, he had opposed Maupeou, been exiled,
and in the recalled parlement was noted for opposition to
reform and for championing the States General 116, He called
for the anti-Jesuit alliance to be resurrected and turned
aqainst the philosophes 117,	 Conti, nicknamed, "Monsieur
l'avocat", by Louis XV, was dismissed as, "... too half
witted to hurt anybody but himself, "by Horace Walpole 118,
"Plus conseiller des enqutes que prince du sang" 119, he
followed the same political career as Eprmesni1. Dakin,
however, analyses him as one of the most dangerous men on the
political scene, "From first to last he was a Frondeur"; he
possessed good looks, personal courage (which he displayed
by attending the parlement when a lesser man would have been
on his death bed, lending a macabre aura of venerability to
his words), arid a compelling arrogance. He allowed secret
printing presses to operate in the Temple and was responsible
for the Maupeouana. Dakin even accuses him of master-mind-
ing the Flour War 120, Somewhere between Walpole's and
Dakin's accounts lies one of Turgot's most implacable oppon-
ents, dangerous by his prestigiousness if not from any higher
political qualities. When he died in 1776 he was succeeded
by Marche who had supported Naupeou thus ending the political
importance of the House of Conti in the parlement.
Conti's career in 1774-6 was not so clear-cut as Dakin
might have us believe - Stormont found out that Malesherbes
was his speech writer over December 1774 to January 1775.
In the debate of 9 December 1774 Conti, with help from
Orleans, rallied a majority of 120 : 10 to vote against
Monsieur's insistence that a remonstrance against the recall
lit de justice would not be tolerated. It was noted with
great surprise that Conti carried: Fitz-James, Richelieu,
and Soubise with him. On 30 December 1774 Conti led the
155
debate on the remonstrance on the grounds of:- various
technical points, the powers the government retained to coerce
provincial parlements, and the retention of the Grand Council
as a standing threat. Conti won a unanimous majority, but
went on to counsel acceptance under protest of the recall.
In the last resort a prin 1ce of the Blood had to be a force
of conciliation if he were not to be Frondeur, which explains
Conti's actions in 1771-4, and December - January 1774-5, but
with death imminent and without a political heir in 1776 he
no longer felt the need to act under restraint 121:
Conti's speech against 'Inconvnients' was the high
point of his career. He attacked the pamphlet as, "Poison
of the most dangerous nature... levelled at the essence
of the constitution, (it) tends to destroy all law and order,
to confound all ranks, and by arming the peasants against their
lords, kindles a most dangerous civil war, ... (a) specious
veil of ... pretended philosophy ... subersive of all order,
property, and law ••123•	 Behind the polemic lay several
important political ideas on the role of the parlement vis-a
vis the constitution, law and order, a-id society.
The sixth leading patriot was St. Fargeau. He was the
principal link between the parlements and Choiseul. The
House of St-Fargeau was one of the leading Parisian robe
families and was to play an increasing role into the 1780's
as a radical (to the point of being Rousseauist) force in the
parlement 123• If this family represented the radical wing
of the patriots Sguier was their divot side. Before consid-
ering Sguier's political position, his patriot credentials,
which were suspect at the time, need to be proved: in 1771
Sguier condemned a Jesuit pamphlet, 'Plan de l'Apocalipse',
as, "Un des chefs d'oeuvre de l'extravagance de l'esprit
humain"; sguier's support for the Church did not extent to
its political pretensions l24	 In 1770 Sguier had been res-
ponsible- for the severing of connections between the phil-
osophes and parlements, and events proved that his actions
had been too little too late as the magistrates were still accus-
ed of being materialists.
After the recall Sguier took a leading role in undoing
Maupeou's work, but what marked him out was his desire to
cement an alliance between the parlements and the Gallicari
church. In July 1775 Bachaumont noted, "La puissance ecclesias
156
tique concourent avec la puissance sculaire pour dcouvrir
les auteurs, imprimeurs, distributeurs..." of proscribed books.
In September Bachaumont reported an indictment of 'Diatribe'a
1'Auteur des Ephrn'rides' (anon. Paris 1775), a pamphlet
viciously attacking Turgot's economic policy via the newly
refounded 'Eph4rnrides du Citoyen' which enjoyed the Control-
ler General's fullest patronage. It is likely that Turgot
himself asked for the indictment, but must have regretted
it when Sguier used it as the opportunity, "u il announce
que le moment est arrivd' de la re-union de cet Ordre (the
clergy) avec la magistrature, et de leur pré'cieuse harmonie,
ce qui va ramener le rgne de la religion". Bachaumont found
the episode "revolting", thus demonstrating that the patriots
reinstated in power had less and less use for the radical
pamphieteers whose publications had served them so well
1771-4 125	 -
The bishop Lefranc de Pompignan's 'Avertissement de
1'Assemb1ëe q 'nra1e du C1ergde France' of 1775 had been dev-
oted largely to an attack on philosophie, demonstrating how
civil society was as much endangered by it as the Church, "Le
Christianisme en a resserré' les liens: l'incrdulite'les
rel'àche	 126 Sejuier's indictment must be regarded as
a reply in which he raised the spectre of a threat to, "throne
and altar" ... "Les Scrivains du si'ec1e, que rien n'a pu
contenir jusqu'a ce jour, redouteront cette union tant desirée
du sacerdoce et de l'empire; ils crainderont ga1ement et
les censures ecclesiastiques, et les regards vengeurs des
ministres de la loi" 127 (That the alliance took root is
confirmed by, 'Mandements de Monseigneur l'Archevegue et Comte
de Vienne contre (Voltaire, Rousseau, and Raynal)' (Paris
1781), in which the most fulsome praise is heaped upon the
parlement and on SSguier in particular for his work against
philosophie.) An interesting footnote to this alliance was
a speech delivered to the recalled parlement of Aix by
Boisgelin, archbishop of Aix, in "Filch he claimed that Mau
peou's coup d'tat had only been made possible by the division
of magistrates and clergy, and their union, therefore, would
be a sure way to prevent its recurrance l28
In 1776 Sguier became the link between Clugny's minis-
129try and the parlement	 . Thevenau de Morande took .t upon
himself to enlighten his reader as to the political situation
157
of the ministry, "Vous demandez ici, lecteur, pourquoi 1'
avocat-general S'guier qui a fait tant et de Si plats requisi-
toires, contre les philosophes, lesquels ne prechent que la
paix, l'ordre et les moeurs; qui a harangue plusieurs fois
au sujet de ces philosophes, les chambres assemb1es, avec le
ton d'un pre de l'Eglise et le stile de H. Lefranc;
Sguier persecute les philosophes, lecteur, parce qu'il craint
leurs historiens". Thvenau accused S6guier of organising
the prostitutes of Paris, to whose pleasures he was addicted,
for a network of political blackmail 130, In 1777 Se'guier's
career, and notoriety in the capital, reached its zenith with
the lrial of Delille (de Lisle). Delille was a minor philo-
sophe who followed 'Syst'me de la Nature'; his work might
have gone unnoticed - one nonentity among many 131 - had
Sguier not picked on him to prove his dvot zeal. The hap-
less author was put on trial before the chamber of. the
Chte1et, the object being not so much to convict him of
some dubious offence against the censorship laws as to force
him to recant his philosophie. Bachaumont condemned it as
"absurd", "fanatical", and "barbaric", and likened it to the
Spanish Inquisition. Grimm and Linguet attacked it in similar
terms, it was a areat cause clbre and reported in great
detail 132 In that Delille broke down and "confessed" the
trial was a success, but it was a sorry spectacle which
brouaht no credit to anyone concerned with it, and any
political benefit was more than wiped out by Voltaire's
triumphant entry into the capital in 1778.
Sguier's success in creating a throne and altar climate
of opinion was matched in other directions of a wholly secular
nature. In the debate over the corvee Miromesnil showed that,
"Chacun (des) Ordres a ses droits, ses privi1ges, peut-tre
ses prjuge" 133 Inequality was no longer to be regarded
as just a fact of social life, but a basis of social stability.
Commentators• had realised that the greater the number of
divisions in society theless risk of social confrontation 134,
Inequality, however, whether juridical or economic, should
neither give theprivi1dgie the right to oppress the under-
privileged, nor did it lay upon the underprivileged the
obligation to remain silent in face of oppression. This
gave conservatism a social conscience, even if from political
self-interest. The parlemerit further began to insist on
the absolute primacy of law. It became a cornerstone of
Opposition to all reform, whether the corvee, where Epr
mesnil declared that Lheparlement should protect the state
against those who sought to destroy old laws and substitute
disorder and chaos, or whether agricultural reform of rights
of way or common grazing 135, The position of law was
explained by Guyot in his account of banalitiesx jurists
attacked a law when they had forgotten the origin and purpose
of that law (the legal reforms of the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries), but once rational thought and research had re-
discovered the circumstances and reason for the law, this
understanding in itself, and the sanctity of traditions,
justified its retention 136 When applied to the corvë'e by
guier and Eprmosnil Horace Walpole described the concept
of "consacre par l'anciennet"., as, "... thus the length
of pedigree renders (abuses) respectable" 137, The concept
of sanction by antiquity was expressed throughout Gin's 'Les
Vrais Principes du Gouvernement Françaie' (Paris 1777) and
and applauded by the Nercure de France 138,
A test case for the primacy of law arose in 1776. A
practising Jew, M. Colmar, purchased the duchy of Chaulnes
which gave him the right to appoint the local clergy in the
duchy. The local bishop (of Amiens) and the clergy protested
that only a Christian could appoint clergy to their livings,
and took the case up to the parlement of Paris. The verdict
was delivered in 1777 that the court could only concern
itself with the letter of the law, and the Jew's legal rights
must be upheld. The case attracted great attention; Linguet
reported it at lenqth and drew the conclusion that thence-
forth the letter of law alone was to concern the parlement;
Arthur Young noted it as a quirk of French jurisprudence ten
years after the event (he called the duchy the viscounty of
Amiens) 139
The idea of France as a Gothic state, every part related
to every other part, was brought out in the debate over the
guilds. S'guier developed the concept of the corporations
being links in a chain leading from the humblest journalier
up to the throne 140, (Louis XVI was unmoved by this argument,
he had been taught to regard the corporations as spokes in a
Wheel whose hub was the crown, removal of one unit, therefore,
would have no drastic consequences). Seuier put forward the
prejudice that people could not work outside a judicial
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framework, and that, as ever, the destruction of one corpora-
tion endangered the others 141, From 'guier's speeches there
can be rio doubt that the parlements were claiming to be the
defenders of law and order; Conti had used those two words
in his speech against 'Inconvenients'. (The point does need
to be made, some of the more facile accounts of the late old
regime might lead us to suppose that the magistrates actively
promoted civil disorder. Law and order, however, implied a
rigidly conservative outlook on society including the main-
tenance of abuse or practices such as torture.) One of the
central points of the attack on this pamphlet was that it had
incited the duc de Montemart's peasants to attack him while
he was hunting (as this was reported in April 1776 it was
likely that the duke was hunting across growing crops, an
issue which caused great bitterness). 142 Of the 'Monargue
Accornpli' Squier painted the picture of an evil "enthusiast"
inciting civil insurrection C"... le sang couler autour de lui
par ses conseils.") against whom the parlemerits as, "... 1'
e'cho de la voix publique", were "charges de veilier 'a tout
ce qui peut troubler l'ordre public" 143, From these pam-
phlets the parlernent tried to show a community of interest
between crown and magistrates defending social stability,
property, and the constitution 144
One of the most important breakthroughs of the recalled
parlement was th confirmatthn of	 rn1 as th defender of
privilege. The magistracy wanted to make all the privilegie
of the realm realise that they had a vested interest in up-
holding the parlements. This could most easily be done through
feudalism: "Le parlement qui avait protq les roturiers
contre les seigneurs de fiefs lorsqu'il tait tirS de cette
classe, dSfend aujourd'hui les intré'ts des fiefs parce qu'
ii en possede plusieurs", an observation corroborated at
the time by the Journal Encyc1opdigue, and confirmed in
future research by Meyer in Brittany 145, Gu.yot analysed a
new socio-political balance in the Louis-seizime period: the
individual (as citizen) was now opposed to the corporations
146, If this balance appealed to Louis XVI, its creation was
largely Turqot's work; he hoped to use it to cut the ground
from under the parlements when they claimed to be represent-
ing the people 147 The corporations proved the stronger to
the mutual ruin of both themselves and the monarchy.
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The fear that recall would encourage once again the
unitddes classes had proved groundless, a situation confirmed
by Guyot's assertion that sovereign courts were by definition
mutually independent, answerable only to the king or Council
l48 (Ardasheff notices the independence of parlements one
from another, but ascribes it to a need to devolve power away
from the centre to avoid another attack such as Naupeou's 149 -
perhaps too profound an analysis of the one area where
}faupeou's show of strength had taught a lasting lesson.) A
report from Provence in January 1776 sums up the situation in
this period, "Rien n'6gaie la division qui existe dans pres
que tous les parlements du royaume', and named Grenoble, Pau,
Bordeaux, and Dijon, as well as Aix 150• The parlements,
however, were not to abdicate their opposition to financial
measures.
Montbarey reported that Maurepas had sounded out the
recalled parlement on the possiblity of a combined effort by
the magistracy and ministry to pay off the national debt; it
failed 151• Finances were as ever the government's weakest
point. In January 1775 a twentieth was forced through by a
show of ducal strength which used up all the goodwill the
recall itself had generated l52 The government's firm atti-
tude persisted as long as Turgot stayed in office, but under
Clugny the par1ement was able to assume the offensive. In
1777 the parlement put up a spirited resistance to Necker;
in January 1777 it declared that it could not countenance
loans at more than 5.25% l53 The arrt of 21 January 1777
was a detailed statement of intent: after fourteen years of
peace the government had not done enough to reduce taxation,
loans in particular were running at an unacceptable level,
and the observation that a loan, "ncssairement est le
germe d'une imposition", shoved a keen appreciation of Park-
inson's Law. While Louis XVI dismissed the arrt, with its
threat of a withdrawal of co-operation, as "fine words" 154,
Vrj commented that the recalled magistrates, "... insinuant
au roi que les imp6ts ne doivent avoir lieu que par le consent
ement de la nation" 155 (of the 1778 twentieth, for which see
below).
The parlement had only one immediate solution to all
financial problems: reduce expenditure whether in the armed
forces, the Court, or on interest rates. Such a policy
was impractical in an age when the scope of government was
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increasing, but the pirlement conceived a duty to keep up
pressure for reducing expenditure. The parlement had assumed
a political position hostile to capital; for them the ulti-
mate resolution of society's problems was to be found in
juridical or political terms. The correct structuring of
government and society would eradicate economic problems at
root. This attitude made itself felt on the guilds when
Sguier warned that if their abolition caused economic
expansion this would in itself produce problems the regime
would be incapable of dealing with l56 In 1777 an even
more striking assertion was made: to increase revenue (in
this case throuoh the lottery) would only make the govern-
ment's financial problems worse as long as they followed
existing policies 	 In a political context this was a
robin answer to the militaire desire to remove money from the
juridical structure.
The January 1777 opposition came to naught because the
parlement was bribed into silence by the offer of the aboli-
tion of the Grand Council and Presidial courts. The average
Presidial court, of which there were 100 in 1789, contained
seven or more judges; it was a court which could judge any
criminal cQse or any civil case where less than 2,0001. were
involved; they allowed no appeal to the parlements. After
the recall the position of the Grand Council and Presidial
courts became extremely difficult. The Grand Council's remon-
strance against their treatment was preremptorily snubbed by
Louis XVI, and the Council went in decline thereafter 158, A
landmark in this decline was a bitter dispute in 1776 over the
Council's insistence on re-registering an edict setting up
Presidial courts in Lorraine and Bar 159, In 1777 the Council
tried to attack Beaumarchais, but was snubbed again 160, For
all this the Presidia]. courts were still a source of inspira-
tion for reformers, Linguet recorded attempts to reform justice
without the disruption caused by Maupeou usin these courts,
and Letrosne implied that these courts could be used as the
basis 'for a restructurea judiciary 161 Miromesnil, however,
pushed ahead relentlessly against the Grand Council, using it
as a bargaining counter to keep the parlement quiescent,
and going as far as to have prepared a draft edict for the
suppression of both the Grand Council and Presidial courts
by February 1778. Although the plan was vetoed by Monsieur 162
after 1776 the structure passes out of political reckoning
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judged on its own merits.
Opposition to financial measures continued, and loans
and naval expenditure were attacked at every opportunity.
An event of particular interest was the reaction to Necker's
mortgaging of the next don gratuit; in a bellicose arr&t
the parlement condemned i as "unconstitutional". This
harkened back to the parlements reaction to the abolition of
the Company of the Indies, when the court had tried to retain
continuous control over any legislation it had registered
previously. In the earlier case the parlement had declared
unconstitutional the subsequent alteration of laws, in the
latter it declared an expedient unconstitutional because the
original measure had not been submitted to it 163, In both
cases Necker was the enemy. The other important trend of
1777 was renewed persecution of the former Jesuits. Louis
XVI found he was unable to prevent this, however close to his
heart the issue was, and Miromesnil and Maurepas privately
did nothing to discourage it because it kept the parlements
from disrupting the government's activities 164.
The climax of parlementaire activity 1777-8 was the remon-
strance in February 1778 over the twentieth, the subject of
a study by Lard 165, Necker hoped that his November 1777
Council of State arrt setting out his intentions for the tax
could be slipped past the parlement in the autumn recess, "...
it berig in the I oirn cE an arrt which interprets an ectict
already registered, it does not require essentially the parle-
ment's cognisance" 166,, The parlement, however, took the
opportunity to conduct an examination into the whole structure
of the tax. The result of the enquiry was three grievances:
the first the usual complaints about the state of finances in
general, the second, that Necker proposed extending the scope
of government, and the third, that changes and abuses were
developing in the assessment and collection of the tax. The
parlement's refusal to allow fiscal reform wa reminiscent of
the campaign to defeat fiscal reform in Burgundy 167, Further
developments were Sguier'sinsistance on the parlement's
sanction for any structural change in the regime, and the
invoking of the States General to look at fiscal problems in
general. Two remonstrances were issued in February 1778 (on
the 7th and 17th), both of 'jhich tere dismissed by Louis XVI,
but which did cause Necker to moderate his policies. Paul
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Wentworth's information about the remonstrances was that they
were being drafted by 3oly de Fleury and Gerbier, and that
their tactical aim was either to force the withdrawal of
the twentieth or to force changing the arrt into an edict
in order to secure public debate 168 Larde"s study shows
the parlementaires in a f.avourable light as conscientious
guardians of the constitution as they saw it.
Despite the 1778 crisis in Paris, and Rouen, over the
renewal of the twentieth the climate of opinion had become
hostile to the parlements over finance. They were accused of
out-right dereliction of duty and the sacrifice of national
to corporate interests by all but the most partisan comment-
ators. Lvis cynically wrote that the parlements, enjoying
fiscal privilege themselves, never tackled the wider
problems of fiscal inequality 169, The parlements' political
activity began to be interpreted as political nihilism: to
attack the monarchy wherever and however possible 170, The
accusation of being Frondeur, always endemic against the
parlements, took deeper root in the final phase of the court's
existence and persisted through into historiography 171,
Montbarey and Soulavie saw a dual threat to society the
parlements in politics and the philosophes in the intellectual
sphere, both acting in clandestine concert and both abetted
by ministers 172 The evidence does not support this fear,.
but 11- brnte an impo rtant part of 1-he r.m's pr1i1-ira1
mythology.	 gur's analysis is the more useful: had the
crown responded to the parlements' position to create a
political alliance, the parlements would have remained the
monarchy's greatest safeguard, but the crown's hostility to
the courts from the mid-century onwards drove the magistrates
into an effectively republican position from which they were
able to do more damage than any other institution 173w
What happened 1774-78 was the parlement's attempt to
convince the crown to take it seriously as a'foundation of the
monarchy's power, and the true guardian of its interests. The
type of society postulated in the parlement's political stands
Was an essentially aristocratic one where juridical hierachy
and structure governed every part of society; the primacy
of law defended the corporations and private property and
was a bulwark of royal authority. Danoerous innovation was
to be analysed and countered before it had a chance to disrupt
society. This was no more than Montesquieu's vision of
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politics and society, and at least one historian has claimed
that by the end of the regime there was developing the concept,
accepted by government, of a constitution based on the corpor-
ations 174• If Cobban's analysis of the Revolution is accepted,
then the parlements are more than vindicated in their attempt
to oppose reform with conservatism, and their action was too
little too late. 175
The monarchy failed to respond, partly because the
ministers most closely involved with the king were either
unused to thinking in new political terms (eg. Maurepas) or
were hostile to the parlements (eg. Vergennes). The conser-
vatism which could have bolstered the monarchy was diverted
into a politically damaging alliance of privilege which
debilitated both government and society. By 1780 Lvis tells
us that the whole Court regretted the recall, and Thvenau
de Morande wrote of the parlement, "Je voudrais que, d'une
seule lettre de cachet, on put envoyer, pour jamais, en
exile, tous ses membres aux Antipodes!" l7b	 The failure
of an institutional conservatism to take root in France after
1774 is the missing chapter of French history which made it
so different from subsequent British development.
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Note on the Chamber of Peers
Tangential to the parlement itself was the attempt to cre-
ate a separate chamber of peers. This traces a sub-theme of
political life at the point where the peerage and. parlement in-
teracted.
A plan was presented to the king in 1765 by the devot peers.
It started from the premise that, "Les Princes de votre sang
et les autres pairs ... forment une cour dont V.M. est l'unique
chef, absolunient distincte de toute autre cour...". It was
signed by nineteen peers, including all the ecciesiatical peers
177, Bachaumont attributed the plan to Noreau, via Vauguyon's
patronage, and lloreau does record a passing involvement with
the peerage at thisdate 178 Hardy attributed it to Vauguyon
with the due de Sully's help, but went on to report that it
was so badly received by both the king and. the public that it
had to be dropped 179,
Cro gave a full report of the alternatives debated in
parlement. The first was the status quo, which was supported
by all the Princes as it institutionalised, an involvement in
politics when all others were discouraged. The second was to
support the unite' des classes, and claim direct superiority
over all parlements but at the expense of antagonising the Par-
isian magistrates jealous of their unique relationship with the
peerage. The third alternative was the separate chamber.
Conti led this debate, but nothing came of it except to give
the idea a public hearing, and to suggest to the ducs-non-
pairs that this new institution might afford them some instit-
utional power 180•
A constitutional theory of the peerage was developed by
Fitz-James, this may be dubbed the "th'se des pairs".' 81
 The
initial idea that in the Germanic forests all Pranks had been
peers had been proposed by Cantalauze de la Garde in 1764 182,
Fitz-Jarnes went on to say that the peerage was, "... un droit
po1itiqueinhrent a la constitution de la monarchie, ne'avec
elle...". From.this it followed that the peers could claim a
duty and a right to represent the interests of the disenfran-
chieed (nb. derivation of 'franchise' is from 'Frank'). The
preogative this implied of being able to counsel and limit the
monarchy was recognised by an anonymous pamphleteer in 1771 183,
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Pitz-James claimed the following benefits for his scheme: it
would halt the erosion of the peerage's privileges, it would
arrest the disunity among the peers, and it would prevent
the danger of France's constitution following the same path
as Poland's - as it might if the parlements gained ascend-
ancy over the crown. This !thse des pairs" has been restat-
ed by the peerage's historian Barthlemy 184, At thetime,
though, Guyot refuted it by maintaining that the peers shared
the same origin as the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire 185•
While Choiseul remained in powerwith the support of.the
Princes and the magistrates there could be no further devel-
opments. Maupeou opened up the possibility of change in.
the peerage, though at first there seemed to be the possib-
ility of the peers losing theirposition. On 5 February
1771 the parlement of Rouen fulminated, "... lee Princes et
/ / /
pairs sont plus interesses que tous autres (citizens) a leur
(the parlements') conservation, a raison de la prminence
de leur etat et dignite" 18 • This gave the peers food for
thought as a week later they were reported to be worried lest
Maupeou dismantle the parlernent of Paris and, "...deprive them
of the small remains of their dignity, and reduce them to a
par with the rest of the nobility" 187, A stalemate devel-
oped in Maupeou's relationship with the peerage.
To break this stalemate Maupeou turned to the idea of
a chamber of peers, hoping to outflank o pposition with re-
form - as he had for the parlements as a whole. As ever,
it is difficult to judge how far the idea was Maupeou's as
opposed to Moreau's or Lebrun's 188• The proposal had been
revived during Aiguillon's trial - though for personal mot-
ives Aiguillon himself would not have given it long-term
support - "En etablissant ainsi le droit des pairs, on fait
tomber, par une suite neessaire, lee prtentions du pane-
ment de Paris, et du mme coup, celles des parlements de
province" .189•
On 17 July 1771 Lord Harcourt reported , "... it had
been surmised that a new Court of Peers is to be erected, to
which not only the Princes and peers are to be admitted,
but some others of the nobility, under the new title of, la
Cour des Pairs. That the very name of the parlement is to
be abolished, and a new court erected in its room, composed
I0(
of the. members of the old parlernent, under the name of la
Cour Legislative, with a power of remonstrating, but without
partaking of any of the privileges of the Cour des Pairs
must prove (if it take place) an object of great importance
to this crown". flarcourt pers onally doubted that the plan
could be implemented. The plan has two points of outstanding
interest, that the peerage would be expanded to form the
upper chamber of a bicameral assembly, and that the robin
magistracy would lose all participative functions in govern-
ment 190
Two other commentators discussed the chamber under Mau-
peou. In February 1771 Miromesnil criticised the potential
influx of politically inexperience peers into the process of
government, but feared that if the chamber were indeed set up
it could prove far more dangerous to the monarchy than the
parlements had been. He also feared that so radical a shift
of political power towards the Great would upset the tradit-
ional balance between the Great, the Church, the magistrates
191and the people to the latter's detriment. 	 In January
1773 the Journal Historigue analysed the issue, "Ce (the Cham-
ber) serait cependant le coup le plus mortel qu'On put por-
ter'a la constitution du gouverneinent; c'est l'objet des eff-
orts muitip1is des divers ministres ennemis de la magist-
rature; et ce serait la consommation et la confirmation des
opc(rations de M. de Maupeou 192	 This suggests that a chain-
ber of peers had become ministerial policy 1771-4.
As a footnote, Monsieur and Miromesnil collaborated in
1774 to revive the idea in the form of a "Chamber of For-
feiture't , that is a court prestigious enough to sit in Jud-
gment on counsellors with functions extending into a part-
icipative role in government. Monsieur's plan agreed in many
parts to Lord Harcourt's account of a chamber of peers,
and it was Monsieur as Louis XVIII who instituted a Chamber
of Peers 193
/ Gtv-en that the hypothetical chamber was supported by
devots, it would seem likely that it would have benefited
the monarchy as against the parlement. It failed in 1765
because the ministry and the magistra cy had a vested inter-
est in the status quo; it failed in 1771-4 because Maupeou
could not implement it against the opposition of the Princes;
and it failed in 1774 because Maupeou had patronised it. It
was to the monarchy's detriment that it was still-born.
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strIratY
The parlements after 1771-4 had to seek new roles. The power
they had enjoyed under Choiseul had been brutally curbed by
Naupeou, and this had proved that they needed to find a basis
for their existence, 'which would be proof against attack by the
monarchy.
Maupeou's reforms, both in their process and content, did
not form a firm basis for general reform of the regime. They
were a narrow and isolated attempt to change the relationship
between the crown and the magistracy in the ressort of the
parlemrmt of Paris. I'Iaupeou' s inability to handle the magis-
trates, and the logic of the events he had set in motion, meant
that the scope of his reforms continually increased until it
embraced the whole realm. It was regarded by contemporaries as
too blatant and "unconstitutional" an exercise of royal power
to be acceptable.
The exiled magistrates had evolved a political philosophy
of the parlements as guardians of a society based on juridical
inequality and. an interlinked hierachy oi eorpvrciviiS. T1I
Church readily accepted this ideology, and the parlements worked
to extend it to include the crown after 1774. The parlemen.ts
attacked any target which threatened to disrupt old social re-
lationships, such as: capitalism, tinkering with fiscal law,
dismantling corporations, or ill-considered reform.
The parlements sought constitutional authority for their
political action by relinquishing their own claim to be a nat-
ional assembly in favour of calling for an assembly of the States
General. They insisted that the law was paramount over all
other considerations, and that the antiquity of a practice or
institution was its own justification.
From its side, the crown under Louis XVI took the magistrates'
loyalty and gratitude for granted. In return it encouraged de-
bate over great issues, and allowed the parlements their full
prerogatives. The great. areas of accord, though, were obscured
by disputes over individual, issues. 	 he erowfl's support for
Turgot's restructuring of society threatened to alienate the
parlements, but this proved to be a short-lived and unsuccessful
experiment. Iecker held out the hope of finding a more intell-
igent and sympathetic relationship between and crown and corpor-
ations - if needs be in a reformed administrative structure.
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IV
STATES: GENERAL AND PROVINCIAL
Of all the institutions of the old regime, none attract-
ed more attention for their potential for expansion and reform
than the assembli6s of States; they were in the vanguard of
both the process of decentralisation and the so-called aristo-
cratic reaction 1
The problem of the States General, which had lapsed since
1614, was distinct from that of the still partly extant pro-
vincial States. The States Ceneral hovered on the edge of
political thinking from 1614 onwards. Only ill-informed
opinion could have been surprised that the States could be
convoked in 1788-9; only the advisability was in question.
Detailed instructions existed governing the convoking of the
States General, arid the election of deputies. From one gener-
ation to the next the functionaries concerned passed on these
instructions and let the public know who they were and what
would have to be done. In this rather extraordinary way the
States Genral remained a living part cf the regime's politic-
al culture if Only at a verbal level 2
The States General had a very definite place in the old
regime. Figaniol de Ia L'orc mctde IL clear that while the
States, like the parlements, were as old as the monarchy they
were subordinate to it and could only advise the crown under
normal circumstances. He refuted those who sought to turn the
States General into a Venetian type senate. In five specific
cases, however, the States had the right to assume full sover
eigritys - if the deceased king had made no provision for a
Regency the States were to assemble and appoint a Regent;
secondly, the States had plenary authority if the royal house
had died out or if the only potential heir ws as yet unborn,
or thirdly, if the king was captured without making provision
for a Regency, or fourthly, if the king was insane and without
an apparent heir or Reqent; fifthly, the States were authoris-
ed to assume sovereignty if the king had violated a funda-
mental law (e.g. alienated part of the kingdom without good
reason)
Ral, who was equally a supporter of the Louisquator
ziaemonarchy, was equally convinced of the States' General
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constitutional position. Rid]. analysed them as being analog-
ous to the British parliament . This observation is signifi-
cant for two reasons: it shows that the monarchy accepted a
constitution of some sort, and it shows the monarchy holding
off the pretensions of the parlement by calling on the lapsed
States General; the parlement .answer was to claim for itself
the authority of the lapsed States. In all cases, however,
the States General were subject to the crown, and where
off icial comment was made on them this hierachy was stressed,
"Aprs le roi, rien n'est gal aux Etats Gei'rawc" .
The most immediate relevance the States General had for
politics was in taxation; only they had the authority to
ratify new ordinary taxation. This had become a fundamental
law which not even Louis XIV had dared to violate, and t
meant that the twentieth was always an extraordinary tax levied
for specific periods. As first president of the Court of Aids
1'Ialesherbes continually affirmed this prerogative 6, Darigrand
went a step further to claim that the parlements as the, "corps
reprsentantde la nation", had inherited the States' General
functions and authority. For Darigrand the parlements, acting
on the States' behalf, were co-equal with the monarchy
Malesherbes, however, regarded the parlements as political
caretakers for the States, and he and most other commentators
recognised the monarchy's seniority. Letrosne took it for
granted that the fiscal reforms needed in his provincial re-
organisation would necessitate the convoking of the States
Gerral to ratify them 8,
The last assembly had been in 1614, and the debates and
decisions of the late sixteenth century were still political
currency two centuries later; the Grand Chamber for example,
quoted their rulings on the need to abolish the Grand Council
and Malesherbes was particularly fond of harking back to
them. The debates had assumed something of a legendary qual-
ity, and by the late eighteenth century every-shade of politic-
al opinion looked back to them for inspiration. Crutti, on
the divot side, recalled their patronage of the Jesuits - in
stark contrast to later Jesuit persecution by the parlements
Both the Espion Anglais and Argenson set great store by
their attacks on the financiers
	 The abbeCoyer, for En
lightened opinion, was able to show that the States General had
encouraged the nobility to follow useful civilian pursuits 12
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apart from the equivocal, and on balance, hostile attitude
of the £conomi,tes, the n1içhtenment was in favour of the
States General. 3oth Holbach and 2iably includcd a reformed
States General in the.r prorammes. The States General as a
defence aainst depotisia was implicit in lbo's work.
chastellux condemned the xtedieval 3tata for ai.lon.ng
 oliar-
chy to corrupt the monarchy (as had Aubusson), but still
described them as an ttassembly of the nation" and hoped that
with a broader representation they could help the king estab-
lish a benevolent ab.solutism in the face of o 'oition from
the Great and vested interest 13 The most novel approval of
the States Generalcame from Mercier, wno so despaired of the
evils of the capital that the States, he wrote, should be con
yoked, should give the parisians a year to -ind up their affairs, *
and then order the city to be put to the torcii
From the maisteria1 side, however, Cantalauze de la Garde
made out a case that the 3 tates had usurped the political poer
which was rightfully the par lements', and thus the
	 dcc
classes, led by the eerae, would restore to France her true
political forms after the aberratio of the 3tates General,
and the 3ourbon absolute monarchy
	 'or the militaires
AubussorL labelled the States an asscj.lj of the too rich and
too powerful controlling too much vested interest ]; he
went on, hoiever, to propose their reform and reinstatement.
(see beic:-). This attitude permeated h1lvo2hC thiii OL.
the subject 17 • Their real enemy, however, was he monarchy;
the States General had been the çreatest barrier to absolutism.
(There is no paradox here with ael's Observations ao\re, j3
cause Real could not envisage the convocation of the CtaLe..)
Henri IV was quoted in the &.th&ie'ride3 as sayiz of the
assemblj'-, "Pardieu voi1 d mchants ç jens et d'imprudents
impostures" . The royal thesis of the abbe'Dubos laid the
ideological foundations for depriving the States General of
their pol'iticàl power by establishing a jurid4.cal continuum
between the Roman Empire and the Fran.'d.sh monarchy. oth
roreau and Gin içnorecl the coL4plex debates on the origins,
pretensions, -d proroatives of the States and concentrated
on the absolutirm or the monarchy. Gin dismiss€d any idcc c.f
a cosLitution as, "... de vaines chihres enantc'es par
1'mbition, ou ar uric Causse saee qui cro.t ouvuir ccl
culer les effet.s des asio des boines" 19
After 1614 the States General underwent hypothetical
in
evolu tiort, the 1orLer they rLuained unconvuc.ed the r eater
the importance as -attached to their eventual asse.Libly; by
1788 they had become a L)o12.tjcal dooasay machine. The begin
fling of their re-entry into political thinking came with the
duke of Burgundy's interest. - Folloiiny on this the States
became an aspect of "aristocratic liberalibm". The hyothetica1
S tates General nor anseeroc1 the -need which the aristocracy
(as opposed to just the robe) fell: to possess some institution-
alised political power. (In the provinces, rairroriny this natioiv
al trend, the Great and the militaires becae more and £Lore
iivo1ved in the local States as the century proressed.) Tue
.influerice of iontesquieu and Rousseau enabled various proponots
of the States to show them either as respectable adjuncts to an
institutional conservatisj or as potential organs of a ceiaocrat
- ic constitution; the two attitudes are xemp1ified by the
pax'leznents on the one hand and iiably on the other 20•
An important addition to the thinking on Lhe S ta te as
the noble thesis, thich Boulainvilliers had intended for the
S tates Gencral, even if the par lements had taken it up on their
on behal.'; both institutions claimed to be descended fCOiii
the Pran' military asseMbly each spzin on the Field of
Nars.	 hile this was a political advantage up to 1783, it
was used at the last icnent. to discredit both i proponcnts
arid the institution. Both Liriguet, who had previously turned
his attention to this area, and Siys ridiculed the noble
thesis in the	 e -enth centu, ayin; thct ceer
believed that events l,OO years earlier in the Germanic
forests were of direct relevance to 1T88 should take theMselves
back to those forests. 21	 - -
From Cardinal Richelicu's day onwards the States General
had been regarded as the greatest potential threat to a ref oria
ing minister. The problem lay dormant uAer Louis XIV, but
the ground vas prepared by the duke of rguridy's irc1e for
an aeseznbly of the States at -the kings death. In thq event
the Regent ocided not to convoke the States ut to try the
o1ysydànie instead. Under Flury the Louisquatorzime system
was continued, but once he had died and the mid-century politic-
al environment had begun to develo, the States became an
issue atain. Louis XV had a phobiQ. aai1Ast 3tates of any
adnd , but the threat of precipitating a sociopolitical
cris.s of such dmens.oi4s that only -the 3tates could sort t
out i.as held aainst iOth iachau1t aiU i .aupcou.
-180
When Naupeou Laced this threat he gave Lebrun his opinion
of States General. "Lcs Etats G6riraux n'ont maiheureusement
rassembl's que dans les temps d'orages; compose d'l-
ments discordans, de grands seigrieurs ambitieux et diverses,
d'un clerg puissant, d'un tiers stat tr's faible, us n'orit
produit jusqu'ici que de tristesrsultats... On aime
mieux lutter contre des difficults qu l'on corinait, que de
se jeter dans un abtme que l'on n'a pas sondF^". He went on
to complain that even if the assemblies were manageable the
petitions of grievances would overwhelm the government, and
there would be no way to resist the demand to turn the whole
of France into States Countries ("mettre la France en pays
dtats") 23
The political movement for .the States General became sus-
tained after Mirabeau's 1750 pamphlet, ('Mmoire Concernarit
l'Utilith'des Etats Provinciaux' Rome 1750). It was then taken
up by the parlements as much as a stick with thich to beat the
government as a serious political position, up to 1771 at
least 24 In 1771 Lauraguais published 'Ex_trait du Droit
Public de la France' meant to refute Haupeou. The book was
largely a compilation of Latin documents from the Frankish
era in support of Boulainvilliers, whose work, Lauraguais
explained, had captured his imagination from childhood. A
theme of the book was that the Franks had had some form of
social contract at the time of Lhe conquest, and this had been
constitutionalised in the States General
	 The addition of
contractual political theory to the States General was a
radical, important, and - for the monarchy - dangerous clevelop
ment; to the politically uninitiated, furthermore, the
difference between a Rousseauist and Lockean (as Lauraguais
intended) contract was not obvious.
1771-4 saw two opportunities for the convocation of the
States General. In 1771 several parlements accused Haupeou
of violating fundamental law, warranting an asemb1y of the
26States • The patriots took up the call in pamphlets such
as the explicit, 'Recrute des Etats-G4'neiaux de France au Roi'
(Paris ? 1772). The period of exile gave the magistrates time
to consider how fragile the parlements had proved to be, and
by 1774 most of them had come round to the position Nalesherbes
was to hold 27, As a result there was pressure for their con-
vocation at Louis XVI'S accession. On 10 August 1774 Stormont
listed the alternatives facing Louis XVI, i'... others again
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(are) for reducing the parlement to a mere court of judica-
ture, assembling the States, and appointing a deputation
of th States General, to exercise the powers the parlement
has hitherto exercised, of making remonstrances, in register-
ing the royal edicts, etc, etc.", but felt forced to add he
considered the scheme 'wi1d" 28 The patriots were not alone
in suggesting an accessional assembly of the States, even
one de'vot adviser suggested j 29,
Once the parlement was re-established, and Malesherbes
reinstated as first president of the Court of Aids, he cam-
paigned actively for the States General. Openly, he described
the benefits of rule by States General and provincial in the
May 1775 remonstrance. Clandestinely, he submitted a memoir
to Maurepas on the same subject. Soulavie was cynical about
the whole affair, he believed that Malesherbes was able to
rally support from the Great because they, through land owner-
ship, would be able to control the States General. Malesherbes
answered this criticism by showing the diversity of the insti-
tution, each type of organisation offering some different
advantage. Some nobles preferred a Burgundian constitution,
others a Breton; some clerics preferred Languedoc,
others looked to Provence or Bigorre.
	 Malesherbs i.xncluded,
with Turgot's support , that the Languedocian model, with
its doubled representation of the Third Order, was the best
Hc also hoped to see Languedocian-style Stdtes established in
every provizice 30, Boulainvilliers and Mirabeau before him
had considered the Languedocian constitution the best, and
in as far as the Third Order had a political voice, it follow-
ed their lead. As will be seen below (Chapters V.
	 and Vt)
the provincial assemblies proposed by tetrosne and implemented
by Necker started from the assumption that Languedoc was the
model of provincial government, and, by inference, of any
national assembly. }ialesherbes regretted that the parlements
were forced to fulfil the States' functions, añd.anticipated
a constitution of States which would be more efficient, more
popular, and less abusive than the Louisquatorzive system.
(Hudson records that an important parlementaire theorist, the
president Jean-Baptiste Durey de Meinres who retired from
politics in 1757 but remained active in writing, had worked
out an account of the States General along Malesherbes's
lines as early as 1763, but did not deem the time right to
publish until after Z4alesherbes's speech). 31
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''then Malesherbes left the courts to become a minister ,
the mantle of championing the States fell on Eprmesnil.
He led several debates on the subject, culminating in 1777-8
with those over the renei.'al of a twentieth 32• One of the
representations on the subject invited the government to
comment on the need for the nation (i.e. States General) to
consent to taxes. The government declined to join in public
debate on the issue, but Vri saw that the die had been cast,
and that through the States General, in effect, the concept
of 'No taxation without repreFentation' had entered French
politics. Of the eventual need to assemble the States he
commented, "Je me crois pourtant pas que le gouvernement
puisse un jour l'éviter. Le dsordre de la finance est trop
public et trop re'oltant pour ne pas amerier 'a quelque rvo1u
tion sembable"	 It should not, however, go unnoted that
there was a minority parlementaire opposition to the States;
it had the misfortune, though, to be based on the naked self-
interest of not wishing to abdicate political power. Vri
recorded that Ormesson, the future Controller General, was
leading this faction
Various reformers had been interested in the States
General as the starting point for new institutions, but
Choiseul proposed a rationlised structure of States, more
rationalised than Nalesherbes's, with a States General in
permanent session. The eighteen proposed States Countries
wQuld provide 108 deputies. The States' function 'would be to
watch over the administration, but political initiative would
lie 'with a Chamber of Peers which would control the agenda
and ratify the decisions made. The system would therefore be
doubly aristocratic. (It is this scheme which seems to have
been circulating in the capital in the summer of 1774 as report-
ed(above) by Stormont). Choiseul would have done for States
what Colbert did for the generalities, and the setting up of
the Corsican States in 1768-70 was the first step in this
directjon. This plan raises several tangential issues, and
it implies the complete loss of all political authority by
the parlements in return f or the setting up of the new States.
The Chamber of Peers establishes some unexpected common ground
between }aupeou and Choiseul. The fact that Choiseul did
found States in Corsica means that the rest of the plan can
not be dismissed from the realms of political reality
Aubusson finally presented a comprehensive reform plan
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for the States General to go with his reformed conciliar
structure. This was to be a part of the mechanistic monarchy.
Soverignty would reside in the States, and the king, as
their hereditary president, would receive his crown from
them - this promoted the moments when the States enjoyed full
sovereignty from Piganiol de la Force's rare moments of
dynastic or national crisis to an average of once every nine-
teen years when a reign changed 36• The States would be
composed of the king, the Dauphin (if aged 20 or over), the
princes of the Blood, twelve lay peers, the members of the
six reformed Councils of State, the Chancellor, one deputy
from each chamber of the Parlement of Paris, and eighty
provincial deputies - four from each province with doubled
representation of the Third. (The plan, broadly, suggests
an amalgamation of Choiseul's States General with his Chamber
of Peers).	 -
The States would be in continuous open sesssion, meeting
every Sunday morning at Versailles. Their competence would
be: legislation, war and peace, the election of all executive
officers of tate, control of all finances, and to be the
arbiter in all matters of religion, law and administration.
The States would have ntrol of the education of the royal
children and of a Regency until the king was twenty. The
king would be allowed to speak in the assembly but neither to
vo1- r. r b,-ri.rice to influence the proceedings. The provin-
cia]. deputies would be elected by the provincial assemblies
and would serve for one year only (Choiseul had also written
in safeguards against monopolisation of the seats in the
assembly). The voting structure was designed to give the
crown.a guaranteed block of forty votes from ex-officio
deputies to create stability 31•
The States were not convoked before 1788, neither were
any reform plans given serious political consideration because,
for once in the regime, the interests of the' monarchy co-in-
cided with those of the robe as a whole to avoid the threat
of new political institutions. Richelieu advised Louis XV,
"J'abdiquerai plut't le trne que d'assembler jamais les Etats
Gneraux" 38, such was the fear of the States, and the
straits to which the realm would have to be reduced before
the monarchy would convoke them. Had, though, the House Of
Bourbon died out in the senior line, it would seem that the
States would have assembled themselves automatically.
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There was couparatively little general interest in the prov-
incial 3tates, except for .r.rittany and languedoc, shown in. Paris.
This contemporary neglect has been reflected in historiography.
iocqueville felt that Laxiguedoc alone deserved attention. Marion's
dictionary of institutions gives them little space. Many of the
relatively few studies (eg. Rebillon's) have tended to be anti-
quarian 39.
Why study them? In the first place nearly a quarter of Prance
came under their administration, and a further quarter could en-
sage their creation. The failure of central government to solve
some of the regime's more basic problems drew attention to those
institutions which appeared to be operating more successfully than
Bourbon absolutism. The provincial States exercised a preponder-
ant influence on	 reformers of the late century, who had stud-
ied their regime's institutions carefully, nnd whose horizons were
wider than just Court and capital. Hardly one of the well resear-
ched or deaply thought out schemes for national regeneration
through provincial reform did not use them as a point of departure.
iithin the nobility, the old robe seeking to differentiate itself
from the post-1715 nobility found the Second Order the perfect
outlet for its political talents and aspirations. The States,
therefore, display some of the regime's most interesting socio-
juridical interactions. Lastly, recent historiography has started
to discover two further areas of interest; firstly, the States
often patronised agricultural reform, and secondly, detailed
research into provincial administrations have revealed the true
extent of their importance 4°.
There was no uniformity of States, but three main patterns
emerge and the very diversity of the institutions, as Males-
herbes had noticed, provided inspiration for different reform-
ers. Every constitution had something to offer 41 (To
unburden the text tables and maps are provided). At the
extreme of the first type came Brit .tany with its anarchic
constitution allowing every noble who resided in the province
to attend. These States attracted the most attention, held
the widest adninistrative competence, and wie3ded the greatest
political pocr. Alone of the States those of Brittany control-
led their own agenda, and thus retained political initiative 42
The president of the assembly was the archbishop of Rennes,
(Girac, who was hostile to the central government). The
quberriatorial staff were indispensable, and the late century
saw six Great involved, with qreater or lesser success, in the
assembly Aiquillori, Duras, Fitz-Jamcs, Penthivre, Condo',
and Aubeterre. The intendant had become little more than the
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governor's secretary. The States had a reputation of unruli-
ness which was caused by the lack of structure in proceeedings
any deputy could raise any issue which the government had
not vetoed. Sessions were also of no fixed duration, and
during the mid century they began to lengthen to s.x months.
The government put a stop to a trend which might have ended
in continuous session, but the sessions in Brittany remained
the longest of any States.
Typical of the biennial sessions was that of 1776. 647
nobles signed in at the opening, although only 250-300, sat
out the whole session. The main piece of business was voting
the don gratuit (4,639,0001.) to the government. This in
itself qave the States the opportunity to debate the state of
the nation, government expenditure, and the fiscal system;
the government could not halt these debates because the States
were an important creditor
	 After this debate in 1776 the
assembly discussed: taxation (internal), troop movements
and billetting, roads, stud farms, customs duties, charity and
begging, relations with the central government as it affected
local privilege, militia and police, commerce, and public works.
A further part of the financial debates was that the States
paid the salaries of the province's administrators - another
opportunity for interference.
The royal commissioners 'were generally able to keep
balance between the First and Third against the Second in most
political debates. This was because the bishops and ex
officio mayors osred their offices to the cro--n. On matters
of local privilege, however, all three chambers tended to
unite against the government. This was one of the most per-
vasive and important phenomena of States, that the ranks closed
in the face of outside, pressure. On matters of local taxation
the Third defected from the government while the First allied
with the Second to defend privilege. The government managed
to avoid the Armageddon of all three Orders uniting against
it on a political issue; when this threatened to happen in
1772 over Maupeou's reforms Vri1lire warned that he would per-
emptorily suspend the States
The political history of the States in the eighteenth
century was of the ciovernment's failure to reform tk'm. Under
Louis XIV the States threatened to lapse from lack of interest,
but the Regency revived their fortunes. Fleury kept the States
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in abeyance, and attempted reform in l73b. The 3,000 nobles
eligible to attend the States were an unmanageable mass of,
"... poor provincial gentry who hated taxes, viewed govern-
ment and public works with suspicion, looked down on lawyers
and tradespeople, and constantly disputed iith the royal
"45intendant • Yet, such are the misconceptions under which
historians have laboured, that it was not these hobraux
whom the government tried to exclude, rather it was the polit-
ically educated and active robin anoblis. The 1736 reforms
attempted to exclude all but those nobles who could prove 100
years of fief holding in the province - the standard require-
ment of almost every other States. The regulations were
ignored.
1759-1770 sa a hardening of opposition to the central
government, precipitated by the first dispute (over road-
building) with igui1lon.	 In 1762 Bertin discussed the prob-
lem with Cro, saying that the States were, "presque rë'volte,",
and could only be controlled if the nobility were curbed 4b,
Aiguillon, alone of the late century commissioners, was pre-
pared to face local opoosition while also facing active opposit-
ion from the ministry and Court. The consequences, however,
were a crisis of national scope when Aiguillon was tried in
the parlement of Paris. The local opposition was so effective
because the parlement and States sank any differences and
presented a united front. The political conflict was exacer-
bated by personal hostility.
The climax of Aiguillon's campaign of institutional reform
in the province was the 1767 Letters patent (implemented 1768).
These regulations attempted to cut away the top and bottom of
noble representation by excluding those - from the robe - who
could not prove fief-holding in either 1532 (the date of uni-
fication with France) or 1668, and by excluding - from the
hobe'raux - those who paid less than 301. per annum capitation.
The 1768 States were held under these regulations which proved
to be so strict that even the Order of St. John found its
interests threatened	 Aiguillonwas masking political
reform behind genealogical improvement; he made a special
point of excluding the wholesalers, vhose nobility was technic-
ally dormant but who tried to exercise noble privilege while
indulging in commoner pursuits. The new regulations gave the
government creater powers of censorship outside the assembly
and of excluding undesirable deputies within it. (Previous
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governors had had to re.-sort to house arrest by lettre de
cachet). A final measure was the greater s.thdivision of
the province into its nine dioceses for the purpose of elect-
ing deputies; a remonstrance complained that the government
hoped thereby to discover and institutionalise regional con-
flicts of interest within, the province. In a wider view, this
was the first step towards creating a Languedocian structure
of assiettes.
The regulations fell with Aiguillon's departure from the
province in 1768. The Choiseulist Duras, who took over the
government, restored the old forms both in the States arid parle
ment. Naupeou's reform of the parlement, however, threatened
to be extended to the States. Under Maupeou the qouvernernent
was entrusted to the dSvot Fitz-James. To establish a defence
against possible dissolution the States refurbished the his-
torical ideology of the institution - just as the parlements
had. The States claimed to be the sovereign power in Brittany
under the terms of the Treaty of Union. This position depend-
ed on the Treaty of Union being a contract between two nations,
whereas it had been, as the government was quick to point out,
a contract between two sovereigns in which the people it
affected had no say. The idea of the States as a sovereic'n
body persisted, and became incorporated in the patriot opposit-
ion to 1aupeou. Carried to its logical conclusion in every
province this assertion would have reduced the French monarrhy
to a Dutch or American type of federation 48•
The 1772 session was the most important of the States'
history. The nobility had wanted an outright confrontation
with the government over llaupeou's reforms, but moderation,
aided by government intimidation and corruption and by the
Princes' vacillation, prevailed. Nearly 500 nobles must have
been approached personally, and the result was a docile rump
Second Order. Even this, however, could not be persuaded to
vote money for the salaries of the new parlement's corisellors
The extreme weakness of the Second allowed the Third to
get out of hand. Before the States had opened a correspondent
reported that, "... on prtend que le Tiers Etat ou du moms.
le peuple, le paysan, le cultivateur, gmissant sous le jouq
des deux autres, ne serait pas fch de les voir abolir, dans
l'espoir d'une moindre servitude. C'est lui qui supporte la
plus grande partie des impts, et qui semble ne travailler,
ne vivre, n'exister que pour ses maitres". The Third did
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indeed rise to the challenge and attempt to initiate reforms
leadinq to fiscal equdlity 50• This, again, illustrates a
phenomenom of all States: when the Second was weak or absent
the Third aired its grievances - or took action - against f is
cal inequality. This should not be misinterpreted, it was
not a class confrontation: the Third were lawyers or office
holders attempting to have their own taxes reduced by spread-
ing the burden; they only attacked privilege from self-inter-
est, never from any wider view of an egalitarian society, but
the debates served as a useful aprenticeship for revolutionary
politicians 5l
The 1774-5 session was radically different. Louis Xvi's
own initiative in pardoning and compensating Chalotais set the
tone for the assembly. The recalled magistrates were accorded
a tumultuous reception in the States. Behind the scenes
Maurepas had worked with Girac, Aranda, who commanded consider-
able patronage in the province, and Penthivre, the governor,
to end the legacy of fifteen years of political conflict and
rancour. (Spain's links with Brittany throucth Aranda were
not only cemmercial but also political; seventeeth-century
political dissidents had looked to Spain and links established
then still persisted.) As a further earnest of the government's
good will Cond put in an appearance 52• This euphoric session
set the seal on two aspects of the States: the nobility's
grip on them was corifirmed, and the intendant finally had to
relinquish any political power.
The 1776-7 session (described above for its administrative
content) tried to strike a balance between the two previous
sessions. The gouvernernent was now under Aubeterre, a royal-
ist but of acknowledGed local background. Political crisis
had been feared from Clugny's ministry whose anti-provincial
attitude had antaqonised the States of Burgundy 	 clugny's
death removed this danger. The session started well, but
ended disastrously when Penthivre made an unexpected inter-
vention. - He insisted on nominating the intermediary commis-
sion, which had usually been freely elected with the proviso
that unacceptable deputies could be vetoed. This caused great
ill-feeling	 . The period 1777-89 was one of almost uninter-
rupted development of provincial autonomy encouraged first
by Necker and then by Calonne.
If Brittany's States were the most important politically,
Languedoc's were the most important institutionally . The
'U'
two dominant fiqures were the president (archbishop of
Narborine), Dillon, who ruled the States "with a rod of iron'
56 through control of tkr' agenda, and the president of the
First, the archbishop of Toulouse, Lorn4'nie de Brienne. The
administrative importance of the States was such that even
Colbert had recognised it in ordaining that the province's two
generalities should share the same intendant. The basic tax
was the taille r'el1e levied on an up-to-date cadaster by the
local assiettes with the full cooperation of the Court of Aids
(at Montpellier). The equitable and profitable nature of this
tax was the envy of the government and of other provinces, and
proved that the old regime could bear heavier taxation if the
system was rationalised. Even more th in Brittany the
States were creditors to the government (e.g. February 1777
they loaned 12,000,0001. to Necker 57), and could use this
position to retain complete internal control of the province.
The nobility was confined to the twenty-three., owners of
the baronies of the province, and after 1770 these nobles had
to be able to prove 100 years of fiefholding in the province
58 The Third was composed of ex-officio mayors and consuls;
here the province had produced a unique adaptation to Colbert's
venalisation of local government when the States bought most
of the offices and put its own appointees in them. 	 FIo't,rever,
praiseworthy the doubling of the Third in the assembly, it was
not democratic. A degree of democracy, however, was welcomed
in 1766 when Laverdy , abolished the venal structure of the
municipalities. Terray's revenalisation caused great conster-
nation, the 1772 deputation to the Court complained that they
would not want sitting in their States the type of man who
would buy Terray's offices. They bought them all, again,
for 4,000,0001.	 The majority of the Third deputies were
nobles of the robe or cloche - excluded from the Second -
who had usurped the prerogatives of commoners the assembly
was exclusively aristocratic in all three Orders.
The provincial infrastructure of LanguedQc was the most
highly evolved of all. Over the centuries the dependant States
had been absorbed into the orbit of the provincial States
until by the eighteenth only three still styled themselves,
"Etats particuliers du pays"; these were Gevaudan, Vivarais,
and Velay. Otherwise the province was subdivided into tuenty-
one (secular) dioceseseach with an assiette 60 The assiette
of Toulouse has received the most attention; it was dominated
by Lomnie de Brienne. The assiette's competence was wholly
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executive, meeting each year after the States to implement
their rulings. The assiette did take initiative in road
building, to such an extent that the provincial States had
to declare a moratorium on public works until debts had been
paid off..	 In the assiettes the clergy dominated. The
barons had still not regained their interest in such local
assemblies before 1789. The Second, however, did act through
protcjs in the Third, which embraced all the lay political
ta1ent of the diocese. As we have seen in the 1772 session
in Brittany, the Third agitated against fiscal privilege when
it was free from the Second. Between the States and assiettes
of the province, Lariouedoc displayed every form the States
could assume.
If we are to make sense of the multiplicity of forms in
the States Countries - and account for the reformers' interesL
in States - re must see Languedoc as the model towards which
provinces were being rationalised. This is confirmed by
Necker's subsequent adoption of the Languedocian model for
his first Administrative Country in Berry. Languedoc was
praised by th estoratinn publicist Trouve, "Dans les tcmps
o'u la science du gouvernemont tait enveloppe de la plus
rornde obscurite (1'assemDle) semble devirdr tous lee
s'crets de l'econornie tublique ...". They combined 1oyaly
to the crown with concern for public welfare, and were able;
tc ttrt the regime's greatest policiLal LdleuL. Truuv
sar the States in the forefront of the attack on abuse 61
The success of the Languedocian States was threefold: the
doubling of the Third, the assiettes, and the taille relle
-and cadaster. Not only were these States used as the niodel
for Corsica, but every provincial reformer used their struct-
ure as inspiration and starting point for their own ideas.
The original States of Provence had been abolished in
the seventeeth century, but the province was found to be
ungovernable without them and a stop-gap Assembly of the
Communities was set up. The president of the Assembly was
.the archbishop of Aix, Boisgelin, who united in his person
the executive authority, which would be exercised elsewhere by:
the president o the assembly, the intendant, and the governor
(or his deputy). .Oeputies were summoned by lettre de cachet drawn
up by the intendant. Despite not being directly represented,
the nobility was still the dominant Order. Asin other tates
where they were excluded altogether (see belowL the nobility
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(100 year fief-holders) met separately before the Assembly
to give their position on the issues to be dbated 62
The province enjoyed the taille relle and a separate
cadaster in each community (of which Boulainvilliers seemed
to think there were thirty, but no other commentators
clarified this). Boisgel.in hoped to introduce more extensive
fiscal reform 63 The revival of interest in States led
Provençal opinion to expect the recreation of plenary States,
a project shelved under Maupeou 64, but realised in 1788.
The Assembly enjoyed the support of the parlement of Aix,
but not of the Court of Aids 65
As in Languedoc, Provence had dependant assemblies. The
three "lands reputed adjacent" did not send deputies to the
main Assembly, but met independently. On even years 11arseilles
held its assembly, and Aries on odd years; of the third, Barce-
lonnette, nothing has been recorded in Paris, perhaps because
they were geographically the most remote States.
The trienniel States of Burgundy were the most embattled.
The Bourbon seventeeth-century drive to abolish provincial
autonomy had petered out in Burgundy, but the apparently
unfinished work still attracted ministerial attention. At
the me time the provincial States were still sipprein
their own dependant assemblies. From the government's side
the States had lost control over the taille, which was raised
by lQction. From the States' side Auxoi
	 lL it
assembly in 1639, Charolais in 1751, and Nconnais only just
retained its assembly when the tide turned in favour of
devolution. Bresse, Bugey, and Gex remained active, and under
Turgot there sras even talk of promoting Gex to being indepen-
dent States 66 Unlike Languedoc, the Burgundian dependent
assemblies met before the provincial States to pass on petit-
ions of grievances and requests for the decisions affecting
them.
The president was the bishop of Autun, but the diocese
never generated a tradition of administrative clerics, and the
governor (Cond ') was the dominant figure. Soulavie, however,
recorded that Luzerne, bishop of Langres, was active in
local politics. Cond'manaqed and attended nearly every
session in the latter half of the century. The intendant was
a standing member of the intermediary commission. These
States showed the closest institutionalised cooperation
betoen local and central authorities. After 1754 nobles had
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to prove 100 years of fief-holding, and all deputies were
subject to a lettre de cachet. Competence extended over
extradordinary taxation and public works. In the late century
the intendant lost ground, and in 1775 the States reached their
apogee when Conde', fresh from his triumphant role as opponent
of Maupeou in Paris and ttien Rennes presided over the most
brilliant and numerous assembly ever 67 The next year,
ho'iever, the States suffered a political mauling through
their deputation which had to bear the brunt of Clugny's
anti-provincial offensive. A distinction these States enjoyed
was that their elections to the Third were reputed the most.
democratic of all.
The States of Mconnais received particular attention
from the government as those most ripe for suppression. They
were small, their composition not being thought worthy of
note, and had almost no competence whatsoever, having lost
control even of bridges and highways to the election. In
a memoir of 1778 Amelot claimed that these States had cost
their tax-payers 248,7381. 1757-1773 for no return, the
money beina spent on sendinç 1 a deputation to Versailles,
where it had no business to transact but spent the money
enjoyinc themselves in Paris 68, The States played an ambig-
uous role under Maupeou, which can best be interpreted as
that of a pawn 69 I4connais shows the States Countries in
their worst light, being run by small cliques of self-inter-
ested and parasitic notables. While such ministers as Arnelot
would like to have us believe that the same applied to all
States, Mconnais was an exception to the general rule of
competent, efficient, disinterested administration. As a
qerieral observation it seems that political power generated
a sense of public responsibility and duty in the nobles able
to exercise it in the provinces, as opposed to the more
usual picture of a friclous and irresponsible nobility
painted by the commentators in the capital.
The dependent assemblies of Burgundy showed similar
development to those of Flanders and the Pyreriees (see below)
7O The effective withdrawal of the nobility had produced
a devolution towards informality which makes them difficult
to analyse. The dominant local figure was the Syndic of the
Third who co-operated so closely with the intendant that
Castries could see little difference between these States
Countries and pays d'lection. These Syndics had usurped
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all the powers of both the absentee Orders; this was probab-
ly the lesser of two evils for the province as its constitut-
ion allowed the intendant complete discretion when the Orders
failed to reach unanimity. The dependent Burgundian States
sent deputies to the later assembly of the provincial States
to represent their interests there.
The Syndic of Bugey in 1775 drew up the most revolution-
ary petition of grievances before 1789, "Le Tiers Etat du
Bugey gmis depuis longtemps sous.
 le poids accablant des
cens et des servitudes qu'ils paye au clerge'et ' la noblesse;
le cr 'dit de ces deux Ordres avait jusqu'ici toufflses
plairites (nb. despite their absence from formal participation
±n institutions), mais soumis	 un monarque qui veut tre le
pre de ses sujets et qui comte le Tiers Etat pour quelque
chose, nous osons parler avec cette espe'rance flatteuse que
nos cris une fois etendus d'un roi bien faisant, taos voeux
seront exige C?). Hommes et franFais, nos personnes et nos
biens ne peuvent et ne doivent tre somis qu' V.M. elle seule
le droit de disposer de nos brasetd'imposer nos fortunes,
une autorit trangre 'a la votre, fonde sur l'usurpation,
ne peut pas tre un titre suffisant pour ravir notre 1iberte
et la partie la plus nette de nos forids. La tai1labi1it ou
la mainmorte sont pour une partie des habitants de Eugey, ce
que l'ignorance des sicles ante'iieurs a inventede plus
p1u brharc ... iI ceroyeni- jmcitoyahlemcni dcouil1c
du bien et de leurs ancetres, et prives d'une fortune que
leurs travaux ont augment" 7l
This document shows how bitter was the feeling against
privilege without service, against abuse without justification
and against oppression without reciprocal obligation. Ihile
the Syndic establishes his humanitarian credentials by his
attack on mortmain, he himself was a privi1e'gi who sponsored
policies such as enclosure, which was detrimental to the
landless peasant. It is of note that the synaics language
has more than an echo of Turgot's, which suggests the possib-
ility that the petition was drawn up in Paris under Turgot's
guidance - in order to convince the king, whom it flatters,
that Turgot's policies had a follouincs in the country -
perhaps in return for some promise on enclosure legislation.
The chances succeted tally exict1y with those in Turgot's
memoir on the municipalities. Granted these possibilities,
however, it is an example of the States at their most radical
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and shows the spirit of Siys operating in the Third.
The States of Artois were the most business-like. The
president was the archbishop of Arras (Corizie) who ran them
with an eye to the ministerial preferment which Lomnie de
Brienne eventually received 72 By the end of the century
the Second consisted of ten gentlihommes chosen from an
electoral college of 120-130 100 year fief-holders nominated
by lettre de cachet. Of all Second Orders that of Artois
retained the most militaire outlook. Competence extended
over every aspect of local affairs. The States were hostile
to Maupeou. The provinces reputation for industry and
harmony frequently managed to win through the most blatant
political 'theeling and dealing. The history of the division
of the commons gives us the level of political morality in
the States. In 1772 the Second, with the indifferent support
of the First, had the measure passed, and many of the villages
supported the measure. Probably for short-term political gain
the Third, who represented urban interests, chose to champion
the rights of the peasantry. The measure was grudgingly
accepted but remained in contention 1772-1778. In the face
of the villages' ungrateful insistence on dividing up their
own commons the Third's opposition weakenrd, and in 177P
the Second did a deal with the First to give serfs the
same rights over the divided commons as free peasants; in
the face of the combined oppoit!ori of the trO privileged
Orders, the Third capitulated fl.
The States of Cambray deserve our attention for shoi,inci
the fastest development, mostly under Choiseul's patronage;
his brother was archbishop of Cambray until 1774 	 Between
their annexation in 1677 and 1754 they were little more than
a vestigial institution, but following on bureaucratic reform
in 1746 the nobility began to attend regularly after 1754.
In 1766 the archbishop was made president, given plenipotent-
75iary po'wers, and ducal status 	 • The president reformed
the States, to the detriment of the intendance, and involved
himself in it. In 1773 and again 1781 the number of noble
deputies as increased. The States were agressively aristo
cratic, the Second being militaires and the Third magistrates
or notables. The Third were accorded a uniquely low repre-
sentation. Se'ac de Meilhan's bioçrapher conceded of the
assembly, "Le seul fait de son existence donne'x Cambrai et
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au Cambrsis une physionammie distincte et originale", and
was forced to admit that the unfortunate intendant had
moved from Aix to Valenciennes only to find himself over-
shadowed by an assembly in each 76•
The two States of Flanders (Walloon and Maritime) had
devolved into Burgundiani 'or Pyrenean informality. The States
of Walloon Flanders were the larger, and a model .f or Maritime
Flanders. The States proper consisted of four magistrates
who net with the governor (Soubise) and the intendant (Cau-
martin) to transact the province's business. The origin
of this unique institution was the theory that as the privi-
1gie paid no taxes they deserved no say in local affairs.
(There was a passing reference to this problem in Buat's
work; if the aristocracy were reorganised into provincial
colleges then all financial affairs would be left to the
commoners (see below Chapter V ) .) The First and Second,
however, met in a separate and informal assembly, as with the
fief-holders of Provence, to give their advice. Castries had
two observations: that these States cooperated the most
closely of all with the intendant, and that the clergy iere
agitatina vigorously for the establishing of a plenary Stal-es
vher they, as in Cambray, would be predominint.
The largest Pyrenean States were those of ]3arn	 The
dominant force was the president, bishop of Lescar (No)
acting in conjunction with the intendant. For a provincial,
as opposed to dependant, States they showed the unique feature
of the First and Second sitting as a single chamber. In
voting this had the same effect as doubling the Third, but
it failed to attract attention as a possible model for reform.
The privilegie's dominated the assembly, and the Third tended
to be made up of their sons. If the two chambers were dead-
locked the motion fell; so as to avoid this there was a pro-
cedure to set up a joint commission to find a compromise. The
States enjoyed full local competence.
The second largest Pyrenean States were those of Foix.
For the Second, as in Artois, the fief-holders of the province
(60) acted as an e1ctoral college to elect twenty deputies.
These States were the last to enjoy a revival when Boucheporn,
the intendant who had supervised the setting up of the
Corsican States, moved there in the 1780's. They enjoyed full
local competence. (Boucheporn here is the clearest example
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of a generation of intendants who specialised in the adminis-
tration of States Countries. A study.of the problem was made
of Provence under Boisgelin: in Aix the archbishop and inten-
dant between them dominated the political activity. The
first intendant Boisgelin had to work with was Nontyon, whom
he liked personally but who was immediately at loggerheads
with the Assembly over taxation. The resultant administra-
tive impasse could only be resolved by Montyon's replacement,
at Boisgelin's instigation, in 1773 by Së'nac de Neilhan. Snac
himself went on to Valenciennes, another States Country, in
1775. The role the intendant played as deputy to the local
plenipotentiary, mediator between local assembly and central
government, and moving towards the idea of forming the
executive of a States Country's administration was radically
•	
•%
different from the Louisquatorzi' model of the intendant as
the all-powerful local agent of government.) 78
The rump of the former kingdom of Navarre enjoyed its
own States, and the province still harked back to its illus-
trious past. The local plenipotentiary was the seneschal,
who was beginning to reassert his authority in the late century,
but the bulk of the work had to be done by the intendant.
There was no formal presidency, different bishops taking it
in turn. As in B 'arn the First and Second sat together, but
unlike B 'arn they retained separate votes. The States enjoyed
full local competence. On non-f iccl matters the Third took
the lead and dominated the assembly. On taxes, however, the
assembly was in a state of chronic deadlock. The First and
Second used their institutionalised power to buttress total
exemption while the Third remonstrated in vain.
The States of Bigorre attracted more attention than any
others in the area. Their president, the bishop of Tarbes
(Cout du Vivier de Lorry) dominated proceedings as effective-
ly as Dillon in Languedoc. The local plenipotentiary was the
seneschal, who exercised no real power. Every' deputy had the
right to speak, implying a constitution of Breton fluidity.
Bigorre may have attracted attention because of its stipula-
tions for the Second which were genealogically the most lax.
The province possessed twelve baronial families, whose seats
th
in,assembly were hereditary. If the baronry itself was sold
the family retained its seat, but he new owner - robin or
militaire, noble or commoner - could also sit as a baron.
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This was the only province where commoners might exercise
noble privileges and where property rights superseded jun-
dical. barriers. From Bigorre came the most definitive state
ment of fiscal autonomy, "Les membres des Etats sont deputs
pour ouir le compte du receveur, faire l'imposition, dresser
l'tat des charges et gnralement traiter de toutes les
affaires qui regardentle service du roi et le bien du pays"
Of the smaller Pyrenean States Castries wrote in despair,
"... on ne peut donner aucun renseignements; leurs affaires
tant tellement dispersees en differents bureaux" (in Ver-
sailles). Soule was run by local notables from a loose frame-
work of thirty Third deputies. The States of Narsan, Nebouzan,
and the Quatre Valles could not muster enough deputies to
establish a formal structure. There were no clergy and few
nobles interested in them, and the intendant generally estab-
lished informal but effective cooperation with the Third. Fin-
ally, the pays Basque was run as a "pays abonn" with two insig
nificant assemblies, but which met the need to assert some
local independence,
The setting up of an administration by States in Corsica
after 1768 marks the political coming of age of the institution,
and it also marks the connection between States and Choiseul's
patronage in the centre and militaire support locally 80, That
States were chosen instead of a pays d'lection was a break-
through for devolutiori, for physiocracy, and for the militaire.
The object of States locally was to persuade the island's
notables to transfer their allegiance from Genoa or Paoli,
and the French promised "... consideration et distinction pour
les nobles, dignite' pour les ecclesiastiques et les gens de
loi, emplois pour les particuliers et gens du Tiers Etat" 81,
The first problem was representation; the province was
subdivided into ten units which were represented by a deputy
from each Order for every 1,000 hearths. This was the only
example of a numerical basis for representatin in any States
Country. It was, however, repealed in the mid 1770's, because,
".,. cependant chaque province a le mzne intrt dans les
affairesquise traitent, la difference de population n'est
qu'une chose du moment •.. C'est le xecle de toutes les
assemblé'es eccle'siastiques, civiles, ou politiques, qui ont
lieu en France: on n'a point d'garc1 au plus grand ou au
moindre nombre d'habitants de chaque yule, province, ou
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diocse, chaque communaut ' est regarde comme meinbre de
l'associa'cion gne'ra1e" 82, Thiz account of representation
reflects the mood of institutional conservatism which was
putting stability above rationality in politics.
A further development of ideas on representation came
from the clergy. (An initial point here is that the presi-
dence of the States wa never able to develop as it had on
the mainland because the senior cleric remained in Genoa,
and the old regime never managed to have an archbishopric
created on the island 83) The original composition of the
First had excluded the meridiant Orders on the grounds that
they neither owned property nor paid taxes. This was subse-
quently discovered to have been mistaken, and the mendiants
were given representation. While the clergy had originally
been included in States for their administrative training
and supposed spiritual qualities, the iniluence of physio-
cracy gave them a now basis of representation - their property.
As well as owning much land in their own right, they paid
taxes through their tenant farmers 84, From this discussion
we can extract the eighteenth century States' theory of
representation: firstly by historic community, secondly
by property, and hence taxation, and thirdly, and very much
the least important, by population. Taxation, however,
held the public interest, and Stormont reported that American
ideas on representation were a fashionable topic of cof fee-
house conversation 85 Between the States of Corsica and the
provincial assembly of.Haute-Guienne the emphasis shifted from
the first to the second point.
The next problem in Corsica was creating a nobility.
The political vicissitudes of the island had resulted in the
1ite being either suppressed or outlawed. The militaire
gouvernement. of the island insisted on the highest staridardss
proof of 200 years of nobility. As few or no such proofs
existed on the island the authorities had to tall back on the
legal formula that a man was "reputed noble" if twelve proven
nobles signed affidavits to that effect3 Using this formula
a viable political nobility was built up by 1772. Expanding
from this a feudal structure of land ownership was set up
with seigneurs, terriers, and vassals. The newly created
nobility (which included the Buonapartes) was to be the po].it-
ically dominant influence in the island, arid elections to the
States were held by assemblies of: the local mayors, magis
199
trates, heads of communities, and all those proven or reputed
86to be noble	 .	 -
The first assembly was in 1770, but was only a meeting
of nobles and clerics to prepare the ground forthe first
plenary session in 1772. This assembly of the States of
Corsica in 1772 is the focal point of our study of States,
it was the vindication both of the survival of States into
the eighteenth century and of the post 1750 interest in them;
it was the first successful experiment in restructuring
provincial government, and it offered the hope of further
reform. It was reported as widely as the Breton States of
the sane year. Opening the session the bishop of Nebbio
declared, "... que 1' erection de cette lie en pays d' stats,
est pour elle une prerogative dont jouissent peu de provinces
en France, est les plus distingues seulement, quoique toutes
87les desirent"	 .	 -
The most important piece of business was taxation. The
Code Corse recorded the ruling of the 1772 States that the
basic tax should be the taille receiie, arid there should be
no exemptions at all. A cadaster was ordered to administer
the tax. Other business transacted in 1772 included; internal
regulations, troops, municipal and ecclesiastical administra-
tion, roads, forests, fishing, salt, pasture, bandits, educa-
tion, and local privilege. It would be fatuous to presume
that the province passed from the chaos of the 1760's to sth1e
political maturity in 1770's. The apparent smoothness of the
1772-3 sessions was due to the intendant's efforts and coaching,
and even then the government warned the Jtates that if harvest
figures continued to be falsified the province would lose the
right to levy its own taxes 88 Generally speaking Corsica
1772-89 was more of a problem than an inspiration to the
government, because all the decisions taken there were politic-
al rather than practical.
Two separate structures of administratioi lead away from
States: the royal commissioners and the intermediary commis-
sions. The commissioners iere the link with the central
government and, where relevant, they carried the government's
instructions and lettres de cachet. The fullest cornmissio'
was Brittany's and consisted of: one, two or three members
of the gouvernement (usually one), three royal lieutenants
of the province (militaire notables), the intendant, up to
half a dozen presidents of courts, an equal number of legal
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advisers and representatives of the central bureaucracy
(e.g. grand master of the waters and forests). Down in the
small dependant States the commission might be reduced to a
single man. Choiseul defined their most important role;
they, "... en inspectant les dliborations, contiendraient
la chaleur des opinions et celle des passions; us tiendront
89la balance des Ordres ..." 	 • Almost without exception the
commission helped rather than hindered the States, and only
in Brittany was friction common. In the last resort the
commission had the authority to prorogue any assembly, but
there is no record of this authority having to be exercised.
The commission's two most important procedural functions
wereto present the government's request for taxes and to
present the government's proposals for the legislation
asked for in the previous session - this was the procedure
for most enclosure.
The intermediary commission, which also fulfilled the
role of deputation to the court, was the most important
development in States in the century. It had two origins:
bureaucratic exigency, and balancing the intendant. The
commission of both Brittany and Languedoc in their final form
date from 1734, and must mark an important step in the recov-
ery of their Stat.es' political power. The official function
of the deputation to the Court was to present the States'
petition of grievances. This documcrit, ho;ever, had largely
degenerated into a formalised lament on the failure to
extirpate abuse, and the vagaries of local climate. With
much ceremony the deputation was presented at Court, but
the real business was transacted in private session with
the ministers. The most important deputation was that of
Languedoc which enjoyed ambassadorial status and maintained a
continuous presence at Court. Political crisis over the dep-
utations has already been recorded for Languedoc in 1772 and
Brittany 1777. The larger States consistently elected the
Great to their deputations, which gave the Great an institu
tionalised base for their patronage of provincial interests.
Within the province the commission was generally pleni-
potentiary. In terms of the ratio of personnel to business
transacteci these commissions were the regime's most efficient
organisation, and were the direct inspiration for Letrosre's
provincial councils. The commissions of the 1arçc?r States
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were in permanent session, those of the smaller met once
every six months, a few States either failed to develop
commissions or failed to have the commission convoked
(Fyrenees); in Bresse, Bugey, and Gex the Syndics fulfilled
the commission's functions. The main function of the cornmis-
sion was to supervise the business decided on by the States
(i.e. taxation), but owing to the regime's failure to
develop a concept of the separation of powers, the commission
could act on its own initiative whenever it saw fit, with
the proviso that the commission was accountable to the
States. In Provence there was no elected commission, the
necessary business was transacted by the archbishop and the
consuls of Aix.
In Brittany it was the commission which took the initia-
tive against Aiguillon in 1769 and again 1770; forced to
justify this ddnarche the commission claimed to be the
"representatives" of the States who were in turn representa-
tives of the Breton nation, and were, "... charq's de leur (the
States) pouvoir, et remplis de leur esprit, (et) doivent
agir comme les Etats seraient eux-mmes, pour la conservation
des droits de la province et des citoyens" o. It was langu-
age such as this that prompts Rothriey to observe that the
Second taught the Third how to he Revolutionaries
	 The
larger commissions also involved the intendant, whose author-
ity they eroded, and in Languedoc's case the problem was
examined in some dctii sho:ing the intendant on the defensive.
The intendant presided at the commission because he had to
"justify" the expenditure he authorised, to "support" what
the subdelegates had done, and to "defend" the administrative
errors and short-comings for which he was responsible 92•
It was in Burgundy, however, that the most dramatic
development occurred	 The States had lost competence over
taxation, which had devolved to the chamber of Elus G(neaux,
which was also the intermediary commission. The Elus had
managed to gain almost complete autonomy from' the States, and
the normal roles of the two institutions were reversed, the
States being reduced to a debating chamber rubber stamping
the fiscal decisions of the Elus through their control of
the agenda. On enclosure, for example, the Elus sent draft
edicts directly to Versailles without reference to the States.
In cieneral the Elus had assumed a dominant role in the
province, by virtue of their connections with the generality
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and parlement. The Elus had turned the other provincial
institutions against the States, but in turn found every hand
turned against themselves.
The composition of the Burgundian commission was unique:
one deputy from each Order of the States, two officers from
the Chamber of Accounts, the intendant ('&u du roi') , and
the mayor of Dijon. (The two Third members, and.the two
magistrates exercised, respectively, only one vote between
them.) The political battle over the amount of power the
respective institutions could wield became centred on the
mayoralty of Dijon. The Elus wanted to have it created an
hereditary post to give them an administrative continuity
which they still lacked while all but one of their number was
changed every three years. The States and parlement allied
against this, causing an administrative impasse . The Elus
and the intendant were attempting to initiate fiscal reform,
while the parlement and States, with intermittent help from
Paris (hence Nalesherbes's involvement) blocked them. The
confrontation reached its climax when an attempt to reform
the taille 1776-7 coincided with Clugny's attack on local
privilege.
The Elus were a force for radical reform in the prnvince.
They hoped to break the hold of propertied privilege on tax
assessment. Their plan was simply to levy the taille with
the machinery for the tventeth. This ]t.1-er tx was zuore
efficient and took less regard of privilege, and the 'danger'
of transferring its method of assessment onto the taille had
long been a fear for the privilegis. After the reforms of
the Elus each community possessed some sort of cadaster and
was able to neootiate its taxes with the Receiver of the
bailiwick, who was an appointee o the Elus. Defending this
system the Elus made an overwhelming case for its being both
more efficient and more equitable. It was, however, reversed
by vested interest in an arrt of the Counci]..of State, 28
July 1776 which ruled that the reforms were 'despotic'
(This was the occasion of Clugny's political attack on the
deputation of States, who were, of course, the Elus Generaux;
to a general attack on provincial autonomy, therefore, must
be added the complication of provincial in-fighting ramifying
up to Versailles.) Based on its intermediary commission the
States of Burgundy had the opportunity to create a reformed
fiscal structure, the chance, however, was lost; it was
incidents such as this which created the myth in Paris that
the States were a conservative force against which the more
radical robin agencies of government should be encouraged to
act. This myth was finally dispelled by Necker.
Through their social composition the States were aristo-
cratic through and through )
 and nowhere was this more obvious
than in the First which was composed almost entirely of the
aristocracy of the Church (i.e. bishops and abbots); there
is no record of any curds being involved in States before the
States General. Across the breadth of the States Countries
the majority of First deputies were noble in their own right,
and felt a community of interest with the nobility. A sub-
stantial block of ecclesiastical interest was the cathedrals
who usually sent deputies to the assemblies. By the late
century the government had lost control of the First which
was coming to regard itself as an adjunct to the nobility.
A particular breed of cleric associated with the States
was the administrative bishop, identified by Soulavie as a
fifth column of democracy, equality, and toleration. He
listed: Dillon, Lomnie de Brienne, Boisgelin, Choiseul,
Conzi, and Luzerne, whose activities have already been
noted, and Col, Chapio	 Cicd', and Ph1ypeaux in
Necker's provincial assemblies 96, These bishops shared a
philosophe outlook, ranoing from the more conservative Choiseul
to Ue radic.i Cic, mdrkincl them of r from otner bishops (e.g.
Girac in Brittany); all were well connected at Court, half
being closely related to late century Secretaries of State.
This group of men were perhaps the single most influential
force for devolution able to act at Court, in the General
Assembly of the Clergy, their provinces, and finally in the
ministry itself. They were a focus of public attention
Their role in States was defined by one historian, "L'
vque y sige i la fois en qualit de grand propritaire, de
grand personriage, comme he'ritier de privilges et bne'f icier
de coutumes, contrats et pactes gui, au moyen age, le faisaient
membre de la fedalite du pays" . (This, in a different form,
is a restatennt of the idea of representation by historic
right.) iithin his province Dillon was the most powerful of
these bishops. His niece painted a picture of his opulent
poer: "Le prident des Stats pasait bien avant ic roi dans
l'esprit des Languedociens". He overshadowed both the cOmman
U4
dant (Prigord) and intendant (St-Priest). Dillon patrorLed
industry and mining. He only attended the province in
November and December to preside at the States, spending the
rest of the year in Paris and Versailles representing Langue
doc's interests; in both places he lived arid entertained
lavishly keeping up better stables and kennels than the king
and failing to make ends meet on 500,0001.
Talleyrand equated the philosophe bishops with political
ambition 100, and none illustrated the point better than
Lomnie de Brienne. Hardly a ministerial change occurred
1768-70, 1774-87 but that his name was suggested on the
strength of his provincial record. Conzie', according to
Le'ris, whose father was governor of Artois, aspired without
success to a similar position l0l These bishops, Lomie
de Brienne above all, were overwhelming Choiseulist. Re-
action to them divided along the lines of the anti-Jesuit
alliance. From the dvot side Caveirac wrote, "Nous
•1
considerons les eveques comme nos peres, nos tuteurs, nos
1ibeateurs (from heresy)", but could see only a spiritual
justification for their presence in States 102• On the
other side Choiseul went out of his way to stress that land
owning clerics should be involved in the political process
in the States Countries 103 xccke, as ever, tried to
strike the balance (see above).
The type of noble in the assemblies chaned to a mix-
ture of the reat and the militaires by the end of the century.
This trend played a major part in the militaire reaction of
the late century. 	 -
The noble representation produced a significant conflict
of interest within the Order. The robe was naturally based
on the parlements, but by the various regulations it was pre-
vented from uniting this franchise with representation in the
States. As the robe tended to own land nearer to the towns
than the militaires, it resulted in the States and parlement
of a province rarely being able to cooperate on an agricultur-
al policy. Depending on the structure.of agriculture, one
tended to promote enclosure, abolition of vacant pasture,
etc., while the other opposed it. In the south-west, for
example, the militaires were more dependent on livestock
in the poorer more distant lands, and therefore resented
ref orms, while the robe's landed wealth ias more dependant
104
on arable farming which benefit--ed from them
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The representation of the Third changed as much as the
Second. Parlementaires had always been barred from sitting
in the States but during the century the robe was progress-
ively excluded from the Second. The need f or robe represent-
ation was filled by their acquisition of the Third seats.
These were generally filled by exofficio mayors, and were
supposed to be elected commoners; Colbert's venalisation
of municipal government changed both qualities. Even in
Burgundy, rhich had retained the ,outward form of election,
the candidates for election were magistrates. Linguet
commented acidly, "... le Tiers Etat n'est composque de
depute choisi parrni les plus riches de l'Ordre des rotur-
iers, leur intrt dar presque toutes ces bruyantes et
inutiles assemb1es, est toujours y bien plus d'eraser le
peuple que de la d^fendre..." 105, Here, for once, Linguet
had missed a point which flirabeau made, "En effet, les trois
corps ... ne sont autre chose que le clerg, le militaire, et
la magistrature" lO6 The encroachment on Third prerogatives
by the Second ras taken a step further - to its logical con-
clusion - by a ruling in the States of Corsica which condemned
those tho ?
 "... supposer't faussement que les fonctions de
deput	 d!2 'Piers Etat et cellos d'oficiers Nunicipaux sOnt
au dessous de 1'Etat de noble" 107,
This disenfranchisement of the Third discredits the
conservative rormuj.a that eacfl Order had its own duties and
privileqes. There is, however, no evidence that this trend
caused ill-feeling at the time - while, there had been a juri-
dical change in the status of the Third deputies there was no
sociological changes rilhe real resentment was caused by the
oligarchic nature of the franchise whereby the seats were
committed to specific people or groups; it was this that
made every provincial reform scheme specify a degree of demo-
cratic choice. The myth had grown up that Languedoc enjoyed
a democratic constitution, inreality, as seei above, those
States exercised complete oligarchy by o'ming their Third
seats. The control of seats, howeve±, went even further than
this; an incident in 1764 shoied that the Order of St. John
could nominate some of the consuls• in Lanquedociari toms -
in other words that they had bought up some of Colbert's
municipal offices. This enabled the Order to exercise the kind
of political patronage analogous to that of the pocket boroughs
206
in Britain, and in 1764 they were using this patronage as
a political bargaining counter lO3 Every seat in every
States Country which was not held by right of birth or
office was owned by someone, or some group, who could dispose
of it as they saw fit (Corsica excepted). Despite this handi-
cap the States Countries still managed to be more efficient
and more acceptable than the pays d'1ections, owing more to
the efforts of the nobles and clergy th.ari the Third. One
last point on franchise was that the urban interest was great-
ly over-represented as against the rural; specifically rural
commoner deputies had to be innovated by reformers.
The Louisquatorzfeme opposition to States persisted in
the eighteenth century. The Epion nc1ais disparaged them,
"Les Etats ne sont plus qu'un imulcre oti figure la vanit
de quelques Crands, qul concouren de tout leur pouvoir'a
opprimer le pays dont us devraient dcfendre les franchises
et les privilges", whose power was devolving to the pane-
merits 109, This was the parlernents'. position before they
allied themselves with the movement f or States. Several
writers were still not used to the idea that the absolutist
tide had turned, and were still wary of the loss of power to
the monarchy that the States representd 110, NRveu
highly critical of States On the grounds that they encouraged
abusive privilege and squandered funds (c.f. Maconnais),
but he dr1 rprrmjqp he v1"t r 10-1 ficr1 conrn1. ;
made the damaging observation that States Countries tended
to be rich not because they were better run but because they
were richer in the first place hhJ; there was indeed a cor-
relation between a province's economic strength and its abil-
ity to retain its political corporations. %Iith the exception
of Mirabeau, the physiocrats tended to dislike the States;
the Ephcme'rides condemned Mirabeau for not being more radical
in this respect 112, Turgot, again, believed in local deter-
mination, but not in the juridical structures States entailed,
"Mais tant compos 's d'Ordres,dont les prtentions sont
trs diverses et les inte'rts trs separe's les uns des au.tres
et de celui de la nation, ces Etats sont loin encore d'op'rer
tout le bien qui serait a desirer pour los provinces a l'ad-
ministration des queues us ont part" 113,
These opinions rere in a minority. Starting from the
duke of I3urcundy the majority of publicists were infavour
of States.	 Of Louisquinzime ministers before Choiseul
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both Machault arid Argenson were said to favour turning the
whole of France into States Countries•; the Old Dauphin too
was interested in these ideas which were descended from his
grand-father's circle 114 In 1750 Mirabeau published his
first book, 'M 'moire coricernant l'Utilitd des Etats Provin -
ciaux • This book caused a sensation - it did for the States
what Montesquieu had done for the parlements 115 This pam-
phlet was in the sarr political generation as Re 'al, but with
several variations. Where the th^vots warned against philo-
sophie, Mirabeau used very similar language to attack
absolutism, which, "... pourrait un jour produire, d'un cte
la violence et le dlire; de l'autre la crainte, les murmures
et le dsir de secouer le jouj". Like Rc 'al, Mirabeau believed
in the concept of public law and enlightened submission. He
was concerned to prevent the collapse of social order, and
believed that States were one of the best ways to-preserve
it. He saw the monarchy as the cornerstone of the hierachy
of corporations 116• On other aspects of administration 2'Iira-
beau showed that States complemented other forms (e.g. inten-
dant) without offering any political dangers. He praised the
benefits of local fiscal determination - more efficient,
more equitable, more acceptable - and pointed out that the
solvent States Countries could offer the government loans at
favourable rates, 5% as against the General Farms' 10%. Mira-
Beau streed the value of SI-ates as covernnent by notables,
and condemned the practice in pays d'lection of the intendant
having to consult men of lower birth interested only in
personal gain. Mirabeau suçgested setting up twelve extended
States Countries to cover the whole of France 117
A second work was 'Pre'cis de 1'Orçanisatiori ou Meoire
sur les Etats Provirciaux' which was reprinted several times
in different contexts. The work started from the Newtonian
premise that a "constitution" was a "political zuachineti,
which would function more smoothly than the haphazard royal
agencies. Mirabeau proposed a subdivision of the Third into
Civil and Municipal Orders, to serve as more useful doubling.
The municipal Order would be the hon-magisterial notables
and would work on a basis of limited democracy. The tho1e
structure would reinforce privilege and juridical distinction
and would contain the two damacing tends of the incursion
of capital and robin corporations into politics. States
possessed three advantages; efficiency and equitability
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in taxation, greater permanence, and "conomie" and "doceur"
in internal administration. Nirabeau also hinted at the
abolition of tax farming. He added, finally, a plan for
turning Guienne into a States Country 118•
A third work which, if not by Mirabeau himself, was
a compilation of his ideas, existed as a manuscript for
reference by the government 119 This covered all the same
ground as in previous works, but expanded on the benefits
of the taille re1le and an up to date cadaster. The taille
re11e acted to spread fiscal privilege evenly through society
as noble land was bought and sold over the centuries ( a
process which had been allowed to reach it logical conclusion
in Foix). This memoir was a very matter-of-fact account of
the structure and advantages of States Countries, one example
was the 35% drain on funds caused by moving money from a pays
d'1ection to Paris and back out acrain which too]ca year. A
States Country regulating its own finances could dispense
more money more promptly from the same income. The tax
f arms cost the government 6,000,0001. a year - the equivalent
of a whole province. The idealised fiscal bureaucracy of a
States Country was for the province's General Treasurer (who
was either a member of or worldng in cooperation iath the
intermediary commission) to have under him the Receivers of
each subdivision of the province (e.g. diocese or bailiwick)
wh in turn co-ordi'nated tne Treasurers of each community.
(This was the structure the Elus of Burgundy were trying to
set up.) Such a structure levying the taille reelle on a
cadaster could raise a total of 7,580,0001. in a province
(probably a projection of Guienne's potential). Mirabeau
made three important political points* given political pover
the privi1egis of the provinces would acquire a sense of
public service; given provincial self-determination the three
Orders would work in perfect harmony, and chains people forged
for themselves caused no complaint.
In 1758 Chaumont de la Galaisires had Mirabeau's
'Precis ...' republished with his own introduction. This
book does not merit attention in itself, but Chaumont was
Chancellor of Lorraine to 1736 (and intendant of MeLz and
Nancy thereafter), a prote'go"of Choiseul, and chargEd with
bringing the administration of Lorraine into line with the
rest of France prior to.its incorporation into the realm.
2O9
Thus his interest in States opens up the possibility that
Lorraine might have been created a States Country in 1766 120,
In the same year the abbe' Caveirac wrote a dvot eulogy of
Ni,rabeau' s ideas • He believed that States offered the best
hope of combating heresy and of repairing the economic
damage done by the emigration of the Huguenots. He described
Languedoc where, "Un heureux m&ange de la noblesse et du
peuple y fait le sureti, la tranguil1it, le flicite" commune.
La fureur des tribuns ne vient pas troubler nos assemble'es,
les ministres de la religion y prsident ...". This was
government by Catholic aristocracy, and was the most con-
sciously Montesquieuan analysis of States 121,
From Chaumont we move on to Choiseul. In language simi-
lar to that Guibert was to use he wrote, "La vertu patriot-
iquedgd'nrechaque ann6e en France ... un des objets de mon
systeme d'administratjon est de rtablir, 1'.nteret, l'amour
de la patrie dans les coeurs français ..." C1ioiseul proposed
eighteen States Countries, with Normandy as his model. The
three Norman generalities would be broken down into seventeen
cantons eacri returning six deputies (two from each Order).
The canton would elect its deputies at a triennial assembly
composed of: all land-owning clergy, all nobles (robe as
well as militaires) and an unspecified number of bourgeois
* appointed by the intendant. Choiseul's scheme would have
ended the macfrter ja1 hold on the Third. In a dtfferent
context Choiseul analysed the Third as a series of segregated
local interest groups who would never normally be a political
force of any strength; were they to get out of hand, however,
they would pose a major threat to privilege. The competence
of the States would be: 'budgetary' management of finances,
public affairs, and elections to the States General (see
above). Choiseul's eventual aim was a British type of con-
stitution, but where Mirabeau said that the people were more
docile in chains of their own forging, Choiseul believed that
the French - too accustomed to despotism - were not yet mature
• enough for political responsibility. Two important points on
this schemes it was the only one put forward•by a Secretary
of State, and it was the most aristocratic of all. The strength
of Choiseul's patronage of States is demonstrated by his
provincial initiative in 1766 when his brother was allowed
to restructure Camhrai, and Lorraine was brought into the
kingdom as a potential States Country (it possessed a
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greater degree of fiscal autonomy than a pays d'lection
even though no assembly had been set. up). This coincided
with Choiseul's appointment of six intendants as a demons-
tration of his provincial patronaçe. Choiseul did take one
step beyond Mirabeau in warning that should the States ever
invent a UfljtS des classes the monarchy would be in dire
peril, far more than from the parlements 122•
From the heady days of Choiseul's patronage the States
passed straight to the threat of dissolution under Maupeou.
The Spring of 1771, however, saw the parlements ally themsel-
ves with the States, claiming that reform of the courts could
not be undertaken without the authority of the States General
in Paris and the local States in the provinces. The best
known and most widely publicised of these calls for States
'waS the parlement of Bordeaux's February 1771 arrteon the
subject. The alliance between parlement and hypothetical
States was wholly self-interested: better to share power
.with the States than to lose it to Maupeou. Only in Brittany
did any effective political co-operation between parlement and
States exist, elsewhere the States were too easily controlled
by the government for any long term political activity to be
sustned. The call, for Stztes under Maupeou came at the
point of changover in the socio-political aspirations of th
hypothetical States. In the 1750's and 1760's the parlerient
of Rouen had c1led Tor S Litc, culminating in the 1772
deputation to Orleans, but the next mention of the States
of Normandy (in September 1778) was analysed as a complex
ploy to subvert the political power of the local magistrates
- implying that while the robe might have hoped to dominate
the States in 1772, it recognised potential exclusion from
the States of 1773 123
The problems under Maupeou proved to be fiscal. In 1771
Maupeou asked for a prolonç,ation of the twentieth. Years
before the duc de Luynes had noted that State could be pre
ssurised into ratifying new taxes more easily than the courts
124, and to Maupeou's great discomforture he was proved right
again in 1771. In December 1771 the Gazette dc Frr.ce ruh
lished a.supplernent in which Louis XV exhorted his parlements,
"Imitiez l'exmple des Etats des mes provinces de Languedoc
et d'Artoi et dc l'assemble de Provence" 125	 In 1772,
however, the various States did object to having to ratify
a new tax to pay for Naupeou's "free" justice. The tax' was
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forced through. (Ratification of taxes was usually smooth,
the Russian noble von Vizine left an account of the procedure
in Languedoc, where the governor delivered a speech outlining
the qovernments financial needs for the coming year, a speech
which moved many deputies to tears, but vhich was rarely
questioned l26) The legacy of Maupeou was the desire o de-
centralise away from a potentially dangerous government; all
Louisseizime reform schemes were decentralising l27
The creation of States in Corsica, set in motion by
Choiseul reached fruition under Naupeou. Hostile reaction
cane from Dangerville, who scoffed at a nobility indistinQuish-
able from the peasantry which Narboeuf had had to create to
make the system york 128, Linguet was more enthusiastic, "On
est fort attentif a tout ce qui doit se passer dans cette cl-
bre assemble. Les objets qu'on y traite sont de la plus
grande importance. 13. est question d'tablir une forme nou-
velle, plus solide ot plus simple do lever les impZts" 129,
One commentator, plagiarising Aubusson's plans for provincial
reform, made the crucial connection between the island and the
mainland, "Le gouvernennt parait aujourd'hui convenir que la
regime par des Etats est celle qui peut le plus attacher un
peu1e, et le rendre heureux. C'est cette forrn
	
'administra-
tion qu'on a choisi pour la Corse" 13O 	 Devolutionary pro-
vincial reform was an irresistable trend of the last t.wo
decac1es of the reqime.
• in 1765 Jacques Varenne, an advocate of the parlement of
Dijon hired by the Elus Gneaux, could ask, "L'utilit de
l'administration municipale n'est - e].le pas universellement
reconnue?" 131, As if in answer in the new reign the Journal
Encyclop4'diaue in 1776 wrote, "Le projet de mettre les pro-
vinces ce royaume en pays d'Etats ... semble avoir rEni la
plupart des suff rages" 132 The prime case in point was
Dauphin4; after a false start in 1771 the issue of the corve
provoked the parlemerit to call for the recreat'ion of the
States with a doubled Third. Necker pacified the call by
promising a provincial assembly - always regarded as a second
best 133w The failure of the qovernmezit to honour this
promise in the face of unrelenting pressure for autonoz 1iy led
to the unilateral recreation of these States in 1788 134
States ocd their popularity to three factors, th first
that they represented in themselves a constitution. "Mix
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Etats Generaux de 1739," wrote Pitri, "la certitude que
l'ancierine zuonarchie obuissait a une constitution rcgulire,
sinon e'rite, du moms fixe'e par une couturne solicle, Sc
retrouve clans la p1upar cco cahiers dc la noblesse" 1..5.
Secondly, Lhey ansverecl the aristocracy's, and particularly
the Greats' and militaires', need for legitimate institution-
alised political po'rer.	 Thirdly, they had the unique
advantage over every other type of reform of disturbing
no existing structures and offending no vested interest,
i;ith the possible exception of the General Farms. They ere
politically radical while remaining juridically conservative.
SU1IARY
This chapter has looked at the .ssemblies of States. It looked
first at the States General to show how the attitudes towards
them - and the expectations held of them - developed over the
century. The States General emerge. as a part of the regime'8
political currency, but not, at this date, the weapon with which
to destroy it.
Lking, occondly, t the rovinc!al States, it becomes
clear that they had managed to solve many of the regime's prob-
lems. They were able to co-exist with the monarchy without the
tensions generated by the parlements. This was because their
administration was defined and patently e1flcient. They had
also accomodated the changes taking place within the nobility,
but at the expense of the middle classes.
Theywere thoroughly aristocratic institutions in all three
Orders. They pointed towards a monarchy founded on an alliance
between crown and aristocracy in the institutions. At the same
time their administration was conscientious and, efficient, and.
the conferring of political power on provincial elites had gen-
erated an unexpected sense of public service. The multiplicity
of local forms, and the willingness of some assemblies to ex-
periment, proved to be a source of confidence,and inspiration
to reformers.
Without the successful example of the provincial States,
it is unlikely that Letrosne would have seen a solution to the
regime's problems in terms of a reformed provincial administr-
ation (explored in the next chapter), nor that Necker would have
adopted such a programme.
Whatever strengths the regime still possessed were to be
found in the provincial States.
TABLE III
PRovINCE
States
Genera].
Brittany
Languedoc
Velay
Vivarajs
G evaudan
Assiette o
Toulouse
Provence
Corsica
Artois
Cambray
Burgundy
B 'ar n
Navarre
13 igorre
F o ix
Guienrie
Normandy
Dauphin
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ERY NOBILITY ri-1IRD
	
300	 300	 600
60 lup to 50C 60
	
23	 I	 23
	 46
	
15
	 9
13
	
7	 8	 18
L(pres- l(absen- 24
	ident)	 tee)
	
2	 2
	
36
	23	 23
	
23
	 2	 10
	
22
	16	 15
	 6
	
70	 up to 29
	
70
t54C
	
0	 60	 I 28
	
8	 1224 not
j iver
	
(?)8	 20	 1120
20	 20	 4J
34	 34	 34
50	 165	 276
MAJORITY
NEEDED
2:1
2:1
IC.'
_, _L_,u
2:1
2:1
2:1
2:1
2:1
2:1
2:1
- 1 Cl
.-, 
_I_i,
2:1
51%
President &
Consuls of
Aix
18
not given
not given
6
24
not givei
10*
President &
Treasurers
not given
not given
DCNL .ANT
FORCE
Revolution-
aries
Nobility
President
President
'President
President
President
Intendant
President
President
Elus Gene-
raux
President,
Governor or
Intendants
Seneschal
President
rres ident
Third
not given
No tables
42 Unanimous
INTER1 tE DIARY
CONN1SS ION
18
18
-	 IPresident
Notes: Figures in bracJ-ets indicate Orders sitting together,
which relates across to the majority needed to pass a
measure.
Elections generally changed only half the deputies at
a time to preserve continuity of personnel.
These figures represent the final form of the States.
Figures for nobles in Burgundy, Brittany and Barn, and
Foix represent the officially recognised number of 100
year fief-holders.
On Dauphin the situation was conf used, Egret defined
the deputies as "notables" rather than retaining strict
juridical divisions, which, in any case, broke down in
the assembly presaging the experience of the States Gen-
eral in 1789 136 (The practice of Dauphin fell mid
way between the theories of Mirabeau and Choiseul.)
* 1 cleric, (the president), 1 baron, 4 nobles, 4 cornrnon.aro
meeting only t'rice a year for up to four days in all. a1aried
resoectively at 181. per day, 91., 61., and 31.
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FO0TNOTE'
1. The French term "pays d''tats" will be translated
"States Country (-les)" which is both more accurate than
the contemporary British "State Country", has the advan-
tage over the French of forming a plural, and is in line
with current Channel Islands usaçe. (The Channel Island
constitutions are descended from medieval ?orman politic-
al practice, and display many of the features today that
French States displayed in the eighteenth century, from
Jersey's relationship irith the crown to Alderney's depen-
dent assembly.)
2. Piganiol de la Force I pt. I pp. 529-49.
3. Ibid. pp. 515-28.
4. Real I p. viii, II pp. 31-2, IV p. 133.
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V
ALTERNATIVE IDEAS IN POLITICS AND SOCIETY: J3ACKCROUND TO A NEW
MONARCHY.
Even after looking at the obvious institutiOns and social
groups, there remain large areas of political and social thought
untouched. These areas can be designated the intellectual back-
ground to the mechanistic monarchy (introduced in Chapter I),
and to many of the new directions taken in social and political
thouoht 1774-8.
If, as part of a new era of monarchy, Louis XVI hoped for
a restoration of mores, one of the first writers we should look
to is RStif de la Bretonne. Rtif's view of the regime forms
the backbone of Furick-Brentano's study of the period. Rtif
was born a peasant - stretching the term to its upper limits -
and much of his writing was a lament for lost rustic innocence
while a famous littraire in Paris. Rtif was the only self
professed peasant of the century to write extensively. In
Marxist terms Rtif was a traitor to his class, not showing
the peasantry as modern research - or as Young and Linguet
show it, but developing a "Merrie France" interpretation. In
Rtif's view of society the rustic idyll was married only by
the iniquitous towns. Rtif was not alone in this rejection of
urbanism, Delacroix presented it in 1770, though in a more real-
istic light, and Aubusson called towns, "... les sales re'paires
de tous les maux" . This cultural tension between town and
country was a symptom of the deeper economic tension which
showed itself in the peasant revolution of 1789 2,
Not being a political so much as a cultural writer, Rtif's
political ideas are difficult to pin down in precise statements,
they have to be presented as attitudes across the breadth of
his work. Rtif appealed to the nineteenth century as a ration-
al man of good sense, but moderate and virtuous. He produced
an ideology of society not dependent on the old regime's jurid-
ical framework but nonetheless strictly divided.into classes,
a society in which every man had a God-ordained place. His
puritan sexual morality and insistence on male dominance were
easy to interpret as the virtuous middle class rebelling against
the decadent aristocracy. Rtif had no specific ideas for
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reform, indeed the whole tone of his work was of political
quietism. Rtif represented an important aspect of the cultur-
al climate of Louis XVI'S reign : the assertion of puritan and
conservative values after the laxity of Louis XV'S time . (It
must be recorded that Brissot dismissed Rtif as unworthy of
study4).
A writer of very different style and background was Duclos.
In gerral attitude to the regime he shared much in common with
R&if, but was witty, sophisticated, and taken far more
seriously by contemporaries. Again, however, it is difficult
to pin down political statement, and in a cursory analysis we
can only discern broader attitudes. Duclos became historio
grapher royal in 1750, and secretary of the Acadmie in 1754.
He was ennobled in 1755 on the recommendation of the States of
Brittany and was active in the States thereafter . Duclos
was a man of letters rather than a true philosophe (as with
Bachaumont), he was the first man to analyse the Enlightenment
and its effects on society; his 'Considrations sur les Moeurs
de ce Sicle' (first edition, Berlin 1751) was continuously in
print for the rest of the regime.
Duclos influenced militaire thinking through his obvious
lack of sympathy for the robe and his pose ot enlightened
common sense, he was also an obvious influence on Liriguet, Buat,
and Aubusson amongst others. A review of one of his supple-
mentary works discerned a social programme based on taxing:
social status, social mobility, and celibacy. He insisted on
looking forward for new solutions to society's problems rather
than searching the past for inspiration -. he advocated teaching
Voltaire rather than the classics in schools. Duclos, however,
moves back into his period when he made it clear that he was
writing to halt a disastrous decline in population and to
shore up a disintegrating social edifice 6, Following on
Duclos came a host of ideas about changing, reforming, shoring
up society. These are most conveniently considered under the
two categories of partial reform schemes and schemes embracing
the whole of society. An extraordinary number of the ideas to
be described below were taken up by Necker when we come to
the all-embracing reform schemes,	 -
it will be clear that they point forward to
Letrosne's synthesis, which became government policy under
Necker.
Only five years after Duclos Coyer put forward ideas of
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lasting importance. Coyer's proposal was that the nobility -
".. en temps du pai.x ... un corps paralytique..." - should be
draf ted en masse into commerce '. This would have been little
more than an extension to the whole of France of the Breton
model of dormant nobility ("la noblesse dormante") whereby the
prerogatives of nobility 'could be set aside to avoid derogation.
The advantages of such an arrangement would be: wider cultiva-
tion from an influx of capital from commerce to agriculture,
an increase in population, an increase in consumption which
would stimulate agriculture and commerce and benefit finance
in qerral by speeding up the flow of money through the economy,
and improved shipping which would benefit the colonial empire.
Although some concessions were made to Coyer's ideas they re-
mained largely unimplemented. There were a number of reasons
f or this, most obviously that such a drastic shift of economic
activity would have changed the regime, but also because there
were very few nobles in a position to enter commercial enterprise
who either had the surplus capital or who had not openly or
clandestinely engaged in commerce already.
Coyer remained an influential figure, a constant reminder
of a more logical and rational structure of the regime. He
was in the public eye again in 1770 with a 'P3n d'Ed1Rton
Publigue' (Paris, 1770), in which he wanted to replace the
Jesuit educational system with a civic one, designed, amongst
oLher thic
	
to encourage Frenchmen to encr ccmrnerc. He must
have been gratified when a 'Compte Rendu aux Chambres Assembl'es'
presented to the parlement for its debates on education in the
same year endorsed his suggestions 8, Events overtook the pro-
posals. The 'Noblesse Commerçante' was reprinted under Necker,
and Coyer enjoyed another vogue. Coyer was typical of those
figures who had accepted the Enlightenment, and tried to recon-
cile it to the old regime; he was unusually successful in feed-
ing ideas into the government which were well-received and some-
times acted on.
A year later Naveau produced a reform scheme which remained
definitive in its field. Like Coyer, Naveau was a constant
source of interest and inspiration in political life. Naveau's
idea was that the (7eneral Farms could form the basis of a
rationalised structure of finances and administration. Naveau
acknowledged a debt to the duke of Burgundy, and claimed also
to have adapted Montesquieu's approach with the maqistracy to
the problem of finance. He welcomed the idea of an autonomous
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financial 1ite whose members, he believed, should be able,
disinterested, enlightened, and patrons of art and public works.
His plan was to establish a single General Farm with competence
over all financial affairs, but which would exclude the Court
and which would devolve itself into the provinces to break
Paris's stranglehold on the country. Naveau was a partisan of
the parlernents, arid hoped that they would acquire the expertise
to turn their justified concern over finance into valuable and
constructive advice. He would have abolished taxes on robe
offices and created a uniform type of office for law and
finance with guaranteed security of tenure. Naveau was a firm
believer in provincial autonomy, but did not seek the extension
of States into all provinces, on the grounds that States afford-
ed protection to local abuse and inefficiency. He hoped, how-
ever, that the fiscal infrastructure of the States Countries
could be adapted to the pays d'1ections; such a scheme was
proposed by Invau in November 1768
Alone among financial ref orme1, Naveau dismissed Vauban's
dtme royale, accusing it of causing crushing over-taxation and
of taxing people rather than wealth. He preferred the idea of
a properly organised proportional taille rSelle, taxing the
clergy, and exeLing only nobles on active military service -
very much Machault's plan. (Naveau's ideas on taxation were
refurbished by Groubentall who used them as an attack on alan-
r.i'ercs' plan (q.v.), an re-presented them for implementation
under Louis XVI 10) Naveau, however, believed that this was
just tinkering with irrelevancies beside the real need, a
solution to insolvency, which was to speed up the circulation
of capital through the economy. Government patronage of commerce,
industry, and agriculture, combined with steps to increase popu-
lation and consumption, would all automatically increase govern-
ment revenue. All debts could be paid off and credit restored;
a single General Farm would be the crowning glory of the scheme.
This was an enormously appealing scheme; it offered a painless
panacea with no harmful side effects. Naveau f1atered every
vested interest, except the most important - the Court. His
vision of harnessing vested interest and privilege to help the
state was a comforting one. Naveau was a member of a small
enlic'rhtened &ite trapped inside a corporation otherwise char-
acterised by inertia and abuse
	 While he proves that reform
can flourish in the most barren of ground, Naveau's offer of a
painless panacea helped to breed a fatal complacence and an
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unwillingness to tolerate painful reform.
Vauban's dme royale, although dismissed by Naveau, spavn
ed a whole school of reform. In general the physiocrats had
endorsed it, but as just part of wider programmes; the physio-
crat dominance in the Control Jenera]. 1759-69 and 1774-6 gave
rise to the hope that it might be implemented. In 1763 Roussel
de la Tour, a counsellor in the parlemerit of Paris, reissued
the idea 12• By this stage of the old regime's development,
however,any challenge to the existing fiscal structure was
regarded as a covert attack on the General Farms; in the same
year Darigrand made this very point overtly in his definitive
attack on the Farmers general 13 Roussel would have divided
French society into twenty classes, and each head of household
(of whom there would be 2,000,000) would pay an appropriate
tax. He believed that 740,000,0001. could be raised. Bachau-
mont recorded the pamphlets, and also that Roussel had distrib-
uted them free. After initial interest from the Control General
opposition from the Farmers General forced its suppression;
the Farmers enera1 used Naveau's arguments to attack it.
Bachaumont called the plan "... le voeu de la nation" 14
Turgot's freeing of the press in 1774 allowed the schenLe
to be revived, this time by Richard des Jlannires 15, who
managed to be the first to take advantage of the relaxation of
censorship. Various emphases were changed, but the ideas
were still largely Vauban's. There were to be eight classes
in• this version, a reformed taille rel1e administered by the
intendants, a cadaster, and fiscal uniformity. Two conomistes
attacked G1annires in 1775-6, Groubentall on the grounds of
practicality, and an anonymous author wrote, 'La Dixme Royale
de M. le Marechal de Vauban Cor qparee avec le Plan de (Glarinieres)'
which accused G1annires of both plagiarising and debasing the
original. Roussel's work was disinterred to attack G1annires
as 'La Richesse du Roi de France', which included a plan for
the liquidation of the national debt by publio subscription l6
G1arinires attracted as much attention as any one pamphle-
teer of the century, and it was felt possible that Turgot was
using the pamphlet to advertise his intentions. Regnaud was
well-disposed to Glannires because of his loyalty to the
parlements and because of the benefits of system 17• Hardy
noted the plan, but held out little hope: the conomistes oppos-
ed it, the landowners feared an increased tax burden, and the
various governmental agencies would have objected to its imple-
mentation l8 The Nouvelle$Ephmrides published a detailed
critique of the plan by the abbe Baudau. It was refuted on
two main points: that the new tax would be twice as onerous
as the old, and that the demographic calculations were inaccurate;
Glannires was insisting on a population of 18,000,000 when his
scheme would only work with 36,000,000 19 The Mercure de
France was sceptical, and gave a more favourable review to an
attack on the plan. This attack held that the cure would be
worse than the disease 20	 Later in the year Tifaut de la
Noue condemned indiscriminate taxation on land, when a tax on
wealth and superfluity was needed 21 The Ann 'e Littraire
was t first non-committal, but pointed out the plagiarisation
of earlier writers. The conomiste attack, however, won Frron
over to Glannires'side 22, Already in these reviews Naveau's
insidious influence can be seen undermining sincere attempts at
reform.	 -
The dime royale was the simplest and most direct fiscal
reform - there were a host of more complex schemes. In 1763
the chevalier cle Forbin had put forward a variant on the dime,
in which each individual would voluntarily contribute 10% of
his income 23 This was to become a recurrent idea in the old
regime (e.g. 'Piches	 d' Roi de France'). In 1777 another
variant on the dtme was presented to Necker 24, In 1775
'Indications Politigues sur les Finances' 25 sought to have
set aside a fund to pay cff i-he ntiona1 debt. Later in the
year a 'Plan pour la Libratiori de la Dette Nationale' 26 was
published to refute both the banker's approach of Law and the
dtme royale of Glannires. It presented a six point programme
for financial recovery: balance the budget, restore credit,
maintain all existing taxation until a surplus had been estab-
lished, judicious borrowing, stimulate agriculture and commerce,
and, a rather complex suggestion, increase the population to
change the ratio of people to specie thus opening up new
economic possibilities 27	 A much simpler scheme later in the
year recommended that an improvement in agriculture and commun-
ications alone would restore solvency 28,	 April 1776 an
'Essai des Finances' proposed abolishing all existing taxes,
taxing all drinks, a taille proportionelle on all land, and the
encouragement of manufacturing, fisheries, and commerce 29
This was a very similar procramme to Groubert de Groubentall's
in 'La Finance PoliticTue' which was, however, as much concerned
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with attacking other reformers as making constructive suggest-
ions. This is only the briefest look at the mass of ideas
which flourished under Turgot's freedom of the press, but the
majority of these pamphlets were rehashes of the physiocrat
ideas of the 1760's. This impulse was cut of f by Clugny, and
never resumed despite Necker's cautious reopening of freedom
of the press.
The ideas in print were paralleled by the manuscript ideas
pesented to the Control General. A scheme in 1770 asked for
nineteen specific reforms. It started from the premises:
that France's adequate wealth was being mismanaged, that those
who most needed reforms were those least able to ask for them,
that the government had lost touch with the people, and that
the welfare of the individual was the only basis of the state's
prosperity. This scheme called for a d'me royale, a free market
economy, and social mobility. The juridical structure of the
regime would have been untouched; credit, money-lending, and
financial dealings were in general condemned. This plan anti-
cipated some of Turgot's and some of Nec]cer's ideas while try-
ing to reconcile new economic ideas with very old political and
social ones. In 1774 a scheme for taxing grain was presented,
in which the different types of grain would be taxed proportion-
ately to their quality. This, it was proposed, would be an
equitable tax reaching all Frenchmen, stablising the price of
food stuffs and encouraging agriculture. Another plan in
1774 attacked the physiocrat obsession with taxing land while
ignoring capital. This plan hoped for a free market economy
with taxation of wealth not property.
A small group of reformers suggested financiers' solutions
to France's economic problems. In 1775 a correspondent suggest-
ed that fixing interest rates at 4% would be the universal
panacea. The next year another reformer analysed the difference
between Britain and France as being that Britain enjoyed 3 %
interest rates against France's 6%, and suggested that France's
solvency would be assured by a rate of 2.5% 30• In the same
vein in 1776 a plan for the universal solution of financial
problems recommended that the government launch a new tontine
31• Conversely several writers were coming round to the idea
that nascent capitalism was the cause of - not the solution
to - France's problems. Aubusson would have abolished usuary
and credit in general and the idea was taken up in more detail
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in 'Moyens d'Extirper l'usure' 32, which advised a state mono-
poly to run credit at as low a rate a was feasible. The spirit
of this phase of reform as a whole was captured in 'Les Irxtrts
du Roi et ceux du Peuple', which stated that France's problems
could be solved without a "rvolution ge'ne'rale" if only a gener-
al reform of taxation were initiated; the converse proved to
be the case
•	 Less immediately relevant to the problems of Louis Xvi's
ministers, but more in key with the king's own ideas, were the
significantly large number of dvot writers calling for a more
theocratic approach to politics. Some ultramontane writers
would have liked nothing better than to see France placed direct-
ly under Papal rule, (e.g. 'Trait du Gouvernement de l'Eglise
et de la Puissance du Pape' Febronius. Venice 1769.) most
hoped simply to see more notice taken of Catholic doctrine in
political life; the vast majority were naive, inconsequential
and impractical	 There was a constant stream of reprints
of old Gallican tracts, indeed there were more of these than
philosophe works. In political terms this was a rear-guard
action, the upper clergy were concerned with entrenching
political power in lay institutions, the lower clergy were never
in a position to cxerci political power, and organised relig-
ion had lost the power to influence political life.
One of the most consistent advocates of a more theocratic
COflLiLULiufl wcs the abb(eavelrac, whose most comprehensive
programme was set out.iri Apologie de Louis XIV et de son Con-
seil sur la Rvocation de L'Edit de Nantes' (Paris 1758).
Caveirac was politically intolerant, he felt that there was
still work to be done against the Huguenots, to say nothing of
the new threat from the deists and atheists. He brought his
ideas up to date for the late century with 'Appel la Raison'
(Paris ? 1764), which linked the attack on the Huguenots with
the need to attack the enemies of the Jesuits. His aim was to
show France how it could vanquish its spiritua'i. enemies without
suffering economic ruin. In many ways Caveirac was a dvot
Mirabeau, whose inspiration he ac1now1edged. He had no inter-
est in social change, he endorsed all Mirabeau's ideas on the
need for fewer nobles to enjoy more privilege for example, but
hoped to turn some of the Enlightenment's better political
ideas against the enemies of the Church. Taking the Jesuit
state of Paraguay as his model, Caveirac put forward a ten point
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programme: the maintenance of religion through the family
as the basis for all else; secondly, he wanted to cut out the
dead wood from the legal system, speed up the process of law,
which, while outstanding, was the only abuse in an otherwise
near perfect institution; thirdly, he required a pacifist
foreign policy; fourthly, a reduction of superfluity; fifthly,
a better lot for the poor; sixthly, he asked for a general
lessening of the tax burden to be achieved by, seventhly, the
; introduction of Vauban's dtme royale; eighthly, he would have
implemented Mirabeau's provincial policy; ninethly, he called
for the abolition of abusive taxes, singling out the gabelle;
and tenthly, he- would have abolished the corvee and replaced
it with the Roman system of using the army to build roads.
Caveirac was by far the most sophisticated and comprehensive
writer of his genre.
In the late 1760's a small school of writers grew up whose
ideas were noticed by more wide-ranging writers such as Mably
and Guibert, and enjoyed some success in action in the 1770's
and 1780's. This was a school who called for civic virtue to
be put above self-interest, juridical barriers, or local privi-
Lege. This was very much an expression of the Louisseizime
monarchy, and undcr the new reign there was a vogue for light-
ing streets, cleaning cities, building magnificent new h?,tels
and public works, and rediscovering and restoring ancient
monuments. (eg. the Roman ruins at Nimes). This might be
interpreted as a symptom of the growing desire for national
unity and sovereignty, seeking some object of pride and loyalty
above things juridical. Tocqueville espied this deep need in
eighteenth-century Frenchmen which the social, juridical, and
political institutions all thwarted. Another aspect of this
trend was a belief in civic education to inspire youth with a
spirit of benefit to the community rather than devotion to
religion. There was a definite link between this concept of
civic virtue, culminating in Guibert's ideas (q.v. Chapter II),
and the emergence of the militaires as a new sociopolitical
group (as witnessed by the title of the books quoted here).
The regime proved unable to harness this energy
A final reform project, 'Principes de La Lgis1ation
Universelle' (Anonymous, 2 volumes. Amsterdam 1776), was a
synthesis of many of the ideas of the period, and one of the
last books to come out before Clugny's censorship was imposed.
It deserves an important place in our study for bridging the
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gap between the type of reform schemes described above and the Rev-
olutionary activity of the 1790's. It seems to have been the first
book to bring together the slogans: 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity',
but added to them: 'Property' and 'Happiness'. It was the half-way
house between Linguet and Rousseau, combining the revolutionary via-.
ion of the latter with the social critique of the former. It called
for a free market economy in one direction, but a tightening up of
feudalism in another, and gave an anti-capitalist analysis of western
econonomies. It trotted out all the usual accepted wisdom about
breaking the hold of specie and increasing the population, but linked
them into the Enlightenment's concepts of progress, the pursuit of
happiness, and natural equality. It was an attempt to reconcile the
new ideas from America with the forms of the old regime 36•
Discussions of equality and Revolutionary concepts lead towards
Rousseau. It could be argued that no survey of the late old regime's
political culture would be complete without an account of Rousseau.
In practice Rousseau was a remote, obscure, and little understood
figure in his own day. For example, reviewing the 'Contrat Social',
Bachaumont could write, "Ii est trbes important qu'un pareil ouvrage
ne ferments pas lea t'tes faciles . s'exalter: ii en resulterait de
trs gr.rd dcrar, c . 11pirysppment aue l'auteu.r s'est envelopp
dana une obscurit( scientifique, qui le rend impenStrable au commun
des leoteurs."	 Rousseau, in fact, only became intelligible to
eighteenth-century Frenchmen after the Revolution had given his works
an unexpected relevance and immediacy. (The opposite fate was to be-
fall Linguet). Contemporaries took little notice of him as a polit-
ical writer, but picked up a simplified account of the clichJ's on the
corrupting influence of civilization, the noble savage, or Voltaire's
quip about longing to go on all fours 38, To do justice to Rousseau's
complex position before the Revolution would require a study of its
own, and as a political theorist he is more aptly studied in the Rev-
olutionary context. For all these reasons, in this study his exist-
ence as a radical writer contributing to the late-century climate of
opinion is noted, but not explored.
Of the general (ie. complete political and social restructuring
of society) practical reform schemes, one of the earliest and most
influential was Argenson's. It was a political land-mark. As a Sec-
retary of tato turned "embittered renegade" 	 his detailed study
of the bankruptcy of the Louisquatorzean system and the need for en-
lightened devolutionary reform caused a sensation. There were two
versions of his 'Considerations sur le Gouvernement Ancien & Present
de la France' (1765 and 1784). This can be accounted for by the
Marquis having left a mass of papers which his son was able to edit
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into two separate books to suit the mood of the moment 40,
The 1765 edition was by far the most important, and such
was its impact that Bachauniont, citing the Acadmie des Belles
Lettres, believed it had been ghost-written by Rousseau
It attempted to capture the mood of physiocracy interacting
with Enlightened Despotism.
Argerison operated from all the premises of the duke of
Burgundy's circle, and his most basic complaint was that Louis
XIV'S personal absolutism had not coalesced into a centralised
monarchy, and that some system was needed to avoid the excess
of absolutism under Louis XIV or its lack under Louis XV.
Like all others of the period, he believed that he needed to
help repair the dama.e to agriculture and the population
caused by Louis XIV'S wars. In society he saw that the robe,
through the magistrates and intendants, had achieved supremacy,
but without fulfilling the true role Louis XIV had envisaged
for them as servants not rivals of the crown 42, He proposed
a complete restructuring of the political organisation of the
realm both ideologically and geographically. The generalities
would be broken down into departments, which would in turn be
broken down into subdelegations or municipalties. Argenson's
plan vould have resulted in approximatel y 180 departrnnts and
1,800 subdelegations. At the top of the structure the king
represented monarchism. At the middle level (Conciliar and
provincial) ai.stocrac- qas to rule (in the Platonic' rather
than Venetian model) to such an extent that every noble in
France would be pressed into the administration. At the
subdelegation level magistrates would organise municipal
democracy. Argenson believed he had taken Colbert's reforms
.to their logical conclusion and infused the merits of three
types of government into France. Argenson had not yet reached
the concept of a Newtonian machine, but he was the link be-
tween the duke of Burgundy and the physiocrats, and more
specifically Aubusson 43,
Generally regarded as a physiocrat version of Argenson's
ideas was the 'Mmoire au Roi sur les Municipalite 's' of 1776.
Although patronised by Turgot, this plan was the work of Dupont
de Nemours, and it lies in the mainstream of the conomiste think-
ing of the 1760's; it looks curiously out of place in the polit-
ical environmcnt of the new reign which had moved on to the
concept of the mechanistic monarchy. Like Argenson, Turgot
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proposed a structure of local representative democracy, but
it lacked the political depth, subtlety, or sophistication of
Argenson. The system was based solely on property ownership
which conferred notability upon a holder of a sufficient
quantity. The notables would meet in the parish each year to
elect the local officials and to elect a deputy for the cantonal
administration. One feature of the scheme was that those below
the property qualification could club together to make up
enough property to exercise a vote between them. The cantonal
assembly would send on one deputy to the provincial assembly,
each of which would send on one deputy to Paris. Extra deputies
would be allowed for Paris. Although the plan is not very
specific it would seem to rest upon roughly thirty provinces
each with thirty cantons 44•
This reform scheme being one of the closest of all to the
regime's political power, it was forced, accordingly, to tread
carefully. It insisted on running parallel to all existing
political, social, or juridical structures. Turgot did, though,
have the definite hope of weakening the grip of privilege,
specifically economic privilege, on society. Oneof the features
of the scheme was the waiving of all juridical privilege within
it. The object of the scheme was to reawaken France by giving
her a simple and effective constitution which would at one and
the same time involve all the notables of the realm in a polit-
ical structure which would function smoothly without outside
intervention, and yet still give greater scope to a just and
reforming monarch. The assemblies in the scheme would have com-
petence over: taxation, public services and works, and the
implementation of a uniform graduated tax based on a cadaster.
All officers would be elected from within the body of deputies,
and would be paid expenses. The concentration on notables was
a feature of much late regime thinking; it was strong in
Choiseul's provincial writing. For all its good intentions,
the memoir lacked political scope and a real grasp on the prob-
lems of the new reign; it was still drastic enough to arouse
intense opposition.
At a further remove from Argenson was Buat. Although Buat
went through considerable literary contortions to avoid naming
any contemporaries, one passage can refer only to Argenson, who
is rejected Nonetheless Buat's first work is pervaded by
attitudes and assumptions made by Argenson, notably on the
structures and relationships of different types of government.
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Buat started from the assumption that the Louisquatorzieme sys-
tem had served France well in the seventeenth century, perhaps
even up to Fleury's death, but had now outlived its usefulness
and was threatening to destroy society. By 1773 France, "...
mrite peine ...", the name 'monarchy'. Commerce, overtaxa-
tion, the blurring of social distinctions, the ease of acquir-
ing titles, the failure tà patronise hobraux and martial values,
the failure to adapt chivalry to modern warfare, and the decay
of feudalism had begun to undermine society 46 Buat set out
his fears for the I uture "En ef let, si le dSsordre qui rgne
aujourd'hui doit toujours durer , si l'ordre de la noblesse doit
toujours tre la sentine de tous les autres tats, en recevoir
les mernbres les plus corrompus et les plus dcidé 's 'a tre Un
poids inutile pour la socit, ii I aut de deux choses l'une;
ou que l'ancienne noblesse prisse, ou que tout ce qui est
opulent dans l'tat devenant noble, on abroge toute loi, tout
privilge, tout exemption, comnte autant de distinctions odieuses,
inutiles, onreuses, qui ne servit qu' favoriser l'oisivet
jointe 'a l'opulence, 'a ennoblir les richesses, et 'a degrader la
pauvret, par la honte et le me'pris"	 . In other words Buat
feared that the nobility would be transformed into a socio-
economic lite analogous to nineteenth and twentieth century
brurqeois ruling classes, with the resultant loss of all noble
values.
Buat produced detailed plans to structure society around education
0.md la11d-ho1ing dcigncd to reintrcthi3o feudalirn, but. But alsc.,
made vaguer references to reorganisirig the rest of society.
Buat was a devolutionist to thefullest extent, each province
was to have fiscal and administrative autonomy and possess the
infrastructure of z canton, district, community, individual.
The individual was included as the lowest political unit, this
was a shift away from the family (or hearth) as the basic unit
and anticipated Turgot and Necker. The community would have
been synoymous with the fief, and the weight of administration
including rudimentary social welfare, was to be shifted there.
The fiscal structure was to be reorganised to avoid the exist-
ing situation of specie drying up once taxes reached a certain
point. Buat considered taxes in several contexts, and while
not directly contradictory, some of his ideas were ill at ease
with others. His most basic premise was a tax of 20% on landed
income for commoners and l0 for nobles, but supplementary to
this was taxation of basic commodities at consumption; Buat
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made two specific recommendations, that nothing should be taxed
twice, and that the leisured townsman shouldnot escape contri-
48
bution .
At a national level there were to be four branches of
government: food, money, law, and defence, and an additional
fifth body concerned with public mores to be in effect a rigor-
ously reformed Court	 Each branch of government would be
run by an elective structure ("intermediary body"), which would
be a bureau of deputies 	 This was an unashamed limitation
of royal absolutism in the interests of devolution, efficiency,
and participation. Taking the intermediary body for food as
a model, Buat outlined its structure. The nobles and notables
of each district would elect three noble and four commoner
deputies; by a process of co-options and further election each
province would have a bureau of twenty deputies, a president,
and two secretaries. So far elections were to be annual, but
at the provincial level a triennial election of three deputies
would produce the national bureau. Assuming Buat worked from
the generality, the national body would consist of a hundred
elected members from the provinces with two procurators general,
two advocates general, onecetary and a president (these
"king's people" to be half elected from the bureau and half
royal nominees). Government was to be conducted as far as
possible by consultation between crown and bureau. Buat was as
qoor as proposing an elective civil serv;ce 51
The parlerrnts as a separate judiciary were to be retained,
but with all the reservations Moreau was making. The magis-
tracy could retain its identity as a "classe", but must aban-
don venality, "... cet tablissement monstreux ..." whereby,
"... l'amour paternel deviendroit un principe de corruption...",
it generated false values and sectional selfinterest. Along
with almost every other commentator Buat desired improved per-
sonnel in the courts, and this tied in with previously examined
plans to make the magistracy a recognised noble career. The
peerage would remain in the parlement, but the idea of an lite
within the lite was to be discouraged, and the institution
encouraged to lapse 52 • Other jurisdictions, specifically
martial, noble, and ecclesiastical, were to be rigidly separated
3. Buat kept three principles in mind in reorganising society:
utilitarianism tempered by aristocracy and feudalism. Although
Buat seems to be setting up autonomous self-regulating adminis-
trative structures, he can not be said to be proposing a mech-
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anistic monarchy. The administrative machinery was designed
to free the crown and nobility from routine drudgery thus allow-
ing them greater scope and power above and outside these struc-
tures.
For the breakthrough to the political, culture of the new
reign we must look to'LAmi des Frartcois' • This was both the
title of the book and the author's pseudonym .. The identity
of the author, however, is problematic. The last work in this
category is signed 'Augustin Rouill', and subsequent comment-
ators and cataloguers have taken this to be the intendant
Rouilld'd'Orfeuil . This identity, however, is not tenable
as the intendant was Gaspard-Louis not Augustin, and what we
know of him neither recommends him as the author nor tallies
with the occasional autobiographical comments in the works •
Furthermore, the house of Rouill could offer no other suitable
candidate 56, The tone of the works suggest authorship by a
militaire, and is hostile to the robe; public opinion reacted
on this assumption, particularly the Journal Encylopdigue which
described the anonymous author as a rich, well-born militaire,
and "Lavelanet" described himself as an "ancien militaire"
Bachaumont went a step further and named the author as the
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vicon tP d'Aubusson
In the eighteenth century, however, the house of Aubusson
boasted no viscounts; that line having died out centuries
earlier, nr were any other members of the amiiy plausible
candidates 59. The viscounty of Aubusson, however, was being
exercised by Chazerat, the first president of the Court of
Aids of Clermont-Ferrand. The president, at last, is a viable
candidate for the 'Ami des Francois'. He came from a twelth
century Bourbonnais family which had moved into the judiciary
in the eighteenth century. Chazerat still united the outlook
of the militaires with the experience of the robe. In 1767
he united the post of first president with that of intendant,
and in 1771 he became first president of a new Superior Council
in ClermontFerrand 60 • This does still leave us with some
loose ends, as both the Journal Historigue and Bachaumont re-
ported their viscount to be an Aialophile recluse, friend of
Lauraguais, and enemy of Maupeou . These biographical com
merits could refer to Pierre-Arriaud d'Aubusson who was indeed
an obscure patriot pamphleteer in collaboration with Lauraguais;
Pierre-Arnaud, however, neither styled himself viscount nor
possessed the political outlook of L'Ami des François 62
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While some doubt must always remain, taking Chazerat as the
author solves more problems than it raises, and we may specu-
late that this provincial president was hoping to make a great
national reputation as the first political theorist of the
Maupeou era.
Grimm read L'Ami des Fraricois' and called it, ".. un
rave politique, qui avec le ton le plus emphatique et le plus
ennuyeux, propose un systme complet de gouvernement pour la
France; ... On pourrait meme soupçonner l'auteur d'en avoir
voulu dgoater les lecteurs lea lus intre'pides". He thanked
the government for banning it, and strongly discouraged people
from reading it 63 . The Journal Encyclopdigue expressed the
same view, but hoped that its literary failure would not obscure
its political merits; such "romans politiques", born of a des-
ire for public welfare miqht, "... faire germer dans l'esprit
de ceux qui gouvernent (la socit), 1'heureuseide d'adoucir
quelques uns de ses maux" 64 Otherwise Aubusson attracted
little attention before 1775 when Groubert de Groubentall called
L'Ami des Francois an, "... ouvrage qui prsente quelques objets
assez bien vus, mais nois dans une mer cl'id6es et de moyens
impracticables" 65• This is a just comment for across the
breadth of the works Aubusson frequently changes his mind and
contradicts himself. It has not been possible to reconcile all
these contradictions, notably on the abolition and retention
of titles.
Aubusson took these criticisms to heart; he prcised and
reissued his ideas in the second and third works cutting out
the cumbersome dialogue and much of the offensive arrogance.
The Journal Encycop digue now praised both the content and the
form • Aubusson's basic fear was that France would follow
in Poland's footsteps, and already he saw the rot setting in in
a. society where "chaos affreux" was presided over by an "adznim-
istration stupide", vitiated by luxury, corruption, self-inter-
est, and idleness. France had six major constitutional fail
ings decisions which should have been taken by thousands were
in the hands of a single man, there was no separation of powers,
the judiciary was subject to political interference, there was
lack of uniformity, and with neither elections nor accountabil-
ity public appointments were based on self-interest and minis-
terial despotism had deprived the administration of a basis in
law. The parlements were neither able to fulfil their true
role nor cut out to fulfil any other (e.g. national assembly).
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Agricultural wealth was compromised by an abusive fiscal sys-
tern and an army of tax collectors. The intendants acted like
gods and could, r would, do nothing to attack abuse. AubUso
was presenting a more radical version here of Malesherbes's
ideas on the regime and he was concerned about the central
rather than peripheral provinces.
Aubusson criticised the juridical structure of the regime.
Hereditary nobility was an abusive chimera no one could be
certain who his father was. The only roles Aubusson reserved
to a nobility were to mark a function or as reward for service,
he would have abolished hereditary and venal nobility and insti-
tuted life-titles. On a different tack, he desired the abolition
of naval and military establishments outside the reach of the
law (a point Mably and Holbach were both concerned with). He
objected to privilege which transferred a financial burden from
one person to another, and was especially outraged by the farm-
ing out of privilege (e.g. banalities) to self-interested
"nierceriaries". Like Mirabeau, Aubussori was concerned about the
true nobility and wanted to halt its debasement - even if at
the cost of destroying all hereditary titles. He was saddened
that chivalry had decayed into a façade for debauchery.
Aubusson attdcked the clergy in similar terms: they were
rich, self-interested libertines. He would have abolished all
ecclesiastical posts except those of bishop, cure' and vIcaire.
.Th Gallic Church' was to be brought more firmly under domes-
tic control. He objected to celibacy as a factor in depopula -
tion, and believed, for demographic reasons, that civil divorce
should be instituted. Aubusson proposed making marriage a
civil contract renewable annually - with provision for the child-
ren. He insisted on toleration. He laid the blame for the
excessive number of holidays at the door of the clergy. In re-
forming the Church, he would have cut it back to a nucleus of
twenty bishops (one per province) and 70,000 curd's salaried
in kind at, respectively, 10,0001. and 1,0001. per annum. Re
made no mention of a role for them in the new political struc-
tures. This was a
	
- radically militaire programme,
Despite his legal ideas about marriage, Aubusson believed
the family was the basic unit of society and the foundation of
social stability. He hoped for a society where each family was
a self-sufficient unit - politically, socially, and economically
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introverted. This structure would reduce, if not eradicate,
the opportunity for social tension and disintegration. The
cohesion of the family would be ensured by virtue (i.e. purit-
anism), "l'unique source du bonheur". Women would have fewer
rights in Aubusson's system than even under existing legal
codes. They would remain legal minors all their lives with no
rights of inheritance, and an alimony of only 5% of the hus-
band's income would be accorded to them at divorce. In another
direction Aubusson suggested a reform which would have been one
of the great humanitarian achievm?nts of the century - a properly
organised system of adoption for all orphaned or foundling
children.
.Aubusson's concept of well-ordered and virtuous marital
relationships was carried to great lengthse The age of major-
ity for men was to be raised to thirty-one, and only then would
they be allowed to marry women of twenty-five years or more.
Before marriage Aubusson set the highest store by chastity.
There is some evidence that the ages AubusGon quotes reflected
the economic realities of marriage for the poor, who had to work
and save money for half of their life-expectancy before being
able to afford marriage and children. Nonetheless, implemented
across the board, given eighteenth-century demographic realities
this measure would have caucod irreversible decline. Aubusson's
aim was to create a stable population in which there would be
noMalthusian pressures causing social disintegration. He
slarids alc'xi tong dontemporary writers in giving serious
thought to the political consequences, and the means of avoid-
ing, over-population. He is also one of the few writers to
grasp that restructuring the generations is the only sure means
of controlling population.
Aubusson held a variety of idiosyncratic ideas he would
have liked to impose on society. Just as Linguet attributed
most social ills to cereal culture, so Aubusson held that the
social and economic structures needed to produce meat were
the origin of most abuse and iniquity; Aubuson was, there-
fore, a vegetarian. He would not just have banned meat , but
also: alchohol, coffee, tobacco, perfume, and mushrooms
(because of the risk of eating poisonous fungi by mistake).
He would have also banned such superfluities as balls and
carriages, and regarded as all but 500 of the books ever
written as worthless. He feared servants as "spies" arid
"enemies" - the viper in the privileged bosom - arid warned that
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on no account should they be allowed to handle firearms.
Foreign policy he dismissed in toto, he wou1c have solved the
'problem of external relations with a dyke from Dunkirk to
Avignon. He loathed the Court as a source of every possible
vice, and urged seigneurs to live on their estates.
To correct all these problems and abuses Aubusson proposed
a new social and political order, the mechanistic monarchy,
where, as in a Newtonian machine, reason, balance, and harmony
would reign. Before this could be done vast stretches of the
old regime would have to be dismantled: censorship, restrict-
ions on commerce, the colonial empire, particularist jurisdict-
ions, existing abusive legal processes, feudalism, the corve,
credit and usuary (by withdrawing any legal redress against debt),
formalec3ucatjon, the infrastructure of the generalities, and
the bureaucracy in Paris. (The first seven points were all
features of Turgot's administration of the Control General.)
The mechanistic monarchy was to be based on a separation of
powers. The king would be the hereditary head of the executive
presiding over six Councils of State (Police, Commerce, Finance,
Religion, War, and Foreign Affairs). Each Council would be
composed of five Counsellors of State and one Secretary of
State. The three former Councils would be composed of former
intendants, the Council of Religion of ex-bishops, and the
two latter of relevant specialists. The Council of Finances
would be charged with drawing up a cadaster and instituting the
dTme royale - the duke of Burgundy's programme. The king in
this plan has come to occupy the analogous position of the
Amercian president, an indication of like-minded political
thinking across the Atlantic community.
In the reformed judiciary each of the twenty provinces
would have a local court of appeal, arid Paris would retain a
parlement as a national court of appeal. The reformed pane-
ments would consist of six chambers: criminal.and police, family
law, divorce, feudal law, commerce, and property. The chambers
would be made up of fifteen salaried magistrates: president
(15,0001.), twelve counsellors (12,0001.), and a procurator
genera]. (3,6001.). A grand chamber would have a first president
(24,0001.), twelve counsellors, a clerk of the court (100,0001.
misprint?), a procurator general, andtwo advocates general
(12,0001.).	 Below these courts would come 7,000 local courts
where the commissioner of police served as judge. The judiciary
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would form a single corporation and a distinct social category
able to elect its own membership. This scheme recognised all
the social pretensions of the unite' des classes while satisfy-
ma all the political criteria of Maupeou's reforms.
The legislature would be based on a reformed States General
which would be the seat of sovereignty and, "... un corps solide,
form par les repreentants. de toutes les classes de citoyens,
dSpendant directement et uniquement de la nation". They would
be formed of: the king, Dauphin (if over twenty), princes of
the Blood, twelve lay peers, thirty Counsellors of State, Six
Secretaries of State, Chancellor, one representative from each
parlement, and four deputies from each province, with the
country-side more heavily represented than the towns. All eighty
provincial deputies would be renewed annually by election from
the provincial councils. The competence of the States General
would be: legislation, war and peace, all appointments, finance,
and acting as arbiter over the judidary and executive.
Below the States General came the reformed structure of
provincial aovernment. The provinces were to be run by: a
governor, lieutenant-general, bishop, parlement, provincial
council ("conseil d'interxdance"), intendant, and receiver general
of finances. All the provincial officers would have to zeside
Ili their jurisdictions - an ideal Louis XVI held dear. The in-
tendant would lose all his legalattributes, be moved to a
different province each year, and be a man of far greater integ-
rity, talent, and experience than under the old regime. In
these ideas Aubusson was looking both back to the original con-
cept of the offices and forward to a professional apolitical
civil service. The officers were all to be appointed by the
States General, and answerable to them. The provincial struct-
ure was a replica (and lower chamber) of the States General and
king. All provincial decisions had to be ratified by the States
General. The province was subdivided again into twenty districts
run by a commissioner of police, the district wasto be divided
into its component parishes whose affairs could be handled by
a syndic. The representative democracy in the system was
vested in the canton, where notables elected four deputies every
Jnuary 1st who served on the provincial council. A final
revolutionary feature was a clearly established career structure:
the commissioner of police was to be promoted to the provincial
appeal court, whose counsellors were the recruiting ground for
intendants, who were in turn the pool of talent for Counsellors
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of State. For Aubusson the most irportanL unit was to be the
district, and the most important official the commissioner of
police; these men united all three bran'ches of administration
in a stable local institution.
The keynote in Aubusson's thinking was stability, at al-
most any cost. One of the duties of the Council of Police
was to supervise a reformed social structure with ten levels:
the Great, the militaires, the upper magistracy, (those of the
capital), the lower (provincial) magistracy, landowners, the
urban middle classes, retailers, cultivaters, artisans, and
journaliers. Only the clergy lay outside this structure as a
career of talents. Each class was to have its own dress, educa-
tion, and was immutable, there being no social mobility.
Aubusson never received any official patronage. He was,
however, the link between Argenson arxl Letrosne, who was, over
and over again, inspired by him. Aubusson produced a vast pool
of ideas drawn on by almost every future reformer. His ideas
were presented to Turgot in 1775 by one Lavelanet, who plagiar
ised him to such an extent that one suspects it may have been
Aubusson using a pseudonym. To some extent this plan was a
compromise between Ami des François and Alambic des Loix, and
its terminology was the most interesting: the canton was call-
ed a "department" presided over by a "Praetor", each district
would be run by a "Prefect", and each parish by a "bourgeois
censor". Only the praetors, prefects, and censors gould be
eligible to stand for hiçjher election. Justice would be free,
and the Presidial court would become the basis of provincial
justice. Privilege would be abolished in general, but retained
to reward individuals. Taxation would be based on a cadaster,
but the newly presented dime royale of Glannires (qv.) was
rejected. Where Buat's scheme traced the outline of a rigidly
structured society with self-regulating administrative machin-
ery, Aubusson filled in the details and produced a blueprint
not only of the mechanistic monarchy, but alsQ of much of the
politics of the next reign. Aubusson was trying to come to
terms with a militaire view of society, with Maupeou's impact
on politics and administration, and with the new philosophe
ideas, while seeing a more distant vision of an administrative
structure taken out of the political arena, freed of the defects
of monarchy, yet accountable to the nation. This vision fired
Letrosne and Necker.
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Looking forward over the seven years after 1771, large
areas of Aubusson's thought were implemented though never
the central vision. Nupeou's reforms cleared the ground for
wider reform by the attack on the political power of the robe.
Turgot took up several individual points, such as the abolition
of the guilds or of feudalism. Necker was interested in several
of Aubusson's ideas, such as the basic fault of old regime
economics being the mismanagement of otherwise ample resources.
Given the problem of authorship, Aubusson himself believed
that Louis XVI was the king to implement his ideas; in his
open letter he asked only for a king who would be open to dis-
interested advice and appoint a committee to examine it. He
claimed to have been well-received and, much publicised, but
to have seen others steal his ideas and take the credit.
Aubusson, for all the breadth of his vision, remained an
obscure writer, but his successor in the field, and the author
of the most important of these reform schemes was a minor cele-
brity who enjoyed public acclaim and ministerial patronage.
This was Letrosne, who lacked Aubusson's originality, but pro-
duced a scheme which caught the mood of the times and formed
the intellectual background to Necker's reforms.
Letrosne was a Presidial. magistrate (1753-73) from Or1ans
who had turned his attention from law to a&ninistration 6j
Letrosne's earliest publicised work was a Discours sur l'Etat
Aetuel de la Hagistrature' 1763 8, which as yet showed no
philosophe influence, taking Sguier's approach to the magistracy.
He went through the standard evolution of the late century of
endorsinq philosophe and conomiste ideas, though not uncritic-
ally 69	 Letrosne's career in the 1760's was close to Linguet's
or Necker's, but it developed to be more constructive than the
fornr and more intellectual than the latter. As a magistrate
Letrosne became a leading reformer, the climax of whose career
was Vues sur la Justice Criminielle' (Paris 1777). Reviewing
this work the Mercure de France described the'author as, "...
un magistrat qui par son experience et sur-tout par ses medita-
tions profondes, pouvait le mieu.x appr 'cier les bons ou mauvais
70
effets de nos loix penales"	 . A feature of Letrosne's work
was an attitude to social mores reminiscent of Rtif de la
Bretonne's, developed in 'Rflexions sur les Moeurs' (1764),
which helps build up the picture of a climate of opinion in
which only a fresh breath of provincial virtue would be able
to rescue politics from the moribund corruption of the Court
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and capital 71 • Another feature of Letrosnes ideology was
his qualified respect for the magistracy, which led him to make
it clear that he disapproved of Maupeou's reforms ; this in
itself dispelled much potential opposition. Brissot's final
comment was equivocal, "... sans chaleur, sane passion, et par
consquent sans veritable beaute's" ''.
Letrosne's De l'Administration Provinciale et de la
74RGforme de L'Impot' was written in 1775, revised 1779 	 , pub-
lished to give depth of Necker's reforms in 1780, was incorporat-
ed into the 1787 edition of Moreau de Beaumont's study on taxa-
tion, and then reissued for the second wave of provincial
assemblies in 1788. Although influential behind the scenes,
Letrosne did not achieve public recognition until the book won
the Acadé'mie of Toulouse's prize for an essay on provincial admixr
istration in 1779 (which itself prompted publication). The
work briefly achieved the same impact as Necker's essay on
Colbert. Letrosne was a personal friend of Turgot and Condillac
and had contributed to the Ephme'rides; it was the association
with Turgot that had prompted his turning his attention to polit
ical writing. Letrosne represented the link between Turqot and
Necker, and was the intellectual apogee of a new Louisseizinte
monarchy. Daire establisFies Letrosne's connection with Turgot,
and Renouvin then establishes patronage from Necker thus justi-
fying Brissot's comment, "On remarque dans son ouvrage ii s'est
beaucoup rapproclt4' des principes do M. ccker". NeL tucI
have inherited Letrosne directly from Turgot - Clugny made no
impact on this side of the Control General whatsoever and
decided to go ahead with his scheme. Pitri traces a line of
evolution from Argenson's ideas through to Turgot, on to Letrosne
and finally reaching fruition in 1791
Brissot was in act the only contemporary to establish the
link between Necker and Letrosne; it is instructive to see the
other guesses made at the time. Lebrun attributed Necker's
ideas to Champion de Cic (bishop of Rhodez) ', rho was to become
president of the assembly of Haute Guienne 76, Moreau saw the
whole scheme as a philosophe plot guided by Lomnie de Brienne,
he arid Necker being, "•. ega1ement 7 nnemis de la religion de
nos pares et du tr6ne de nos rois" 	 . These two candidates
are logical choices, being old school friends, and in a circle
which also included Turgot, Morellet, and V&i. The lie, how-
ever, is given to their candidacy by Véri's assertion that the
S
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idea was a combined project by Necker and MaureI s , whose
newphev was president of the assembly of Berry . A1.lonville
believed that Choiseul was the éninence grise of the provincial
reforms, but this idea does not survive a reading of Choiseul's
essay on provincial form in the Chante]oup edition of his
memoirs (see below)	 . The genera]. opinion was recorded by
Arthur Young, that Necker had simply developed Mirabeau's ideas
, but the gap between Mirabeau' s patronage of States Countries
and Necker's of Administrative Countries is too great to be
bridged by any simple evolution of ideas, although the Boulonnais
experiment does establish a link. Letrosne was a synthesiser,
just as Necker was, and was at the simplest level a mixture of
Aubusson and Turgot. This, however, does not do justice to the
depth and scope of Letrosne's work, which was the most cogent
and coherent reform project of the century.
Letrosne was not modest about his work and its place in
the late century; the period 1660-1775 had been an administra-
tive disaster, but finally the principles of government had been
discovered and could now be implemented. He claimed his work
to be the climax of this discovery. His analysis of the regime
started from its failure to balance its books, and was a milder
version of Aubusson's, with similar phrases occuring at similar
points. He believed, like Necker, that the Control Genera]. was
the hub of government and that restructuring society must start
from taxation. fl;- the i7?O' he hzid r.jctd physiocral- orain
policy as one of high prices, and, in terms similar to Linguet,
commented caustically that the people were unable to appreciate
high prices as a benefit of Enlightened government. On the
clergy Letrosne proved that they paid an appropriate amount of
taxation through their tenants, an important foundation for
Necker to build from. He made a large number of points import-
ant from Necker's point of views that industry and commerce
were more in need of help than agriculture (Nfker planned to
exempt manufacturing from the 1778 twentieth. ), that the
support of public opinion was the key to successful reform, and
that the greatest opposion would always come from Paris, the
home of vested interest
He laid down a radical programme of reform for a minister
who should let nothing daunt him, and whose personal qualities
were those laid down by the dvots and reinforced by Necker.
The minister should announce his programme, should make a show
of confidence and efficiency, and act with speed, courage, and
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resolution. These qualities would be sufficient to defeat the
opposition of vested interest. Implementing the reform programme
with justice and humanity would rally support to the ministry.
There were to be two phases of reform, the first: 6conomie,
pruning pensions, a universal third twentieth (i.e. a 15% tax
on income), taxes on salt marshes and vineyards, the abolition
of internal customs and excise, bringing the States Countries
up to a par with those of the pays d'1ection, and forcing the
clergy to accept the capitation. (This programme harks back
to Machault's abortive reforms 1749-54). A prerequisite of
true reform would be the breaking down of the esprit de corps
of the various autonomous groups in society, who were prevent-
ing a national community of interest being readily perceived.
In the short-term this would require a "revolution", but in the
longer term a reorganised educational system would teach people
to abhor such unpatriotic aberration. There would be some
period between the abolition of the corporations and the full
implementation of the second phase of reform, this period would
be weathered by appealing to public spirit, by not dismantlinq
existing administrative machinery until the last moment, and,
•	 85if all else failed, by loans
The second phase of reform was the complete restructuring
of provincial government, devolving power into thirty generalit-
ies (initially excluding five States Countries) subdivided
into nine districts and again into nine arrondissemeni-s. Tn
language reminiscent of Guibert, Letrosne anticipated a national
revival. The structures would be built from the top downwards
with the government nominating notables in each province to
organise the new structures; at each level committees of twelve
(nine elected and three nominated) would supervise the initial
four or five years of the new Administrative Countries. The
government would also encourage the growth of representative
democracy from the bottom upwards. Letrosne, as ever under the
old regime, looked back to the glories of Pep,jiri and Charlemagne,
rather than forward to some hypothetical future 84,
The new structures would involve a separation of powers
between legislative arid executive. The single most important
institution was to be the provincial assembly, which could be
the representative body, the seat of accountability, and the
instiLution which could conduct debates. The assembly would*
consist of forty-eiqht deputies, two from each of the district
councils, and thirty elected members. The assembly would have
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absolute competence over local taxation. The backbone of the
executive would be the hierachy of councils, The arrondissement
elected a council; which sent on one deputy to the district
council, and two to the provincial assembly. The district and
provincial councils would have twelve deputies (the district
council was specified to consis! of two each of* clergy,
nobles, wholesalers, bourgeois, merchants, and artisans), allow-
ing three to serve at the next level and the remining nine to
specialise into some specific competence. The three deputies
- on the provincial council not drawn from the district councils
would be nominated by the provincial assembly; thus establishing
strong reciprocal links between the various branches of adminis-
tration. There, was, finally, to be a national council composed
of one deputy from each province and the Ministers of State,
the king would be the honorific president though the office
would be exercised by the Controller General. The council
would be in permanent session and, "... sera vraiment le repr-
sentant de la nation". The provincial councils were clearly
modelled on the Intermediary Commissions of the States Countries,
and had analagous functions
•	 The system would create a narrow political lite of some
200,000 active members of the political nation, supported by
the electors at thearrondissement level assessed on the pro-
perty qualification of an annual revenue of 6001. This was
also a subtle ploy to flush out all thnseat this level of
wealth onto the electoral register, and hence the tax roll.
As in Turgot's system, those below the property limit could
club together to exercise one vote. Those standing for elect-
ion at a provincial level had to prove an income of 10,0001.
Elections to replace half the deputies would be held annually,
and any one man could only stand for election twice consecutive-
ly. Although no expenses or salaries would be paid, the stipu-
lation of personal wealth was designed to prevent corruption.
(There is great, similarity here with the E phmrides's critique
of the magistracy in 1768, which derived its original inspira-
tion from the British J.P. system.) This lite would have made
very , little differezice to the regime, and would have institut-
ionalised the political power of the existing 1ite in return
for relinquishing its fiscal privilege (reckoned at 4,000,0001.
on the taille). The parlements would not yet experience
radical reform, but would find themselves excluded from political
and administrative competence sufficiently to warrant their
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being the separate judicial branch of government; Letrosne
was more realistic about the power of the robe than Necker was
86
tobe
Letrosne laid down a detailed plan for the first five
years of the new administration. The first priorities were
fiscal. A new tax, based . on a cadaster revised every ten years
and levied at the arrondissement through its assembly of 1,200
notables and the council, would balance the state's books. The
national debt would be divided between the provinces and paid
of f through them. The clergy would lose all fiscal privilege
and juridical independence in return for the payment of their
debts. The corve would be abolished in favour of a new tax
flowing into a new Department in Paris which would take control
of all communications. Parallel with the cadaster would be a
full ordnance survey of the realm. The tax system would be
progressively reformed, the taille personelle changed to a taille
rel1e, and eventually an "impt relle" would replace all former
taxes with a dTme royale. Weights and measures would be stand-
ardised. A full physiocrat programme of agricultural reform
would be implemented with emphasis on technical improvements
and larger units of production. The increased prosperity in
the provinces would eventually finance free education and medi-
cine, and some rudimentary poor relief. A some stage the States
Countries would be absorbed into the system
A central concept of Letrosne's new rcime was the trans-
formation of the state into, "... un seul corps social", where,
as Turqot had envisaged, there were no autonomous corporations
standing between the king and the people. To achieve this all
superfluous corporations and offices (including the guilds) would
be abolished, but unlike Maupeou or Turgot, Letrosne assured the
priviiigi4's that they would be sacrificing the lesser juridical
advantage to the greater political one. Only four categories
of office-holders would be allowed to continues priests,
soldiers, magistrates, and the administrators.. These posts
would have become charges with the abolition of the Paulette.
The eventual reform of the parlements was to take the form of
consular courts based on the district; each court would be
composed of salaried men, accountable to other branches of
government, and replaced regularly. By implication the con-
sular courts would be derived from the Presidial. At a provin-
cial level there would be a consular appeal court.	 In a
similar vein internal police would be increased and ref orméd,
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the militia reformed, feudalism dismantled - with the seig
neur's cooperation - and the royal domain inteqrated into
the rest of the state. Close to his heart was his hope that
a reformed society could rid itself of brigandage. 88
Letrosne made no mention of central government institutions
but it may be presumed that he might have endorsed Aubusson's
ideas here. He made a cryptic reference to the need to estab-
lish a system proof against an incompetent king, but hoped his
own scheme would still give full .scope to a reforming monarch
He was determined to show that his ideas did not exist in
a vacuum (as did Aubusson's), he quoted extensively from physio-
crat- sources, pointed to Sardinia/Piedmont as a country where
similar reforms had been successfully 6np1emented and claimed
universal applicability for his ideas . Although Letrosne
did not use the term himself, his plan was a more sophisticated
version of Aubusson's mechanistic monarchy. Again, although
Letrosne did not draw attention to it, his plan bears many
similarities with the new American political thinking, partic-
ularly in such concepts as the king being president of the
executive.
The ideas and schemes in this chapter have fulfilled a
number of functicris. They i11utrate the interest in reform
and the breadth of thought it generated from R&tif's rustic
idylls to detailed administrative structures. They also show
hOw ULe qp	 the ideds of the duke of Burgundy's circle
and the reforms of 1791 were bridged by the late regime's re-
forming writers. Most important of all, they show a steady
progression towards political reality from Rtif's or Duclos's
moral writings through to Roussel distributing his pamphlets
in the Street, and on to Letrosne who enjoyed ministerial patron-
age. Along the same lines they illustrate the change in the
regime's political culture from Argenson who wrote to justify
his fall from office on to Letrosne whose work is a manifesto
for reform in prospect. Letrosne lastly, cafries us from polit-
ical theory into political practice when Necker chose to base
his provincial reforms on his writings.
248
SUMMARY
This ehapter has extended the study from the regime's
actual institutions into areas of contemporary speculation
about political structures and social attitudes.
The general survey of printed and manuscript material,
aimed at convincing the ministries of the period to alter
their approach, establishes an intellectual foundation for
Louis XVI's concept of the monarchy and Necker's reforms.
There was an evolution of thought towards the grand reform-
ing and restructuring vision of Letrosne. The aim of these
reformers was to preserve the best features of the regime
while restructuring it to remove its faults. In the back-
ground, they remembered Naupeou's experiment with "despotic"
power, and were determined to find a more acceptable way of
solving the regime's problems.
In the next chapter it will be seen. that a very great
number of the ideas examined here were to be taken up by
Necker.
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VI
BECKER AND THE IMPLEMrATION OF A NEW MONARCHY
After the disruption of Choiseul's system 1768-70, no one
figure had been able to dominate more than isolated parts of
the regime, and all had experienced political failure. 1776-8,
however, saw a fresh attempt to reshape the regime around one
man, an attempt which gave every indication of being more success-
ful than Choiseul's, and which embodied Louis XVI'S ideas on the
old regime and was based on the best of the reform schemes of
the period.
From ait historiographical point of view Necker is one of
the most difficult people to come to terms with; by 1784 both
Necker himself and his enemies had produced coherent and radic-
ally divergent accounts of the first ministry in an attempt to
prejudge and dictate to future historiography. (This approach
illustrates Hampsori's claim that the Enlightenment pioneered
"historical time" "as a new dimension" in the context of a
politician thinking in terms of justification in the eyes of
history 1•) Equally, thourih, there is comparatively little
printed prospective material on the minister, making an unfavour-
able comparison with Turgot; as a result Turgot has always
i,roved, hitoricciraphical1y, th more intcrestin and ympathe-
tic figure. (The inevitable cOmparison between Turgot and Necker,
and, the controversy between them, tends to detract from t1iider
observation that Louis XVI early ministries produced two major,
and several minor, reforming ministers within three years). The
orthodox attitude is that of Dakin, that early successes had
turned Necker's head, and that, possessed of, '...all the ass-
urance of men of little minds", he proceded to ruin the country
2, More recently, however, interest in Necker has reawoken and
the need for re-evaluation established
From his side, Necker wrote 'De l'Administration des Finan-
ces de la France' 4 vols. 1781-4 to justify his conduct 1776-81,
to show it in a consistently favourable light, and to prepare
the way for a second ministry. Following his second ministry,
Necker issued 'Sur l'Administration de H. Necker pr 1ui-mme'
(Amsterdam 1791). His daughter Nme. de Std1, interpreted the
eighteenth century as a progression towards liberal democracy
in which Necker was a protagonist 4. On the other side Cara-
ccioli, in an open letter to Alembert in 1781, claimed that NecJcer
was a charlatan, ignorant of the true nature of the regime, mot-
ivated by vanity and ambition, running up unrepayable debts,
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falsifying the state's accounts, and causing internal disrupt-
ion in the quest for personal gloire. This interpretation was
taken up by Morityon, and has dominated historiography. Cobban
describes Necker as the "Gerievan wonder-worker" who caused the
ruin of the old regime .
In a manner reminisOent of Linguet, Necker is a man whose
career illustrates the regime; also like Linguet he came under
a great many of the political influences of the regime, but
unlike Linguet Necker rejected none of them but tried to build
them into an all-embracing system. Necker and Linguet were
members of the same political generation, the generation of
Louis XVI. By origin Necker was a Prussian, but by upbringing
he was a Genevan, and there he imbibed its strange mixture of
Calvinism and philosophie. Necker decided to make a career in
banking in France, and arrived in Paris in 1747 "pauvre comme
Job" at the age of fifteen, and joined an illustrious bank as
a clerk. This was one of the cornerstones of the Necker
leqend, but Necker had become a freemason and was well-connected
through this, and through his links with Pesay (see below).
Throuqh Favier, an important figure in the Foreign Office, he
gained inside information about the Peace of Paris. He corner-
ed the market in the shares of the Company of the Indies', whose
value fell to almost nothing during the war and attendant
British blockade, but which suddenly became a lucrative commod-
ity once the seas were reopened. Necker mcie persrl
of hundreds of millions of livres over-night. This became a
cornerstone of the anti-legend of Necker. This deal was a
continent-wide affair, a "... shady Anglo-Genevese conspiracy",
which established Necker as the link between respectable govern-
ment and the 'tinderworld"of finance. 	 It ended the first phase
of Necker's career, 'la coriqute de l'argent" 6,
The Company of the Indies was a government monopoly of
st Indian colonial trading, which was a successful arrange-
ment in normal times, but which was unable t cope with the
phenomenal increase in overseas trade after 1763. Choiseul
realised that breaking the monopoly would increase trade and
prosperity, and that the Company had fewer friends than enemies.
A political campaign 1768-9 resulted in the Comgany's abolition,
and trade rose by two and half times 17691776 . The Company
had been defended by the parlement, both on the constitutional
grounds that it was illegal to disband any corporation, and o1
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the more self-interested, but less publicised, grounds that it
had been a profitable source of permissable investment
Necker joined the parlement in defence of the Company with the
position that controlled economic activity was was preferable
to the anarchic proposals of the physiocrats, Anglophiles, and
philosophes - the position worked out in detail by Linguet. A
pamphlet battle developed which attracted some attention, and
in which the economic stances of the next reign were taken up,
but it was regarded as an interna1 matter to a corporation
arid the pamphlets did not make the same impact on society that
later pamphlets by Necker were to
Necker was active in other directions in the 1760's, a
phase Lavaquery labels, •'la congute de l'opinion publique".
Established as a leading financier of Court and capital, he
began building up political alliances and patronage, and made
a splash in the cultural world by setting up a salon of iittSr-
aires presided over by Mine. Necker, a minor philosophe herself,
which was based around Thomas, Dorat, and Harpe. This salon,
which remained politically uncontroversial, acquired an excellent
reputation and became a minor source of political patronage
after 1776. Necker managed to gain the approbation of the Enlight
e1nL without committing himself to it 10,	 In 1768 Necker
managed to have himself appointed Genevan minister (i.e. ambassa-
dor) in Paris, thus nominally enjoying Choiseul's patronage -
sucri an appointment S not being ±easizle without his approval.
Necker's duties as minister were mainly the concert of financial
arid political affairs between Paris and Geneva, and it was as a
creditor at Court that Necker came in line for this promotion,
and was able to represent Genevan interests effectively. Another
important factor was that Necker supported France's intervention-
ist policy in Geneva whereby the ruling oligarchy was kept in
power
This post gave a free rein to Necker's ambition, and the
sudden fluidity of the political scene after 1770 gave extra
scope for it. In 1771 he avoided the pitfall of tying himself
to Choiseul's fallen star, and managed to spin his financial web
at Court even wider. In 1772 his protgeThomas had the Acad-
mie's prize essay for 1773 set as an eulogy of Colbert. As
Liriguet noted, no prize essay, however apparently innocuous,
failed to become politically contentious, and Thomas from his
side realised that the essay miqht prove a useful way to announce
a new political career. Necker won the Acadmie's prize, the
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first foreigner ever to do so, and thus annrmriced himself as
a candidate for high office. It was the focal point of his
"conqute du pouvoir" l2
The eulogy was one of the most important literary events
of its decade. Mme. du Dffand recognised the importance of
the emerqence of a new intellectual figure, "l'antipode des
ericyclopdistes" l3 The Mercure de France praised the essay
as demanding, "... un homme, qui joignit au talent d'crire,
des connaissances dans plus d'un qenre d'administration", in
14which the Ann6e Litteraire concurred • 'the essence of the
essay was a rehabilitation of Colbert's economic policy, for
which Mtra condemned Necker for being too Colbertist in an
age which had rejected this philosophy; this was an unimagin-
ative and typical reaction which failed to realise the changing
15climate of the 1770's	 . Chapuisat precises what Necker saw
in Colbert's policies: reduced taxation on land, more equitable
taxes, improved communications, and the suppression of costly
sincecures. This essay was a political manifesto, but Necker
proposed not a slavish resurrection of Colbert's ideas, but
that Colbert's experience should now be integrated into the new
ideas of the Enlightenment to produce more moderate and temper-
ed policy. Babel shows, further, that in this essay Nec'ker
refuted the idea, to become a foundation of laisser-faire, that
the sum total of self-interest was harmony. Necker,proposed
setting the limits to the economic freedom created by Bertin
in 1763 16
Colbert's inspiration can be detected throughout Necker's
subsequent career. In 1777, for example, Necker was planning
to set up a Bureau of sixty inspectors of commerce, an overt
resuscitation of one of Cólbert's plans 17 At the same time
Necker also borrowed Galiani's ideas, and his claim to be
empirical l8 The borrowing of Galiani's ideas illustrates
a feature of Necker's mind, that he was not himself an original
thinker; Necker's talent lay in recognising a good idea, or at
least a popular one, when he saw it. He loudly rejected the idea
of "system" (i.e. ideology), and, as Stormont put it, gave the
impression of "business" as opposed to "system" 19 Having
originally set himself up as the reincarnation of Colbert,
Necker went on to collect an impressive list of antecedents,
he was likened to a new Sully, a new Bertin, a new Silhouette,
and Machault gave Necker his blessing 20• Necker creditted Sully
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with a flair that the industrious Colbert lacked - implying
that he united the merits of the two . To keep in favour with
the Choiseulists, he approved eventually - of their foreign
policy, and praised Kaunitz (the author of the Austrian alli-
ance from the Viennese side) as the perfect minister 22,
Necker might try to take all the credit for rehabilitating
Colbert, but at the time he had a serious rival, -Pélissdry.
Pelissdry was a minor anti-philosophe who came second in the
Acadmie's 1773 prize essay competition. In 1777 he published,
'Maximes Gne'rales d'un bon Gouvernement Suivant les Opations
Economigues et Politigues de B-J. Colbert'. The points from the
book which reached the public were that a unity of law, religion
and administration should be established, but a uniformity free
from oppression and tempered by an awareness of local interests.
Agriculture should be encouraged, but not at the expense of com-
merce, capital or luxury industries. Taxation on-necessities
should be abolished, and taxation in general should be more
uniform and equitable. The book was suppressed by the police,
and its author imprisoned in the Bastille 23, Pe1issry was
the only man imprisoned by Necker, the sole blot on the copy
book of Necker's reputation for generous humanitarianism. Bach-
aumont mentioned that Pelissry also wrote more specifically
against Necker's administration, nonetheless the only explana-
tion for this aberration - for many others attacked Necker in
print - is Necker's 'pique on finding he had an effective rival.
Linguet made political capital out of the episode to show Necker
as just one more despotic minister . The •importance of the
episode is to place Necker in a context, thus making him less
of a unique figure, just as Boncerf's 'lnconvhients.r.' in its
context becomes politically more intelligible even if less potent
as a myth (see Appendix I).
Necker next came into prominence after the Flour War, which
in itself vindicated his economic position. From this moment
Necker was an immediate candidate for high office 25, Necker
exploited.Turgot's failure with the pamphlet 'Sur la Lgisla-
tion et le Commerce des Grains', which reiterated Galiani's
ideas as they were relevant to the 1775 situation 26, From this
time Necker had allies at Court pressing for his appointment.
Condorcet, who had previously dismissed Necker's Acade'mie essay
as a propaganda exercise, wrote a defence of Turgot's policy
Lettre d'un Laboureur de Picardiea Monsieur N(ecker)', but
failed to divert public interest from Necker's Convincing attack
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on physiocrat policy 27	 hardy, for example, condemned
Turgot's policy in the light of Necker's attack, "... ii
fallait tre ou bien aveuqie ou bien m 'chant pour y (physiocracy)
demeurer encore attache'" 28, Within a year of this pamphlet
Necker was at the threshold of the Control General.
If we are to understand Necker and his relationship with
the regime we must go over some of the detail of 'his political
activities, his patronage, his manaqement of the Control General,
and the preparation for war, as well as the political context
of his provincial reform. Everything about Necker tries to
separate him from the rest of the old regime: he was a foreigner,
a Protestant, he looked to high office for justification in the
eyes of posterity and not immediate personal gain. To understand
Necker, though, the illusion must be penetrated and the man seen
in his context. If this is done then both the pro-Necker and
anti-Necker legends fall away; the first shows Necker as a
saviour of the regime coming in from the outside, the second shows
him as the man who used every trick to gain and keep office of fer
ed by the unsuspecting regime. In reality Necker possessed
different perspectives of the regime to native Frenchmen, and
it was the insiqht this conferred that guided him through from
the Company of the Indies coup to the Compte Rendu. Necis.er
believed he could see how to achieve what had eluded those be-
f ore him, and was simply a more effective political operator with
ir the regime than, say, Turgot had been. It is in this light
that Necker's career from 1776 onwards should be judged.
Necker brought himself to the threshold of high office
through his April 1776 memoir to Maurepas. The route whereby
this memoir reached Louis XVI was via Pesay and on to Maurepas;
Nicker paid Pesay 100,0001. for this political service ("telle
est la premire edconomie de Necker" ) and the connection with
Maurepas was the "decisive intrigue" 29, This memoir was never
published; a curious fact in view of Necicer's avowed belief in
a more open management of finance. Extracts from it were reprint-
ed in 1787 in a pamphlet in which Necker defended himself against
Calonne 30, The extracts show that Necker calculated a deficit
of 24,000,0001. a year indefinitely if existing policies were
not altered. He adopted the parlementaire complaint that four-
teen years of peace should have produced solvency, but had failed
to. He promised that a policy of économie, rationalisation, and
good management, characterised by the word "bonificationi", could
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establish a yearly surplus of 10,000,0001. without new taxes
or painful cuts of expenditure. Stormont seems to have managed
to see a copy of this memoir, and his account of it tallies with
Necker's extracts, but he noticed one proposal that Necker was
later to omit, that any reforms would have to be preceded by a
programme of loans	 (It is difficult not to suspect that
this memoir , if published in full, would have revealed some
financial dealing which would show Necker in a shady light and
alter our understanding of his first ministry, perhaps that he
agreed to serve under Maurepas only after a promise that the
government would honour a course of loans favourable to the
consortium of which he was the spokesman 32•)
The negotiations for the 50,000,0001. loan seem to have
bequn in July 1777 and dragged on during Clugny's ministry;
Stormont heard that the rumours of war were making the bankers
prevaricate	 When Cluony died a sub-committee of the Council,
composed of Naurepas, St-Germain, Vergennes, Sartines, Soubise,
and Bertin, met to debate a new Controller General. On Maurepas's
advice they nominated two men: Taboureau des Reaux and Necker;
"What a strange event", wrote Horace Walpole 	 Clearly, it
was the link between Pesay and Maurepas which brought Necker to
the sub-committee's attention. The link also meant that Louis
Xvi saw the memoir , and his comment was that no one before had
been able to explain finances so clearly
Necker's politic	 p1rr'n-je erted, incongruously, a vi.y
dubious circle of associates. Necker chose well in that they
were men of the moment - men in the public eye like Beaumarchais
or with Maureoas's ear like Pesay. Necker over-reached himself
here, the opprobrium of being allied to tricksters and charlatans
made people believe that Necker might indeed ao a stage further
to falsify the realm's accounts. Necker tried to disassociate
himself from this clique, but Jarrett can still label him as a
"Cagliostro" or "Mesmer" of finance 36• For all this Necker
was probably genuine in his belief that he could solve the finari-
cia]. problems, or as Malouet put it, at the end of the day he
was at peace with his conscience
If Necker could be dubbed the Cagliostro of finance, then
Pesay could be labelled the Mesmer of the Great 38• His father
had been a Lorrainer financier who had become a Catholic and
came under Naurepas's patronaqe (Naurepas as Secretary of
State for the Admiralty prior to 1745). He had purchased the
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estate of Pesay, which his son claimed was a Marquisate and who
accordingly styled himself the Marquis de Pesay. Pesay passed
himself of f as a militaire and went out of his way to be of fen-
sive and high-handed towards the robe 	 which tied in with
Necker's own political antagonism towards the group. Pesay knew
how to manipulate the regime. Once entrenched as a Court
creditor he had his nobility confirmed by letters patent and
moved closer towards the throne. His career illustrates the
closed and unreal world of politics at Versailles where money
and bluff could carry all before them.
Pesay was unable to make any headway in the old reign,
but 1774-5 opened up the political scene to him when his father's
old patron Maurepas took him under his wing. He gravitated
naturally to Necker's rising star because they were men of
similar origin and because each had something to offer the other;
Necker had the money and talent while Pesay had the connections
to turn them into political reality. "Necker, who was Director
General of Finance by the influence of the Marquis ..." in turn
opened up areater political horizons to Pesay after 1776 40•
Pesay capitalised on the new voctue for philosophie under Turgot
by attendinc Mme. Necker's salon and becoming associated with
some of its littraires, and by contributing articles to the
Nouvelles E ph4'mrides. These articles were studiously non-
controversial (e.g. Alsation defences). One series of articles
however, showed an interestirq choice of subject matter:
Maillebois's Italian campaigns; this was the period when the
marshal's grandson was agitating at Court, and with the other
marshal's, to gain his own baton 41• Maillebois was an import-
ant political associate of the new clique around Maurepas and
Necker in 1776. Also at this time Pesay was convincing Louis
XVI that he had been a confident of the Old Dauphin, and was a
perfect courtier as described by Real or Moreau. All this while
Pesay was an implacable enemy of Turgot himself and the physio
crat policies; he supported at Court the campaign Necker was
waging against Turgot's ministry in the capital 42•
At a personal level Pesay's politics were as corrupt as
any the old regime knew, being based on a web of sexual intrigue.
According to Aranda Pesay's sister, Mite. de Casini, was Mallle
bois's lover, and generally she played Gramont to Pesay's
Choiseul. Soulavie accused her of spreadino her favours widely
through the Younq Court, but only named Maillebois as a lover.
Wentworth may have muddled up his names when he reported Montbarey
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to be entangled with "Mme. do Pesay", and Sou].avie, elsewhere,
claimed that Pesay and Mme. de Montbarey were lovers. The up-
shot of these liaons was that Montbarey became a politically
dependable Secretary of State for Maurepas '. Not only do we
see here the failure of Louis's attempt to reform the morals
of the Court, but even a worsening of the role of sexual patrorr
age in politics from Choiseul's day. 	 -
Pesay hoped to dominate the Court by controlling all its
lines of intrigue and patronage. His first success in 1776
was establishing the political link between Maurepas and Necker.
1-Xe went on to engineer Montbarey's appointment. He gained
favour with the queen, thus threatening the Choiseulists'
position. He became the "Marquis de Contrebande" through being
able to interet the posts (as had Ogny). He became, however,
intoxicated with his success. Maurepas had him created Inspect-
or General of the Coasts, which conferred on him the "privilege"
of communicating directly with the king, thus according him the
rights of a Great Officer of State. In this power, "he found
his destruction", by trying to undermine Sartines in the Admir-
alty. Maurepas did not like Sartines, who was beginning to
show his Choiseulist leanings, and he was hoping to replace
him in the Adn1iralty vih Pesay - a plan to install Pesay as
Director of the War Department having failed. Pesay revealed
his unsuitability for high office by precipitous and ill-advised
fl arAticipG%Led ULC end rttilitdire ofrensive by patron-
ising the sword over the quill in the navy, but in a way which
opened up corruption and caused disruption. At the same time
the intendant of Brittany (Caze de la Dove) complained that
Pesay was interfering i his jurisdiction. Both complaints,
from Sartines and Caze) were upheld by Louis XVI, probably, be-
cause Maurepas had had second thoughts and switched his allegi-
ance back to Sartines. Louis ordered Pesay to be exiled, and
the self-styled Marquis's career was ended. He died of, "... a
malignant fever and disgrace by M. Maurepas".' His death caused
great disruption at Court as structures of patronage collapsed,
revealing him to have been "le noeud de l'intrigue", and the
weakening of Naurepas's grip on power caused by the episode may
have post-poned the declaration of war while he was trying to
pick up the pieces
Aoart from its unsuccessful conclusion, Pesay's career had
no redeemina virtues, and it revealed the lengths to which
Maurepas was prepared to go to surround himself with anti
Chojseulists. Another member of the circle was Beaumarchais,
along with Pesay described as Maurepas's two crutches, but in
1777 with Pesay's death and Beauinarchais's eclipse, Maurepas's
"... right hand counsellor is now cut of f - his left too is
very lame - " '. Equally, the effect of this was to leave
Necker politically isolated from the circle to whom he owed his
office, i development he probably welcomed, and rom 1777 on-
wards patronage played a greatly diminished role in his career.
Not all Necker's patronage, however, was to his discredit. The
Company of the Indies affair brought him into contact with
,astries. Following Turgot's fall the two great philosophe
patrons, Rochefoucauld and NIvernois, took Necker under their
wing, and most of 'le monde' followed their lead 46, In the
ministry itself he could count on Vergennes's support as well
as Maurepas's '. Dy his own admission he courted, and gained
MarieAntoinette's patronage, though this was bought by an out-
right payment of 150,0001. to the queen, and the payment of the
1776 pension arrears out of his own pocket - a move likely to
48benefit most of Marie-Antoinette's proteges 	 . He endeared
himself to Louis XVI by his apparent honesty, political lucidity,
but above all by possessing (or affecting) the king's vices of
falling asleep at boring meetings, and suffering the consequences
of over-eating .
In his attitude to politics Necker did attempt an honest
account of his motivation; he dnic'd r.eithr hi pr4.de nor his
ambition nor his desolation at disgrace, but he did deny a lust
for power and stressed his virtue, honesty; and integrity. He
was attracted to the Control General by the scope of its compet
erice and possibilities for directing social mores; no idea could
be more in keeping with a minister of the Enlightenment than
that society could be legislated towards perfection. He showed
every sign of having read the more dcvot writers Louis XVI is
known to have studied. He deliberately paraphrased their maxims,
and passages from de l'Adniinistration can be compared with others
from Re'al or Moreau. Necker went on from this to integrate the
thinking of men such as Guibert, Linguet, or Galiani into his work.
Re stressed the need for justice to pervade f,iscal matters, and
without justice taxation becomes difficult and socially divisive.
Necker's high moral tone, which is sometimes difficult to separ-
ate from his all-pervasive selfriqhteousness, reflected his
"hard and arrogant" character. He was filled with fulsome praise
for Louis XVI'S monarchy, of which he was a classic expression;
in terms reminiscent of Guibert, he hoped that the king could
create a new spirit of national unity, "Touté s'anime en France
i 1i 'univ rl'iin mnnrrm rrui met un Drix' se faire aimer". 'Ph
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crown, according to Necker, should help the poor and oppressed
who are at the mercy of their economic environment - an idea
explored by Mably, and in a similar way by Liriguet. The
monarch had a "holy duty" to ensure a basic standard of living
to enable people to clothe, house, and feed their children 50,
Necker's analysisof the Controller General arid the quali-
ties he would need were daunting. He specified: integrity,
intelligence, breadth of mind, an ability to learn, application,
wisdom, resolution, common sense, perspective, an instinct for
administration, an ability to choose and keep a good team of
advisers, good judgment of men, and virtue in private life.
This list parallels the Old Dauphin's on the same topic, but
while the prince judiciously doubted that any mere mortal could
combine these qualities, Necker does nothing to disabuse the
reader that he himself did. Using Ral's very words of twenty
years earlier, Necker called for a "soumission eclairee" as
the foundation of the monarchy. One of the most striking asser-
tions made about Necker's ministry was that he tried to imple-
ment Malesherbes's 1775 Court of Aids remonstrance. Letrosne
too was influenced by this remonstrance, but drew the conclusion
that the abuses described in it were too great to be reformod
within Pxicting fiscal structures 5l
Necker's most obvious approach to the Control General was
to apply his banking expertise to the realm as a whole. This
iAvoled de9Aee or professioilalisdtion which meant that by
the 1780's France could be said to possess the beginnings of a
true bureaucracy 52, The second direction Necker took was to
make the Control General more open and accountable, ultimately
to have an annual budget with its implication of some form of
parliameritariariism, but in the short-term to invite public
debate and comment based on information leaked out to the
capital. The third was to establish a new structure of provin-
cial administration from which to restructure the whole politic-
al and administrative nature of the regime. 'Behind all three
lay the idea of breaking the robe supremacy in society. This
was simply too big an idea for those around Necker, friend or
foe, to grasp, but in all he wrote or did the robe was the
enemy and the group to benefit least from any changes. Before
he could implement any reforms, however, he had to prove his
political worth to Maurepas by keeping the realm solvent.
As Protestants could not hold office, Necker took the
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nonce title of Director General of Finances. The first crisis
was the opposition of the clergy, led by Beaumont. Maurepas
solved this by the simple expedient that the cler gy could have
Necker's dismissal if they paid of f the national debt. Within
a month Beaumont had given up trying to convert Necker and made
his peace with him 	 This was an early and important step
in Necker's attempt to present himself as a synthesis of the
regime's political culture 1	The second,
and chronic, problem was Taboureau's hostility to Necker which
rapidly developed into factional and interest-group intrigue.
Taboureau drew support from the magistracy and financial estab-
lishment sufficient to threaten Necker's position 	 One of
Necker's bitterest enemies from the Company of the Indies
affair, Lauraguais, predicted that Taboureau would fall to
Necker, and Necker to the parlement
From mid 1776 onwards the finances, which had remained
manageably quiescent since 1772 Croy commented that France sur-
vived on Terray's credit (or the illusion of it) until 1776 -
were threatening to slide out of control 56• Only Necker's
appointment could hold credit up in the face of preparation for
war. Necker at least vent through the motions of protesting
that war would mean bankruptcy, but no policy decisions 1776-8
reflected this plea 	 Borrowing was at an unprecedented level
for peace-time: 110,000,0001. by December 1777 most of which
found il-s way to tht services. Stormont manaqeci to discover
that Necicer was gathering a lump sum in cash of 40,000,0001. to
ensure being able to sustain the forthcoming war (Wentworth's
estimate was double this) 58• As a reaction to heavy borrowing
in an uncertain climate the market raised the price of loans
from 5% in 1776 to 7.5% in 1777, which provoked the parlement
to political action. The parlement had declared itself only
able to countenance small loans at 5.25%, provided no new taxes
were introduced
In January 1777 . the regime experienced ±ts first major finan-
cial crisis of the type used aaainst Choiseul 1768-70. Provoked
by Choiseul, the par1ennt threatened to withdraw its support
from the government and obstruct its operations 6O The pane-
ment apreciated what was to become "Parkinson's Law", that
expenditure rises to meet income, and hence that extraordinary
governitnt expenditure financed by loans could easily chancre to
ordinary expenditure financed by higher taxation 61 The minis-
try's tactic against this was to use the rand Council as a
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bargaining counter. Maurepas let it be known that if the pane-
ment let Necker's financial measures go unopposed the Grand
Council, that millstone round their neck, might be wholly or
partly removed. The temptation was too great, and the pane-
ment put corporate self-interest before public welfare. Vri
castigated the magistrates for their dereliction of duty, but
gained some solace from seeing Miromesnil's discomfoture; the
Keeper of the Seals had been trying to play bothends against
the middle 62
Necker, however, adapted his tactics to avoid accountabil-
ity to the parlement. He took three lines of attack. The
first was to employ financial sleight of hand to keep the govern-
ment in liquidity, a tactic which led progressively to the dis-
creditinci of his reputation as.a financier, until at last the
Compte Reridu was dismissed as one more artifice. A classic
example of this tactic was his mortgaciinq of the next don
gratuit in December 1777 63	 Necker's second ploy was to
appeal to public opinion (i.e. the capital) over the heads of
magistrates, courtiers, or ministers 64, Necker's third tactic
was reform culminating in his provincial reforms of 1778.
Necker's credit depended on the flow of cash for war. As
long as Necker could guarantee this where others could not he
was unassailable, £urgot had had to be dismissed in order to
declare war, but It was found that Necker had to be kept in
Oflce in order to pursue it. In February 1777 64,000,0001. were
raised from internal corporations, in April Genoese bankers
lent 10,000,0001. at a surprisingly low 5%, but in July he
suffered the "mortification" of failing to necrotiate a 60,000,
0001. loan in Holland, (recorded as 20,000,0001. by Wentworth
19.August 1777) which was hailed as a "triumph" for the Chois-
eulists 65, all this was in addition to smaller sums raised
at such steady intervals that, "H. Necker a le rage des
emprunts"; the same observer reflected sadly that it was easier
to raise a loan than face the parlement 66, That the Choiseul-
ists should be prepared to sabotage Necker's loans shows once
again how far ministerial intrigue was taken. The parlement,
though, was trying to adopt a role, which, while based entirely
on self-interest, recognised the darfler of unbridled ministerial
intrigue, and attempted to establish a limit, through institut
ional conservatism, beyond which politics could not he allowed
to damaqe the regime. The magistracy was determined no to allo
its opposition to Necker to turn into a repeat of the disaster
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when it opposed Maupeou.
Opposition to Necker was constant once the euphoria gener-
ated by the novelty of his appointment had worn of f. Maurepas
rearetted chosing yet another man of energy and talent •,ho
insisted on private audience with the king; he began to rally
opposition of the disaffcted financiers in preparation for
some future opportunity to discredit Necker. InFebruary 1778
the major crisis broke over the twentieth, this crisis has been
examined elsewhere in the context of the parlements. From
Necker's point of view the battle was a legacy of Terray's
Control eneral; in an uncharacteristic move Terray had made
the 177]. twentieth renewable every four years (until 1791) only
with the parlement's approval. The 1775 renewal was pushed
through by the peers as an adjunct to the recall of the parle
ments, but the peers were riot enthusiastic about the govern-
ment by 1777, and Necker attempted to avert a full debate by
renewing the "edict" as an "arrt". The courts refused to
accept this, and in 1778 remonstrances were issued which attempL.
ed to show Necker as acting "unconstitutionally". Louis XVI
could find no extenuating circumstances for these remonstrarices
and refused to heed them; he had granted the justice of rcmon
strancc over the Six Edicts because he aareed that they changed
the constitution. The remonstrances did, however, acknowledge
the new reir-in's political climate by not making personal attacks
on Necker 67
This episode was no reiteration of Louisquinzmeformulas;
new styles and issues had emerged with the new reign. On the
one hand the unite des classes had not been invoked, "En gSnral
(the magistrates) ont reconnu que leur annatissement est
possible et peut s'oprer sans que l'ensemble du royaume en
souffre, et c'en est assez pour les contenir dans les bornes de
prudence et de moderation ••, 68 Opposition, on the other hand,
to financial measures was, for the first time, linked to a call
for the States General. Parlements had ca11d for the States
General before, but not even Malesherbes's Court of Aids remon-
strance had been so specific. The path from this political
debate over the twentieth tax to the calling of the States Gener-
al ten years later iias a direct one 69 Neckor had aroused the
deepest opposition the magistracy could offer short of provoking
a 1771 type crisis. (Indeed, the parlemont of Roueri did pro-
voke such a confrontation in the summer by threateninq to
resiqn en masse, Louis would not allow a crisis to develop and
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simply ordered the magistrates back to their duties while
Miromesnil worked cxita compromise which wouldpacify them
This episode may have persuaded Necker to push forward with
the creation of administrative structures which would circum-
vent the robe'.s autonomous power in society.
We have seen the prdcess whereby Necker kept loans f low-
ing into the Treasury, but the political manoeuvring Necker
went through in the last year before war deserves closer atten-
tion; the most closely observed account was Paul Wentworth's
which showed Necker in a far less favourable light than the
Director might have wished. Necker had always made it clear
that he believed war would result in bankruptcy, and that he
could riot countenance financing it 71, It is difficult, however,
to reconcile this attitude with his programme of loans, most of
which found their way to the War Department or Admiralty.
Necker may have convinced himself that he was only financing
the rebuilding of military power, and that were enough spent on
preparina the armed services, the British would never dare to
take them on, thus making such expenditure an insurance aaainst
the far greater cost of war. Were this a viable delusion it
was seriously breached in April 1777 by a report from Wentworth,
"I don't see how war is to be avoided long - the count of St
Germain, the Controller-General and Mr. Necker will probably
soon be dismissed - but the former may be declared a marshal
and actively employed - M. de Maurepas, w undrqtad i rr.
longer averse from war" 72, This prophecy was proved correct
on the first and third points, suggesting both that Taboureau
des Reaux had opposed war - and had accordingly suffered the
same fate as the pacifist Turqot - and that Necker had been
shown the writing on the wall if he persisted in opposing war.
By November 1777 Necker was embroiled in the plans over the
twentieth and the parlement's opposition to them. This was the
time when Pesay's circle of patronaqe was disintearating, and
Necker found himself caught between two factrons. On the one
side were the Choiseulists who were proposinci Calonne for the
Control ,eneral by this date, on the other hand Maurepas had
revived the boqey of Aicuillon, and was proposing Lefvre d'
Amecour as a new Controller .enera1. Necker was, at the same
time, attacked at Court by the princesse de unen ' who was
layinq claim to some 3,600,0001. from Jecker's Partie Content
ieuse (see below). Necker decided to turn the Court intricue
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to his advantage and chasten his enemies by provoking a finan-
cial crisis which only he could solve. It took only a cursory
look at the Control General to convince Maurepas that if the
government wanted any cash in 1778 it would have to patch up
the quarrel with Necker. Necker had adopted the tactic which
had lost Choiseul his pow!er in 1770, the tactic of engineerinci
a crisis, but in Necker's case the bluff dared not be called
A month later Necker was reported to be pretending to
finance war to keep in favour with the public, and the forest
of Vincerines was ostentatiously felled for ship-building. In
March 1778 a banker acting as an acent for Eden reported that
Necker had put the finishino touches to schemes of finance to
carry the Control General into war. The banker wrote a fitting
comment on Necker's position in the Control General, "Mr. Necker
will continue as long as he finds money. That's our opinion
here" '.	 In the course of moving from opposition to war to
making specific provision for it some of Necker's initial ideas
and statements became "inoperative" The mental evolution re-
quired needs a moment's consideration, for at some staqe Necker
must have convinced himself that financing the war was both
feasible and desirable. Having presented himself as the new
ColberL in 1773, his ambition may have led him to attempt what
Colbert had failed - to finance a war without sacrificinq intern-
al policy. Had Necker not attempted to finance the war he would
have Leen repldced, and, like Turgot with the recall, he may
have regarded it as the price to pay for his continuance in
office.
Before looking at the detail of Necker's reforms within
the Control General it is necessary to consider why any robins
were prepared to co-operate with Necker in view of the cons is-
tent hostility of his policies to the group. There was a kernel
of magistrates, particularly among the masters of requests, who
saw their role as changing from Montesquieu's autonomous corpora-
tion of amateur political notables into a proessiorial 1ite of
bureaucrats. Some of those who had worked under Naupeou (e.g.
Lebrun or Joly de Fleury jnr.) held similar ideas, but had been
quickly disillusioned after 1771 as to the chances of their
implementation then. Necker's appeal was wider and not so polit-
ically compromised so that he was always able to find enough
maciistrates, both in Paris and the provinces, to carry throuch
his reforms. There is also a marked lack of the kind of personal
vilification of those who worked for Necker that was conducted
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acainst Maupeou's supporters. We will, however, see that
Necker hoped to interest other oroups in society in taking
over some of the administrative functions of the robe - an
approach Maupeou was not able to utilise as his concept of
reform was narrorer. He also opposed the free market economy.
The details of Necker's reforms within the Control
General have faded into inconsequentiality, but the sinqie
most important one was the replacement of the intendants of
finance with a "Partie Contentieuse", a bureau of three mas-
ters of requests. These intendants of finance had inter-
posed themselves between the Controller General and the pro-
vincial intendants; they were venal officers who, in 1776-7,
sided with Taboureau and the maistracy against Necker. This
block of opposition may have provoked Necker to such drastic
reform against the magistracy 	 The intendants were an
absolute drain on the Treasury, and the 2,100,001. it cost
to buy up their offices was a sound investment. The Partie
Contentieuse was salaried 76• Unlike Maupeou, then, Necker
could choose reform that was popular and showed immediate
benefit.
The abolition of the intendants of finance followed
Necker's pattern of isolatinu some small area of privileced
vested interest that could count on no public sympathy and
little support at Court. This episode caused Taboureau to
resiqn in disgust, but most went of f smoothly. This reform
in June was followed by plans to abolish the Postal Farm
discussed over the late summer. This abolition would have
been part of a general cutting out of dead wood designed to
save 14,000,0001. per annum, 2,000,0001. of which would come
from the Postal Farm a neat arrancement whereby one reform
paid for another. becker was not able to carry throuch as
much rationalisation as he would have like as Louis XVI him-
self intervened to veto any meddling in the King's Household
Although the parallel with Máupeou suggests itself 78,
Necker was determined not to fall into the same pitfalls of
being forced into hasty and unacceptable action.
Necker's approach to financial reform was a direct
development of Naveau's, supplemented by many of the financial
schemes discussed in the previous chapters, notably the ideas
of accelerating the flow of specie through the economy.
Necker believed that there were some 1,900,300,0001. of specie
in the country (a disproportionate 500,000,0001. of it in
l I
Paris) 79 , which meant that, according to the various calcul-
ations of the period, the Treasury saw only 15-2O of that
money, On a different tack, Necker was interested in paper
currency as a method of over-coming the problems of cash
flow; this opened up unfavourable comparisons with Law. It
was in any case rejected by Council in April 177880. In July
1777 he proposed a sinking fund based on 12,000,0001. a year,
reaching 60,000,0001. when successful reform had released more
cash 81• He believed that smuggling in general could be bet-
ter controlled by manipulating excise duties to make it un-
profitable than by maintaining police forces 82,
Necker's appeal to public opinion was reported to be au..-..
cess2fl by Stormont writing in July 1777, "...in all FIr. Neck-
er's operations hitherto he carries the publick opinion along
with him" • This grew into a "propaganda machine" according
to Cobban, but is more sympathetically called "la politique
d'information" by Grange 83• This was a major politibal in-
novation9but it was not based on Enlightenment thinking.
(The Enlightenment had generally rejected universal education
as a dangerous invitation to "democracy"). Necker himself
claimed to be realis.ing the full potential of the Louis-seiz-
irrie practice of educating the already informed public about
the intent of edicts through their preambles 85• This practice
was a development of paternal absolutism, and. was not an ex-
tension of the political nation to make every subject a citizen
86• This practice did seem to break one of the fundamental
precepts of the regime, that information itself in the wrong
hands was dangerous and inflammatory. Necker's peculiar brand
of Protestantism forced him to believe that every member of
the political nation should have the opportunity to justify
himself in the eyes of history with political good works.
Vei suggested that, on a personal level, this was Necker's
own most important motivation 87 it is a concept alien to
a Catholic political tradition, but it alsQ goes a long way
towards vindicatinq Necker as honest, at least with himself,
even if a little unscrupulous by expedient. It was this
quality which made him acceptable to Louis XVI.
Necker was able to exploit public opinion against the
financial establishment so successfully that he succeeded
in reform whcre Invau, Terray, and Turoot had failed B8
Georqe),, however, reversed the conccpt, sayinq that Necker
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attacked already unpopular targets in order to rally public
opinion to a ministry without talent or political base. This
became an important feature of Necker's anti-mythology 89 One
of the bases of Necker's appeal to public opinion was the leak
mci of information to the capital. There are two important docu-
ments in this context, 'Tb1eau nral des Impositions du
Royaume' by Necjre des Rivires(a counsellor of the Court of Aids)
and Dailly (a first commissioner to the intendants of finance)
This was a detailed and important document setting out not
only a rudimentary budget, but also a detailed attack on the
intendants. (Although not a leaked document, the 1777 'Extrat
de l'Etat Politigue de la France' expressed the financial policy
behind malcinq this information public, "Le tableau ci-devant de
la situation des finances est ffrayante, mais on observera que
les ressources de la France sont inpuisab1es •a•
The climax of this policy, the second document, was the
'Compte Iendu'. Although outside our period, it deserves mention.
It was an attempt to force a budget on an unwillinc regime 92,
though Necker's good intention has become forgotten in the debate
over the accuracy of the Compte's figures. Recent reappraisal,
one of the few objective studies of the Compte, has traced the
caLeqorical assertion that the figures were fabricated from con-
temporaries through to some eight respected historians who are
quoted	 Going back to the original, however, shows that any
qiven criticism can be disproved, and tnat within certain strict
limitations the Compte was logically consistent and even accurate.
The most fundamental fault of the Compte was its fallacious and
deliberate division of ordinary from extraordinary income and
expenditure. In reality the two were inextricable. Moving out-
side the strict spheres of evidence two points present themselves;
the first was that only Necker could comprehend the system and
results obtained, the second, that if the Compte were wholly
accurate, it would be very difficult to account for the political
crises 1787-9 and the Revolution. Necker does deserve the foot-
note of comparison with other estimates of the period, and these
show immediately that he produced moderate rather than inflated
figuress
British Embassy 1768 (Laverdy ?)
Revenue	 450,000,0001. (approx.)
Expenditure	 (sliohtly hici'her then revenue)
Balance	 (steadily mountinq deficit)
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Espion An1ais 1776:
Revenue
Expenditure
Balance
193,686,6961.
(eventual surplus when reforms imple-
mented)
Etat Politique 1777: 	 Compte Rendu 1781:
Revenue	 412,313,7711.	 Revenue	 264,154,0001.
Expenditure	 392,261,4001.	 Expenditure 253,954,0001.
Balance	 +20,052,3711.	 Balance	 +10,200,0001.
Projected Revenue from Administrative Countries: 500,000,0001.
Projected Revenue from a DIme Royale:	 745,000,0001.
All these figures (except for the first set) compare very optim-
istically with Marion's assessment of 1775 and 1776.
1775:
Revenue	 377,200,000
Expenditure	 414,400,000
Balance	 -37,200,000
1776:
Revenue	 378,300,000
Expenditure	 402,500,000
Balance	 -24,200,000
Necker's desire to disseminate information was evident in
two other projects. He gave much official help and patronage
to Moreau de Beaumont's study of taxation; this work was first
published in 1768, but the eventual 1787 edition, a store-house
of technical fiscal data, owes much to Necker 	 The second
was MOheau's (Montyon's) 'Rcherches et Considerations sur la
Population de la France' (Paris 1778) 96, This was commission-
ed by Turgot, but brought to fruition by Necker, thus sharing
a similar history to Letrosne's work s	This work
claimed to be the most objective and scientific in its field
and to reconcile all previous systems in one empirical account.
Like all other such studies, however, it laboured under the two
crippling handicaps of believing that the population was declin-
md, and that .the ancient world had been ten times more populous
than the modern • The book, though, recovers from these false
premises to outline a very appealing political programme which
praised Louis XVI'S monarchy as the regime most likely to imple-
ment it. The programme steered away from excesses of democracy
or anti-clericalism while still retaining a philosophe outlook.
fL
The idealised regime would be one where: citizens would
enjoy greater equality before the law, property would be more
evenly distributed, men would be assured of the fruits of their
labour, at both a social and individual level they would be
allowed the pursuit of happiness, children would be universally
educated and well-fed, and the economy would be run to ensure
a constant slicht excess of demand over supply in labour. This
was a political programme for Necker's reforms arid reflects a
mixture of ideas from various sources all liable to be regarded
as laudable in Louis Xvi's eyes 	 This issuing of a political
prgramme through a patronised book ( or pamphlet) was an approach
borrowed from Turctot's period in the Control General.
The reaction to Necker was generally optimistic. The Jour-
nal Encyclopdique, for example ias convinced that the policies
of 1776-7 would liquidate the state's debts by the end of 1778
98 By 1777 Mme. du Deff and had overcome her initial resevations
sharing Hardy's hopefulness; even Linguet had to admit that
Necker was popular . Of Necker's administration by 1777
Chapuisat comments, '... ii. tire momentanement les finances de
leur dtresse", through the success of his banking techniques
100, There were dissenting voices, however, even at this stage.
Condorcet dismissed the triumvirate of Naurepas, Taboureau, arid
Necicer as the Holy Trinity of finance - and just as mystic 101,
Turgot was implacably hostile to Necker, whether from a genuine
belief that Necker's policies could not succeed, or whether
from pique' that Necker seemed to be succeedini rhere he, Turcot,
had failed 102, The capital, accordino to one of our main
sources of its attitudes, remained sceptical. If he could hon-
our his promises Necker must possess the philosopher's stone,
but it was all too likely he was no more a sorcerer than his
predecessors. All his measures were an attempt to shore up a
crumbling financial edifice with cosmetic surgery and reckless
borrowing. Disorder was piled on disorder, "Je dois trembler
sur l'avenir pour notre pauvre France" 103, The charge that
Necker was a latter day Law was endemic 104 • in a damning
account of Necker, Jarrett endorses Maurepas's subtle (and
ponderable) quip that France was now abandoned to "Neckero
mania" 105
Necker's most important political activity concerned the
provinces. Immediately, Necker reversed Clue'ny's policy of
draconian centralisation and alloyed the process of dovolutiori
to resume. This initial phase of policy, however, was double-
edged, being as much a move against the Court as a patronage of
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the provinces. Necker hoped to move the politically dancerous
Great out of Versailles and into the provinces, where they
could be usefully and safely employed while leaving Necker free
to push through his reforms. Necker's hatred of the reat and
their power to influence politics was a theme of his writings,
but he recocinised the monarchy's need to harness their revived
power to its service lO6 Equally important is Necker's posit-
ive political motivation for turning to the provinces. During
the late century ministries looked to the peripheral provinces
f or political inspiration, and the concepts of limited democracy,
provincial autonomy, and fiscal reform were "peripheral" ideas.
Necker himself admitted that he found more support in the pro-
vinces than in the capital; the point was taken up by Georqei.
and turned round to say that Necker could not muster support
in the centre, where he was seen as a fraud, and so turned to
the more gullible provincials 	 A more important motive was
the need for money; Necker realised that the slogan, "no taxa-
tiori without representation", (which was being discussed in
the capital in the 1770's 108) could be double-edged, that by
qrantincr the provinces representation they could be ericouraoed
to part with more taxation. Necker judqed that 1778 was the
right moment to initiate a reform project, and that France would
now accept from Necker what it did not accept from Turgot 109,
Necker had a wide choice of models for provincial reform.
Lachaze, analysinq the backGround to th assembly in Berry, div-
ided devolutionists into two schools:the first, calling for
States Countries, started with the duke of Burgundy and culmina-
tinq in Mirabeau, the second, a separate development based on
Administrative Countries, branched of f with Argenson, Turgot,
and finally Letrosne	 Necker regarded concept of "mettre
la France en pays d'tats" as a dead end, and paid no heed to
it. We have seen earlier the schemes of Argenson, Aubusson, and
Turgot, but again, Necker did not regard them as suitable. The
model Necker chose to look back to was an experiment in Boulonnais
in 1766, when letters patent had set up an "administrative corpor-
ation". This was a two-tiered system with eictht (nominated)
administrators, a clerk, a receiver, and four deputies from each
Order as the top tier; the latter twelve deputies were elected
by the second tier, an electoral colleqe, of eiuht clercy, eicht
nobles, five bourceois, and six rural notables (elected in turn
by the syndics)	 The experiment failed because it was poiit
ically too anaemic, no existing jurisdictions being challenged.
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1766 was a dynamic year in the provinces with the absorbtion
of Lorraine into France, and Choiseul's creation of six new
intendants. The Boulonnais experiment may have been submerged
in the greater matters of state. A similar, thouGh even less
substantial, experiment was conducted in Champaone 1776 112, but
as a prelude to the implementation of Letrosne's plans. Letrosne
had manaqed to present the content of Aubusson's scheme, added
son of the more useful aspects of physiocracy, and then dressed
his ideas up as the scheme to carry France into a new political
era under an enlightened king arift well-chosen ministers.
Having decided to be guided by Letrosne's scheme, Necker
acted with undignified and unsuccessful stealth with the circula-
tion of a private memoir to the king and a few chosen ministers
1777-8 113, The memoir, a "perfidious" attack made in bad
faith and ignorance, was a "rquisitoire contre l'intendant" 114.
Like Necker's initial memoir on finance, this wa never meant
to be published, but someone in overnment leaked it to the
capital, and its injudicious assault on the robe caused a storm
of protest. (The bulk of the memoir was an attack on the robe,
and will be considered below in that context). The advantages
of a new system would be: the rekindling of the people's affect-
ion for the kina, a separation of competences to allow fiscal
self-determination, eventual reduction of the tax burden on the
poor, better accountability and attention to local problems, the
qovernnent's credit ,would be strenothened, ministers' good inten-
tions would not become lost in the capital's chaos of competing
jurisdictions, the States Countries' institutions, with all
their existing advantages, would be perfected, arid a complete
restructuring of taxes could be achieved. In one passage Necker
set up and destroyed the arguments against Administrative
Countries, taking Mirabeau's 1750 pamphlet on the States Countries
as a model 115 This was Necker's constructive reaction to
Letrosne, and it was restated in the arr& settinq up the assemb
ly in Berry, though without any of the vicious attacks on other
jurisdictions 116,
In the capital Grimm managed to see this memoir in Septem-
ber 1777, and expressed the most fulsome praise for it. He des-
cribed the mariaqement of the Control ('eneral under Necker, cul
minatinc in the memoir , as " ... la plus exceli.erite code d'
conomie politique qui ait encore	 fait. On y trouve tous
les rands principes developp6s avec la profondeur et la pr-
cision la plus lumineuse , la rforme des abus prepar6e sans
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effort, la d6pense soumisea un ordre plus constant et plus
c1air, les frals de perception diminus, le systeme gnral
des finances r6duit a une marche plus simple et plus uniforme,
enf in le grand art de gouverner et de maintenir le crdit pub-
lic, de ranimer la conf lance des peuples, et de l'inspirer
mme aux nations rivales". This was an important analysis
ramifying throughout Necker's reforms. Already it was known
that Berry - the "Siberia" of the old regime ll7 was to receive
the first assembly, and Grimm confidently predicted that other
provinces would follow and Necker's name be immortalised. Grimm
saw the new structure as filling a gap rather than the preface to
wider reform, this gap being account:ability and participation
in taxation. Even if the new system failed, it would leave
foundations for improvement. Grimm took. up all Necker's points
about the failures of the present system. He would appear to be
the first man to use the term "Administrative Country" - Letrosne
and Necker never quite formulated it so neatly. Grimm felt the
new assemblies could create balances of local interests and cor-
porations without running the risk of their allying against the
qovernment 118,
Necker followed up this memoir with several more documents
filling in the details of the new structures
	 He was most
interested in increasing the representation of the Third, not
just following the Languedocian model of doubling the Third but
moving towards a Swedish model of four juridical Orders by sub-
dividing the Third beLween tuwn and country 120, Necker showed
how the reform would solve innumerable problems in society and
administration, such as the revitalisation of provincial aities,
arid the eradication of begging The intendant would not be abol-
ished, but would become the provincial arbiter of fiscal dis-
putes - thus accelerating an existing line of development 121,
Necker was not entirely happy about this situation, fearing that
the intendant might be revived to the plenitude of his power at
some future date, and he was particularly concerned that the in-
tendant was liable to alienate the urban middle class. Two
documents on the cleray, followed up by comments in 'De l'Admirr
istration des Finances •..', showed that Necker was wary of
granting them a political power Letrosne would have withheld.
He was as wary of bishops as of intendants, and as critical of
their abuses and laxity, but Necker was forced to recognise a
Valuable tradition of administrative training and experience,
which, when added to the clergy's potential as a political
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balance to the robe swayed the deicision in favour of their
substantial representation 122, Iuch of this documentation
displays a disquieting sense of urgency, a growing awareness
that the regime could not ithstand indefinite failure in its
attempts to reform. The Aministrative Countries iere presented
as the last hope for the oovernmént to curb corporate vested
interest, restore credit, regain the confidence of the people
and prove good faith by tacklino abuse. The political power
of the parlements, which, by 1778, Necker felt, qere closiriq
their eyes to the lesson of 1771, threatened to destroy the
monarchy. These documents made great play of antecedents back
to the duke of Burgundy. While some of these remarks were scare
monclerinc' arid desiqned for short-term political advantage, tiey
had an ominous ring of truth.
In 1778 assemblies were set up in Berry and Haute euienne.
The presidents were nominated by the oovernment, both were
bishops connected with the ministry who were prior supports of
the scheme. The intendants and crovernors :ere the royal commiss-
ioners, and between sessions the assemblies 	 delegated power
to intermediary commissions made up of two deputies from each
Order, a president and one clerk. The outward structure, there-
fore, was so similar to that of the StiLcs Countties as to allow
the Journal Encyclopdique to comment merely, "Les Etats de
Berry sont actuellement assembles pour reniplir les vues du
crouvernement ..."; this imi1arity	 L'VLL Lcxnquedoc and the
new assembly in Berry forms a cornerstone of Lachaze's analysis
of this Administrative Country 1z31 In the initial debates on
the structure of the Administrative Country of Berry Letrosne's
radical suggestion of abandoning juridical Orders was dropped.
This became a feature of the reforms, that the original radical
intent of Letrosne was modified by encounter with political
reality. The eventual plan was for the province to be subdivid-
ed into twenty-four arrondissentents of thirty parishes in each.
Half the arrond jssements would be rural and halr urban. The
arrondissement would hold an electoral assembly of: mayors,
municipal magistrates, and six elected rural notables, this was
for the Third deputies, the other Orders would elect their
deputies separately. The cler rly vere no problem, being used to
political assembly, but the nobility had to be defined as those
of 100 years of fief-holdiner but who also possessed 3,0001.
income. The nobility cravitated toward the Lanquedocian model•
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of giving the twelve largest esLaLeb hereditary representation,
but was pulled back. The idea behind this scheme was to unite
the two oroups of militaires and property holders in the same
suffraqe. The forty-eictht deputies would enjoy leaal immunity
for the session and for the two weeks before and again after it
124,
Within the assembly, speakinq was strictly regulated by
juridical hierachy, but votin g was by head. Th&1778 assembly
was fixed at one month in Berry, and decreed to be biennial
thereafter, but pressure of work forced annual sessions. (An
important initial point was that the intendant was charced with
nominatiricr deputies, to smooth the transition from "ministerial
deSpotism" to democracy, and to erect some barrier aqainst a
surc:e of particularism; in Berry the 1778 deputies consisted of
sixteen nominees and thirty-two co-opted members, but the experi-
ment was a failure in that the nominated members behaved as if
they had been elected, and protested a qainst the nature of their
appointzmnt.) The initial sessions were concerned with: fiscal
reform, a cadaster, setting up a salaried bureacracy (presided
over by the intermediary commissions), public works, communica-
tions, local industry and economic problems, and the corve.
The mode of business was to divide the deputies up into bureauc
thieh debated specific issues and presented iesolutions to the
plenary assembly. (This was an adaptation of the British parlia-
mentary practice of working through committees before presenting
a Bill.)
Four points emeroed from the first year's activity. In
Berry the intendant fought hard to preserve his prerogatives and
obstructed the assembly. Also in Berry the duc de Charost was
a great reforming influence from the Second; he was an Enlighten-
ed land-lord on his own domains, abolishing the corvée and setting
up hospitals, and he worked to transfer these policies to a pro-
vincial level. He also patronised canal building, hoping to
earn a reputation as a French Bridgewater. In Haute Guienne
the assembly identified itself with local economic privilece, in
particular attacking the stranglehold Bordeaux exercised over
wines exported via the Garonne, which Turgot had attacked, but
which had been re-established. Finally, both assemblies decided
that a cadaster and full scale tax rc'form would be too expensive
and politically inadvisable, and probably without conscious emu
lation, they moved towards the Burcundian initiative of ref orminc
taxes up to the standard of the twentieth 125, As will be seen
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below, this was the most important and most disastrous decision
taken; it was the only area where the Assemblies' decisions
were of importance.
The previous paragraph is put together from sources well-
disposed towards the assemblies, Laverqne quite explicitly
attempts to show that the politIcal virtues of the nineteenth
century could be found in the eicihteenth l26• In reality, how-
ever, there was no smooth transition,towards Enlightened liberal
administration; this was the promise in 1778, and aclairi more
desperately, in 1787, but it was unrealised. More hostile re-
ports from the provinces painted a disturbinaly different pic-
ture. In Berry a failure to achieve fiscal reform had made
the situation worse than if no reform had been attempted. The
privilegis had exploited new-found political power to reduce
their own taxes. The Third had been able to offer no effective
opposition because the division between town and country had
become one of implacable hostility. Another source of worry for
the government was the assembly's wish that its officers should
be aiven absolute security of tenure - making a mockery of the
idea of accountability. The most startling development was a
reaction to the Second's of fenive to increase itc privilege by
which the First and Third had tried to c1eprivr i-he S...COUd of
all its privi1ee and power and set up a "thocratie dmo-
cratique" 127,
These repori-s were as much an ox ggertion	 s the pro-
cs verba1 refusal to acknowledGe any real tensions, but they
must be taken seriously as the ammunition for the enemies of
the Administrative Countries. Young wrote of the Administrative
Countries in 1787 that they '... were viewed with eyes of jeal
ousy by certain persons who wished for no better government than
one whose abuses were the chief foundation of their fortunes •.."
128, One of these certain people was Jo].y de Fleury (procurator
general), who wrote cogent and incisive attacks on the new sys-
tem. He foresaw the "disorder" that would result from a clash
between provincial assembly and pari.ement, a possibility inex-
plicably dismissed by Necker 129• He deplored the attack on
tradition, and was apprehensive of the political power of the
clerccy. He foresaw the entrenchment of privi1ee, the increas-
ing of the tax burden on the poor, and the possible local anta
conism caused by the transfer of responsibility for tax assess-
ment from outside impartial authority (the intendant) to local
interested bodies. As a nascent conservative Joly de Fleury 130
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was concerned that the exclusion of the parlements from fiscal
matters would remove that last barrier againt ministerial des-
potism, and deny people any recourse against it. He accused
Necker of uniting the demerits of theStates Countries with
those of the pays d'lections, and of dismantling Colbert's
work (in setting up the eneralities) amidst, "... l'obscurit
d'urie immensit6 de mots" 131 	 -
Joly de Fleury's deepest criticism - harkina back to
the opposition to Turgot - was of the economic and social con-
flicts the new system would both reveal and enqender. "Le plan
des administrations proviriciales, est un mlance monstreux de
principes rpublicains et monarchiques ... en crenral ce plan
d'adniinistration provinciale a toutes sortes d'inconvnients
en tout qenre et ne peut avoir d'autre objet que de rendre les
impositions solidaires, d'craser les propritaires des terres,
d'armer le peuple contre leurs seigneurs et de rendre le clerc
iridubitablement le maître du royaume". An unsigned and undated
memoir started from the premise that involving more people in
adminislration was fundamentally anti-monarchic, the intendant
as single aoent of royal authority was a microcosmic reflection
in hs qenerality of the kinq in his realm. The memoir feared
that the Administrative Countries would s-ct up call for th
States General. The writer associated decentralisation direct-
ly with the surrender of local administration to interested
parl-ies, "... on croit y dcouvrir un dancr c'ti-.in pour 1'
autorit royale, la possibi1it de la destruction des privilges
des diffrents Ordres ou la facilit donneaux propritaires
les plus puissants de se dcharqer du fardeau des impositions"
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These were informed criticisms of the scheme - second hand
critiques were also available in abundance. Mirabeau, now a
patriarch of physiocracy, accused the Administrative Countries
of neither respecting tradition nor inauquratino democracy, and
a poor third after the States Countries and Purgot's scheme
Turgot feared that the proposed thirty provincial assemblies
would by force des choses acquire power of a revolutionary
nature. Turqot was impressed by events in America and foresaw
a situation where some .weakness in the centre would enable the
assemblies to form a congress and take over the nation. Pe
further feared that eriouqh militaires were dissatisfied with
Louis XVI'S monarchy to incite civil war throucth this new
institutionalised power. His advice was to limit the assemblies
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to solely fiscal competence l34 Choiseul, too, had advice.
He made two specific criticisms of Necker's scheme, that the
royal commissioners were failing to exercise sufficient control
over the assemblies, and that the idea of a community of inter-
est in the Third was a fallacy. He also echoed Turgot's fear
of a coneress challenaina the monarchy l33
Choiseul's two criticisms were the most accurate, especial-
ly that the Third failed to live upto Necker's hopes of it.
There were also some purely technical reasons for the partial
failures in 1778; Necker, and the theorists before him, had
not envisaced the breakdovn in local tax assessment caused by
injudicious iiithdrawl of hiher authority. Dailly recoonised
that a problem micht exist in this sphere, but never explored
the possibility l36 The abuses of the existing system blinded
reformers to any short-cominçs in their own alternative proposals.
The institutional cause of the problem was that Necker had only
implemented the leqislative third of Letrosne's plan, and, even
given its developing bureaucracy around the intermediary Com-
mission, he left the legislative structures stranded in the
midst of the hostile administrative machinery of the generality
and suhde3eqations. There was never any mention of the new
judiciRry. Thc aemhlis, therefore, found themselves operat-
inq in a vacuum; they could debate and vote on any matter they
wished, but had to rely on hostile administrations for execut-
lye support, which they did not rcccivc. without porer, they
abandoned responsibility. In their defence, the disasters that
befell Berry were absent from Haute Guienrie, and even in Berry
the experiment, on balance, benefit-ed the province 	 The
failinqs of Necker's hasty piece-meal approach vindicated
Letrosne's detailed, long-term, and carefully planned course.
Probably because of the short-comirios of the assemblies in 1778
two proposed assemblies in 1779 (Moulins and Dauphin) fell to
opposition, in Paris and the provinces, which could point to
the fiasco in Berry l38 Another document, presumably of the
same period as the original memoir , short-listed: Roussillori,
Rouercue and Quercy (i.e. Haute uienne), Lyonnais, and Hainault
as suitable f or the regime of Administrative Countries beinr Un-
encumbered with hostile local corporations or bishops; five
schemes then,were still-born 17789.
Necker's reforms rere not universally recarded as a disas-
ter; one reformer took up 'rimm's earlier point that even a
failure would leave foundations for new reform. in 'Pr6cis d'un
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Projet d'Etablissement du Cadastre dans le Royaume', Tillet
praised Necker fulsomely and suggested that the Administrative
Countries should be used to implement St-Pierre's plan for a
taille tarife. The prerequisite of this reform was the cadas
ter of the title, without which the privilegis could (and had)
adapt(ed) the reforms tO their own advantage. Tillet pointed
to the success of this scheme in Angoumais where Turgot (as
intendant of Limousin, which included Angoumais) had implemented
it in the face of strong opposition from vested interest. Its
four main benefits were: that the more rational fiscal struct-
ure had led to an increase in agricultural revenue, that more
land had been brought under cultivation, that the more prosper-
ous lands would bear the heaviest burdens, and that the number
of law suits had been reduced. He suggested a staff of twenty
surveyors in each generality to produce the cadaster. He gave
a stern warning that should the structure of the Administrative
Countries be used to entrench and extend privilege it would be
the perpetration of the greatest abuse yet, and its victims might
take revenge to destroy all privilege 139,
Necker attracted attention from Prussia from one Hertzberg,
who studied the feasibility of setting up Administrative Countries
there. Hertzberg covered most of the ground Necker had, that,
for example, all deputies should be landed, that the clergy
should be treated as landowners, that the assemblies should have
consultative and executive, but not legislative roles (though in
reality this failed to happen), and that if power were to be
devolved, it was safer in the hands of the assemblies than in
those of the parlements. He rejected both a national assembly
and the States General as being too dangerous. Hertzberg did more
than just precis Necker, he also offered some valuable comments:
)lontesquieu had laid the foundation for basing the monarchy on
political institutions (in fact it had been the duke of Burgundys
circle), but the Administrative Countries took the ideology a
stage further by transferring it from autonomous corporations to
representative bodies.
Hertzberg showed how Necker had adapted reform projects to
the monarchy, as opposed to obliterating the monarchy in a self
regulatina system. "La meilleure forme de gouvernement est celle
d'une monarchie libre, dans laquelle un seul souverain runit
dans sa seule personne i.e pouvoir lgislatif et excutif, mais
oti ii observe et ne change pas sans une necessit urqente et
visible des loix foridamentales ... et o'u ii. tablit o laisse
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subsister (States and Administrative Countries) qui sans parti
ciper ou pouvoir lcjislatif, ont la facilité de s'assembler
encertains temps, de d1ibrer sur la situation et sur les besoins
cle l'tat, d!en faire des rapports et des reprsentations au
souverain, et do concourrir ainsi avec sa permission et sous ses
auspices l'administratiQn intrieure et civile" 14O This
type of analysis causes May to call the Administrative Countries
parliamentarianism without the parliaments 141, it shows either
that Necker committed a drastic political miscalculation as re-
gards the behaviour of his assemblies, or that he had quite
failed to understand Letrosne's concept of provincial separation
of powers, and therefore failed to see that he had succeeded only
in superimposing an impotent debating chamber on the resentful
administrations in the generalities to the disadvantage of both.
Part of the explanation for Necker's apparent ineptitude
and miscalculation lies in his most important motive for reform
- the supplanting of the robe. Necker had realised that the
robe was the dominant group in society, and it was their influence
he came to believe, that lay at the root of all France's problems.
Necker decided that breaking the robe's grip on society would
opn up the possibility of the political solution of any given
problem.	 ]l the various policies pursued by Necker were overt
or covert attacks on the robe, whether to convince them to
abandon autonomous corporation in favour of professional bureau-
c'racy, r to or'clucie, circumvent, or supprecs t-heir pofltical.
power. The robe, for its part, returned the compliment by
regarding Necker as a dangerous saboteur of the old regime. The
first clearly hostile attack to gain any note came in November
1777 during the winter's financialcum-political crisis: "Mean
time, the gens de robe began to triumph in the impropriety of
setting people at the head of a department who were unacquainted
with the laws and customs of France, and hoped to reclaim to
their body, the great offices which had seemed to belong" 142,
This last remark is potentially one of the most interesting of
Necker's career, f or it links Necker's reforms with the second
militaire ministerial offensive, which had begun to gather momen
turn after the refusal to transfer the War Office from militaire
to robin hands in 1774 and 1775, and was reinforced by the
Choiseulists' shadow ministry of 1776. A possibility whose
substance will be explored below.
The destructive part of Necker's plan was his attack on the
robe in his memoir on provincial administration. "Une multitude
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de plaintes," he began, "s'est leve de tous les temps contre
la forme d'administration eiuploy4'e daris les provinces ...". Of
the intendant he continued, "A peine en effet peut on donner le
nom d'administration cette volont arbitraire d'un seul homme
qui tantot present, tantot absent, tantot instruit, tant6t incap-
able doit re' ir les parties les plus importantes de l'ordre
public ..	 us sont impatients de venir'a Paris et laissant
- -	 .-leurs secretaires eta leurs subdelegues les soiris et les rem
places dams leurs devoirs publics". The disadvantage of relying
on the subdelegate, a generally wbrthy and excellent man, was
that he could only communicate with the government via the in-
tendant, who if lax or absentee, could cause the provinc&s
admihistration to grind to a halt. The lack of local accountab-
ility by the intendant and his staff could cause "injustices
clatantes", which could be ignored by the intendant who was in
the position of being arbiter of the complaints made against
him. The intendant was in the unfortunate position of bringing
the whole administration into disrepute if he were iniquitous,
while being broken by the system were he well-intentioned. An
important start would be the devolution of responsibility 143
The complaints concerned the intendant alone, but Necker
drew the whole robe into the web of abuse and administrative
/	 '	 - -
chaos. "Quand de longs murmures degenerent en plaintes generales,
le parlement se remue et vient se placer entre le roi et ses
peuples". The intervention of the parlements and Courts of Aids
in taxation slowed down the whole process of fiscal administra-
tion and vitiated royal authority. It was Necker's hope that
the parlemerits could be deprived of fiscal competence, in addition
to removing the intendant from this sphere. Necker, however,
would not have stopped there, but continued, "... comme un corps
politique on dsirera les affaiblir", by removing all jurisdiction
over, "les grands objets" l44•. This attack on the parlements was
a stronger statement of Letrosne's position, but in a wholly
negative way. Necker repeated all these accuations in 'De 1'
Administration des Finances ...', but in a milder form. Necker
did add one, more sweeping, attack on the robe than any made
while in office, "Les gens de robe croient trop aisement que 1'
esprit d'administration est leur appanage exciusif; cet esprit
comme tous les autres, n'appartient ni l'habit, ni au manteau,
ni l'talacie de la chevalure: c'est un don de la nature que
l'ducation, l'tude et l'experience fortifient, et que l'habit
ude de la rflexion perfectionne" 145, thus opening up the field
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to any other competent group. This critique was reminiscent
of Duclos's remark, "Le magistrat regarde l'tude et le travail
comme des soins obscures qui ne conviennent qu" des hommes qui
ne sont pas faits pour le monde" 146, This brings us back to
Necker's approach to information and education. Of itself a
freer flow of information to a wider and more educated public
would undermine the robe's supremacy.	 -
A document in this context half way between Nec]cer's extreme
attack on the robe and those members of the magistracy evolving
towards bureaucracy was the 'Tableu Gnëral des Impositions du
Royaume'. Negre des Rivires dismissed the late century inten-
dant, as, "Un •jeune frSlucjuent qui sort de Paris pour i.e premire
fois, ignorant souvent comnie croit le bled, ayant presque
toujours intréAt contraire'a celui de la province, courant la
carri'??re de la fortune, avide des graces de la Cour qu'il doit
obtenir par i.e canal du ministre des finances..."; This account
of France's administration tarred the subclelegates with the same
brush as the intendants, and suggested that a breakthrough in
provincial reform could only be achieved after some form of
petition of grievances had been presented to the king. Negre dis-
agreed strongly with Letrosne over the use of a cadaster, "...
un vain fantSme destine ahusr la nation par la trompeuse pers-
pective de changements avantageux dans l'avenir", but agreed that
it was an advantagous institution in provinces where it was cus-
tomarye Necre, alsci, would have no truck with the militaires,
"... ns pour etre les flaux de Ia sociét", passing themselves
of f as heroes and demi-gods to whom the intendants pandered 147,
Georgel saw the attack on the intendants as the single most
important aspect of the new assemblies, and linked it to the
attack on the financial establishment 148, Necker juxtaposed
the helpful attitude of "gentilshornmes" and commoners in the
assembly with the disruptive behaviour of the robe 149 Necker
devoted a chapter to the training of the intendants, and while
he admired the legal training of the masters f requests, he
deplored the relaxation of standards in the course of the century
confirmed by Gruder 150, This chapter was one of Necker's most
important statements about the regime in that it forms an oblig-
atory point of departure for any study of the post-1715 interidanL.
Ardasheff takes Necker at his face value, and, combined with an
uncritical acceptance of robe genealogies, it causes him to con
dude that an increasingly more noble caste was tightening its
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grip on the masters of requests. Recent research by Head and
Gruder has disproved this aspect of the intendants, but the
other criticisms remain valid 15l Dailly believed that the
intendant's function should be reappraised and reduced to
representing the province's interests and providinq the govern-
ment with a steady flow of information 152,
In another direction Necker went back to an 'idea of respect-
able pedigree that the monarchy should base itself on property.
Necker desired a compromise between the belief that commerce was
the sole source of wealth and the physiocrat view that agricult-
ure was its sole source. To this end Necker insisted on the
inclusion of specifically urban as well as specifically rural
deputies, and both subject to property qualifications 153,
Letrosne described his plan as, "une administration de proprit'
aires" in the belief that the involvement of all property owners
in the political process would prove an unshakeable political
base 154 Letrosne had turned into political detail Noreau's
general observation, "Si la monarchic est la surete des proprie1es,
les proprits, de leur 	 doivent tre, pour la monarchic,
une source intarissable de secours' 155, ti ri analysed the
development of late century political thinkinc T as a steady evOlU
tion 1-ruards the omnipotence of property 156 In this we should
detect not so much a move towards a property-owning democracy -
as Lavergne would like us to believe - as an attempt to create
a moro widcly based plutocracy vhjCh %vould SLtL Lh iube.
But this was a long-term hope, immediately Necker had to
persuade part, at least, of the robe to defect, and to find some
other group to help the initial transition away from a robe dom-
inated stociety. Although there is no coherent body of evidence
to support it, several disparate fragments suggest that Necker
looked to the militaires to fill this qap. Somewhat nebulously,
Necker patroriised Coyer, and gave his 'Noblesse Commercante' a
new vogue; this work was an overt assertion of militiare inter-
ests. Necker's specific stipulation of nobility of 100 years'
or more standing in provincial assemblies meant that only milit
aires or older robe, in theory, would be eligible for the Second.
When this same policy had been Implemented in Lancuedoc in 1770
it had caused a storm of protest and been regarded as a straioht
conflict between robe and militaire'.57
 The structure of represent-
ation was loaded heavily against the robe, forcing them to fail
between the categories of militaire and notable commoner. This
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in itself caused friction with local robe institutions. In
retrospect, as we have seen above, Necker praised the militaires
for their helpful political behaviour in the assemblies. Vri
was genuinely alarmed lest the assemblies provoke a republican
movement led by.the militaires which would topple the monarchy 158
The most important piece of evidence comes from the 1777
'Etat Politique' in a critique of Maupeou's reforms. Bearing in
mind that Letrosrie had suggested basing a new consular judiciary
on the Presidial courts, the 'Etat Politigue' said that after
abolishing the parlements outright in 1771 each province should
have been given a sovereign court based on the Presidial judges.
These judges, however, should not be robins: "Les présidiaux
auraient clans peu de temps ts composes des cadets de la
noblesse provinciale qui se seraient fait honneur d"tre membre
d'une cour souveraine et l'on auroit vu les ains servir l'tat
dans les arm6es et leurs cadets rendre clans le Temple de Thmis
la justice aux peuples" - a pro-'ramme for militaire hegemony
through provincial reform 159• Finally, Goodwin quotes Besenvai.
as sayina that the soclo-political balance was preserved by
Miromesnil patronising the robe while Necker patronised the milit-
aires l6o While the case can be made out rather than proven,
it is evident that Necker attracted and dispensed patronaqe from
and to the militaires at the expense of the robe, as can be seen
in his initial clique.
One rect of Necker's Control General was an impulse to
humanitarian reform for which full credit is due. This impulse
is attributable to Necker's Calvinist-cum-philosophe background.
In 1777 alone Necker lessened the brutality of life in the areas
of: hospitals, slavery, naval deserters, and abuse in credit 161,
His greatest triumph was the abolition of mortmain on the royal
domain in 1779, though the disappointment of all reformers the
initiative was not taken up by private land1ords.	 Necker
also manac5ed to curb the extent of legal torture. He naturally
took an interest in toleration, and Marmontel., whose plays
'Blisaire' and the 'Incas' were covert pleas for an end to
religious fanaticism, came under his patronage 163 In the same
vein, Necker never used office for personal ciain nor for the
advancement of family or friends (as opposed to a normal level
of patronaçe). Here he shares with Turcot a personal morality
in office far hicther than the accepted standards of the ace 16 4,
Ignorinu future financial chaos, on balance the people of France
benefit-ed from Necker's period in office. This humanitarianism
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was another aspect of Necker's desire to achieve the politics
of concord and conccnsus, which was a possibility if Necker is
viewed as the apociee of an abortive Louisseizite monarchy, but
which fell victim to force des choses and to Necker's injudicious
assault on the robe.
Grange analyses the great breadth of vision within Neeker's
writings, and presents a coherent view of the aims of his re-
forms, "Le but poursuivi est une transformation profonde de la
monarchie francaise, tine v6ritable rvo1ution silencleuse,
aussi bien politique qu'administrative", leading to structural
solutions to the ancien regime's problems 165•
Necker is the dominapt figure of Louis XVI'S reign up to
1789. Allonville called him, "... le seul v6ritable ministre
qu'eut le roi Louis XVI", for the scope of his ambition and the
breadth of his vision	 osher is no less laudatory, "Necker
was without doubt the most skilful politician of the reign,
perhaps of the century" l67 A less cenerous judgment is Jol].y's
that Necker simply trod the same path as Turgot, to whom the
credit for reform is clue. Even within such limitations Jolly
believed that, fully implemented, the Administrative Countries
miciht have enabled the regime to withstand the impact of the
162States General	 (Lachaze points out that the assemblies on
set up could survive on their own nerits, but the ref orminci ira-
pulse was too little and too late 3b9•) The definitive statement
of the still-horn Louis-seizime monarchy and Necicer's potential
place in it was made by the militaire Le'vis, "Avec un roi juste
et conom9 , un ministre habile et des assembl6es provinciales
la monarchic et	 industructible, et Ia prosperit6 de
l'6tat se sorait accrue indfiniement" 17
Necker fell in 1781 because he could no longer find the
money his power depended on, hecaus Murepas considered him
finally, more dancerous than useful, and because his acknowledged
double or quits policy had finally come up quits over the Compte
Rendu i7	 In his political career to 1778 Necker brinçs togeth-
er every thread in the political culture of the old regime, arid
when the political tapestry he wove unravelled itself, it left
the regime with no new options and on the path to disinteciration.
But Necker in 1778 marks the potential triumph of Louis Xvi's
new monarchy and of new points of departure for the regime.
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SU1IMARY
Necker is the focal and concluding point of this study.
The biographical reappraisal to 1778, and the detailed study of
his ministerial polities, have shown that he was not the hes-
itant outsider but a consummate political operater.
It has been shown that his political ideas were a synthesis
of contemporary theories and, attitudes spanning the political
,2spectrum. His reforming vision was sharper, but less ideolog-
ical, than Turgot's. He reformed the Control General, lie be-
gan to create a genuinely modern bureaucracy. He used public
opinion as a political tool. He shared Louis X1TIvision of an
alliance between citizen and king. He also hoped to be able to
harness both the traditional strengths of the regime and the
innovating spirit of ceformers in a new structure of provincial
administration. His broadest vision was to challenge the robe
oligarchy.
The first provincial assemblies had just been successfully
introduced when war was declared. Puture reform was postponed
during the war, and that postponement marks the conclusion of
this study at the point where Necker had taken the regime to
a new point of departure.
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0NCLUS ION
The period 1768-1778 was outwardly marked by weak leadership.
Ministers came and went too rapidly to exercise control for more
than a few years at a time. Yet, the traditional emphasis on the
history of successive ministers obscures the increasing effective-
ness of the king in Council. The turn-over in ministers was less
an index of the crown's weakness than a sign of royal assertiveness,
though unbacked by consistent policy.
During the last two of these years Necker began to build a new
political system that turned most of the regime's remaining strengths
to account. He gave the Control Ceneral a new lease of life as a
kind of State bank and fashioned a genuinely modern - because apolit-
ical - bureaucracy. Above all, he knit together all the elements of
political and moral support upon which the crown could call. He won
the king's own affection and support. He developed the widest system
of patronage of any contemporary minister: it stretched from the
devots to the philosophes. His support comprised all the various
groups in society which were hostile to the robe's dominance. To
this he added convincing appeal to all those who genuinely sought
reform.
The monarchy had given every indication of degenerating into a
"moribund pornocracy" in the early 1760's. It now began to show sur-
prising signs of vitality under Louis XV from the Session of Scourging
in 1766 through to the endorsement of Maupeou's reforms in 1771. This
royal authority, however, had been entrusted to ministers who were
allowed to manage the Council. Its exercise also seemed to step out-
side the accepted limits o absolutism, and this threatened to do
great damage to the monarchy's standing in the regime.
In 1774 Louis XVI appeared to relinquish this power through var-
ious actions culminating in the recall of the parlements. He believed
differently, and there is some reason to respect his judgement. As
'restorer of mores' he aspired to introduce a golden age based on
justice, resolute government, economic reform and the enlightened
submission of his subjects. There is much evidence - from the ser-
ious tone of ministerial politics, to the changed quality of life at
Court, or to the deliberate heeding of public opinion - that the king
did sticceed in raising both the quality of public life and the expect-
ations of the public spirited among the ].1te.
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What the regime had to come to terms with in this period was
not respect for royal authority - to which all elements in society
paid at least lip-service - but the problem of imposing it after so
long an absence. "Despotism" under ministers such as Naupeou, Terray
and Aiguillon had been tried and found wanting. Louis XVI also re-
jected the politics of consensus his grand-father had allowed under
Choiseul. Louis chose three - mutually compatible - approaches:
direct royal intervention to regulate the conduct of the Council,
ministers of outstanding probity and ability who could capture the
public imagination with bold and well publicised. reforms, and a will-
ingness to allow the monarchy to co-exist with existing and proposed
institutions whose loyalty would strengthen the crown. Louis did not
see the exercise of royal will as an end. in itself, but as the start
of the process of publicising and expounding his intentions, so much
so that by mid 1776 a eulogist of the reign could write that within
two years Louis had created a new style of monarchy and. a new polit-.
ical culture ('Ane'cdotes du Rgne de Louis XVI' Anon. Paris 1776).
The length the the regime's unbroken history gave it an illusion
of stability and a false sense of security. As the pace of political
life quickened in the mid to late century, minisers heeiiel3 ui
the foundations of the regime at risk in their intrigues. In fighting
to stay in power, Choiseul brought the parlements' survival into
question, and threatened the regime's corporate structure. Turgot's
enemies attacked his ministerial policies for peasant unrest aris-
ing from food shortages, whose ultimate cause was climatic. Necker
used the regime's solvency as his personal currency.
Five other problems confronted the monarchy, which needed to come
to terms with them. These were: changes within the nobility, d.evol-
ution, institutional conservatism, philosophie, and. the "peasant
problem". The first of these took the form of the so-called. militaire
reaction, whereby a group based on military institutions institutions
and families of 100+ years of nobility began to develop a sense of
political identity and common interest. This new group created
pressure on society and politics, threatening to lower the status of
both the robe and the middle classes.
The trend towards devolution, secondly, affected all the regime's
institutions and assumptions about reform outside the immediate area
of vested interest in central policy naking and bureaucracy in Paris
and Versailles. The oceanic provinces already possessed two respect-
ed and powerful organs of autonomy in their parlements and States.
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The parlements had experimented with capturing central power in the
pretension of the unite"des classes in the 1760's. This had been
swept aside by the government, leaving the provincial parlements
free to concentrate on local privileges and interests. The States
had always argued in favour of local administration, and had set an
example of excellence which the government could not ignore. A
theme runs through central government's policy from Cholseul's dec-
ision to administer Corsica through States in 1768 through to Necker's
creation of provincial assemblies in 1778. This theme was that de-.
valved administration using the provincial elites was more efficient
and more equitable than the intendants' rule, and would create in-
stitutions drawing together all the strengths of the regime in re-
newed loyalty to the crown. The agents of central authority - the
governors and intendants - were themselves transferring their alleg-.
lance from central to local government. It was common ground. among
political theorists that devolution of power was a prerequisite of
successful reform. The crown could look to institutions such as the
States of Languedoc or the Assembly of Iaute- .Guienne as sources of
inspiration and support.
Institutional conservatism, thirdly, was only a problem for the
government because of its own uncertain reaction to it. In the trad-
itional interpretations of the regime a reforming monarchy is pitted
against reactionary institutions. The government's achievement is
measured by its progress against the vested interests opposed to it.
This simple view, however, does not square with the complexity of
the political situation. There were, of course, small areas of naked
self-interest such as the Postal Parms, which would always resist any
attempts at thorough reform.
The majority of larger institutions, however, shared many of the
crown's interests. Beside narrow corporate self-interest should. be
set a real concern for the common good. It used to be held, for in-
stance, that the opposition of the parlements to royal policies was
entirely self-interested. Yet, it can be plausibly argued, as Prof-
essor Bosher and. others have shown, that the parlements' reluctance
to grant revenues to the crown stemmed from a wish to escape finan-
cial obligations, and from a genuine conviction that the government's
financial administration needed to be overhauled before further re-
venues should be voted. The parlements were concerned to ensure that
most funds raised by taxation did actually reach the government, and
were used effectively where they were most needed.
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• In areas such as the maintenance of law and. order and efficient
local self-government, the crown and various institutions had much
common ground. The crown itself recognised that its own policies
could be put into effect more smoothly by devolving much of the ad-
ministration to local bodies. In Brittany, for example the pane-
ment and. states were close allies. This promised efficient trouble-
free administration if the crown could harness this local co-operation.
One of the keys to successful local government in the oceanic provinces
was that each institution or interest group in society had a defined
jurisdiction or competence - we find the major disputes in the regime
(eg. Aiguillon in Brittany) where central government occasionally
challenged this situation.
Men such as Letrosne recognised the need for such separation of
competences, both to rationalise administration and to sfttisfy the
needs and pretensions of powerful vested interests in society. One
of the arguments in favour of a provincial administration with a sep-
aration of powers - from both sides - was that such an arrangement
would free the crown from having to intervene in day to day matters.
It would also allow the crown to concentrate on wider policy and
moral issues, while at the same time conferring greater real, if
specified, power to the corporations. Despite these successes, the
problem remained: the crown had succeeded only partially in forging
alliances with corporate interests with which it had much in common.
The fourth problem was how the administration should treat the
philosophes, their challenge to existing institutions, and their jus-
tification in political and social theory. The philosophes can, per-
haps, be divided into three main groups. First, there were the supp-
orters of the noble thesis, whose moat illustrious exponent was Mont-
esquieu in 'De l'Esprit des Lois', and whose most committed followers
were to be found in the intellectual circles of the parlementaires.
The alliance between the panlements and philosophie in our period had
been largely dissolved, however, by the disputes over materialism and.
anti-clenicalism, and by the opposition to Turgot's reforms in 1774-6.
The second and largest group, which Included Voltaire, Condorcet, and.
others, supported the crown, as the guardian of the common interest
against vested. interest. The possibility existed, but was barely ex-
ploited, of fostering a party of supporters of the crown among the
philosophes, apart from the rather crude buying of loyalties through
the award of pensions and other rewards, so graphically described by
Professor Darnton. The third. party, which numbered Linguet and. which
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grew larger after 1770, while remaining still small and poorly con-
sidered by contemporaries, called into question some of the basic
institutions and attitudes of government and society under the ancien
regime. The problem that the government needed to face was how to
counter this threat by the winning over of individual writers or by
repressing them more effectively through censorship.
In looking to these different groups for support - the militaires,
the robe, provincial 6lites, and philosophes - the crown did not nec-
essarily need to solder an alliance between them, but only between
the crown and each individual group. This brings us back to the
crown's model of the regime as a wheel with the king as hub, and the
corporations and interest groups as spokes. If the crown could reg-
ulate the interaction between all the parts of society, there would
be no inherent need for each part to be in harmony with every other.
In the parlements' view of society (as a chain with a hierachy of
links from king to journalier) social harmony and cohesion was, of
course, essential.
The fifth problem was the threat to efficient government from
the peasant problem. Any detailed study of this question lies out-
side the scope of this thesis, but it has formed a background reality.
It was beyond the imagination of ministers to better the peasants'
lot within the context of muddling through with existing policies
and outlooks. The radical solution of a free market economy was
not fully understood, and. its effects in times of short supply proved
too dangerous to follow it through. The reformers whose ideas have
been examined in Chapter V had suggested solutions to the peasant
problem that ran from vegetarianism to applying the findings of cad-.
asters. The government, within the limits of the possibilities
open to it, did try to solve the problem by galvanising local init-
iative. It was one of the hopes of the new provincial assemblies
that they could encourage each province to solve its basic rural
economic problems locally as part of the bargain for devolution and
the institutional confirmation of privilege.
In the States Countries there did seem to be scope for optimism
that a prosperous peasantry could co-exist with a society based on
Orders and privilege. It should also be remembered that only the
States General had the constitutional authority to ratify reform of
ordinary taxation (ie. the taille). It was the combination of these
two observations which gave such force to the call for an assembly of
the States General in 1774. In the atmosphere of the new reign, and
with an untried but virtuous and popular young king, the government
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might have convoked and managed such an assembly with success.
With no revolutionary context, there would be every reason to
suppose that an assembly would fit somewhere between the States of
Languedoc and the General Assembly of the Clergy in composition and
outlook. The reform of the worst abuses of the tail].e, corv 'e, etc.
might have been high on the agenda. The assembly would end the pan-
ement's pretension to be a national assembly, but by 1774 the court
ad abandoned this in any case. Malesherbes in the panlement might
have brought the magistracy into co-operation with the States Gen-
eral behind a programme based on his May 1775 Remonstrance. It is
all too easy, finally, to overlook the obvious fact that the king
did eventually have to accept the calling of the States General to
sort out the regime's problems,
In the short term, the government chose to pursue a different
course with the ministries of Turgot and Necker. In a wider per-
spective these ministries were only following more tortuous paths
to the same ends of tax reforms in exchange for devolution and sep-
aration of powers. The period 1768-1778 showed the monarchy exper-.
imenting with political reforms as a reaction to the forces of change
in society. What marks this period out from the decades on eitner
side of it is that the monarchy retained some initiative, and was
prepared to exert itself to intervene directly in the political pro-
cess to pursue poUcy objectives.
Seen from the perspective of 1778, what comments could be made
about the actual failure of the regime a decade later? Firstly, the
personal character of the king had changed. His interest in, and
enthusiasm for, politics had waned. At the same time Marie-Antoinette's
ascendancy, which he had resisted so strenuously earlier, had become
predominant. These were changes internal to the royal family, and
not caused by any more general despair with the political process.
Secondly, the States General had not been convoked at a time when the
monarchy retained sufficient political credit to manage them, or when
the States themselves would have been concerned to protect the essent-
ial qualities of the regime. Thirdly, the financial situation had
been much exacerbated by the costs of the American War. The govern-
ment's failure to remedy the increasingly important financial prob-.
lems helped to alienate some of the middle classes from the monarchy.
Fourthly, the basic problems of the rural economy had not been
tackled. This was partly because the opportunity to convoke the
States General on the crown's own terms had not been seized. It
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was also because the impetus to provincial reconstruction had been
postponed by the war. This postponement became permanent in terms
of it being led by the monarchy instead of becoming a weapon used
by others to undermine it. Neither the provincial States nor the
provincial assemblies were allowed to develop to their full potential
under central guidance. Fifthly, the option of the crown consciously
allying with the aristocratic institutions, which was an unanswered
question 1774-8, remained unanswered through to 1787. After 1787
the nobility, through the institutions, began to initiate.independent
political action designed to reduce or eliminate the power of the
crown.
None of these points discredit the viability of reform or dev-
elopment led by the crown 1768-78. In its cijosen lines of action,
it had achieved real results. The evidence presented in this study
has not attempted to ignore the regime's difficulties, but has shown
that by 1778 a new point of departure had been reached. The found-
ations had been laid upon which new political initiatives could be
built, which could offer the regime a hope of coming to terms with
its problems.
-	 -'	 -.D Jl.-	 4 1	 .	 ,4e succe s c. u.s. exper...e..
with Letrosne's programme for restructured provincial administration.
The other elements were Louis XVI's personal interest in politics
and concern to support reforming ministers. Public opinion had been
won over to the government. Humanitarian reform had been implemented.
In the background lay the memory that in 1771 the government had been
prepared to exert itself to crush all opposition. A programme of fur-
ther provincial reform had been drawn up for 1779. The programme
embarked on in 1778 seemed able to mobilise the strengths of the re-
gime arid to eradicate its worst faults. It offered answers to the
problem of the fraught relations between the crown and corporations
by the separation of powers and the devolution of power to the prov-
incial aristocratic lites. Necker seemed to have found the regime's
middle path to regeneration without revolution.
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APPENDIX I : POLITICS 1768-1778
THE OLD REIGN 1768-1774
Choiseul dated the start of his own fall from power from
1768 , which marks that year as the introduction to a decade
of intense political activity and chanqe culminating in the de-
claration of war and the setting up of provincial assemblies in
1778, the further boundary of this study.
The deeper trends and activities within the late old rectime
only make sense when seen acainst the background of the minister-
ial politics of the period. The militaire offensives, in partic-
ular, reached up to the appointments of Secretaries of State,
but the conflict between Oceanic and Continental policies was
also played out at. this level. Every ministry felt compelled to
base its power in Versailles on some provincial foundation ,
through from Choiseul's loose patronage of provincial interests
and reform, to Maupeou's restructurinq of the judiciary, to
Turcot's physiocracy, to Cluqny's recentralising drive, and on
finally to Neckers attempt to institute the provincial parts
of a mechanistic monarchy (see Chapter VI ). A trend which be-
comes more apparent with each new ministerial crisis is that
the stability of the crown and th futnre of the reqime rere
brouaht into the political arena. So unthinkable was the
collapse of a political tradition stretching back 1,300 years
to Clovis that it never occurred to the politicians of the period
that they vere undermining their regime - that they had done so
became a theme of post-1789 memoirs.
In 1768 Choiseul was in control of the Court, the capital,
and the provinces; the only obvious chink in his armour was
his failure to replace Pompadour, who had died in 1764, with
another friendly titular mistress. This became the focus of
political intrigue 2 From 1765-8 Choiseul and Richelieu, his
old enemy and rival, had sought to find permanent candidates for
the royal bed. Choiseul presented his sister, the duchesse de
Graniont who was forceful and sexually attractive but lacked any
finer qualities. She was promiscuous and headstronc', and her
reputation was fatally flawed by the endemic slander that she
and her brother were lovers . Despite persistent efforts, she
failed to seduce the king, greatly to the annoyance of both her-
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self and her brother . Richelieu had no better luck, his
presentation of a Mine. d' Esparbs provoked a venomous counter
attack from Choiseul who forced Louis XV to choose between his
mistress and his minister . At this date the kinq felt neither
the strencth nor inclination to seek a new ministry. Much later
Stormont made a passing comment on a Mme. Luvilin, who was
related to Richelieu, whom Choiseul had also managed to veto 6
Finally, however, a prostitute from Strasbourg called Jeanne
Bçu was broucht to Louis's attention. She was strikinccly
pretty, and Richelieu married her off to an insignificant pro-
the comte du Barry, in order to introduce her at Court.
The kinG fell for her at once.
She was, "... good natured, qorgeous, illiterate, and
common beyond belief ..." , politics were quite beyond her and
she was ecually unsuited to the role of arbiter of fashion, a
role in ihich both Pompadour and Marie-Antoinette excelled. She
served only to relay Richelieu's advice and to distract the king
from Choiseul, to whom she bore no malice. Lauzun even reported
that she had asked him to mediate between her and Choiseul. to
find a modus vivendi; Choiseul dismissed the approach haughtily,
thus allowing her to remain a thorn in his side 8 Louis Xv's
senile besottedness brought derision and contempt down on the
monarchy, but opened up a new political scene. Du Barry unasham-
edly enjoyed the life she was unexpectedly able to lead; she at
least went through the motions of returning the king's affect-
ions and gave him an Indian sexual summer, althouqh Besenval and
Bachaumont reported that she was also Aiguillon's lover and
Lauzun asserted that she and Fitz-James were lovers
The successful placing of a mistress hostile to Choiseul
was the rallyinG point for the duke's enemies. They coalesced
into the "Court Party"10 , which eorgel called the "partie
Richelieu", "... une cabale rise dans les foyers de l'intrigue,
d'hommes pervers et corrompus ..."	 Mpntbarey reported
that the faction was centered on the htel Richelieu which had
become a centre of intrique 12• Horace Walpole villified Riche-
lieu at that date as possessing only, "... that last talent of
a decayed Frenchman - a spirit of backstairs intricue" l3 The
initial members of the faction were: Richelieu, Soubise, Iarsan
(Soubise's sister, jhe d6vot tutor of the royal children),
Beaumont, and Vaucjuyon. Soubise was a "bosom friend" of the king
and effective head of the House of Rohan (the duc de Nontbazon
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not taking any part in public life), he was already a minister
without portfolio but lacked any grea.ter ambition l4 Marsan
was a great thorn in Choiseul's side, sapping his influence
with the kinq and, with Vauguyon, poisoning the Dauphin's mind
aqainst Choiseul 15• (From 1768 to 1785 the House of Rohan
made an attempt to become France's leading political dynasty,
which was to affect several aspects of the regime and its polit-
ics.) Beaumont was unremarkable except for austerely dvot polit-
ics and religious instransigence. Vauguyon, "a great bigot",
was judqed by Mercy, "... un des plus dangereux sujets que (la
France) ait produits" 16 He was universally detested and his
sombre malice cast a shadow over Choiseul. Aiguillon was committ-
ed to the faction, but was too involved in Breton affairs at this
date to play any role at the centre.
Choiseul, on the other hand, was one of the most popular
men of the century. His generous bonhommie impressed his con-
temporaries and has projected itself into his historiography.
He was the perfect aristocrat in office being both friend and
adviser to the king. This personal relationship was the only
firm foundation of his power for all that he and }raslin controll-
ed: Foreign Affairs, War, the Admiralty, Posts, Lieutenancy of
Police, the Control General, and the Chancellory. iesenva1 ana-
lysed him as the man of the moment for the defeats of 1759 and
the aftermath of the Seven Years War,but detail escaped him which
wac a fatal flaw 17: Amidst the eriera1 acclaim of hi personal
qualities Horace Walpole's judgment struck a discordant, but
more accurate, note, "His ambition was boundless, his insolence
ungoverned, his discretion unrestrained, his love of pleasure'
and dissipation predominant even over his ambition" l8 The
other side of Choiseul's character was his arrocance and pre-
sumption, his utter indifference to the opinions of others, his
preparedness to lie and slander, and his ruthless, exploitation
of loyalty and affection; this side is revealed starkly in his
1765 memoir to the king. It was this side of' him that the
Dauphin experienced, and which ensured his exclusion fromoff ice
after 1774. Praslin, his cousin, was an, "... ill tempered and
disagreeable .." man noteworthy only for his oreed and meaness,
but a dependable stooge if kept on a tic cht rein 19
The first ministerial set-back for Choiseul was the loss of
the Chanceli.ory. The incompetent B].ancmesnil had held on in
office 1763-8 while Maupeou (snr.) exercised the functions of
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Chancellor (and Keeper of the Seals) as Vice-Chancellor, an ad
hoc office created to meet the problem. The Vice-Chancellor was
a servant of the crown rather than the ministry and had proved
more of an encumbrance than a help to Choiseul. In 1768 the
opportunity presented itself to clear up this situation when
Blancmesnil aoreed to step down and Maupeou (snr.) agreed to
accept the Chancellery for a nominal few hours before handing
it on to his son by survivance.Maupeou (jnr.) was then first
president of the parlement of Paris andwas known to be an ally
of Choiseul until at least 1766 20, and did nothing to disabuse
Choiseul of this idea before 1768. Maupeou was known to be an
unscrupiaous and ambitious man, but Choiseul felt justified
in riskin'i his appointment, "I know Naupeou is a rociue, but
there is nobody so f it to be Chancellor" 21 Dancierville assert-
ed that Maupeou only defected tD the Court Party when he realised
that du Barry's position was secure,and that more might he c'ained
opposincr Choiseul than supportinçj him 22
The ministerial crisis was triqc'ered by an economic one
when the harvest partially failed and bread prices becan to rise.
The free market in c'rain accelerated price rises as demand out-
stripped supply. To avoid taking the blame Choiseul offered up
Laverdy as a sacrificial coat, "The dissatisfaction the Contrr11r
General gives at Court, as well as to the public, who have felt
the severity of his ill considered measures, increases ,, 	 23;
it ied to his fall and to an offer nf rec iD r1ton rr Srtinz
of. whose jurisdiction Robert Walpole was alarmed lest, despite
a tripling of the watch, "... the fears of an insurrection are
riot lessened; and I may add, that the cries against the duc de
Choiseu]. have been so creneral that it would have not required
much address to overturn him •,• 24, By mid-October, however,
Choiseul had ridden out the storm: the threat of bankruptcy had
been averted, and creditors had been placated by heads rolling
in.the Control Ceneral and Bureau of Finances. By 19 October
Robert "a1pole could write, "(Choiseul) flatters himself he is
much stroncer in the favourable opinion of the kincr of France than
ever" 25, Public attention was diverted to the conquest of
Corsica, commenced earlier in the year 26
Choiseul replaced Laverdy with Invau, another dependable
proteé, but an unfortunate choice because he was a physiocrat
reformer who was too diffident to be an effective ally, too radic-
al to be a 000d support, and too honest to be Controller eneral27.
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Years later Liriguet called him a "... ministre vraiment
patriote...", who was "trop peu connu", but one of France's
28potentially best recent Controllers General • Choiseul con-
ferred a unique honour on Invau, he gave him a seat on Council
almost immediately (usually Controllers (3eneral had to wait
several years). Choiseul had to do this because he realised
that if St-Florentin, Maupeou, Soubise, and Jertin acted aaainst
him simultaneously he would lose his majority on Council without
this extra vote 29	 The economic problems, which had erupted
in the autumn were quiet but not solved. 30 He no loncer had
a reliable Controller eneral and the new royal mistress was
hostile, and though only a few Frenchmen recognised it, the
crisis of autumn 1768 had opened a new political scene. Choiseul's
claim to have seen the writing on the wall is confirmed by his
preparincf of Chanteloup, his chateau, for exile 31 The pattern
of Choiseul's last three years in power was set : partial harvest
failure provoked economic crisis exploited at ministerial level.
Each crisis was wider and deeper than the last.
Choiseul mictht be able to use Corsica to divert public
attenl-ion, but it created its own problems. c!hile the French
had been welcomed as liberatino heroes in the towns, the country-
side had already been liberated from the Gerioese by Paoli who
had no desire to excharir'e one overseas ruler for another. This
"creat rascal and poltroon" 32 conducted a vicorous and intially
successful cuerilla,campaicTri which cave Britain time to become
interested in the island. Boswell's 'An Account of Corsica'
(London 1768) portrayed Paoli as a romantic hero and roused
British public opinion in his favour. Arms were boucht by
public subscription and their export to Corsica condoned by
the british government now worried by the strategic implications
of France's annexation of Corsica	 With "petulant and impru-
dent vivacity" Choiseul informed Lord Harcourt that if 3ritain
felt free to meddle in Corsica, then France would interfer
in North America. This was not so much an idle threat as a
statement of fact for British spies had uncovered a steady flow
of arms from Bordeaux to St. Domingue in French ships and
thence to Boston in colonial ships	 Despite reports of
Fr''nch naval and military incapacity 	 Britain allowed the
Corsican issue to lapse, but four years later France was to
pay a very dear price for her moral hiqh-haridedness when Kaunitz
laid it down that if France could annex Corsica then Auctria
could invade Poland 36 	 Choiseul was not merelyin his
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element in foreion affairs, he made himself seem indispensable
to France as well as beinc able to fend of f any ministerial
challencie. Dancerville believed that it was only the Corsican
crisis internationally that enabled Choiseul to weather the
domestic crisis
The Court Party had 'laid no foundations for exploitinq
the economic crisis of 1768 politically, they did not make the
same mistake in 1769. In March 1769 Richelieu's and Vauciuyon's
alliance became openly recognised 38 In Nay the entlemen's
Mariazine was predicting a major confrontation, and in September
the duke of Richmond reported that the polarisation of factions
was the sole topic of conversation 	 This speculation had
been made possible by du Barry's presentation at Court (i.e.
official introduction to the kino) on 22 May; Lord Harcourt
commented at the presentation, " The party, in opposition to N.
de Choiseul will leave rio stone unturned in order to dispossess
him of his power" 40• This presentation made du Barry the titular
mistress and was a severe blow to Choiseul's power, althowh he
affected an aloof disdain for the whole affair. A protS-i of
Conti, however, reported in late July thatthe new titular mis-
tress was havin'i no effect on politics, and Choiseul wa still
1- the heictht of his power 4l• Richelicu reco. nised that
Choiseul would remain unruffled, but the "amazons" (Mmes. de
Gramont and Beauvau) who controlled much of his patronage at
Court were more easily provoked 42 Richclicu 3pent the next
year qoading them into political indiscretion.
After July 1769 Aigui].lon retired, defeated, from Brittany,
and joined the ministerial intricues at the centre. In July,
Duras, the Choiseulist lieutenant-general, restored the parlement
of Rennes to its original form and reinstated its magistrates.
Aicuillon had ruled the province by imprisonin q his enemies,
notably procurator-creneral Chalotais, and installing a new
parlement nicknamed "bailliage Aicjuillon". Aicxuillon's reform
of this parlement may have been the inspiration for Maupeou's
reforms of 1771; in the late 1760's Brittany became a testiriq
around for a number of experiments around the States and pane-
ment - thouch not on the same level as Corsica. Chalotais
had been put under house arrest in his chateau, which was drtp,
this ruined his health but ensured his reputation as a martyr.
Aiguillon never lived down the odious reputation of his treat-
inent of Chalotais. Horace Walpole described Aiguillon's politics
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as "abominable tyranny" which was "universally abhorred". "His
ambition beiric' much superior to his abilities, he had betrayed
the badness of his heart before he had reached the object to
which he aspired"
T hile historiocrraphy is interested in AicTuillon as a vigor-
ous provincial administrator and as a minister pursuinci policies
'which stre':hened the crown, contemporaries reacted to him on a
more emotional level and cave him no benefit of the doubt as to
his motives. It was, thouah, at this level that he experienced
failure because people reacted to him as a "hard", "malfeasant",
"wicked", and "vindictive" person with whom it was impossible to
'work . It is difficult to believe that anyone could be as con-
sistently blacithearted as Aiouillon's enemies allere, and he
never bothered to reply to his critics; elsewhere Horace Walpole
described him as a "deep man", "who communicates himself with
nobody"	 The only complimentary remarks made.. at the time
were the British embassy's that he was easier to cet on with
than Choiseul 46, As Aicruillon continued in power his personal
ambition increasinc'ly outweihed any service he was renderinri
the crown until by 1774 he was openly seekinci Choiseul's former
power.
Soulavic interpreted the last years of Louis Xv's reign as
a strucicle between Aic'uillon and Choiseul, two very evenly match-
ed opponents. Their careers in the army and in politics had
been very similar, except that Choiseul reached hicih office
earlier	 Aic'uillon's politics were militaire by inclination
and divot by expedience, and only the need to defeat Choiseul
made Aicuillon ally with the robin civot politics of Maupeou;
once Choiseul had been eliminated Aiciuillori becran to revert to-
wards political behaviour nearer to Choiseul than to Maupeou.
His experience in Brittany made Ai quillon ruthless and intransi-
cent at Versailles, bluff and compromise were alien to him. He
let it be known that he was a candidate for hirh office in Decem-
ber 1768 presumably convinced that the political climate was now
ric'ht but only made real headway in September 1769. The reci-
ment of Licrht Horse was up for sale, and Choiseul had hoped to
qive it to Praslin's son the vicomte de Choiseul.
	 he regiment
was a prestinious praetorian one with a pension of 30,0001. for
its colonel. The market value ias reckoned as 1,000,0001. 	 -
but Airuillon put up 1,200,0001. and with du t3arry's help ac-
quired the re'iment. It as a major break throu h civin'
Aiuillon an important footinu at Court and balancint his defeat
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in Isrittany 48
Over 1769 another economic crisis was buildinc up. In
April a recession in manufactured coods had brouctht economic
slump to Rouen, and the peasantry dependent on puttinaout
49
were badly affected • The harvest was affected by bad weather
and was again below averaae. Enbouraoed by the free market,
grain prices rose rapidly. Financial confidence was shaken by
the ministry's decision to dimantle theCompany of the Indies
and open its former monopoly of overseas tradinc'r to private
enterprise. Financial confidence was further shaken by the
expense of the Corsican adventur and by a costly show of
strenr,th in Nay when Choiseul had insisted on callinc' out 60,000
militia - not a measure calculated to endear him to the peasantry
5O In the parlement Terray, then a cousellor, was actinr as the
Court Party's agent to foment discontent and or' anise votes
aainst Irivau's policies 	 • It was his Controller General
who was to be the greatest threat to Choiseul in 1769.
As early as March Lord Harcourt wrote, "The various objects,
of which the overnment is now in pursuit, have occasioned such
extraordinary expenses that it is imaciined (Invau) is not likely
to hold his employment much lorer" 52• Invau worked on a plan
of radical reform to tuckle fiscal problems at their root in the
provinces. In Novem T er 1768 he had put out a scheme whereby
each province 'rou1d on effect pay a don c'ratuit in ret.urn for the
abolition of all existing direct and indirect taxes.	 ne admin-
istration of the don gratuit would be left to the hiqhest local
authority, whether States, parlemerit, or intendant. This was
a very truncated version of provincial autonomy and would have
given the Continental provinces the substance of Oceanic autonomy
without the structures. There was to be no political dimension
to this administrative scheme	 The plan aroused the hostility
of every financial vested interest at the centre, and had no
hope of success. Writing in 1772 Reçnaud recorded Invau as the
only Controller eneral to tackle the causes s opposed to the
symptoms of financial problems	 Irivau experienced the inevit-
able: even successful reform did not produce cash.
Invau felt back on loans within months of takinc-' up office
In Novem.er 176d he raised 30,000,0001. to_avoid a clash vith
the parlement over prolonin a tventieth . 13y the end of
1769 a deficit of 40,000,0001. was anticipated hich caused
a crisis of confidence in hich the loan needed to meet the
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deficit could not be raised, "... all business is at a stand;
people who have money don't care to part with it till it is
known what terms will be proposed. This state of uncertainty
has affected (French) trade so much of late, that there has been
no business transacted on the exchare (mi&october to the end
of November) 	 croj noticed the coincidence of this economic
crisis with the political crisis 	 which broke on 13 December
1769 when Invau revealed the size of the expected deficit to
Council. He stated that given the failure of reform he could
only recommend cuts in expenditure of 18,000,0001. on the armed
services. Invau seems to have presented an ulitimatum that
he stayed in office only on his own terms, which gave Maupeou
the opportunity to attack his administration in the Control Gener-
al and pursuade Louis XV to dismiss him on the spot 58
Choiseul himself remained unscathed, but a replacement had
to be found for Invau. Lord Harcourt predicted that Choiseul
/ /59had lost the power to fill this post with a protecie , which
was proved when Loznriie de Brienne was proposed and then reject-
ed. This was Lomnie's first appearance on the political stare,
and the interest ciroup he represented illustrates Choiseul's own
power bases	 the administrative bishops, the philosophes, the
militaires, and the States Countries. What followed Lomnie's
rejection was a classic illustration of Choiseul's political flaws;
Maupeou put forward his own candidate, the abbe Terray, and
Choiseul qave them a free hand. The Choiseulist version of this
decision given by >lontyon, was that Choiseul was giving the Court
Party enoucih rope to hang itself. In a hypothetical dialogue
with Louis XV Choiseul was made to explain, disingenuously, that
as his two previous Controllers General had failed he no longer
felt qualified to nominate a third. Montyon enlicihtened his
readers that Choiseul hoped the parlements would give Terray as
rough a ride as they had given Invau (Horace Walpole accepted
this version) 60 Choiseul miscalculated very seriously by
givina away his single most valuable patronace in an apparent
show of bravado, he failed to crasp the measure and quality of
his opponents, above all he does not seem to have recocrnised the
shift of emohasis towards dvot robins. As early as February
1770 Terray showed his mettle by suspendinr' the national debt
for eiaht years, arid the measure was steered throuch parlement
by Maupeou 6l
As before Choiseul seemed to weather the storm and recocr
his power if only because du Barry's political influence was
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province to be illusory as Richmond reported, "It seems that
Choiseul's security arises only from (du Barry's) excessive
giddiness ... she does not care a pin who is minister". The
Court Party was driven to distraction when it realised she
was more interested in chanres in fashion than changes in
ministers, "The duc de R&chelieu beoins to suspect that Mine.
du Barry's influence will never be so powerful asI1me. de
Pompadour's was, he seems to despair of making her subservient
to his ambitious view ....", Richelieu himself confirmed these
views 62 Choiseul even went so far as to tell Mine. du Deffand
that he was satisfied with the political scene 63, Behind this
brave face, however, two factors had tipped against Choiseul;
he was no loncTer able to command an automatic majority on Council
thour'h this did not pose an immediate threat,, and those about
the kincc at Versailles were riowdu Barry's patrons	 . The
foundations were laid for the "crisis" of l770-1 with Choiseul
over confident but vulnerable and the Court Party powerful but
seeinc no easy way to attack him.
The 1770-1 crisis was the deepest France experienced during
the century up to 1789, and its depth and scope have only recent-
ly received the attention they deserve 65, The crisis was not
only immediately political but also economic and cultural; only
the social element was missing. (The institutional side of the
crisis is examined above in chapter I II) This crisis was such
a turning point that much of the political activity of Louis Xvi's
reian was directed towards preventing its recurrence, and one of
the premises of the mechanistic monarchy writers was to construct
a political framework in which the crown and its ministers would
never have to act as Louis XV and Naupeou acted in 1770-1.
The Department which took the lead aciainst Choiseul was the
Control General. Havinc suspended repayments on the national
debt Terray went on to make drastic cuts in expenditure, mainly
against the Departments still under Choiseul's patronace, and
silenced state creditors by threatening a bankruptcy 66, At
the same time Terray had to finance the Dauphin's wedding; the
pomp and expense of the wedding in a time of economic distress
attracted much adverse comment 67 Terray tried to hold his
ground by reducin pensions, at the expense of Choiseulists, and
by bribino counsellors to produce a packed parlement. In this
Terray rceived much help from Beaumont, who could exercise oreat
patronacfe as well as havinci many men of leoal trainincT at his
disposal 68• From February 1770 Bachaumont discerned an anti
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Court faction in the oarlement callinq itself "patriot"
The formation of this faction in the parlement (as opposed to
Versailles) was of crucial importance: Terrav and Naupeou had
to reckon with an effective and dancTerous opposition operating
at a different level from Choiseul's at Court, and the capital
was now beginninri to draw, the political limelic,ht away from
the Court, thus openinc up the scene for the operation of
more radical politics 70,
This skirmishinç over the winter turned into outriqht battle
on Council in the sprino when its votinc pattern po].arised between
Choiseul and Maupeou. Choiseul was now threatened at the heart
of his power, and the battle for power on Council caused another
crisis of confidence in the capital to the point that it was
thour ht either Choiseul or Terray must resign 71• This crisis
would have been precipitated by St-Florentin c T ivinr consistent
support to the Court Party. St-Florentin, described by Horace
"aloole as "... an ancient drudce ... steeled to insensibility"
72 had never been happy with Choiseul's free hand qiven to the
magistracy and the provinces, but had waited till sure of his
cround before defectinr . As a revard he was civen the duchy of
Ia Vrillire in the autumn. St-florentins political position
was an important one, it was based on the robe upholdinq a
centralisinc 3ourbon absolutism within the framework of existinci
institutions. This looked back to Louis XIV and to Fleury, and
was the truly "conservative" reaction to Choi c elll. Maurepa was
of the same creneration, outlook and dynasty as Vrillire, and he
went on to form Clugny's ministry around this philosophy. St-
Florentin's position did not allow him to lend Maupeou enthusias-
tic support, and his loyalty to the crown (and to his own contin-
uance in office ) outshone his loyalty to any one minister.
From Narch to June politics were dominated by Aiguillon's
trial. Neither Choiseul nor Maupeou wished to be seen to be too
closely involved, and they restrained respectively from exercis-
ma the prerocjatives of peer and Chancellor . 	 Despite Louis
XV'S cood personal showinc, the trial became increasincily too
embarassinc to be continued, it threatened to reveal the workings
of coverninent to the c-aze of the idle and curious populace, and
to ciive them too creat a dose of reality.
	 Louis XV quashed the
trial, but not the charces, which left Aiguillon in a judicial
limbo, but determined to reven'-e himself on his enemies and
clear his name in the courts. Althouh not playinq an active
role, Maupeou used the trial to steal a march on Choiseul by
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aranc-inci a lit de justice (to tie up the trial's loose ends)
without reference to Choiseul, and acainst Choiseuls parlement
aire allies	 Choiseul was left in an increasinrly weakening
position by late July; his hope of seeinri his enemies confounded
in parlement had come to naucht and his attitude of disdain
towards du Barry was becominq less and less realistic.
Richelieu's campaicin of stealth and cossip at Court came to
fruition in mid-July 'when Cramont vas exiled for insultinc' du
Barry	 Aiouillon was bein1 tipped for hich office 	 . (Accur-
ate) rumours that the harvest would be below averar e for the
third time were already pushincl
 up prices, and grain rioting was
reported from the provinces . Terray convinced a receptive
parlement that physiocrat policies were responsible for the
economic distress, and it revoked them; this was not just a
hard political blow for Choiseul, it also removed the last reason
for Enlir-thtened opinion to support either him or the parlenents
as things stood in the immediate context of 1770	 This succes-
sion of reverses finally seems to have broken Choiseul's nerve,
and Richelieu must have felt that he had won the psychological
battle on 20 Aucust when Choiseul quarrelled openly and violent-
ly with him over the parlements . During Auciust Choiseul also
found his poers of patronace slippinc' away. Aiguillon and
Vrillire succeeded, where they had failed in 1769, in ciivinc
the comte de Broc'lie (a then member of the Court Part y ) a
c'ouvernement (Saumurois)
The Dauphin's weddincT was only a fleetinci distraction from
Choiseul's discomforture, and even that turned sour when he
found that the Court Party had captured patronage over the
Dauphine's household. Appointments Choiseul would have taken
for qranted a year before were made by Aiquillon and Vri11ire,
and Marie-Antoinette found herself surrounded by politically
hostile strancers 81, This experience may account for her a1
most fanatical loyalty to Choiseul and his adh4erents after 1774,
at both personal and political levels.	 Also around this time
Choiseul lost the c-ood will of prince Louis de Rohari, and with
him the house of Rohan, when he made Mme. de Brionne the prince-
bishop's first cousin and former lover his mistress; prince
Louis was sufficiently upset to defect to the Court Party 02,
mhis reckless sexual exploit had far reachincT consequences; it
upset stable patterns of patronare to the point where the family
became a maverick element in Court political intrigue to the
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ultimate creat detriment of the rerime. This episode illustrates
one of Nontbarey's explanations for the Revolution: that the
old reg ime's politics were compromised by its corrupt personal
relations 83 which must be taken seriously as a climate of
opinion if not as an objective reality.
While Choiseul's power to place men, and hence command
patronacce, dried up at Versailles, his power in parlement was
equally challenged. One by-product of Aiouillon's trial, as
a peer, had been to revive the loriq felt antarjonism of the
provincial parlemerits for Paris's unique prerogatives; the unite'
des classes was temporarily a dead letter 84, The provincial
parlements used the quashing of the trial as a rallyinr point
for attack on the rovertijuent led by the parlements of Bordeaux,
Toulouse, Me€z and Rennes 8D It was at this point that Choiseul
found his association with the parlements being turned a-ainst
him; his sister toured the provinces rallyinc dissident ma is-
trates to support her brother by attackinc the coverr1me1t. This
was never the style of Choiseul alliance with the parlements,
which had been subtle and discrete, but he could hardly deny
his sister's activites. This marked the point at which Choiseul's
political reputation could be undermined, and his actions showed
him to be in opponent of the crown's i.nl-erests 86	 s autumn
procressed the unite des classes beaan to re-emerce with Maupeou
as its tarciet arid Choiseul its champion - thouçh always tacitly.
Once provoked into relyinq on open support from the parle
nients, Choiseul rendered himself vulnerable to attack throucth
them, and this attack developed throuch from July to December
1770 and on to sprinci 1771 when the parlements themselves follow-
ed Choiseul into dis'-race and exile. Besenval summed up the
politics of late 1770, "Attaquer le parlement c'4tait donc
attaquer M. de Choiseul" 87, On 22 Auc'ust Robert Talpole report-
ed that Richelieu had rushed of f to Bordeaux, "to try to brinc
them (the counsellors) to reason", and that a deputation from
the parlement of Rennes had been imprisoned in the Bastille;
he reviewed the situation and its implications thus, "The
cabals.at Court and the warmth throu r hout the kinçdom, in the
different parlements, seem to increase: and although it does
not appear ouhlic}cly, one may look upon the present situation
of things, as a secret struggle, between the (Court) Party and
the duc de Choiseul"..., Choiseul iiould believe himself lost
if his enemies, "... should first succeed in their artful
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sucoestions, that the parlexnents are underhand exasperated
by the duc de Choiseu]., and pursuade H.M.C.N., that by
sacrificino him as the instrument of commotion, the tranquilll.ty
of the kinodom may be restored".. 	 a1po1e added tersely that
he believd Choiseul had already lost this battle 88,
In September	 Choiseul was threatened on
Council, weakened at Court, and discredited and attacked throuch
the parlements. Above this the harvest was turning out to be
worse than in either 1768 or 1769, and there were tales of
peasants havinc to eat crass 89, "he lit de justice Naupeou
was orcanisin'- became more dancerous when troops were drafted
in-o the capital, at which Mme. du Deffand said she felt the
chill of a new political climate 	 Choiseul was thrown back
on his last line of defence, which he used in a camble to
defeat his enemies over the Falkiands crisis. '"he essence of
the crisis was that Britain and Spain had simultaneously
but unknown to each other, landed on the islands earlier in
the year and laid claim to them - de facto and de jure
respectively. Spain appealed to France to honour the Family
Compact and treat the matter as a casus belli. The war-scare
in France beqan in September, when it was learnt that Choiseul
had given encouracement to Spain.
Most commentators have seen the Falkiands crisis in itself
as the occasion. of Choiseul's fall, and have commented on its
apparently suicidal nature	 Choiseul went to c'reat lencths
to dispel any idea that the crisis was bluff by callinq an
expensive arid unpopular mobilisation of army and navy with lonr
forced marches in bad weather 92, A report from Provence
spoke of a war scare causino oreat. "consternation" 	 Know-
ing, however, the true state of French finances arid armed
forces, Robert Walpole could not believe France would risk war
in the field	 All the same Choiseul won a vote on Council,
against Terray's protestations, to appropriate more money to
the navy	 This vote is the key to understanding the crisis
from Choiseul's side: he was once more at the centre of the
political scene, he could command a majority on Council arainst
his opponents, and money was flowing back into the Departments
under his control. X:uch later Crop said that Choiseul had
supported himself only throuh the Foreicn Office 96• 'h
analysis is supported by Choiseul's o'n i.ords, on 19 September
Mercy reported a conversation about the crisis at its inception
"Je n'ai lieu de douter que le duc da Choiseul ait cru que la
ccuerre pourrait l'affermir et rendre son ministere necessaire".
11ercy claimed that he and Aranda had tried to disabuse Choiseul
of this idea, which is an extraordinary claim, for if true - and
Mercy is a reliable witness - it leaves Choiseul's actions in a
vacuum	 An even more illuminating remark was Choiseu],'s to
a friend a few days before his discrace, "... that perhaps he
micht have maintained himself in power, if he had prompted a
var" 98, Choiseul hoped thal by raisinc the spectre of war he
could create a situation only he could cope with, thus vanquish-
in his enemies
Choiseul staked not just his career, but his supporters,
parlements included, and the whole style of covernnient based on
Oceanic institutions on his Fal?dands amble. As a result when
Maupeou and Terray outmanoeuvred him they had to reorcanise
the old reoirne. Louis XV had always favoured peace, and this
steady royal pressure had built up by the end of November to
the point where Choiseul would have to ensure peace to stay in
office 100 In the second and third weeks of December Maupeou
and merrayushed Choiseul from an uncomfortable to an impossthle
position; on 7 December they ado'ted a devil's advocate ploy
k-c) trick Chofreul into opposing the ,ar on financial rounds 10l
- erray then turned the tables on him by producinr a compte
reridu which, besides reiteratinr all the usual comolaints about
over-taxatinn, bnrrowincr, and overspendin'-, also showed that
wr w-as indeed OUt Ut the cTuest3.OrI. As a coup de grace Terray
claimed that the parlements were the principal obstacle to solven-
cy 102k On 16 December it was reported that the kinc' was insist
inc on peace and that the Court Party, "... make no difficulty
of declarinc, that a var, under the circumstances this country
is in, will complete the ruin of it" 103 Choiseul was in a
"no-win" situation: the threat of war would exile him as surely
as the promise of peace.
'ithin the Court the propacanda campainto associate
Choiseul with the fractious parlemerits was stepped up, and a
camoaign of vicious character assassination was be un with the
house of Rohan, du Barry, and Vau r uyon spreading the calumnies
fha- Choiseul had poisoned; the Old Dauphin, the Old Dauphine,
the Duchese of Lorraine, and flour-'orne, and that lie and his
sister were lovers 104 Choiseul was further blamed for the
failure of physiocrat train policies and for over-spendin in
his Departments - two issues on which the parlements were cal-
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culatéd riot to c'ive him support 105, Meanwhile Choiseul could
not reverse the processes he had set ifl mot.ion war still
threatened and the parlernents still remonstrated. On 16 Decem-
ber Lord Harcourt wrote, "he struggle between the kin' arid
parlement at this particular conjuncture, may be considered as
a context for the ascendincy in the (Council), vithout which
thins miht riot have been carried to such lengths". Five
days later Choiseu]. arid Fraslin received letters of exile and
the war scare dissipated within the week; the parlementaire
crisis was also expected to end now that the Court Party had
cained its polit.ical objectives 106,
.It should be noted that this interpretation of Choiseul's
fall would not have been accepted at the time; the version
current then, which has been followed by most historians, was
Besenval's, that Choiseul was tricked into takinc Maupeou into
the ministry and was then helpless to counter du Barry's evil
influence with the kinicr which undermined and misrepresented
his every move. In 1770 she falsely told Louis XV that Choiseul
'was fonientin 'war. 	 hen the diplomatic crisis broke Choiseul
found that Terray had cut the cround from beneath him by wil-
fully mismana 'in the finances for which Choiseul was then
blamed. Maupeou's treachcrous incitement of the parlements
to disaffection, for which Choiseul acain, had to take the
blame, sealed his fate 107 Choiseul's own writings at Chante
ianp dii nothinr t.o'contradict this account, which tends to
under-rate him in order to exonerate him.
This interpretation of 1768-1770 with all its assumptions,
bias, stereotypes, and over-simplifications passed into politic-
al mythology and dominated the thinikinc behind ministerial
intricue under Louis XVI. 	 Choiseul's friends, and subsequent-
ly the Queen's Party, failed to accept that Choiseul fell be-
cause he ' ras outmanoeuvred and out-bluffed by more capable
opponents, this failure caused them to see deeper and darker
forces at work than the evidence would sucicet, this in turn
led to a deepeninc and widenin of the scope of political intri-
gue to draw in new croups and forces. The political battle to
oust Turcot (q.v.) will show this the most clearly. The Louis
seizime answer, worked out in theory 1771-4, was to be the mec
ar'iistic monarchy where the political machine curtailed minister
ial scope.
Choiseul's fall in December 1770 blends into the crisis
of 1771 and the. reform of the parlemenits; there are two
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interpretations of their relationship 107	 id Maupeou intri-
que ar-ainst Choiseul simpl y to cain a free hand acainst the
parlemerits, or did a simple political crisis cet so out of hand
that only draconian measures of reform could brinq it under
control? The former view is, and always has been the more
widely accepted, althou h there are few unequivocal contempor-
ary commentators to support it. Georgel, taking evidence from
prince Louis de Rohan, spoke of a plan, "... simple et hardi
le rsultarit d'une vaste conception et de profondes combin-
ainsons" l08 Maupeou's secretary, speechwriter, and suspecLed
mirience grise 109, Lebrun, provided the most authoritative
evidence. This account, showed Naupeou to be the old reqime's
createst ref orminc' mini..ster who anticioated the reforms of
1791. Jhile, however, Lebrun may be accurate in describinç
characters or conversations, neither the contexts nor chrono-
1ocy of his more important passa'-'es are trustworthy (e.c. a
detailed analysis by Maupeou of the dan ers of convokinc the
States reneral attributed to the year 1771)	 Lebrun's
remarks may simply be a transposition of events of 1791 back
to 1771 to the reater foresir-ht and qiory of both himself and
his patron.
Aciainst this can be quoted a number of contemporary wit-
nesses, spanninr the political spectrum, to show that Maupeou
was an opportunist who stumbled into the c'reatest reforms of
the century, and lacked the imag.ination to comprehend the macni-
tude of his own achievement - not least Maupeou himself. The
sincle most tellinc' remark in this direction is Lord Harcourt's
on 9 January 1771 when he analysed the events of the previous
month, and while biased towards a foreign affairs explanation
of Choiseul's fall, he felt compelled to add, "Some very sensible
persons have all along been of the opinion, that the late dis-
putes between the kinq and the parlement have been fomented and
kept alive, by the intricues of M. de Choiseul's enemies •,,, hi.
The day to day evidence of events, too, as it emerres (see also
Chapter Ui) tends to su.pport this interpretation.
Yet a third interpretation, however, must be considered,
which is that the political crisis was merely a symptom of the
economic one. Bosher puts forward the idea that the economic
crisis of 1770 which disrupted finance, commerce, industry,
and acriculture forced the covernment to adopt new solutions to
political problems which were insoluble in terms of a political
style evolved in the post war period of prosperity. This is a
324
restatement of the dichotomy between Continental and Oceanic
France in terms of time rather than space: Oceanic policies
worked well only in times of prosperity, and when the economic
climate changed the Oceanic Choiseulist policies had to be re-
placed by Maupeou's Continental policies. Turgot's failure can
be attributed in part to 'his attempt to re-introduce Oceanic
policies in times of continued economic depression. Althouh
Bosher does not quote them, two contemporaries put forward
this interpretation. Regnaud was in no doubt that the economic
and political crises were linked and the Mercure Historique et
Politigue reviewin- 1771 stated explicitly that the two crises
could not be viewed seoarately 112• A variant on the theme was
Albertas's content-ion that the political uncertainty of the
late 1770 had precipitated the acfricultural and commercial
star nation ll3 Acain, as with the second interpretation, the
contemporary evidence here spans the political spectrum.
Another factor not hitherto included in the crisis was its
cultural side. In 1770-1 political and intellectual history
interacted. The links which kept philosophie within Choiseul's
oolitical sphere of influence had always been weak, and in 1770
they snapped. he philosophes had never been happ y in alliance
-ii i- ' thc parlements, but while relative freedom of publication
arid phyiocrat cram policies were allowed to operate there
was sufficient common around for co-existence. The archetypical
rci±i3xhip	 \r-cntal's circle which czrJraccd Chiul,
Praslin, and Aumorit on the ministerial side, the salonson the
intellectual side, and Arcerital as a maristrate championing
Voltaire's ideas on the parlementaire side ll4 On. both sides,
however, there were people not prepared to comoromise: Voltaire
on the philosophe side or S&'uier on the magisterial 115 The
rejection of physiocracy put the alliance in question, but the
real break came over anticlericalism. It was a widely held
fallacy that the parlements were anti-clerical because they were
antiJesuit. Ressuier reported, with evident surprise, that
the parlement was hamper inc the work of the Commission of Regu-
lars as early as July 1769 116 Parallel to the Argental -
Voltaire connection was that between Suier and the bishop
Lefrnc de Pomp icrian. Pomp.icnan ket up a steady stream of
pastoral diatribes a'-ainst phi1osophi and S 'ouier wrote and
inveiched in Paris a ainst the deeneracy of the times. Ly the
late 1760's Siuier was movin towards a throne and altar ideo
logy for the rec-ime 117, althoucth it was not till the next
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reicn that the •full alliance and ideolocy developed.
This situation chanaed comp1etelr under the impact of
Holbach's 'Systne de la Nature' (Rouen 1770) which appeared
in January. The book split the Enlichtenment between the salons
where it was condemned and the Cynics and radical philosophes
who espoused it. Voltaire's comment is both typical and illuzir
inatinc, "Un diable d'hornme inspir par Be#lzbuth vient de
publier (Systme de la Nature) dans lequel ii croit demontrer
chaque pace qu'il n'y a point d Dieu. Ce livre 6ff raye tout
le moride, et Lout le rnonde veut le lire" ll8 It has been des-
cribed as a, "... vritab1e bible du matrialisme ... un
ment.et un monument" 119	 After Aicuillon's trial was out of
the way S4ouier issued a r&ruisitoire (18 Aucust 1770) callin
for the seven most outrageous books of 1770 to be burnt;
Systeme de la Nature took pride of place in a speech where guier
proved it was an incitement to rebellion acainst Iëritimate
authority as well as an attack on Christianity l2O
The importance of this speech was not immediately recoçjnis-
ed, Mme. du Dffand reported only that it was badly received in
the parlement, and Condorcet could see it only as a political
ploy not t.o be taken seriously 12l• A month later, however,
r rimrn was detectiu a r rowinq alliance of macistrates and clercy
against philosophes l22 At the end of the year the Nercure
Historigue et Politique described a definite backlash a-ainst
the philosopnes, ana when Scju1er attacked Harpe in the Acad6mie
in December it was described as a, "... coup de foudre pour le
parti encyc1opdiciue" 123,	 Concurrently with this intellectual
struqçle the Court Party played a stroke of political cenius by
tarrinct Choiseul and the parlements with the brush of material-
ism l24 Such was the political climate and the emotive power
of the accusation that, aqainst all the evidence to the contrary,
it stuck. Condorcet described the counsellors' hel'Dless race
at beina labelled "encyclopedists" 125	 Choiseul fared even
worse, the Commission of Requlars had acquire& an odious reputa-
tion throucrh its analoc'y to Thomas Cromwell's Visitation of the
Monastries in 1536 126, and the spectre was raised of Choiseul
workinq to abolish orcranised religion. Bachaumorit claimed
that, "La conversation roulait sur les moines, de la destruct-
ion desquels on s'occupe essentiellement en France", which was
attested to by other commentators l27 A mood of off iciallv
condoned anticlericalism was described by Caillard in 1768 when
he complained, "... depuis plusieurs annes que les esprits et
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gue les systemes ceneraux, et particuliers, sont defavorabjes
(aux) corps religleux ..,', and in July 1771, before Maupeou's
reforms had reached Provence, Gaillarci gloomily warned that the
Order of St. John could no longer take its continued existence
for granted.
The deep political emotion being stirred up over anti-
clericalism, which were so damaging to Choiseul nd the pane-
merits were part of a widening of the scope of politics. Maupeou
attacked Choiseul not only for the usual run of ministerial
short-comings, but also for the economic crisis and all its
ramifications. Maupeou would not allow Choiseul to plead force
des choses, but instead unwittingly pushed the regime to the
position where economic problems ought to be solved by minister-
ial change and institutional reform. The full fruits of this
chanqe were gathered by Turgot when the peasants rebelled against
his grain policy: the regime had to interpret an apolitical
economic reaction as a political attack on the ministry. The
Court Party claimed to have saved France from Choiseül, but in
doing so it laid many of the foundations for the regime's polit-
ical destruction in 1789.
The events which had swept Coiseul out of office were not
under Maupeou's control either. Maupeou moved to the centre of
the political arena to face the resentful magistrates, for only
- Maupeou could initiate any action to solve the problems caused
by. Choiseul's dcprturc 129, Maupeou's position in January 1771
is susceptible to two different interpretations. The one is
that he now stood on the brink of the creative phase of his
career, and had eliminated his opponents prior to implementing
his long planned reforms. The other is that Choiseul's exile
was the climax of Maupeou's career as he had envisaged it, and
that he spent the next three and half years having to fend of f
increasingly potent challenries to his pOlitical power. In the
process of defending his position Maupeou created and used one
paramount weapon - a reformed judiciary. The former interpret-
ation is more attractive for institutional historians, but Mau
peou's reputation as a great reforming minister was only born
after his death. During the old regime Maupeou's influence
was almost universally rec rarded as destructive, and his involve-
ment with the judiciary an unfortunate result of his evil ambit-
ion and grasp on power.
The first challenc'e Maupeou had to face was from Conde
and this challenge moulded the political shape of 1771. As a
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peer and prince of the Blood Condi was Choiseulist till 1770,
but in Choiseul's fall he saw the opportunity to play a leading
role in politics. Condhoped to emulate Choiseul or Praslin
as a minister-peer, but his being a prince of the Blood was
to make this politically unacceptable. Cond moved onto the
political staqe, according to Horace Walpole, when it was he
who p2rsuaded Louis XV to sanction Aiguillon's trial in the hope
that it would eliminate all his rivals 130w He built up a body
of patronage at a tangent to the Court Party, notably, Bertin,
Nonteynard, and a brief flirtation with Terray. When Choiseui.
fell he tried to get the War Department for himself, and, fail-
ing that, had Monteynard installed there 131,	 His next sortie,
"... le moment ... de jouer un grand rle ...", as l3esenval call-
ed it, was an attempt to becoine the mediator between Court and
parlement. l32 This attempt marked the high point of his
political career as it was Soubise who captured this role, and
by May 1771 Lord Harcourt had discounted him from political
reckoning 133 After this Cond fell in line with the other
princes of the Blood in opposition to Iauepou, an opposition all
the more bitter for his thwarted ambition. Conde's bid for power
was a brief episode with no wider significance except to put
Naupeou more firmly into an otd regimP context, and forr Mai,peou
to take measures to keep power firmly in his own grip.
The far more serious threat to Mauepou caine from Aiguillon.
One set of neLauii. dLt.ibutes to him, on ta1ing up the Department
of Foreign Affairs, "C'est mairitenant entre le parlement et moi
une cruerre 'a zuort" 134, Horace tialpole made the astute comment
that dismissing Choiseul would not calm the parlements because
their remonstrances were motivated by hostility to Aiguillon 135
Maupeou here would be the agent of Aicruillon's vengence. For
all these reservations, however, it was Maupeou who was the
central figure in 1771. He played this role, though, as a law-
yer coping with political problems in an ad hoc way, falling
back on the judiciary to answer the problems. He spent 1771
making a coherent and rational structure around the desparate
measures political pressure forced him to take in Paris. Having
•created a new judiciary he entrenched himself in power with it
on the rrounds that he alone could now control it and preserve
a stable regime. This left only one option open to his opponents:
the recall of the parlements, and over 1772-4 all ministerial
intricrue centred on this. In turn this explains why the exiled
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magistrates held out for so long, they knew they were the
only political weapon available to ministerial intrigue and were
justifiably certain they could afford to wz.i until someone need-
ed to use them.
The detail of Maupeou's reforms and the political activity
needed to implement them are explored in Chapter itr, but it
should be noted here that Maupeou transformed the politics of
the regime by changiri the relationship between the crown and
the corporations. No longer could a nebulous concept of funda-
mental law protect institutions Or individuals from ministerial
attack, protection after 1774 had to be souoht in political
alliances of privilec-ed corporations (as against Turgot) or in
the call for the States General. After 1iaupeou's intervontion
the loose, easy-going political style of Choiseu]. had nothing
to offer the institutions, while the opposition to a ref ormincx
minister was too we1l-orcanised to resist for long. Thus Louis
XVI's reicn, and AinUillOfl's role 1772-4 under Louis XV anpear
to present a series of blind alleys in political life resulting
in ministerial instability, the failure of reform and the necia
tive pressure of an institutional conservatism in opposition
to the crown. Men such as Aiguillon, Choiseul, or Maurepas
failed to grasp this chanae, but others such as Clucny, Necker
and even Louis XVI himself felt they could see beyond the
immediate problems to rebase the crown on different political
concepts, and areas of support, as has been explored elsevhere.
By the end of 1771 politics had stabilised into an uneasy
supremacy for Maupeou - "l'horreur de la nation" as the patriots
called him 136	 ['he new courts worked with varying degrees
of success, but the opposition had not lost heart. The patriots
were defining the disaster as a Jesuit plot to take revenge on
the Jansenist maoistrates 137, An underlying reality, however,
unaffected by Naupeou's reforms was the economic depression for
which the political spectacle was at the most a placebo, though
the new government control over grain was helpful to an averace
harvest.. Depression refused to lift and Horace lIalpole wrote,
"... tyranny and poverty are trying wiiich shall have the honour
of conferring total ruin on (France)", and later, "The people
curse the king, the Chancellor, and the mistress; and starve"
138	 1772 arid 1773 were years of political stability to he
point where hunting became the only topic of conversation a'..
Court, "Our politicks in general are this moment at a cry low
ebb..." 139	 For all this the progress, however uneventu1,
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of Maupeou's parlements, obscured all else on the political
scene. Terray's draconian measures were bearixxy fruit, and
Lord Harcourt predicted solvency within two years l4O The
new courts fell in.o the sdme vices as the old, but were at
least enlivened by a series of show trials designed to discredit
Choiseulists, bolster Maueoou's position, and attract people
back to the law. The most famous trial was l3eaurnarchais's
where ridicule was heaped on the recime throucrh kiis affair with
Coezman's wife. The combination of a manaqed economy with show
trials led to the accusation of government by bread and circuses
141
Two factors broke up this tranquil stability, the first had
been buildnq up since early 1771, the second broke suddenly in
1773. They were the break-up of ministerial coherence and the
break-down of food supplies. Once the parlemerits had been sub-
dued and replaced, Maupeou's own importance benan to decline
and he was increasinc-ly less able to fend off iquil1on's
threat 142	 As early as July 1771 Lord Harcourt sketched a
course of events in which Aicruillon would supplant Iaupeou at
Court, reconcile the princes to the kinn, and recall the parle
ments, and Horace Ti1o1 commented in the same month, "The
only real st.rurrcjle is between the Chancellor and the duc d'Aiq-
ujilon" 143,	 Aiguillon however, remained isoiated until Naupeou
and Terray fell out, which happened in January 1772 when the
ministry was split as follows: Aiguillon, Boines, and Terray
against Maupeou and Monteynard •'. From this point it was
possible f or ministerial intrigue, which had been suspended
since Choiseul's fall, to re-emerge and for the regime's politics
to open up again.
Aigui].lori beqan in the Foreign Office as the antithesis
of Choiseul. He was mild and conciliating, and made a favour-
able impression on Lord Harcourt who described him as the ablest
of the Great 145	 He was reported to be looking for an
Italian state to buy back Corsica from France 146,, He was
thought to favour a return to alliance with Prussia arid rappro-
chement with Britain, and the Family Compact was at a very low
ebb following the Falkiands fiasco 147, Above all Aiguillon's
policy was peace at any cost, "... the duke's fall is inevit-
able if a war should happen" 148 The weakness of this policy
was shown by the 1772 Partition of Poland when France stood
by while her ally was dismembered on the pretext that the crisis
did not concern France as the election of a king was not at
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stake	 Frenci foreign policy was doubly snarled up here
by the ambicuous state of the Austrian alliance and by the indis
Crete handlina of the Viennese embassy by prince Louis de Rohan,
which had the eventual effect of estranina the house of Rohan
from those of Richelieu and Aiciullion which made ccovernment
more difficult 150
The Polish debacle may have forced Aiguillon to rethink
his foreign policy, hut more immediately Aiguillon was able to
rebuild French prestice when Terray informed him the finances
could withstand a war l5l From this point on Aiguillon's foreign
policy ciravitated back Lowards Choiseul's - part of a wider pic-
ture of Aiguillon parting company with the Court Party. A war
threat was made in the Baltic, but any plan for an expedition-
ary force there was turned down when the Council refused to
vote the money in April 1773 152• 'He then turned his attention
to the Far East and the possibility of a colonial adventure
there. This finally tock shape November to December 1773 when
Aiauillon, in alliance with Boiries and ]3ertin, sucested an
expedition to TJenral; once acain Terray persuaded Council not
to vote the money 153, In January 1774 Stormont could write
that the Family Compact was "as close as ever" 154•
first dcfini.e evidence of Aiguillon tryin Lo iobuiid
Choiseul's patronacie around himself came in July 1771, and in
October 1771 he showed his hand clearly by tryinci to remove•
Monte'nard; at thiz stae thcre vas sLill i3 yLLLui or
policy split within the ministry 1i5 In 1772 the parlements of
Bordeaux, Nancy, and Besanon remonstrated aciainst a twentieth,
and Aiguillon exploited Naupeou's loss of face to gain ground
against him l6• In April 1772 Mme. du Deff and noted that
Aiguillon was moving away from the Court rarty 157 Aiguillon
made his decisive move away from Maupeou over the princes. The
British embassy account of the princes' reconciliation makes
out that it was brouciht about solely by Aiguillon, and that the
eventual aim would be to recall the old parlements, thus out
flanking Maupeou and drivincr him out of office. Conversely,
this develorment gave ieart to the exiles who had justifiable
cause for hope from Deceriber 1772 onwards. To start the process
Boines visited alesherbes to sound him out on terms of recall,
and in turn Malesherbes never reciarded Aicjuillon as a political
enemy, which is hardly surprisino as he was reported to have
been of fere the Chancellery if Maupeou erc remDved l58 In
July 1774 Stormorit was confidentially, but reliably, informed
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that had he remained in office loncier Aiguillon would have
recalled the parlexnents 159
The event which enabled Aiquillon to come to the forefront
of the ministry was the break-down of food.supplies across the
south and west causina riot and jacquerie in 1773. 	 In May
the fear of harvest failure, caused by persistent bad weather,
caused peasants to revolt in a crescent from its centre in
Guierine to Touraine in the north and Aix in the east. In
Bordeaux the bourgeoisie was armed to prevent the rebels taking
over the city. Terray and his agents in the provinces were
accused of using the crovernment's control of grain to hoard
and speculate ("pacte de famine") - a perennial charce in times
of hich prices 160,	 L.aillard observed the whole process from
hicther taxes and bad weather in late 1772 throuch to fear and
revolt in May 1773 161, Because this revolt did not reach too
near Paris it was not seen as a direct attack on the covernrnent,
but it was the last apolitical revolt the reqime allowed itse1f
In the aftermath the Journal Historique commented, "... les
ministres sont en ctuerre ouverte de plus en plus, surtout M.
Xe cluc d'Aiciuillon et Xe Chancelier" 162	 By October 1773
Horace alpole described Louis XV'S relationship to Aigui11or
as, "... hi minister's minister" 163
Aiguillon's suremacy was marked by the dismissal of Montey-
nard from office in November 1773. The ground was preparedin
October wnen t.ondé, honteynard's patron, attached himself to
Aiguillon ".	 ionteyriard's actual dismissal was brought about
by a trick to make him give offence to the king by putting in
an unauthorised appearance on Council l65 The 7ar Department
was left open f or some months because of the - accurate - fears
that Aiquillon was working towards Choiseul's position. In
February 1774 he was civen temporary control of the Department
which made him as toverfu1 as Choiseul ".. in his best day"
166 Stormont reviewed the ministry on 23 February 1774:
Mauoeou was in poor health and low spirits, Trray was actincs
hesitantly, Boinec had been qiven a place on Council and was
firmly in Aiouillon's camp, and Stormont could foresee only in-
definite ascendancy for Aiquillon 167, It was at this point
that Aicuillon he.an to lay his . plans for the recall of the
parlements which would set the final seal on his power. So
muca did o1itics seem to be çuided back to Choiseulist paths that
by May 1774 Beaumont was rallying a new d 'vot opposition 168
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Maupeou was far from lost, though, because the third
anniversary of the reform of the parlement was an important
psychological moment which took heart out of the opposition 169,
The climate of opinion had begun swinginc away from recall to-
ward a permanent reform (Aiguillon's intriques not being public
knowledce) after the princes' apparent capitulation at which the
Gentlrnen's Macazine commented, "... there is now a final end
to all the old parlemerits of France, and the king is as absolute
as it is possible for any monarch to be" 170• i3achaumont took
the opportunity of the anniversary to describe the dvot pre-
dominance at Court and in the capital and to warn of a radical
alliance of patriots and encyclopedists 171,	 Levis concluded
that for all the faults of the new judiciary, after three years,
"... cependant la machine marchait" 172, Louis XV was beginning
to see that his own end miaht be near, he had been badly shaken
by a huntino accident arid was placiued by indi gestion. As if
to atone for a life-time of political apathy the old kinç rein-
forced his resolve to keep Naupeou in power and his parlements
in operation; possibly he hoped to redeem his reputation and
leave his grandson a stronc' monarchy 173
In another direction Naupeou was entrenched behind Terray's
successful manacement of the finances, successful at least in
the eyes of his contemporaries. Linquet judqed Terray, "...
froid, judicieux, et voulant le bien, sil avait Pu le faire"
174 In 1772 he had presented a compt rendu which claimed
matters were in hand enoujh to start cont.ructive reform 175
This was never taken up, partly because of the expense of running
the Court with du Barry as titular mistress, but more because of
Maupeou's lack of true reforming vision. This lack of ref ormin'i
impulse to animate the ministry was noticed in the observation,
"... almost everything is inconsistent, and done without reflect-
ion" 176 trerray was "embarassed" by the cram riots of 1773,
which emphasised the deep problems of the economy which no Con-
troller General could remedy 177, Unlike th? physiocrat Con-
trollers General Terray had no desire to innovate, and the near-
est he came to a new measure was a plan (not implemented) to re-
possess all royal domain alienated since Clovis - at cost price.
Stormont called this, '... a very hard and vexatious measure
(which) will affect many considerable families in this country"
178, Not so much ref ormina as rationalisin r' was Terray's depart
mental empire buildino, which anticipated Turcot's desire to
bring all financial competence within the Control (..eneral 17.9,
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More evident to his contemporaries was his desire to found a
new political dynasty; he aspired towards a cardinal's hat 100,
he had his young and inexperienced nephew appointed intendant
of Montauban in 1773, and he was buildinG a lavish htel in
Paris with money alleGedly stolen from political enemies l8l
In May 1774, then, Maupeou was entrenched but threatened;
Terray wa restoring the finances but was intensely unpopular
for his sterile self-interested administration and was undecided
over ultimate loyalties; the rest of the politically important
figures were grouping behind Aiguillon who was striving to be
come a second but greater Choiseul. The staqe was set for
Maupeou and Aiciuillori to fiaht for ascendancy with the final
hopes of the exiles resting on Aiguillon. At this point Louis
XV contracted smallpox and died.
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THE NEW REIGN
"The consternation at Versailles is beyond all expression,"
wrote Stormorit of Louis XV'S illness, and when Louis XV died
he added, " here can be not doubt that this catastrophe will
occasion a fatal chance of scene"
The new king wept at his unlooked for acces ion and started
his reicn with a display of adolescent priggishness by exiling
all mistresses from du darry downwards from Court 	 He next
set himself to rule as his tutors had instructed him, and set
in motion the t.qo dominant phenomena of 1774: a new and radical
ministry, and the recall of the parlements. These two events
vere related hut not interdependent as, while the monarchy took
the political initiative, the ministry was put to the direction
of economic problems . Anyone who had studied the Dauphin coulo
have prediced the direction his political thoucht would ta1,
but, incredibly, no one had taken him seriously while his crand'-
father remained alive, and the final illness had been so sudden
that there had not been the time to study the crown prince be-
fnre hs arcession.
Naupeou had fared very badly at the chance of reicn, and
his dilemma was typical of many. He had never had smallpox and
miht thref ore LJnLLccL the disease, or become a carrier, if
he saw the old kinci on his death bed. He had to choose between
seeing Louis XV before he died in hope of some dyinc confidence
or pledge of power in the future, followed by a period of quar-
antine, or trying to influence the new kinç in ioriorance of
Louis XV's dyinr' wishes.
	 (In the event only Soubise and Noailles
shoved personal loyalty to the old kinr , and while they gained
no immediate political advantac'e, Louis was determined to reward
their loyalt y and, even thouc . h the first was a Rohan and the
second a homosexual	 (both out of favour in 1774),, they became
elder statesmen at Court.) Maupeou chose the latter course arid
hoped to cement his reforms by an accessional lit de justice 6,
a consensus of opinion across the politicdl spectrum believed
that this would have broken the patriot opposition and persuaded
the exiles to return '. 	 This was not to be; in a remark of
superficial wit and profound insi&-ht Conti said of the accession,
"Eh bien! nous voi1 reenus aux principes de 1754" 8
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Louis was determined that just, resolute, and d'liberate
policy should be seen to be done, and spent the summer collect
ing advice, opinion, and plans. Louis made a few public state-
ments to reassure the new parlements and bolster confidence,
but his was a voice in a wilderness of political speculation
and panic. Albertas traced the .course of public debate over
the summer: from }iay to July a recall was favoured, in July and
Auctust the new courts were favoured despite the exiles of Mauoeou
and m erray, from late Auccust to September a recall was acain
thowht likely, in the first full week of October a recall was
thour ht out of the question, they suddenly on 11 October the
recall was announced . Behind the scenes the decision had been
taken in Aucust with the dismantlin'- of Naupeou's ministry, and
only the time needed to neQotiate the details had deceived
public opinion into discountin. a recall in the late summer 10,
The responsibility for the recall has been variously attri-
buted to other members of the royal family and Ihe ministers
apoointed in 1774. Of all observers of the day only "the omnis-
cient Lord Stormont" 11 realised it was neither Maurepas nor
the Council as a whole, which was incapable of followin e any
concerted policy before SepFember, who were directing policy 12•
On Aucust 13 St.ormont could write, "The whole (Court scene) is
so fluctuatinr that no minister can from one day to the next,
be sure of the c'round he stands upon" 13• Over the summer only
two ministers, Maurcs and Turcot, were preDared to stand ur
and be counted in favour of recall; the others were either
trimming, indifferent, or hostile. As to Turcot's role, Condor
cet wrote to hm in late July fearful lest the whole issue
might be decided without reference to him 14
Once Maupeou had been dismissed the coverriment could set
in motion the machinery of recall. Ihile Maurepas was authoris-
ed to conduct the riecrotiations for recall, the proceedings were
directed by a sub-committee of the Council composed of: haurepas,
Sartines, Miromesnil, and Turcot 15. The progress of this committee
was followed with creat interest 	 Those minisLers opposed
to the parlernents were excluded from the committee, Soubise,
for example, was pointedly omitted, "It must have been a great
and painful mortification to him and to the whole family, of
Rohan" 17 rp .1e recall was no cut and dried choice between
old parlement c
 and new, 1-he committee considered all the all em-
ativeq
 between.	 he first proposals were a strin ent procranune
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which had to he dropped because only 22 exiles would acree
to it, and none of the leadinq maist.rates amona them. The
conditions were:- recIstration of edicts before remonstrance
(as under Louis XIV), only one remonstrance, no involvement in
relig ious affairs, no strikes, all the parlements' Naupeou
business to be ratified, no intezferinr with the imDlementation
of edicts, and no absolute security of office. The original
structure of the parlement, therefore, would be retained,
but with no political po.'er. Stormont was not surprised that
the plan had to be abandoned, it was a crave mistake to have
dismissed Naupeou before necotiatinç the recall, which, " ives
the (exiles) an infinite advanta-e, and plays the whole came
into their hands.	 For ... the consequence is the old parle
ment must come back, in some I o.rm or other. If they are wise,
they will return triumphantly, without submittin to any con-
ditions whatever" 18
Three separate options were considered in September and
October. The first was to reestablish only six of the oricirial
nine chambers, and one of i-hcce was to be composed entirely of
"restants" (those maciistrate who had served under Maupeou, as
opposed to the former exiles known as "ren i-rs") and was to be
called the "chambre heneficel1e ".
	
hi1e venality and eices
were to be restored in full, along with the former structure of
provincial parlements, strinqent checks on the parlement of
Paris were proposed:- ne otiations for recall were tn he carried
out on an individual level to prevent any corporate action by the
exiles, all political and especially constitutional matters were
to be p'ut outside the parlernent's competence, and a minimum ace
limit of up to 40 was to be imposed to exclude the younc hot-
heads. In October a second plan was put forward which retained
more of the structure of Maupeou's parlements, but more of the
political complexion of the 1770 Courts. 	 he chambre bnEicielle
was to he dropped as a sop to the rentrs 19
Both these plans failed because, accordiq to Stormont,
Naurepas - acain - deliberately mishandled the negotiations
makinci them both premature and protracted 20, The exiles had
time to orranise themselves and exert collective pressure for a
total recall. Like Choiseul and Naupeou in their handlin' of
the parlemeni before him, Louis XI found himself the victim
of t-e events ho had set in motion; once the idea of recall had
been put about the path led inexorably to total reestablishment
of the old structures. The very existence, however, of debate
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and of options in 1774 alters our understandinc of the recall.
For oulavie the chance from Maupeou's parleménts back to the
old ones was a triumph of liberty, philosophie, and the idea of
21a lirni.ed monarchy over devot and militaire ideo1oy 	 . Stormont,
however, recorded disspiritodly that no one seemed to be giving
any real thouccht to the co'nsecjuences 22
After the behind the scenes necotiations had -been manoeuvred
into total recall a third option was presented. Between them
Niromesnil and ]1onsieur drew up a plan with three major pro-
visions; legalised forfeiture of office, a Tribunal to judge
this forfeiture, and the reestablishment of the Grand Council
to be able to stand in for the other Chambers in the event of
their striking. The Chamber of Forfeiture was the most interest-
inq part of this plan, it would have consisted of the princes of
the Blood, the peers, cousellors of state, masters of requests,
counsellors from the parleinent, and other notables. It as
desicned t.o be so presti'-Tious arid so broadly based that its
decisions could never be questioned. "hue Or1ans was in favour
of the plan, the rest of the princes and the mac istrates as a
whole, able to act through IIaurepas, forced it to he rejected by
the Council 23	 Despif these failures to institutionalie
checks, Carre' has ben able to show that. the recalled parlement
was still a cowed, resentful, and poi-entially ineffectual body.
The exiles were offended that the - in their eyes - worthless
perfidinu, pnrvenu rtants had been a1loed t stay in th
parlement at all, and, to add insult to injury, were in a posit-
ion to be promoted into the other chambers should the macistrates
go on strike. Carré'
 shows how Maurepas and Miromesnil had tried
to steer a course between the d4'vots and the patriots, and had
produced a compromise potentially very favourable to the former
24
The parlernent which was reestablished was that of 1770 with
the po'erful Crand Council, and with restants and rentrs mixed
to"ether. Louis was content to abandon any institutional checks
in favour of what he believed would be a show of royal authority
in the lit de justice - not the petulant assertion of royal
authority as in Louis XV's Session of Scourgin'j, but the Phar-
oahic self-assuredness of Louis XIV's monarchy. Louis XVI be-
lieved that the parlements would see his decision to recall them
as just, macnanimous, and resolute, and would respond according-
ly. rhe immense pooularity of the recall helped foster Louis
XVI's illusion that his would be a colden ace for the monarchy.
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Various more sober assessments were made: Stormont wrote that
thc parlements had beim, "broucht from ruin to the heicht of
their power" 25; the abbe Froyart declared that the tocsin of
revolution had been sounded 26 Choisoul reflected on the dil-
emma the monarchy faced on account of Ilaupeou's ill-considered
measures, "On a versd ' le feu roi d'un ctd ', on verse celu2.c1
de l'autre, I would have done neither" 27; Horace 'alpole drew
the most interestina, thouc-h in the event the most inaccurate
conclusion, "rhen one king breaks one parlement and another an-
other, what can be the result but despotism?" 28, Because of,
not despite, the recall, the monarchy in November 1774 had as
cxreat a potential as ever.
The kinc in Nay 1774 had resolved on a decision on the
parlemorits and a policy of "conomie"; the ministry he put to
getherMayto September was principally concerned with the latter,
and he drew on its talents for the former only on an ad hoc
basis. No'ihere has a more lurid poliuical mytholo'y crown up
than over the appointment of Naurepas as Minister of State wiLh
out portfolio a few days after the accession.	 Both Besenval and
LSvis, amonst others, tell us that Louis had chosen Nachault to
he his "prime minister" but that Mesdames, who had supported
Manrepas when he was Secretary of State for the Admiralty (1715
45), had altered the name on the letter from Nachault to
Naurepas, and that the timorous Louis had not dared reverse the
mistake 29, Given, ,however, that Louis wished to call on an
elderstatesman there were only two other candidates: Nachault
and Bernis. Conti's remark about returnina to the principles of
1754 shows in itself that 1774 was riot a suitable political cli-
mate for Machault, and the "silly" Bernis 30 was unacceptable
both for his lack of personal qualities and the rancour acainst
him for the Austrian alliance arid its attendant disas-ers.
Bernis's own account of his failure was that Marie-Antoinette had
blocked his re-aitry to the ministry 31,
Maurepas's appointment was wholly in keepinc with the new
]dnct's attitudes. Maurepas had been amon-' those recommended to
Louis by his father in a list of reliable men (iVeri to Louis at
his accession 32, The very fact thaL he had been exiled from
Louis XV's Court for libellinc a mistress recommended him to the
prudish Louis XVI. Furthermore, Maurepas had not wasted iis 27
years of exile; his seat at Pontchartrin had become a polIticd].
finishin school for aspirin courtiers, and wasas great a polit
ical centre as Chanteloup, without DeIfl factional. i3Oth yen
345
and Montbarey describe political apprenticeships there, andre-
Call meetinc most of the leading poli.tical ficures of the day
who came to seek advice	 On a personal level he was well-
received, Bachaumont called him, "Un sei r neur de beaucoup d'
esprit ... homme de plaisir et de toutes parties du roi"
arid Horace Jalpole found him, "by far the ablest and most acree
able man 1 knew at Paris"	 Mercy, however, believed he had
uncovered the real reason for his appointment: 11arie-Antoinette
would have attempted to have Choiseul recalled, but both Nes-
dames and Louis XVI were set against this, and Mesdames pursuad-
ed Louis XVI that Maurepas would be stronr enouc h to keep Chois-
eul out of politics	 .	 As early as 16 June Stormont was to
comment that Naurepas would never allow Choiseul to serve w1 h
him, and hardly a month went by thereafter but that Storznont
recorded some thwarted attempt by Choiseul to penetrate the
ministry
lVhile Maurepas had kept abreast of politics in exile, his
outlook was still that of Fleury's period. Maurepas believed
that he-had been called to be prime minister, and worked to create
a cabinet system. dhile Iaupeou remained in office this failed,
but by August he was succeeding 38, Maurepas was never able to
make all his ministers toe his line, except for the brief period
of Clurny's administration, hut to all intents and purposes he
was prime minister. Haurepas's style suited 1774, and was well-
received in that year, buI. his reputation amonc' the late century's
political c'eneration was low. S4cur accused him of an indiffer-
ence which was mistaken for wisdom. Boui11 '
 condemned him as an
"homme sans caractre, sans vertus, sans talents, mais doux,
facile et 1cer", he was a weak man who employed danc'erous ones.
Seiac de Neilhan found that he had the faults of extreme youth
in extreme old ace. Levis made another damnino comment, "Sur
le vaisseau de l'tat pl'tot passager que pilote"
	 His one
desire was to stay in office with as little effort as possible;
Necker was to write, "La retraite des crandes places ressenible
' i la nuit du sepuicre" 40, and Naurepas, urc'ed On by his wife,
was determined not to enter into darkness a second time. Mau-
repas had a cenius for manac-ing men, and he attempted always to.
choose men he thouc,ht would be manac Teable whether throuc'h polit-
ical isolation (Necker), incoiipetence (Clucny), or common out-
look (Miromesriil); a less cmp1imentary account of haurepas's
political manarement came frnm the American delecation in I-paris
who described the ministry in December 1777 as, "... a set of
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men work'd on like puppets by an indecisive old man" 41• From
the point of view of his own politica.l position Maurepas's ex-
perience with Coni-rollers Ceneral was as unfortunate as Choiseul's.
Maureoas has been judced harshly because he usurped power never
des-ined for him when he manoeuvred himself into the post of
prime minister.
As 1'4aurepas was Aiciuillon's uncle an immediate wave of specu-
lation believed that the appointment had been encineered by Aig
uillori to strenr then his position 42 Aiguillon, however, was
doomed by his associated ith du Barry, to whom he had extended
personal protection in May. For the first few weeks of the reicri
Aiquillon acted as if the issues had riot chariced, and battled
with Maupeou for ministerial advan' a e, but on 3 June aurepas
broke it to him Lhat Louis hated him and that he was on the
point of bein di g ccraced, Aiguillon resiçned to avert exile.
lie bore resic-nation with bad grace and made several attempts to
rer'ain entr y- to Court whether as minister or Creat Officer of
State. Maurepas's relation with Aic,uillon vas ambivalent, and
one of '-he most interestln r interpretations of it, and its effecs
on Maurepa's career, came from a British acer3t in Paris - Tent-
worth - in 1777. Analysirir political weaknesses at Court he
wrote, in a hurried and intricuinc report to Lord Ieymouth, that
Naurepas, "... tyed a millstone about his neck, he can't easily
shake of f, in the first measures he pursued to cain popularity
and eclat by a chance of the Maupeou system to disenc-ace M. d'
Aic'uillon from his embarassment with them, and to reconcile him
to the queen, and thro' her to the adherents of M. de Choiseul,
but (which led) to his exclusion from the manacement of affairs.
I should go further in the embarassment this has caused the Count
(of Maurepas), but the time may be more usefully employed".
This account would show a con 4 inuum of political activity by
Aic-vuillon from his attempt to have the parlement recalled under
Maupeou and to inherit Choiseul's patronace after 1771 (see
previous chapter). More importantly for the new reign, it
would show a drastic political miscalculatior by Maurepas, which
compromised the whole of his second term in office and would do
much to explain the apparently directionless and enervating con-
duct of the minister	 .
Just as Naurepas's a cendancy had suç'lanted Ai uillon's,
and was to end Naupeou's, it also excluded Cboiseul. 45 . Choiseul
had spent the sears since Decem 1-r 1770 in 1orious exile at
Chanteloup , which became almost a rival Court, and its atmos-
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phere was held to be areatly preferable to "old kinc Capetdsh
Between the hunLs, balls, and dinners Choiseul and his
co1learues prepared for the new reicn, and had a complete plan
of rninc-ries and measures. They hoped, indeed counted on,
Marie-Antoinette having the same predominance over Louis XVI
as du Barry or Pompadour had had over Louis XV; Maria-Theresa
had even iritten to Marie-An l oinette, as Dauphine, tellinc her,
"N'oubliez jamais que votre &ablissement tait l'ouvrage des
Choiseul, qu'ainsi vous n'ouliez jamais de leur devenir de la
reconnaissance"	 Like everyone else, however, Choiseul had
left Louis Xvi. out of his reckoning, the kinc r detested hii or
injuries done to both himself and his father, and made it c1ar
that the du'e would never serve under him 49; ie refused to
received him at Court. The body of Choiseul's patronaçe passed
to Marie-Antoinette, and the Choiseulists became known as the
"Queen's Party", 	 Choiseul himself played an active role a a
peer and elder statesman, but, like Air uillon, accepted irrevoc-
able defeat with bad rrace. lie intriçued constantly to plce pro-
terces in the ministry and to become a Great Officer of State him-
self.
The first new appointment was that of Veroennes to the
Foreicn Office. Verqennes had also been on 1-h p Old Daurhin's
list, he was a robin career diplomat servinq as am'assador at
Stockholm in 1774 and it was cenerally assumed he had excluded
hine1f ''m consideration for hicrh office by marryinr o Crc'k
airl while servino earlier at Constantinople.	 Not to let this
stand in the way of the appointment ias an important indication
of Louis's personal attitudes, for instance that a legal wife
of low foreign origin was preferable to an impeccably French and
noble mistres. Externally he favoured Choiseul's diplomacy,
and having been a member of the King's Secret, he was able to
unite the public and private sectors of foreign policy. He re-
built French influence in Europe by the Arxed .eutrality of the
North which united the Baltic acrainst Britain 1780-1, and to a
lesser extent by containing the 1ar of .davarian Succession in
1777 to a sincle campaiqn between Austria and Prussia, and he
restored French power in the world by the successful intervention
- if no 4- enineerinc	 of the Tiar of American Independence 1778-
8l	 Internally, however, he favoured haupeou, and supported
him on Council 50, he was excluded from the committee for recall.
Vercennes's qualitics sere esentially pedes-rian and nera
tive; the livelier Lauzun was decidedly unimpressed by him.
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Stormont found him, "... calm, prudent, cautious", an ally of
Haupeou who held himself above intricue
	 . i-ic was meticulous:
uninspired in his. Departmont and horinc on Council, hence easily
overlooked. After the quest. ion of recall had been settled he
could share Maurepas's position on all issues; and was a creat
force for conservatism; he incurred Horace Yalole's wrath for
opposin Tur r ot and Natesherbes 52• 1hen Maurepas died in 1731,
Vercennes inherited his political position up to becominc' the
head of the Council of Finances. Verçennes's most important
negative quality was his ability to exclude both Choiseul and
any of his prot&e from the Foreicn Office. He was appointed
in the face of the queen's patronace of L3reteuii, Choiseul's cand-
idale, of w'ioxn Kaunitz cornmen od, "Ii voudrait. faire le petit.
Choiseul"	 Vercennes set a paLtern both for the type of min
ister that. Louis XVI was to patronise and for the exclusion of
Choiseulists.
ith Ai'-'uillon's departure a new Secretary for Wr al o
to be found. Louis XVI chose Nuy, another of the men reco.Lond-
ed by his father. Muy had been offered the War Department in
December 1773, but his principles made it impossible for him to
accept, "He is a r-reat de'vot," reported the British embassy, "and
vould not consen- even 1-0 visit Mme. du Barry, much less to pay
his court to her"	 , In 1774 he accepted because he, "... a
compte sur la reformation prochaine des moeurs" 	 . Muy was a
force for conservats rn, a fanatical opponent of Choiseul, and
the philosophes, and a man opposed to any robin reforms. His
only political act of any sicnificance was his defeat, with
Soubise, of Turot's proposals for reform of the militia.
Muy was an
ideal fi'ure for Louis XVI and for Maurepas - moral but manace-
able. He died bravely on the operating table urider-oin'- the
simple, hut excruciatin r 1y aconisin , sur cry for the stone.
In July ]3oines was replaced by Turot. I3oines had been
rlaupeou's richt hand man until he had defected to Aicuillon. He
left chaos in the Admiralty, and millions of livres unaccounted
for. 'T urr ot's appointment was no bolt out of the blue, all in-
tendants were candidates for the ministry, and Thrcot was one
of f-he heter connected as well as havin an excetionally solid
administrative record in his -enera?ity. 	 he first mention e
have of 'urrot as on 15 June when he was brou ht to StormonL's
attention a, "a man ... of reat and deserved reputation, of
considerable abilities, and of the hichest intecrity and honour"
56
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He had been in the winqs for rAearly a decade.	 1thouch Stormorit
believed, correctly, that Threot's aointment to the Admiralty
was temporary, only lastinr- until Terray ould be dismissed 57,
most. commentators set to analysin r his prospects in the Depart
ment.
Hardy had heard c-ood reports of him and believed that he
would do we1l if he could overcome his addiction to "projects";
Mme. du Deff and, whose patronage he enjoyed, came to the same
conclusion	 . In a letter to Condorcet 'Turgot made it clear
that he was coin to take his appointment to the Admiralty very
seriously and was determined to do well	 implyinc the irony
that. Stormont was better informed than Turcot. rurgot appears
to have declared himself in favour of recall arid prepared to
acceot 1.iaurepas's line from the start, and Iesenval records
that comple 4-e harmony reirned between them for nearly a year 6O
Equally from the start treat. disauiet was shown towards the
appointment of a known philosoohe 6l
rurrot' relationship with the parlement ias been a subject
of speculation and debate from the summer of 1774 onwards. His
record was ambiouous - while he had supported the exile of the
Jesuits, he had previously served in Machault's Royal Chamber,
which damned riixd irretrievably in some eyes. The accepted opin-
ion or his role as outlined in earr's examination of the problem,
has been that Turgot opposed the recall, which was also carried
out acairist Louis XVI's true wishes - this has already been dis-
proved above. This account coiLtes from Condorcet's attempt to
convince himself that Turgot had not acquiesced in a policy that
he, Condorcet, found disquieting. There is, however, no corro-
borative evidence here, and Carr shows the bulk of public and
philosophe opinion supported the recall and applauded Turcot's
evident role in it - thou-h he had played no part in its instig
ation. Carr shows that Miromesnil and Maurepas did not support
patriot pretensions, but believed it essential to repair the
damare ilaupeou had done to the myth of a limited monarchy, with
which Thrrot, as a robin as mucn as a philosophe, agreed. The
structure, furthermore, of the recalled parlement would have en-
abled a descisive monarch to dominate it. On a personal level,
Carr made two observations; the first was that 'iurcot acreed
to the recall as pa yment of a political debt to Haurepas for
brin' in him into the ministry and to the Choiseulists for not
oppo-inr- him once appoin cd; and the second that fur ot re drd
ed the recall as the lesser principle which could happily be sac-
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rif iced to the raeer - his apf'oinLiutiiL t. the Control •eneral
;thero h coulc.i formvle policy arid dorairial-e the ittiriistry 62
The question of exactly how urcot ca:ne to be appointed is
as i.moortant as it i-as fr Naurepas. Arain, Louis XJ himself
played a central role	 , and if :e look tá the advice he .ras
c iven on the typo of minister to chose we find that Tur ot is a
lO(lca3. choice. At the same time Thrr:ot tS as well connected
as any intendant, he had J•rne. du Deffand and the Rochefoucaulds
workiri" for him in Paris, and as an encyclopedist ws very much
an "homme la h'tode" 64 The Rochefoucaulds were a direct
route o miriisLcr3al preferment, and Crop favoured t.ieir influence
as the r.tost im-ortant	 . Bachaumont, however, believed that
Vri, a close rierid of Loh 1•laurepas, an hs wife, formed tue
crucial lin1	. In the fairly euphoric historioraphy around
rrur o it is all too easy to lose si g ht of him as a man of his
times intricately involved in his political environrient. in the
last reort iiauepas tooz him on because he thoucit h wouJ.d
prove talented hut malleahie, and a ref ormini- servant of the
monarc'y, who would c reatly improve on the performance of Lt;
XV's miniotors 67	 If the public took calmly to Turcot's appoint
rnent to the Athira1ty, it creeted his promotion to the Control
General with asto rlisi-L-nent 	 "Tout est possible aujourd'hui et
on peut s'attendre a tout", declared 1etra	 • Stormont sunzned
up his qualities as "disinterested integrity" 70, and 'rur'ot
announced his pror ramme as: no loans, so nev taxes, no bank-
ruptcies	 Thile a philosophe, Turcot iac a "partisan of
royal authorit y" and a suforter of the old parlements 72: he
was an ideal man of the moment.
urot's reputation has two foundations: his apparent anti-
cipation of nirieteenLh-century economic and soial ideas, and
his attitude towards hi ' :h office. L'ho first quality stood as
lonc'as the ideas themselves trere held in hirh retard, and only
in the late twentieth century has urr ot ceased to be fashion-
able	 (Laisser-faire can be accused of creating more problems
than it cures. Also the historiographical perspective of the
late twentieth century takes in some of the significant failures
of capitalism — ntost notably the Depression. By comparison,
Necker's more cautious blend of liberal social and political
ideas with a managed economy seems more attractive. In his att-
itude to power, Turgot stands head and shoulders above those ar-
owid him by disdaining all the pettiness and self-interest gen-
erally associated 'with it. His integrity, honesty, and uncom-
promising insistence on what should, or should not, be, earned
him the respect of both friend and foe. It also earned him a
quite unwarranted reputation for lack of ambition. His ambition
was in reality so much greater than any of his colleagues' that
it could not even be perceived by them. Decker possessed the
t! .1.2	 '1.1. .	 ,v, 4 + ,.rc,	 I	 inrcr,t_ whereas it
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was tacit in Thrgot.	 eor el quotes him as sayinç, "Je crois
vritahlement que je suis n pour r 'cenrer la France" ', and
his behaviour, whether his bullyirir manner with the kinn or
his refusal to indul r e in intrirue even for self -preservation,
is only intellir ible in terms of this remark. Despite less
than two years in office with, to his name, a peasant insurrect-
ion on the one hand and no lastin'- achievements on the other,
Turrot succeeded not just in being remembered when all about him
have been forr otten, but in heir-ic remembered as the one man ho
might have saved the old re'-ime.
Sartines was moved from the Lieutenance General of Police
to the Admiralty. Sartines preserved the robin continuity of
office at the Admiralty osi-ah1i'-ied y iiaupeou and maintained
by 1aurepas. In this Department Sartines had to devote almost
all his erierr ies to repairin L3OIflLS'S maladministration; ueorgel
believed that his very real talents were wasted there 	 . Sar-
tines was a political survivor, trimmin his way hrouc'h the
various ministries of Choiseul, Naupeou, and Naurepas. His
sympathies, 1owevr, lay with Choiseul and with the parlemens.
H was replaced in Paris by Lenoir, "a man of very fair characier"
76, who preserved continuity of outlook and policy. Lerioir held
the oost until 17S with nl a shor 4- break ]775-6. He stayd
outside in-'-ricue, hut shared haurepas's political position.
Maupeou's removal in Auust. should have opened up the two
tZ Chaz,tlluL and reeper ot the Sea.L, ut £Laupeou refused
to surrender his inalienable office - invoking the same funda
mental law which he had icnored in the case of the mar istrate.
who had opposed him. It was an ironic, hypocritical, and embit-
tering footnote to his career. "he man chosen to replace him was
hiromesnil "an intimate friend of N. de Ilauropas" '. carr"s
judc'ment was kind, that this subtle Norman trimmer had proved
his administrative worth as first resident o the parlement of
Rouen (1751-71) and proved his personal integrity by bein exiled
1771-4	 He was a colourless man whom Narepas found easy
to manare. Niromesnil's reputation has been blackened almost
sinrlehandedly by V'ri who painted him as the black-hearted
insidious urecker of Turrot's policies, the only other bii-s-erly
hostile con'-emorary jud mont was passed by the EsoionAnj_.
who accused him of never workinc openly, but always shelterin
behind some instituion. Lenoir accused 'urn of lackin the
coura e of his convictions
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Miromesnil shared the political position of Maurepas and
T UrCOt in 1774, that of a loyal servant of the monarchy who
believed in the recall of he parlements.. Albertas was relieved
to be able to record that Niromesnil vats more "royalist" than had
been assumed. Recriaud and ontharey vere both pleased by the
appointment and impressed y the man. S-ur, however, accused
him of a Louiscuator?ime servility to absolutism 80 Before
the political crisis of the Flour Tar l¼iiromesrlil's political
position was fairly easy, but from 1773 onwards the pressure
built up arainst him from both sides: from the ministry to manage
the mar is-rates, and from the parlemerits to represent their
interests in politics	 .
Three ministers remained unchariced it-i off icc;	 Vrillire,
Soubise, and Bertin. All three had supported Naupeou, but were
,
more royalist than devot. Vrilliere remained on sufferance, and
played a minor role in the 1-st year of his lonq career in office.
Soubise and x3ertin were re-arded as voices of moderation on
Council, softenin- the impact' of Maupeou's, Turcot's, and St-
Cermain's reforms; they were credited with pursuadina Louis XV
not to exile courtiers hostile to Maupeou's reforms 82,	 either
were personally ambitious: the "inconsequential" Bertin	 had
relir'rtuished the Control Cen pral in 1763 to concnf rate on a ri-
cultural problems, and Soubise had refused the Tar Department in
1773 on the crounds of insufficient ability and possible conflict
f j rftersf q b1-we, ;h rrs flf	 ihl and rnin1r 84	 ou-
bise played an important role in 1774 when Louis consulted many
of the (rea-, but the recall of the parlemenl-s from which he had
been excluded, spelt the end of his political po'er. then Nont
barey worked with him he found that he no loncer exercised a
vote, and was on Council only in a consultative capacity . He
had stayed on only a Louis XVI'S personal request 86 Both men
were ideals of Louis. concept of a minister, and both were
accused of ieinç blind fanatics of monarchy by Soulavie 87
• Louis's desire for 6conomie, the reduction of both revenue
and expenditure and the elimination of all superfluity, had
first siorn itself in May with his waivinç of the tax of joyous
accession. rrjS tax was meant to cover the cost of the coro'-ia-
1-ion, arid in view of Louis's decision i-o have a traditional.
crownin at Rheims it was an ill-advised measure. Louis also
announced that all sate thbt-s would e honour2d, a mea'ure
desicned to inspire conficence and to prove Louis's justice.
Of these two events ai].lard wrote, "Ces deux pices, qu'on
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admire, rious confirraent dans les prSventions en favour du
nouveau couvernement"	 The Court-was shaken by the new
kino's attitudes: mistresses dismissed, 2,000 horses sold off,
pensions questioned, and conspicuous consumption discourarecl
All these measures were desicined to herald a new era of
the monarchy and to make it popular. Louis was obsessed oy
the desire to he loved and, understood by his subjects, which
placed him in a dilemma only too well appreciated by brace '-.al
pole, who wrote that the crown would be: "popular ... when it
pleases ... and powerful without popularity" 90• LouisXV sacri-
f iced popularity to power in. 1771, Louis XVI was to sacrifice
power to the fickle 'i rill-o'-the-wisp of popularity from the
first ac t- of his ret' n to the evolution. Every commentator
acreed that the abolition of the tax of joyous accession was
popular, hut a sour and prophetic note was struc by Coquereau
who first claimed that rerray had deliberately falsified the
accounts to show a surplus, confirmed by urcot in r.ovember 91,
and then wrote that waiving the tax could no longer have the
effect they would have done before laupeou; now, "Les sujets
n.e doivent rien personellement leur prince: ils lui f)urniss-
errt- les secours ne'ces c'a'ires pour l'administratian qul liii est
conf'p" 92	 T! ler acr of I n;cou's ossertion of royal auLhority
was a conscious division. in society between rulers and ruled,
somethine-r alien to the old recdme, and something Louis was in-
caoah1 of rrr.n . or atin'- upon.
The team of miriisters assembled by Louis at the end of the
year and the oolicies they had implemented met with almost uni-
versal acclaim. The ae of the philosophe kinc seemed to have
dawned. "Ainsi les intrtts de l'tat et des honnt,es c-ens sorit
confis	 des mains pures et fiddles", proclaimed 1-1tra
The clearin out of most of the old ministers led to the quip
that it micht have been a St. Bartholemew of ministers but it
was no massae of innocents	 . The bricht new ioung Court
(the circle of youner courtiers who had coalsced around the
Dauphin and Dauphine 1770-4 and who ha avoided bein r drawn into
the politics bf Maupeou's reforms) with its hich moral tone but
cheerful emulation of Henri IV'S day pleased the capital, where
"ressurrexit" was daubed on Henri 1V's ec-cuestrian statue on the
Pont Neuf.	 wo experienced and sober commentators, however,
claimed not to '-iave c hared in he euphoria; Cro feared 1 zat the
recall of the parlements ou1d prove to be the decisive event of
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the year, and would mar the whole reicn, and Richelieu (dis-
graced and exiled for his association with du arry) wrote in
1788, "Je penais'a ce roi si jeune, si honnte, a cette reine
si le rere et si bonne, a cc premier ministre si faible, et i
insoucieux,	 ces parlentents qui relevaient la tate, a ces philo-
sophes si hardis ... " and foresaw the fall of. the monarchy
The first political achievement of the new ministry was the
freeinc of the rirain trade - Turcot's policy. This came as a
"sensation" in December 96, and.heralded an era of reform unpre- -
cedented in France even if short lived and ultimately unsuccess-
ful. The parlement remained true to its recantation of 1770 (of
phviiocrat policies and patroriare of the philosophes), and issued
an arrLas a formal prolost a r ainst the reimposition of physio-
crat policy. The parlemerit was determined to show cood faith,
and did not press the issue. The parlement mana r ed to restrain
itself until Iarch, after which the honeymoon period followin
the recall beran to turn sour 97; the disaster of the Flour ar
in flay permanently alienated the ma istracy from reform. The
parlement also occupied itself with remonstrances acainst the
form of the recall, and the failure to exact retribution on the
rectants; Louis could hardly countenance punishin': men for
sho in lo'alt; - even tio	 now thouc ht misplaced - to the
crown.
Public attention was taken up in 1775 by the trial of the
d	 ci :Z.li.	 ani nte. cia ,L. VincenL. The case arose otn-
sibly out of forcery, but was the pretext for a political trial
of one of Maupeou's allies and acents 98 The case dracced on
until Nay 1777 when, in effect, both parties were found cuiity
but Richelieu had to pay the 60,0001. costs. At the judcment
a counsellor commented that Richlieu had been treated harshly
because he was a man, "qul est entr, le flambeaLa la main,
pour embraser le Temple de justice" (in 1771)	 . The trial,
however, had yet a third and iore important aspect. Richelieu
had invoked his privilece of being tried before his peers, so
the trial had to he heard before the parlement of Paris as the
Court of Peers. This save the peers an excuse to attend the
parlement at will for two and a half years. For much of the
trial only Conti could eidure tne boredom of the mass of trivia]
evidence. Nme. de St.Vincent received help from te Rochefou
caulds. 'heri t'ie parloitent came to debate matters or rea-
public concern, such as the pamohiet 'Inconvn-jents drs
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Fodaux' or the Six Edicts, a creater number of peers attended
arid leant a new dionity and siq x-iificance to the parlement's
political debates 1O0 The increased involvement of the Creat
in politics was to be a feature of the reic:n.
Turciot was to be the dominant ficure of 1775. Maurepas
had hoped to he able to sèoarate the cood economic mana ement in
physiocracy from iI:s pror-ramme of social and poli-tical reform,
arid in doinr so to keep 1 urcot in check, but he found he was un-
able to do Ithis, not merely because of Turcot's determination not
to let him, but also because of the confidence with, arid ascend-
ancy over, the kin Turcot had secured. Turcot used his friend
and ally Malesherbes, once aain first president of the Court of
Aids, to publ 4 cise his intentions, and the Court's remonstrance
of 1.Iay 1775 was the re ime's first political manifesto. The re-
monstrance divided into two halves, i-he first attacked the c eneral
Farms and the fiscal structures engendered by them, the second
attac'ed 4-he structure of centralised adriinistration and called
for the fullest provincial autonomy in fiscal affairs. After
this Ilaurepas became jealous and apprehensive, movinc from patron
to enemy.
One of the most noted aspects of Tur r ot's administration
wa 1f hurnaniarianiii. 'Turqot appreciated that the riat.uro of
the recime mi ht cause a man to fall out of its corporate struct-
ure to became a dispossessed vacrant. There can be no clearer
exam.D]e of t'i 4-hn I-h nili1-	 .Tl-1ich cid 'eroy a ednt
family: Tur-ot proposed to abolish the oricinal abuse and then
to use the institution 1-0 help rehabilitate society's victims 1Ol•
Such attitudes were a paradoxical appendage to urcot's belief
in a free marke economy and its attenderit social organisation.
That tmurDot's vision was wider than his ideology is part of the
reason for his endurinc reputation. Turc!ot suffered a set back
when he tried to have the reforms he had implemented in the micro-
cosm of Limousiri transferred to the macrocosm of France, but th
attempted reform of the militia in November 1774 set the pattern
for Turr.ot's period in office up to the Six Edicts.
Turot kept u a constant stream of minor reforms within the
Control General, and constant pressure on the rest of the covern-
zent Deartmcnts, to ra-ionalise their jurisdictions.	 Tur-ot,
desoi-e his promise oE no loans, had to raise small loans to
retain day to day liquidity, bu 4- true to his word there was no
larc'e scale borrowin . lur at produced five ideas for putin
the finances in order.
	
He put forward the ideas of alienatinc
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259,000,0001. of royal domain and of takinc over the Church's
assets and 1iabilites in return for -salaryin the clerç y -
both ideas borro:ed from F-uyscur, the anticlerical inilitaire,
arid both abortive 102 The issue of royal domain provoked a
pamphlet 'Conicirntiorr ur l'iflaliCfl&Dilj	 dii Domaine de '.a
Couronrie' (Amsterdam 1773), which claimed that the royal domain
was a foundation of the moimichy, and that to attack it was to
imperil the crown. 4.ur:ot proposed a cadastcr of the whole
realm independent of provincial reform, this was also rejected
lO3 - Turçot planned, and ad partly implemented, breakinr, of
the hold of privilee and sLate control on the economy; this
was embodied in the Six Edicts, which beran the process of creat-
irir a free marJe. He also had well advanced plans to crea.e a
neir municipal structure of provincial covernment.
Before Tur'ot could implement any reforms at all, however,
he was overtaken by the most serious peasant insuirection the
rec-iime had to face in the cen'ury up to 179, arid the only one
to reach Paris for 50 years 104; this was the Flour rar. Across
the north east froui Artois to ChamDcrLe via iaris the price of
bread soared beyond the peasants' ability to buy it. As in 17
17u., nd ]77) the free market aravaLed the crisis. In th
i2rket towns i-he neasant	 nd urban poor took over the supply
of bread in spontaneous price-f ixin'- ("taxation populaire") at
the 're-crisis levels. As long as the authorities did not try
--.-,	 wa :ao, z:ii in moot areao the
	 :-ioriti
were sinathetic in any case. The c.overnment, however, was
forced to act, as it had not been forced in 1773, by the invasion
of Paris and Versailles by mobs of rioters. Control was lost
temporarily, but successively ("en cnaine" according to i?aure),
of half-a-dozen provinces and the capital. The army took over
in some places to regulate grain supplies and prices, and. tcto e
-gain "police" control - by military action where necessary
Turc'ot was determined to make his policies work, by force
if necessary, and while 1aurepas and the pariement hesitated ho
authorised action. On the military front vafious of the Creat
• cleared the rebels out of the towns arid markets and scoured the
• country-side for rinc1eaders, who were imprisoned and subsequent
ly hun'- - an unusual stop in a peasant uprisinc. It was an im-
porf-ant moment: the robe lost all authority dunn' the evet.
and had to coxitenL itself with fu1minatin ftervards. A (irmor
government, su-orted by the rea, was not prepared to let. (ho
the ro'x moc11e in "po1icin" administration, nor allow it to
exploit nor to tace any credit fro:1i the insurrection. On the
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poLitical front rurcot took the opportunity of an untimely
visit by Maurepas to theopera to have Louis dismiss Lenoir and
appoint Albert in his place 106 Albert had been an intendant
of commerce dismissed by 'erray, but reinstated by Turcot in
107	 ,ugust 1774
	 ; ne 'was a loyal pnysiocrat, unlike Lenoir who
looked to the interests of the crown first and the implementation
of a procramnie second. Maurepas never fOrt-ave this stab in the
back, "It is certain there is no creat. harmony amonrst the min-
istry". The political poi-ions taken up were extraordinary
even in their context, Turcjot called for more strincerxt milit-
ary action a r ainst the re: 'ls than even Muy	 . There was ta)k
of a ministerial reshuffle, but the crisis died dorm.
Contemporaries had three explanations for the Flour ar,
all supported by eye-witnesses. The first and least helpful was
to condemn it as a manifestation of human wickedness without re-
ference to any external influences, his idea 'was put forward
by the cler y 'who equated loyalty to he crown with devotion to
God, civil insurrection was a sin, and committed by men already
filled by oririinal sin.	 he insurcents were simply political
atheists	 "he physiocrats, led by furnot, had to find some
account which would exonerate their policies. Coquereau's was
the most cnnvincincl , that Tu ot wa'- ircDiy reiin the fruiL.
of Terray's maladministration llO• lartisans of Turçot, ho.qover,
produced a plot theory by 'which the rin-leaders had been paid
-ent- of - Nau'eo, Terray, tho cicr y, finiiLir, Ui EfiL
lish, or the Jesuits 111, Certainly among those arrested were
several functionaries of the 1771-4 period, but there is always
the possibility that the civil disturbance was beinc used as an
opportunity for settlincr old scores 112 The plot theory 'was tak-
en a sta e further by the claim that Necker had incited the peas-
antry to revolt by his pamphlet 'Sur la lqislation et le Commerce
des rrain c ' which had been patronised by Maurepas and Pesay ll3
'o compound the plot, and add some 101c to Lenoir's dismissal,
1.urgo'- riad already quarrelled with the Lieutenant of Police over
allowirir Necker's pamphlet to be puolished 1l4 This episode
shows Turgot in an unusual lioht: he attempts to prevent a
hostile pamphlet from beincr published, then accuses iL of incit
1fl rebellion, and finally pur es the ministry of the man he
takes to be the author of his problems. It was a dress reiersal
for the olitical battle oer 'Incon ncn-s' Lthere Tur ot play d
t'-ie injured part y .	 -
Much contemporary evidence, however, points to an economic
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explanation. The British embassy chronicled the Flour Var
as a revolt of despair, and quoted risin , bread prices. Both
Hardy and Vri saw rain as at least the pretext for revolt.
Cro, who sa the riots and directed the pacification of Artois,
was in no doubt that hi th prices had caused the revol'-
he Joly cle Fleury pagers reveal .reort after report showinq
hoi an exlosive situation of imminent famine in the apparent
midst of plen(-y was touched off by some hasty act, ill-advised
word, or ou'-side news. There was no doubt in these papers that
the revolt was a series of independent rebellions which linked
to ether n-o a coherent insurrection of economic ori' in 116,
The parlemen. of Paris acted on this interpretation in its
policy to. ar&' r rain after 1775.	 o ether with the 1773 rebel
lions the whole of France experienced peasant disturbance in the
1770's on either side of an axis from Avranches to Ceneva - to
the south in 1773, to the north in 1775 - hu the overnrnenl-
iriis'-ed on reac-irv to the Flour ':ar as if it had been a
ical act, and i doin so it politicised peasant rebellion with
catastrophic consequences in 179.
'hat the Flour !ar was economic in oricjin was proved Ly
default when price-f ixirw ended the riotin - even if Vri mana -
ed to convince himself that lo reriri the price of bread had
arrravated the situation 	 Mme du Deffand accused 'urcot
directly of causinr the rebellion throu h his policy of hih
cram "rices hld• An unexpec ed result of the riots was the in-
volvemen'- of the cures in civil administration; not, only were
the bishos, overnors, and intendants ordered back to their
provinces to supervise the pacification, but urcot also instit-
utionalised his Limousin practice of makin r the cure the subclele-
r ate's arent. in the parish. :he parlement never re ained the
competence in administration it had lost in the heat of the
moinenL.	 he rebellion, however, finally ended the period of
-oodwill and cdve and take in the .oiernrnent. The Espion
is claimed that from this moment Maurepas joined forces with
iiromesnil and the parlement to oust "urcot.
At-ention in June was briefly distracted from politics by
i-he full ceremonial of a traditional coronation at Rheims. rhis
was held a Louis XVI's exress personal desire, acainst ur'ot's
entreaties for a chea? modern cronin in Iotre Dame. F ur r Ot's
os1i ion vas strenr thened by the end of the month cy the creator
number of conomistes in c overnmerit. ills reat-et- vcLory ' as
Nalesherles's appoin'ment in July. V'ri11ire,
	 no a "cphr"
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119 had been awaitinc dismissal ever since a Council meetino
of 25 June 1774 when he had denied all knorledce of a lettre de
cach'- hearin'-' his sir-nature. Louis would riot tolerate his con
finuarice in office after tnat, but he survived for a year on
aurepas's credil- 120 Malesherbes was brou r'ht in because
Maurepas believed that he' could be mana ed easily, holdin
Maure'Das's political ideas, and there was even ta1k of Malesherhes
being groomed to be the next prime minister 121, Nalesherbes's
political talents were suspect from the start. His father had
not considered him suitable for hich office when his name was
first put forvard in 1763, Vri accused him of indecision, and
Soulavie found he had a naivet4 and sincerety alien to the ace
122
A second ally in the ministry turned out to be StCermain
the "fanalique des Allemands" 123, who took over the Zar Depart-
rnent from iuv in October. It was after this appointment th&-
ur r ot. fell- secure enou h to cuicken the pace of reform. ame.
de Campan believed that flood-caLes of reform had been opened,
and Allonville a-ha'- 'ur r at ias fl0 1 7 retracin' the s.eps of
La 124	 ith Albert, Naleierbes, and St-Cermain with hir',
"ur'-ot's dream of rationalism Departmental jurisdictions could
be realised 125
In the Autumn of 1775 the ministry came under attack for its
attitude towards orLanised reliqion 12b, Back in Aur ust the
or.F1nnt', nubrrd at around 3,000,000, had been nrouraeri
by Turc ot to present a petition to the ]cinc askiricj for tolera-
tion, and pled in'- a don cratuit of 20,000,0001. for their
cratitude l27 The move was politically premature, and failed
to take Louis's own feelin s into accoulit; it was rejected.
'T he clercy was in "despair" at Nalesherbes's appointment, and
its pessismism seemed justified by the raisin of the minimum
ar-e £ or entry into Holy Orders; in the environment of 1775 this
was liable to reduce drastically i-he numbers of celibates l2,
In November Stormont was able to write (as a .protestant of
coursej that monastries and convents vere recarded as an evil
not- only by the philosophes but by all "calm and moderate men",
and under thiF ministry, "perhaps the day of their total abolit-
ion is not far remoed" 129	 Cro believed that decision-
about reli c ion as imor tan	 s any since Clovis were possible
in 1775, a'd Souldvle rent a s 1 e furer 1-o sUr j jf that philo-
eaphie would uon ' O 1-iIe accepLed mares of society 130	 he
1775 Assembly of Clercy was stormy. While 'turcot's covert ally,
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Lomeclie de Brienne had to petition the kin'- to rest.ore mores,
continue to persecute protestants and proscribe philosophie,
Beaumont tried to rally a dvot opposition, whose conduct would
extend beyond fine words; but the mood of the times arid of the
assembly (mana rre by the caucus of administrative bishops), was
acainst him 131, Vehement debates on mixed marriaces, philo-
sophie, toleration, and Jansenism failed to produce any chanrres
in the Church's attitudes, bu- steps were taken to co-operate
with the parlement acainst subversive 1iteraure 132.
Many of these events have a familiar rinrj from 1770.	 he
positions of five years ealier were beinci reassumed. Turrot,
ho ieer, remained invulnerable as ion as Loui.- refused to ieed
his enemies.	 he classic stalement of Turoot's immunity had
been made in January 1775 rhen Louis commented to Maurepas
that urcot did not seem to attend mass, to which Maure'as re-
plied that ''erray had at'-ended every day; the ooint was a'en
133, Such was Louis's confidence in urcot at this period that
he told Stormont that the coun'-ry was respondinc well to reform
and that opposition was felicitously weak 134,
2\t Court, however, opposition was already well developed
before urcot had beun to introduce his most irtrortant. reforms.
The mood had chanced from reçardinr' Turcot's policy as "reform"
to seem it as "danLerous innovation";	 some even believed
thaL the n'orrchy wa in dancer 135, st ermairL's olicv of cu t
-tiric out the praetorian re iments at Court had aroused hoctility,
but Turcot ias also attacked with the sane tactic. He was
manoeuvred in-o refusirr-r a pension to a Luxembour'-, one of whom
(the chevalier de Luxembourc) was one of Louis's few close person
al friends, and the head of which family, incry, was "austre,
ami du feu roi", and one of the four Captains of the Guards 136,
The family was one of the few to be in favour with both the kiric
and queen, and were dancerous and powerful enemies.	 he same
ploy as used to discredit Turcot with the hou4se ofRohan, when
he refused a pension to "the remains" of Mine. de Brionne,
Choiseul's mistress of 1770 137	 This opposition on the one
hand and the hostility of the queen, haure?as, Miromesnil, Sar
tines, and the parlements on the other left lurrot in an increas-
j1'Y isolated posiLion, "he certainly s 4 ..ands upon slipLery
cround" comrnen-ed s tormon 1 3
The climax of Tur ot's minisLry, triouch urcot musL have
hoped it was t-o oe only a preluds to creater reform, was the
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Six Edicts. 't'he edicts were presented for debate in mid 1775
and finally re istereu at a lit de justice in March 1776. Four
of the edicts concerned cram policy, Departmental reocanisation
and the abolition of sinecures, but the other two sFruck at the
hear'- of the old re'ime. one set out to abolish the corvee,
the other the 'uilds.
Commutinc -i the corve to a monetary tax delihted enlichten
ed opinion in the capital, but it was badly received by the
Great, by privi1cis in c1eneral, and even by the peasants, who
found another demand for casri as onerous as the forced labour.
The parlen'ent took charce of the opposition, and within it the
presence of 1-he 'jeers crave an illusion of parliamentary debate.
O.poosit-ion nrro -ed doi'ri to 'hree points,	 he first was that a
new tax vorkin its way throuch society nd i-he economy would
re'u1t in hichpr food rices (and the Flour Tar all over a'-ain)
139	 he second vas i-he "specious" argument that as the new tax
e applied to all Frenchmen - urarx or rural, noble or com-
moner - it zas a subversion of the juridical order, and that if
the tax were abolished then all the previous tax-payers would be
liaole Lo forced labour. (1'he Ord€... of St..John was afraid that
once their exemption from one tax had been overruled, none of
their fiscal rivileres would be safe l4O)	 1'his point was
stressed n .iroictesnil's debate with 'lurcot. A more genuine com-
plaint was that there were no safecuards to prevent the covern-
men' a2proprJ.atin the money to other uses 141 Turcot should
have t- i r htened u on the technical side of the measures, and
should have made some provision to counter the charce of levell-
inc.	 he aboll-lon of (Parisian) çuilds raised the spectre, firct
raised under Nachault and then acain under Naupeou, of the dis-
mant1inc of the corporate nature of the regime. This measure,
wrote torrnont, "... will necessarily create creat murmurinrs...*',
because of the parlemen 4-s' vested interests in the cjUilcls 142,
because of the growth o a coherent conservative ideoloc-y vhich
reacted to the riieasure as an attack on the nature of the reçime
and becuse, on the most practical level, even enlic'htened men
believed that the "menu peuple" were so ric.ed and lazy that the
would never vurk if left to their o'n devices (but see Morellet
belo-q) 143
In 1-he ar1oment onlj Rochefoucauld still remained loyal o
Turgot Thile Con.i and Eprmosni1 rallied the bodies of the peer
p ri-J na isi- racy a am - Tur"jo' , and c1led for 'ar -o ho do-
dared a ains- £he philosophe. as it had been acainst the Je^uits
144
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Turot remained inflexiole, and.the SIX Edicts were roistered
unchan-ed at a lit e justice. The parlemen was forbidden to
debal-e any aspect of he edicts, a sure si'-n of Louis's contin-
ued confidence in ur r ot, but the political price of this viciory
was cripplincly hioh. Ilalesherbes lost the respec 1 and suppor
of the macistracy 14 , wiatever coodwill the ministry had was
used up and Turcot was reported to be at a nadirof popularity
146 The alliance of vested interests	 vas
fully for ed, and remained a basic fact of politics throuch to
1789. On the other hand Morellet felt that affairs could not be
better, "Toute est fort trariquille. On a affranchi les paysans
de la corve, et us ne se r 'voltent point pour y tre asservis
de nouvau. On a dtruit lscor;orations, el nous avons d'aus'i
boris draps et d'aussi boris souliers, qu'auparavant, et les
ouvriers ne font point de ciuerre civile", arid he foresaw a schcrn
of European free trade akin to StPierre's vision l47
rurcot fell two months after this createst triumph. An im-
portant si-ep towards his fall was the realisation that the Dix
Edicts were just the beinniri of his plans for reform 14d, The
occasion of his fall was the abrupt withdrawal of royal favour
in Ilay. The political hac 1c-round was the debate around +he pam-
14-	 d'	 Droi- F-daux' and 'I' Mor'-u
J' .	urjot had adopted the habit of patronisinc a pamphlet
to vindicate and explain fortncominq edicts: for the abolition
•' r''.re it had been a still-born jr:	 Conrcut ..!iicth
had been suppressed by the parlement as "an indecent libel",
written by a member of, "an absurd, fanatical, darerous sect"149.
o herald the abolition of the guilds tur-ot had patronised
'Essai sur la Liber F e' du Commerce et de 1' Induscrie' by Biot de
Ste-Croix. it was not entirely specious, then, for the parleirteriL
to react violently 4- the attack on feudal dues in 'Iriconvriien''
especially as Loncerf,its author, was turgot's secretary.
'Inconvnien'-s' was not, however, an isolated literary evens-,
in its cohtext it was a refutation of 'Le 1ire des Sei-neurs'
(Anon. Paris 1775), and 'Itho& des Tefr c ' (I'fll. Joilivet
Paris 1775); reviewino all three books rio 1'ercure de France
vrote,"cette concurranco prouve combien l'object est. interess-
ant"	 The ar r ument in 'Iricrt c<iienl--' was the ramo as
ur r ot's on the corves, that the oririnal structure 'as acusive
and inefficient, and that mono f
-ary i aymen' would honef it all rn-
cerned. A rumour ias qUiccly Put about that feudal dues woula
co the same way as the corves 15l	 ihe opposition to this
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potential reform was more effective than acainst the corvé'es;
Miromesnil had widened the issues over the corves, but the
abuse of forced labour had been so apparent that effective op-
position in support of the oricinal ins tution was impossible.
Alone amonri th Six Edicts that concerninr the corves was not
rejected unanimously, the vote coinc 84 : 16 against 152• Feudal
dues, however, affected every privi1i and were not re ardeci
as an abuse the opposition showed TurQot's policy here as an
attack on feudalism, on nobility, and on social stability 153,
The duc de Ilortemart told the parlement that the book had incit-
ed his peasantL. to attack him 154 - the very tactic Turot had
allowed 1-o be used a-rainst Necker a year ea1ier.
ri he second pamphlet ras 'Le 1onargue \ccrn;li' bj Lan uiriis
"... la cause la plus prochaine de la drnission de M. Turcot"15
Os i-erisibly a eulocy of uoseph II's enlirhtened despotism, Turts
enemies xnanaced to prosent it as an attack on Louis XVI. Sruier
and htra both accused it of wild enthusiasm, 3achaumont, ho.revr,
found it borinr , rescued from well deserved obscurity only by
the chance operation of politics 156•	 urot blundered badly
over these two oocs, by turnin the issue into one of confidence
in himself acainst the parlements' meddlin: in matters of boo,
circulatioi and cenor-ip. 	 On 4 ach TurçD hd Louis for-
bid the parlemerit to debate censorship in genera]. and 'Inconvë'n-
ionts' in particular, not only did this add fuel to the flames
of S L CCU1at3L.,	 t it. was aIs oonly flou 5-od by Cnti '.rhu lud
the debate on a particularly damaçin, arrt a week later 157,
Rumour, aided by Ilaurepas's subtle moves, latched onto the Gen
eral Farms as the next tarret of Turr ot's reforms, "The whole of
which he will tear up by the roots" predicted Stormont l5u
Just as flaupeou had stirred up the parlements to discredit
Choiseul, so it was alle'ed, were Nirornesnil and aurepas in
lear ue with the parlernent arainst Turqot, wiich was a contribut-
ory factor in Malesherbes's decision to resign in April 159, A
concerisus of opinion holds that Nalesherbes resicried out of des-
pair from the enormity of the task, his inability to cope with
it, and the lack of support he received from Court. Me had be-
come a minister acainst his better judgment, and took the opporL
unity of op?osition to reform reaching a level beyond hi ah.Li-
ity to cope with it to resicn lGO
she	 rain 'as be-innin to tell on the Controller eneral.
In January he was developinc; " a harshness and has tinoss of
manner"; an attempt to placate Alicre, the first president of
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the parie'nent, ended in arçum2nt 161k His "orgeuii exrrie"
caused 31-ormont to note, "lie considers all his secu1aiivo
opinions as incontestable truths" 162• ilis manner with the
kinri became more ur'ent and assertive, and in his final letter
to Louis he held tre spec 1- re of Charles I before the unhappy
monarch who was torn beteen onthe one side his respect for
Turgot arid conviction that, "Ii n'y a que.Tureob.et moi qui
soyons ainis du peu1e" 163, and his queen, Court, and prime min-
ister on the other, who were persuadinç' him, throu:h the polit-
ical debate over the pamphlets that furç,ot was too dan"erous a
man to retain. Louis fell aci on the excuse that Turcot' s
famiiiari-y was an affront -o the monarchy to carry him over
ycholo-ica1ly difficult moriont of dLmissal in Lay.
Tur-ot fell on more than just the uccess of immediate
political intricue, he hd aroused the hostility of all financial
ves'-ed interest, but he did not have ready cash to offer in re-
turn; in ay 1he Llritis'l embassy repor ed, "ii. ur r ot's measures
have hither 4-o rather lessened T-han increased their revenue" 164
I-us hanrflin' of the distemer epidemic vas not univer5ahly
ap'Drovod. His decree that I he disease should b- fourht by ño10
sale slau hi-cr, which did incalculable daiiaje to ariculturc,
1.ac' questioned o; r	 inter rits 'ho Lia red o L aL: to cure
the beasts affected 165
here was yet another dimension to jurcot's fall, the broad-
es of 11.	 Ui	 .'L U.LeILL )f
	 itei lCd., WL;L Wd.S Ii'J w LUH(iLI LU
dominate politics, iri 1774 trio issue was not urLent, and under
Tur"ot arid laurepas Stormont could comfort his Buperiors that
the ministry "will be ent-le, rioclerate, and pacific, not unsim-
ilar to that of Cardinal Fleury" 16b, and in October Stormont
smu ly reported that the recall of the parlements would provide
a source of ion'- -term internal disruption to keep the French
from contemplatinr foreic-n adventures 167, Thrçot's announce-
rient of his fiscal intentions seemed another step in the direct-
ion of peace, for no war could be financed 1th neither loans,
hankruotclos, nor new taxes 163• Stormont was deceived in Octo-
ber 1775 by Verrennes's apparent hostility to the Declaration
of Inde'cndonco on the crounds that a free American n-ttion viould
even 4-u 3.1 create navy to dominate not merely both .ncricct3
but also	 the or1d ibO	 December 3torraori. asesEed
the ministry's Do1icy as one of suppiyiri the rebels ith arxis
in the hoe that the two sides would fight o mutual exhaustion
170 As a furth€r proof of tur,Ot's unwillin ness to bccme
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involved in colonial ventures it. was rumoured that he had been
tryinq to mortaace or sell ou-richt the French esb Indies 171
The issue seems to have been debated in Council in the first \'eek
of May; an estimate of 8-10,000,0001. was put forward for an ex-
pedition to help theThirteen Colonies, bu Turcot flatly refused
to provide the money 172 it was a Falkiands crisis in reverse:
the Controller General renuinely did not have the money and was
prepared to commit political suicide before seeinc war declared.
The export of arms, hove'er, had remained continuous. Pub-
lic opinion in the capital had been won over to the American side
by December 1774 l73 In April 1775 disquietinc reports soed
tha'- the Youic Court 'ias ea er fur war, and was prepared to find
some way round the official shortare of funds; there was even
talk of war by private subscription 174, 'o ficht a war TurcoL
had to be removed, and this arcument must have been presented
to the kin if only in its mildest form, that Turrot insist-ed on
c1osin' options which France had to keep open to operate an
effective foreicn policy. After urcot's fall Stormont sent bacc
reports of a 'very different type, "The apprehension of a war is
becomevery general here", "rhe çenera1 1anuaçe both of Earls,
and Versailles, is immediate war" 17o After May 1776 the ques
Lion 02 ar wa 'wher" not "whether". It was also in 1776 that
Beauinarchais inqratiated himself with Naurepas, gained ascendancy
over him and used the minister to help him further his dreams of
an	 i.Ll	 tid fldmboyant career as diplomat, secret agent,
and soldier in America 176
Reactions to Turrot's fall varied. flesenval was merciless
in condemninv him for, "... 1'incapacit rel1e, et le caractre
vain, (gui) commençaient 'a l'emporter sur une reutation accre-
dit 'e par quelques homrnes fariatiques" 177 Ilost commentators
believed he had only himself to blame, in his inflexible Mess ian-
ic pride and self-rir'hteousness, which did not allow him to ficht
for survival. Montyon judced on a technical level that Turgot
had failed because qualities which made for a good intendant did
not necessarily make a ood Controller General. i'itra believed
that Turcot had set Louis XVI an excample he was not able to f oil-
ow, and that Louis had simply lost his nerve 178,
The der irilica' ions of his fall were presented b' the
Eoion Anr1a	 who foresaw an era of ministerial instabili'-y,
fear of reform, and reoirtn of intriue: all honest men tren l'-d
ac. the event. For 'rimm it was the crowning disaster in a ver
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.179bad year for the Enhiçhtenment 	 . The tone of commentators,
even those hostile to Lurgot, was rapidly to charire to recret at
his passinc, honest reform was found to be more palatable than
corrupt conservatism. A change occurred in the rythxn of old
reqime politics after this event, a nervous self -conscious haste
began to make itself felt 180• louis could try to convince him
181self that Turoot was endancerincr the monarchy	 ., but it became
clear that his dismissal, and the manner of it, was to prove
equally as dancerous.
With the passing of Malesherbes and Turgot, Naurepas was
able to form a new ministry. Malesherbes's fall had preceded
Turc'ot' s by a few weeks but Turcot had tried to influence the
ner appointment. Turcot proposed: Invau, Truclaine, or Vri,
but all three were turned down by Naurepas 182, As with Choiseul,
this loss of the ability, to dispense political patronaçe should
be taken as a sicn of imminent disjrace. 1Iaurepas had appointed
to the }±flc'r 'S Household Amelot, an old friend and a man of known
incompetence whose merit was his complete malleability and adher-
ence to klaurepas's politics 183, A lesser appointment opened up
by the change of ministry was the Lieutenancy of o1ice, whicn
reverted -o Lenoir as part of a general purce of ronomistes:
Condorcet , Anrervil1irs, Roubaud, and J3audeau alsn suffered
disgrace or eclipse from minor posts.
For the Control General Maurepas chose Cluny, whose career
had been based on the Adniii.ty here he h becone
Praslin. F hi1e involved in colonial administration, however, he
had been disc raced by Estainçj and had had to resume his career
as intendant in Bordeaux. Clugny could be presented to Louis
XVI as a supra-factional minister: he had offered his services
to Maurepas, but liad travelled to Versailles via Chanteloup to
receive his instructions 164, Such were the feelings this man
had aroused that Estainig felt compelled to write to the king warn-
ing him what manner of man was to become Controller General
Both Stormont, the Espion Anr1ais, and Vri ascribed the appoint-
ment to the most vicious type of Court intrigue with Oçjriy, the
Superintendant of Posts who was a prot&jeof Naurepas, intercept-.
ing compromising correspondence, or forginc' it where none existed,
to shoT trurrot as a villain and Clucny as an honesi- man. This
intrir-ue as reinforce d in the bed chamber by the devious hierry
186, However much influence these methods may have had as a
supplementary factor, they reamin more a part of the mytholo-7
than the reality Of the regime, but that people believed ministers
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were made and unmade throh the abuse of the Posts compromised
such ministers' political authority.
To set the seal on a new ministry Maurepas was created Head
of the Council of Finances which both institutiona1i-ed his posi-
tion as prime minister, and aave him direct influence in the
Control General. The tone of the new administration was set by
Clugriy's subservience to the Farmers General. "11. Clueny,"
reported Caillard from Provence, "a dorin un diner splendide aux
fe'rmiers cee' aux, ce qui fait jucer qu'il presse sur leur compte
plus assur4'ment que son pr'd'cesseur" l7 The political credit
of both Veronnes and Miromesnil rose, and the latter spent a
busy. summerreestablishincr himself on the ruins of rurrot's dis-
mantled re:o-u l88 Joly de Floury, tion rocur or ceneral
of the parlemerit of Paris, enjoyed the ministry's confidnce;
Se'ruier's power reached i s-s zenith. Maurepas now had a mana'e
able team of rhom he was firmly the prime minister l9	 1U.S
miriistr and the Kins Party cencrally was overtly robin as
opposed to militaire. indeed the only significant support from
Lho (reat or militaires came from the House of Rohari (of •thich
more below). This shows how Choiseul had marioouvred the majority
of these croups under Ilarie-Antoinette's )atronace tnus makin
their eventual ministerial posi t-ions defeat-s for the cro.m.
It is easy to dismiss this ministry as an unfortunate inter-
lude between the reforms of rurot and I'ecker, but in its context
it. i	 important	 either. C1 iy, l.'L1	 iioii the late cen-
tury Controllers General, might have been able to implement re-
forms alon- the lines porposed by 1\aveau 190, (because he alone
was not thoucht to threaten vested interest) and under this min-
istry the parlemont was able to derelop its conservatism. In
the contex t- of Court intricue the new team was a compromise be-
tween Naurepas and the queen. Choiseul's pressure on the minis-
try via Narie-ntoinette had become irresistible, particularly
as Louis Xvi was now enjoying full sexual relations with the
queen after his operation, and was becinnin to succumb to her
influence. Maurepas decided to meet the Choiseulidts half iay
by appointing men acceptable to them hut loyal to himself. hau-
repas wa sailing close to the wind, ho had to appoint St-uertnain
a mIniser (2ivin him a vote on Council) to revent tne Chois6ui-
ists cainin' a majority, but he succeeded in temporarily takin
the wind out of their sails
	 Irhere va an ur erit politicul
need to placate Choiseul because he controlled the parlement;
"It is certain," believed tormont, "that the parlennt is much
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connected with, and in a manner devoted to Choiseul". If Maure-
pas bought peace in parlernent with Choiseulist political appoint-.
ments, it was at the expense of iaromesnil's long-term political
credit (which was repeatedly undermined by the disruptive in-
cursions of others into his jurisdiction); indeed by March 1777
St-Fargeau was secretly being promised the seals 192• iiaurepas
did buy political peace with the parlement, but this could only
be temporary because the paement refused to abrogate any of
its presumed prerogatives in financial affairs. E .Iaurepas allow-
ed the government to lose face without any compensatory gain in
authority.
Such was Choiseul's threat to the ministry that in January
1777 Stormont transmitted. a depressing report that, "Peu de mm-
istres on-b eu autant de partisans que le due de Choiseni pendant
son ininistre", and that although he had been outmanoeuvred in
1774, ChoiseuJ., acting through arie-Antoinette and Artois, was
now in a position to form a new ministry supplanting Maurepas
completely. (The detail of this "shadow ministry" is set out in
the table at the end of this Chapter'93 This ministry would have
been militaire in outlook, and have had no hesitation in declar-
ing war on Britain in favour of the American rebels. Choiseul
could appear to unite parlementaire opposition behind this pro-
posed ministry, because of his promise to revert to the politics
of the 1760's, where power was devolved into the corporations.
his gave the advantage of alliance between government arid aris-
tocracy, but without the benefit of central direction or adminis-
trative efficiency. .ileinents in the parlements could see many
advantages in a disorganised ministry, which would not meddle in
their affairs, and. which would allow them to expand their con-
stitutional pretensions.
Detailing rumours of a ministerial crisis in 1776, which
probably prompted the compiling of Stormont's report in the first
place, the Gentlemen's Flagazine wrote, "Choiseul, and some other
men out of power, in concert with the queen, had laid a deep
scheme, not only to put out (St-Gerrnain), but also by a coup de
main to overturn the whole court system, and bring about a change
of ministers and, measures". The report continued that Louis I
had heard of the plan, and vetoed it 194
ilaurepas was by now being forced to experiment with new and
other oioo, in Dc-ier 1777 I-iul entworth reported th: t'
death of Iesiy and the Lcajorary eclipse of iienuniarchais havn
lerri ve1 1iturors of his t\:D "crucs" , ho .. . :i1l u,e Lhc?
c1e d':iui11on o defend him a:ainst the attrLcs of the
Choiseu1ist parLy"
	 On	 different level after 1776 1aurera;
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determined to counter Choiseul's influence at Court and to
rival his candicla'es for hi h office by promotinc the interests
of the house of itohan. This process had started in 1774 when the
duc de Bouillon decided to sell the Grand Ciamberlains'iip, a
reat Office of State thich both gave direct access to the kinc
and allowed the holder to contrQl the access of of-hers. Both
Choiseul and Aiui1lon had attempted to buy the office creating
a minor crisis because Louis XVI found both personally unaccept-
able. Haurepas had skilfully had the prince de Gumene put f or
ward as a suitable compromise candidate 196
The house of Rohan was strong in the Order of St. John, and
during 1776 several ]cniqhts noticed liaurepas's interest in the
Order, and one corroroondent went as far as o spoa of LAaureaF's
"great" and "intimate consideration" for prince Louis, and that
they were working 'ith iliromesnil and Joiy de Fleury 197,
Iiarch 1777 he Order's embassy in Vienna fell vacant; a Jroteuil
in the Order was put forward for the post, but aurepas inised,
successfully, that prince Camille de Rohan should have the em-
bassy. Stormont was convinced that Maurepas was usinç, the house
of Rohan	 :lock Choiseulisls. 198
In November the old cardinal ocheayrnon died, vacatin the
Folio of Benef ices and the Grand lmonershi p . Choiseul, and
the queen, presented arente, the bishop of Orins who had held
the Benef ices until he made his support for Choiseul too obvious
in 1771. Jarerite was unacce'ab1c to Lozis XVI, so 1ureoo
proposed a comoromise: prince Louis de Rohan received the post
of Grand Almoner, which made him private chaplain to the royal
family, and the youn ralleyrand, with his Choiseulist leanin s,
was suc--ested (unsuccessfully) for the Benef ices. 199 All Lxis
mi(ht have remained as inconsequential, as most Court intrirue
remained in the lonc-term, but. after Naurepas's cuidin hand
was omoved prince Louis lost all restraint. He had been croomed
by the family as prime minister in 1774, and may have hoped to
succeed Naurepas in 1781 200, He was already nominal elector of
Alsace, archbishop of Strasbourc, and a cardinal in 17L0's, but
he could not crasp the ultimate power at Versailles of which he
dreamed.	 iven vanity, a decree of cul1ibility, and an ambition
bevnd his capacity to fulfill it 201, prince Louis was in a
ulneraole position and easy to exploit, in the affair of the
Diax.iond eck1ace the whole house of Rohan was disrdced dnd the
queen's reu'ation ruined.	 apoleori daLed the RovOlUion from
this loss of face by the royal faLüly 202•
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These were the lonr -term problems which conerned i'iaurepa
and in ithich Clu riny was as much a pawn as an ally. Clu',riys
mjnistry was marked by -wo trends. The first was the destruction
of all Turcots ;ror}, root and branch. Vested interest was 'iv0n
free rein. The old Louisquforic fiscal solutions were die-
interred, lettres de cachcI proliferated, and the '.. eneral Farms
enjoyed a r'olden ar e. The miiistry was characterised by, "Un
attachement aveu r lo d'anc'iens USC es et aux prjuce's qu'ils
ont cons acres", whether in the par lement or the Control Cencral.
The ministry was the reverse of Turot's which had been ti'ht in
the centre and loose in trie provinces. The sole innovation was
a lottery , which was a success beyond all ex?ectations, and had
none of the dra;r bac:s of a new tax 203 Censorship as reii.v
posed, as were corves and guilds.
In the provinces Cluny' ministry marl:ed the last drive
for centralisation. Any relaxation of abuse or authority 1774
6 was attacked, internal customs, an issue in the balance under
Turrrot, were now secue and enforced with exceptional vic our
The authority of the intendant was bolstered a' ainst that of
local institutions, and repression by the intendant became the
answer to any call for reforM accordin' to the spior An- lai.s ".
?he test case cane when the deputation from the S taLes of Jur
çundy arrived at Versailles; 1aurepas, flertin, Cluuny and
Amelot joined forces to treat them with unheard of brusque host-
206	 -1ity
	
. There was fear of a revrsal o the stead' trend
towards c'ecentralisation back to a Louisquatorzi.me po1ic of
centraliced absolutism. What Clugxiy could have achieved in in-
ternal policy was a draconian reassertion of centralised royal
authority. He could have rallied all those elements which had
opposed.philosophe..re±'orm, and forged a fresh alliance between
crown and corporations. In'practice Olugny must have been a
sick man when he took office, and, can not have been up to the
task. He died before his policies could show any benefit, but
not before contemporaries had noticed the corruption, self- 207
inteestedness, and, anachronisms attending his administration	 .,
In foreirn affairs Tur r ot's fall was the siçnai. for creat
activity. The navy was (riven an extraordinary payment of 6,000,
0001. in-July to prepare it for var, and a further 12,000,030].
were voted to it in October 203 :usiours of war became rife 209
and as a result covernuent credit dried up. The Esoion An'la3
claiired that a firm commitment had boen made to the re5els, and
this ws confirtied on the other side of the £tlant.ic by Jorforon
who wrote on 26 Aucust, "we have (official) assurance that the
Frcncli coverrlors o the West 3ndies have received ordcrs not.
only to furnish us with what we want but to jrotect our ships.
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They will convey our vessels, they say, thro' the line of British
cruisers" 210
Clugny died in October 1776; of all contemporaries the only
word of praise came from Georgel who recorded that he had a solid
record for hard work in his çenerality 211w By July, however,
Stormont could call him, "unequa] t his office" 212	 Dcto'er
Bertin was havinci to stand in for him, and Montyon quipped that
his death relieved Haurepas of the embarassment of dismissing
him 213, Intrigue and rapacity went unchecked, "the whole was
one constant scene, of secret plunder and extortion" 214 was
Stormont's comment. An anonymous, pamphleteer published, 'Essai
sur le Despotisme' vhich, so he claimed, had been written before
Louis XVI's accession, but which was now relevant to the politi-
cal scene 215, when his papers-were opened they contained only
a few notes on the Farmers General and the lottery; Bachaumon's
epitaph was that Clugny was a minister, "qui n'a rien fait, dont
on n'esperait rien, dont. on craicnait beaucoup, qui avaiL contre
lui la voix ne'ra1e" 216 The Council then chose two men to
fill the vacant post: Taboureau des Reaux and Necker.
Taboureau des Reaux had acquired political respectability
by having refused to serve under Turgot in October 1775 217, He
was a former intendant o Va1rr'ennes and a erfcct Louissei'ime
minister as well as a pliable protq4 for Maurepas. He appealed
to the kinci because of his lack of patronae a Court, the ,ame
quality hr1, ha'9 reconen' 1 e	 '-'err'min, he was a :'i cf :'Ii
reputation and known to be, "above all suspicion of corruption"
218, Each appointrnent influenced by Louis XVI up to 1776, shows
an overeaction ac'ainst the previous incumbent or incumbents -
while Taboureau would never display the reforming 7eal of Turot.
or the corrupt malfeasance of Clucny he lacked imagination, drive
and nerve. For the third time Louis and Maurepas found that
qualities essential to an intendant did not necessarily make a
crood Controller General. .lithin the Control Leneral it was hoped
that Taboureau would deal with the administrat.ion while Necker
produced the ideas and dealt with the kinq. In less than a year
Taboureau found the task beyond his scope, and Necker to be too
radical for his tastes, He resigned in June 1777 over Necker's
abolition of the intendants of finance, who had become his pro-
t4' e's. (There •rere seven intendants to 1771, and five thereafLer;
they wore e1icib1e to attend the plenary Council of State.) 2l
There can be said to have formed a ne-sr ministry in 0coher
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-November 1776 (HaureDas's third) as there w a chance in Lne
'ar Deoarment. St-rermain had become a political embarassment,
acouirinr the nick-name "le Turot militaire" 220, but 1aurepas
could not do without his vote on Council. To moderate his be-
haviour Naurepas forced him to accep t- Montharey as co-equal
holder of i-he Department. This division of competence (in the
Control eneral,War Department, and between Grand Almoner and
Folio of 3enef ices) was a feature of Maurepas's political be-
haviour in 1776-7. St-Germain resicned at the end of September
1777 unable to retain Louis's confidence or overcome Court in-
trigue. As a mark of respect for faithful service lie was 11ov
ed to stay on in the hotel de l'?rsenal until his death, a gest-
ure unicu to Louis '.'s style of monarc-iy.
Montbarey was a militaire of the old school who set on a
course of refeudalisation 221 He was an ideal minister for
Haurepas, eric characterised by incometence and exua1 ii d
crel-lon i.rhich undermined his political authority. Montharc 	 im
self seems, from his memoirs, to have been a remarkably insr
l ye and unperceptive man 222, Up to April 1777 he enjoyed thc
patronae of Choiseul and the queen, but 'hen he discovered he
was bein'- used as a pain to en'incer Castries's appointment ne
dect.ed 1-0 liaUreras onLirely, 'CA in LULn i10d the prune
minioter to drop St.-Germairi 223, He was deceived a am by Mau-
repas, who, after failinci to have kesay cre&-ed secretary f
C ta Le for -ie Adiii J. L, Lr led L have him mdoe .iiirec Lor ot ar,
a'post which vould have underincd ontbarey's political compet-
ence. Montbarey b1oc'ed thi. move, thus isolatinr himself from
both Choiseul and Laurepas by 1778 224, He was dismissed in 1780,
by his own account for trying to circumvent Maurepas's cabinet
system, but the chance of Secretaries of State for ar and tie
Admiralty i'ere part of a dder repercussion of the ar of Americ-
an Independence, and reoresented the second militaire ministerial
offensive as well as a triumph of HarieAntoinette's influence.
a
The detail of Nec1cer's ministry has been examined in Chapter
VI , bu s- its broad course was of Koc}er's success in rebuildin
liquidity (as opposed to lon r-- I erm solvency), of his cuttin free
from Uie circle of patrons - includin aurcpas - ho hel cc1 hm
to po er, and -he deiloç'ent of h is ref orrtin' p1cies.	 is
ministry sho\ed three broad featuresz the manac omerit of the Cun
L rol ener1 a d n in ins itut ion, d:c. aeal to public i in
ion over the hoads of minister' and ma istrates (culminal-in in
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the 'Compte Rendu'), and the attac)c on the robe throucth provin-
cial reform followinq Letrosne's ideas. Necker attemtped to
synthesise the best: features of new reirn politics and present
himself as all thins to all men while at the same time attempt-
in to transcend politics as turrot had. For the short-term,
and for his contemporaries, Necker's most important role, which
enabled him to stay in power açainst Maurepas's opposition, was
to be able to fund the forthcoming colonial war.
The problem of when to declare war was becoming a thorny
one. Reading the intercepted dispatches from the American dele-
gation in France, it is difficult not: to conclude that France
had iven some sort of assurance that she would declare war once
the rebels had commit'.ed themselves mili.arily, but: was unwilling
to honour the oblir,atiori. The simplest explanation was that money
was difficult to find, and that France had no desire to bankrupt
herself. Another, more acceptable excuse was that war was being
postponed until the Family Compact was recemented and other Euro-
pean alliances (notably with Holland who subsequently did declare
war on Britain) had been neqotiated 22o, The war party at: Court
(Lauzuri, Ilontbarey, Fesay, BerLin, Soubice, Naillebois, Chartres,
and Birrn 226) had come to the conclusion that the rebels would
havc to sccre a major victory in the field before France commit-
ted herself; this miht be termed the "Saratoga policy", 227
Another factor in delay was Stormont's deliberately overoptimis-
tic reprts of 3ri.h succesoc. Last1-, it must be remembered
that from the summer of 1776 orr•iards i?rance was mobilising and
was almost openly exporting munitions to the rebels. 228
Such rational reflection was not so easy for the Americans
at Versailles. Their diplomatic position was difficult to the
point of causinrc them despair 229, The Americans declared thenr
selves, "... heartily disc'usted in the manner with which their
overtures have been accepted. Tho' promises in abundance have
never been wanting", they condemned, "... the fallacious promises
of minstry...", and wondered if they could evn count on the
c1andestne help continuing. Their most explicit complaint
acainst France came after an audience withVerrennes in September
1777, "... requestinq that if (France) cannot immediate1 make
a diversion in our favour, they would lye a subsidy sufriciont:
to enable us to continue the war without: them, or afford ti-ie
States their advice and influence in making a 
.00d peace"
a very defeatist outlook 230,
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Behind the scenes, however, the proress towards war as
inevitable, the overnment's hand was. beini forced from too
many directions. In the capital Frank1i had captured public
opinion. He was its idol, able to satisfy its thirst for novel-
ty, for American ideas, for hard po1iticl news, and for Rousseau
1st ideolow. He could combine the allure of a backwoodsman with
the sophitication of an Enlichtened aristocrat. Franklin met
Rochefoucauld and Choiseul, and slipped easily into the pattern
of Court intrirue. This creatly helped the American cause by
rallyin faction and vested interest to them 23l Early instruc-
tions to the delecation ur r ed them to stress to qercennes, "...
ho-, all importani it i to the security of American independence
tha i France should enter the -ar as soon as ma y be ..." and
offered American support in capturinc the British rest Indies
as an inducement. A far more effective bait proved to be tobQcco.
Franklin mana ed to me otiate a treaty with the Farmers enera1,
for which he reported he QovernenL to )e press in hard 32
This was the domestic breakthruh of recoriit.ion for the rebels,
and a subsecruent international commercial treaty confirmed their
success in he overnmerit's recornition of the ne state and
declaration of intent to join the var. On the diplomatic front
there was a stronj hint of iar U? to i1arch 1777 wien )ritain
threa.ened an ul' imatum before France was ready, Verennes pre-
varicated and the immediacy of a declaration of war receded for
nearly a yr; bui- -io one 3n iiJier the French or 3ritish overn-
ments ever doub-ed even'ual conflict.
From within France the militaires vere threatenin: to pre-
cipitate ar on their own account by volunteeriri in embarrassing
ly lare nurtthers. n LiU1 1776 Jefferson wrote from hi1adelphia,
"I would not advise that the French contlemen should come .iere.
'e have so many of that counLry, and have been so much imposed
on, that the Congress be' ins to be sore on that head". In harch
1777 the Amoricdn dele-abion reported, less unriratefully, "the
desire military officers here of all ranks nave of ooin with
the service of the United Stat-es, is so ceneral an so strori
as to be quite -amazin" 23	 he war party vas able to exloit
this undercurrent of pressure for war.
The decision to declare war was not taken 1i' htly. It caus-
ed much soul searching, no least in the kin himself,
	 ouh
he became enhusiaLic once thedecision ias made 234 	 riie dariace
dane o the monarchy as irrevocable. SIriest, a dislin uished
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diplomat, believed that- war was declared either because public
opinion was boxed to or because ministerial ambition had over-
ridden all other con3iderations 235 Verçennes desired to be
the first foreictn secretary for over a century to preside over a
defeat of the British, nd Necker in his turn would have been
the first Con-roller eneral to finance a war without internal
disruotion. Vercennes was able to prove that 1778 was the most
propitious year for usettin the balance of Atlantic power in
France's favour, Nocker could provide themoney, and Montbarey
added that the opportunity was just too rood Lo miss 236k A
combination of outs-ancinc diplomacy on the continent and milit-
ary victory across the .2½tlant'ic aave France the triumphant war
she had c1remed of since ie 1740's, unfortunately it laid many
of the foundations for the destruction of the regime in l79.
men years of political activity led from Choiseul's system
built on the aftermath of the Seven Years 'ar to i\ockor's thich
wac poised to launch a successful colonial ar overseas and con-
structive pro' incial reform at home. Under Choiseul reform was
hapha7ard but often successful, thu'n less so once the Court
1-arty used reorrn as Choiseul's weakest point and coiicentrated
their enercies arainst the physiocrat policies of Laverdy and
Invau, and a inc-t -h suppood phitosO'h' conn rs ctiDn between
'vstme de la I ai-ure' and the ministry over 1770. Under hau-
peou Lhe re Inc over-reached itself in the direction of "auth-
oritarian" ref or ord horice	 stcd the epor tuni-y L're e	 b:
Choiscul's fall.	 The leracy of the "authoritarian" monarchy
was to create boLh radical and conservative oppositions to the
crown, while riviri the crown a fillip of self-confidence which
carried it throu h the recall of the parlements and forward
into the reformin- ministries of rurrot and Necker. IL was
iiith this pattern of political activity that the various instit-
ut ions and reform schemes of the period interacLed - most im-
portant of them the monarchy itself.
S
SUNNARY
The 8tudy of the political process 1768-78 has shown how the v-ar-
bus themes and institutions described earlier operated in a min-
isterial context. The crown's determination to regain the init-
iative by direct action is explored. This began as a ruthless
change of ministers and a reformed parlement under Louis XV.
Under Louis Xvi the crown adpoted a more conciliatory, but still
absolute approach. The Council was demoted to a consultative role
and managed directly by the king. Two reforming ministries were
supported while the support of the institutions was still sought.
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APPENDIX II, POLrrICAL .3IORMHY
LIN u:
	 i II:LT, DEVO
"11 brule, rnais ii claire", 1 as one of Voltare's Icinder
comrnen4-s on Linr uet, and Ii: serves as a startinc point ror this
chapi-er, for Lincue F be1onçs complelely to the Louisseiimo
political reneration and his career, ritinr rs, arId interaction
with his society so illuminate the late old re iiie that ne
deserves a separate study.
It- is de rir-eur for every study of Linrue •to make the
comment that he has fallen into oblivion but oeserves attention
2	 in his lifeti.ne he was a tol
 erin	 it ure mx ioned froquent
ly in all i-ne journals and diaries of the capital, and his ideas
aroused furious debate . 1iore1let labelled him, "an enemy of
reason" , and one of t 1ie philoso:hes' most redoubtable oponen1s.
The essence of his life and thour ht was paradox. 'hue 'c ra a
man of the 2nliçhtenmenL he rejected is political conclusions;
while he cham.ioned he caue of the oporessed he feared LheLr
rev1-ion; while his political posiLion was functionally d'o
he rej9-ed 4 he operation of divine influence in politics. lIe
proacedsmission bUt warned of revolution . io is bes- des-
cribed (in modern ems) as an atypica.J. conservative 6•
Lincue:'s father 'zas a Jansenist academic of the boureoisie
de robe from -rhom he received a mar'isterial educaf ion. rj vourcr
Lin uet was a small, thin, u ly, and nervy man wio found it a1
most impossible to establish re1atiorhips with people arorid
him; the bitterness and instability this enr endered are clues
to Lincuet's tempestuous career at a ersona1 level. His first
position was in the bureau of Bridges and Aic'hways; his exerience
of c ovemnment, 'owever, brief, was first hand. LIe then sered a
philosoohe apprenticeship with the du.e of Zweibrtcken, a prince
un on France's border who patronised many of the creaL :thilo-
sophes. According to Cruppi Linquet's association with the duke
lasted 1751-4.	 From 1754 to 1762 Lincuet moved in a clvo.b
li-traire set which included Dorat and Frron, thowh dunn
this period he b3came an aide-dc-camp for the prince de eauvau
another phiiosop-ie patron - and va'- a'le to travel in'.pain and
ortucal
Liii uet's firs- career was as an historian aric1
 drax'i .ic.t
s artur	 i-h a sudj of Aleander t e reat. hich "as e1l re-
ceived 8 • ris most im?orlant work here was a iiistory of Ihe
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Ronan Empire in rhich he praised 1-he tyranny of Noro as the
re ime moat beneficial to the mass of the people. Bachaumont
not-ed him as a promisin' younc' historian, but added in a comment
ihic was to set the 1 .one for almost all other criticism of
L jfl uet, "Ii prend surtout "a tcne do contredire tous i.es ides
recues ... Ii. crit ayed beaucoup de gnie, de force, de cnaleur,
et fournit aux soeculations" . Lin r uet's drama'La Mort de
cocrare l
 (Ams'.erdam 1764) received such bad reviews that it was
never performed	 Very much as an afterthoucht to his historio
graphical career an 'i-listoire Universelle du Seizi'éme .?'ecle'
apeored in 1769 and was civen an encourd in rather than cnthus
iatic reviev by the	 r'-i	 c Fr	 His praise of ileriri IV
ened - o iace Lin ua re ecab1e.	 he I!ercure iiade he im-
portont. observa-ion that Lin-ue- wroLe like a philosophe while
refutin-' ?hilocoohie II.
Lin uet had by no'.;- (1764) Fettled in France and iras puitn
do' n roots in he to'n of Z5bevi11e. He wroLe 'Iicioiro'- sur i. n
ObjeC I
	 r-Font pour la rovinco de icarde' (Abbevillo 17u)
icii shoed strong hysiocrat iifluencc. Lin-uet was in bbe-
yule a the tir of -'ie La 3arre affir, and Cruppi believes
that this experience decided Lin uet's whole attitude to his
o-r an va tne ins irat.ion for his o1i' r1 iIl) o 12
Lin'-uet announced his interest u-i the law with 'La Ncecji4d1
uric Rforme dr' l'Admin 4 s-ra-..on de la Ju 1-ice e 4- dans les Loix
r4"	 rri-'' (Asterdam 1764),	 wall raccivad. .r
another direction he had published 'Le Fana ie des
(Aia erdam 1764) rhich aLtacked Rousseau usinc the phi1osohe's
o'n framework In 1765 Lin'-uet became an advocate and prac-
tised for the next ten years.
In this' combined period of 1eca1 practice and polil.ical
wrii-in-- he wrote 'Thore de c- Loix Civles' (Ams'-erdam 17o7) vnich
as his sthgle most imDorant work beinr a refut-ation of Nontes-
quieu. In 1768 he wrote 'L'Histoire l.martia1e dec 3euit-ec',
which was burnt by the parlemerit for containi-ic, "Maximes/dan"-ereuses, des principes eronnes" - an openinc shot. in the war
bet'ieen them 14• In the same year he wrote the satirical 'l-lerre
Philoophalc'. In 1770 his 'l'i&notre tour Fl. le duc d'Aicuillon'
wa a defence of iis o1Lica1 sys em, crid as burnt ' the D
menL of aennes. In 1771 he had pub1isred 'Rpone a.x Deirs
Mo&rnor' -'-jc1	 hi most rlor'-ant inLollectual attac O'i
the	 i1osopcs in cenoral. From 1771 to 1774 he pleaded in
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11au2eou's parlement and conducted several important ca'es eihich
made him as unoou1ar in t'ie ne court as he Mad been in the old.
In 1775 he conducted a vir-orous defence acainst his ven-eful
enemies in the rec21ld par] ement, but with only Suier to help
him he as dic'arred.
lie spent '-he reinarid.er of 1775 in more literary çursuits.
He attacked physiocraL crairi policies in 'Le 4-tre	 l'u'-our
des ObRer'	 onc ur lo Conmer-e ds rain'-'. His 'Essai philo-
sohcTue	 r le iionarhi c rie' was a stronr attack on celibacy.
'e became enLoroiled in a furious literary battle with Horellet,
-;-to took e'cception to Lin'-uet's attacks on the physiocrats and
at- t empted to discredit his poli'-ical arcuments by refutinc his
inte11ocu 1 pe':hod in 'La h one de arccioxe'. Lin uet. replied
,in 'La The 4 e d Li e11e' and HorelleL riposted with 'e'oris
sr iec l. L. a . liore imoortantly his areer took its third
and final, ch nce of course when he beca m e a journalist, perhaps
-h r 	 eaLe-L o. the '-eriod.
In 177o his 'Jo'rn'1 de o1i'ictue e'- do Lite'ra-ure' .as
closed down 'ow Hiromesri1 and Lin uet was driven into exile in
'c'rney; fro:. -'-iere he addressed his	 -r-re'pct--
jtic	 Rc-rr e-at jor c' addres q e '	 a Maj pst' to Louis XVI
outlinin hi sui?fenins in the parloment. In.1777 he wrote a
'I -' i-re de I . L 4 ri ue'	 ?i. le C. d 'Jer cones' in which he de-
tailed his rdisfortunss at the hands of ministers and ma' istrates.
These two pm.h1ets were masterpieces of polemic, but lost him
his last chance of bein-' accepted in France. In 1777 he founded
his 'Znnales -o1ii-igue c' civi1er et 1itraires' with hallot du
an 's help in 3rusEels. This journal was outstandin arid was
the most important critique of the old recime.
Lincuet r.eturned ..o France only to be imprisoned in the
Bastille 173O-2.
	 His resultant 'I 'moiro c' sur la Tastille'
(1762) were his most successful flook and ran into many editions.
The memoirs reiterated every clice' about the capricious, despot--
Ic and abusive nature of t2.e late old rerime the mob which
stormed the as 1:i11e in 17C9 was more li}cely to have read this
than Rous c eau's 'Conra- '- oea1'.	 17r7-179 he became deeply
involved in both the 3elr'iari revolution a ainst Joseph II and
in the French "ore-revolution". lie ar ued in favour of f ic-cal
r'ari alan LC linor of Vauan's dLe royale and joined
Sieyes in nY-ac..in the political pretensions of the nobility.
0 evolu Ln I sel , no :evcr, .as n event he was unable Lo
cope with even thou h - perhas even hecau.e he had accurately
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predicted it in the preliminary ref lexions in his Annales in
1777. As tnie evo1ution failed to live up to nis ex?ectations
Lin uet became opposed to it, and in 1797 he was executed; a
fiiinr-' end Cor one wrio likened himself to Cicero.
'Ihis career was a failure in the old recime's terms, but
at evrry poin t- up to 1776 Lin'uet could have ac'ileved the hichest
horiours. illS work on hist-ory and canals could have earned him a
place in the Acade'mie. His leca1 caeer could have established
him in parlement as one of the cenlury's c-reat jurists, and by
1773 services rendered to the nobility of evaudan promised to
earn him ennoD1ement 16• In his literary and journalistic career
he mr'ht have on a place in "le 1onde" and -ained respect and
a ron. Ine3d in 1776 he ias hounded from France a destituae
commoner 1accinr patroriace 17, position or profession. This fail-
ure reults from Liricuet's characer, in which, "thtransi ence
was the keynote"	 A quick temper, a passion for polemic, and
a total lac of cra l-itude combined with a burninc desire to com-
bat abuse and injustice, an exaggerated sense of self-importance
and a cosmic self-pity made hifr a totally imossih1e person to
ior'c 'vit ri or to form any stable personal relationship wIth. He
was detested by every every person who came in contact with him,
and Voltaire described his uninvited cuest of 1776 as a "faggot
of thorns" - it was as painful to endure him as to cast him of f
19
Very rourhlv Linruet's intel3ec'-ual career divides in-o
three sections. his attack on philosophie (1764-71), his involve-
ment with the law (1765-75), and his role as outcast and critic
(1775-177).
m he influences workinc on Lin-uet in the early 1760's were
his father's Janenism, which led into the law, the Enlicht-enment,
of which the Court. of Zveibrc1cen was a minor centre, and his
divot literary friends. From these influences Lin uet synthesized
a radical but an'-i-philosophe and hichly idioEyncratic alternat!'e
to the accepted ideas of his day. lIe made th philosophes of the
hich Enli htenient the first tarret of his pen in Le Fanatisme
des	 loopos' in 1764. This work vent unnoticed at the time,
but it reLesented somethinc quite new on the literary scene, a
serious and polemical attack sin'ultaneously on the philosopries
and tie C-iurcni.
'Fnat-ste' sho'ved how one spiritual tutelar'e, the Ciurch,
was oem	 rerñaced 1 y ano ier, the Enhichteninent. Of reli ion he
wrote, "Le fanatisme relic ieux ensancilante Ia Terre. ii eleve
S.'
'a l'intolrance des monwnts affreux. Ii s'entoure de cadavres:
C'est en buvant leur sane qu'il s'alaudit do sa vicLoire".
T he philosophes, however, could offer in rel-urn only destructive
criticism based on vanity and a corruption of moral standards.
Lint uet feared the philosohes' dissection of the body politic
would turn into an autopsj as they thouchtlessly reealed to tne
çeople the true natureof their society 20, 'he similarity of
these ideas with those of Duclos, of Suier, and of the Old
Dauphin is strikinc, and while Linuet parted company with Frron
over religion, he borro'red many of his ideas attac:dn the philo-
soohes. If i r norance was the establishment's last weapon21
Lincuet -as not yet ready to spike its cun.
	 in 'Theorie' he
condemned all education for the ea-ant beyond ti.e toe'- nical
minimum as, "un cerme de d 'couracemenL ou de r 'volte, et pour Ia
socit un commencement de troubles" 22 Only after he had lost
faith in the old re ime did he turn to the dissemination of
inforniat'on for political ends.
Lin uet opened up a line of criticism outside the acceoed
frames of reference, he condemned the philosops for being
at best irrelevant to society and at orst destructive o. ts fe
cood features. He opened up around explored more fully in 'Thr-
ne', cahilL. hontesquieu and If irabeau "ces lrhc imos ure"
for their failure to ahleviaLe any of society's ills; wien bread
was needed they offered su ar 23 ie ismisod Newton for losin
himself in -1-he voids he had discovered, and cr ra-r
stract thou-ht. with the realities of this worla, "Chez (le.
peuples civihizs) fameux par les arts et par l'opulance, 1'
unique esec 'rance cle trois quarts do le nation, est de pri.r sun
un fumier, aux premires maladies cusSes par l'excs du travail
et de la misre" 24
At the time Linc'uet failed to make any impact on the pulic
as a serious opponent of philosophic, a contemporary playvnicht,
Palisso 1-, was receivin#- creat acclaim for his satires ar-ainst the
philosophes. Another "enemy of reason", Palisot held the same
ideas a kin uet, superficially at lea 1-. de called the ncy-
clopedia, "Ce pniLle monument", of plagiarism and called its
authors "charlatans" 25	 'Les rhilosor.e,' , Palissol-'s most
famous play '•ritten in the l70's and 'erforned re ularly there
after as a modern classic, showed tne philooes as L.ie ar'uffe
o the intellectu] world, dmaLic even in their scepticism.
Lin uet resorted .o satire to catch the public eye with 'La erre
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Philoo'ia1e' in l7G. This purported to be a physiocrat proçramme
prsenLed Lo	 Chinese acado1uy. ..rir'iu, who -	 now t lcst
reviewinc Linuet, rrote, "N. Lint uet ri'est ni ai ni plaisant".
Ntra later condemned LiriueL's attempts at sairo as, "inpties
noye'es dane un farra-:o de mobs r içanbesques, d'ancdotes pu
26
riles"	 .
Liw'uet's broadside aairjst the philosophes was his 'RsoncP3
aux	 -urs odernpc ' in 1771. He affected Lhe pose of a non
nartisan observer persecuted for revealinr truths. One of the
fe men of the period to take a stand acainst "An r 1oman:a', he
accused the Encyclopedia of creatinr , "Je ne sais queue .ferves
cence an'licane, qui annoncait deja aux yeux claire-vojanbs
les Si: flCS d' une reiolution prochaine". Takin r up a theme from
'Fanatisme", he vrote of the philosophes, "... us ne russirent.
cuerre qu'a corrompre les moeurs, cju'a relacher tous les liens
ociaux, qu'a isoler les horrncs, a favoriser le luxe, a iniro-
coire ar:out izi d-ravation at la nire, l'esrit do deoi::e
etcelui de rvolte, le dsir et la hams clu pouvoir" 27	 this
criticjuc would he dvot rere it not Utisiric:uet's politic 	 ere
atheist. iiavin previously dismissed relicion, Lincuet's mesca e
seemed to b uw 3r upa1atac d;ir , "Les peupies,"
Brissot of their role in Lin;uet's poliics, "sont des Lroupeaux
condamn 's de toute ternito' ' 	 tre tondus, muLilics,	 .rLr.b^.:'
2• TO this Lirrue was to provide two answers, his political
system of despoticm in "h 'ore' and his anticipation of a
revolt, of the masses in 'Znn1es'.
- linguet was particularly concerned to refute the conomistes:
the "anabaptists of pliilosopliie" 29 In 'Fanatism' and 'Rponses'
he had chüged his target from the economistes to Rousseauist
philosophie. 'La Pierre Philosophale' had been only a light-
weight foretaste of 'Dii Pain et du Bled'. He was not the first in
the field, Galiani' s 'Dialo r us sur la Commerce cis ..raiiis'
had questioned all the economic premises of physiocracy in 1770,
but Linguet widened the arcument to its fullest social itnplica
ions, and, again, went outside the reime' usual frames of
reference, a cfuiLy which makes D.C. Levy describe Lin'uot here
as "so proma;urel', so intri r uinc1y modern"	 in 'F-rnes'
he hod defined Jio conornistes as "abbots", "centilshorres",
"marT itra Its", -icl "cloc::-riakors" (presumably a reference o
31th	 hapless Dauphin)	 in 'Theore' he accused these re:i of
wantij , "dc tuor les homne; pour lc rendre houreux" 32, :or
their advocacy of a free market economy in rood.
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Linouet saw the dependence of French ac'riculture on corn
as the root of all suial injustice o1'in' r to the socioeconomic
structures required to row it whichcreated, in all-but name,
- conditions of economic slavery, but uiL-iout the reciprocal ob-
lications imposed 'Detveen true slave and owner 	 Forster's
analysis of the rrain economy i the Garonne plain confirms
Linr uet's belief that cram was the basic reality of the rerime
and that it cenerated conditions of economic subservience. Fors
ter shos how the successful c.ultivation of rrain reinforced all
the existiri-- structures in society 	 Lin uet could show that
men would be better of f fully enslaved than as a depressed peasan-
try, and, ho-ever shockinç this idea seemed to enlihtened opinion
it ws the same conclusion that trie parleraent of Be'arLcon came
to when it considered the question of freeiri the serf. £ his
idea was also put forward in 'ense'es sur diffc 'rent- ujets' by
an "aricien militaire"	 Pursuinr similar lines of thouçht
the EiOfl Devalise declared that all the problems of political
economy would be solved if chemists could synthesise bread and
wine, and Condorcet told Turcot that cheap bread and free jus-
tice would end superstition 30,
The reiritroduc'-ion of physiocrat c-rain policies in 1774 pro
inpted Linr uet. to write 'Lei--re	 l'uteur desCberva!-4on sur
le Commerce des rins'. with customar r arrocance Linruet ascri-
bed France's economic problems to the government's consistent
failure-to heed his advice sinre ]764
	 , -ilossin-' over the fact
that he had supported the physiocrats hack in the mid l7O's
In 'Iettre, Thrret' Linruet extended his ideas on economic ser-
vitude. criculture allowed, even encouraed: the exploitation
of the urban poor by the rural land-owners, the economic depress-
ion of seasonal itinrant workers, the fallin off of production
- to keep prices artificially hiçh, and the deliberate reduction
of land under arabic cultivation to the same end
	 Implicit
in Lin-uet's analysis was that the physiocrats were more interest-
ed in maintaining a particular economic structure in acriculture,
beneficial to the social lite, than in makinc. technical improve-
ments.
At root Linuet was attacking the concept of a free market
economy, thou'h he failed :o separate the idea from the oc1y of
physiocra-t .hinkn' . Here he a-reed with the post-1774 pane-
ment. and with	 uier in porticular. Linuet believed that food
must he an absolute rint and not a matter of commercial specula-
tion or nichts of property 40• Lin uet drew the contrast btween
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the physiocrat method of rer'ulatinc' a basic commodity whose
suoplv would not always meet demand and his own method. The
former was to allow the price to rise until the demand fell to
meet supply, which had the unfortunate result of killiric off
lar'e numbers of people. The latter was to rerulate the supply,
rather than the demand, by controllinc. price and distribution
to ensure all had an adequate minimum.
Linçuet. constructed his own theory of society and the solu-
tion to its problems. The decade 1764-1774 saw the development
of the En1ichtenment's major societal ideas, and Linguet was not
to he left out 41• In 1767 r horie caused the kind of uproar
in its field that 'Systme th la Nature' was to in the field
of materialism. Lin:uet fldd started where the philosophe and
dvot ideas about society had left off, he attempted to çrasp
and solve the problems which their iritins had merely revealed.
He rejected both the Christian account of society as divinely
ordained and the philosophe belief in a rationally neçotiated
con-ract (or contracts). Linr'uet started from "nihilistic
anarc'-iism" 42
For Lin uet the ori- in of society lay not in philosophical
systems but in human nature; social orranisation was a biolocric-
al imperative as necessary as eating or breathin . Government
and society were the realities Linçuet started from '. Given
this human predicament some men will enslave others by violence,
and every cociety was founded nn force and every soci1. structure
on slavery. mhis was no more than the dvot critique of Rousseau
but while the dvots could only sue- cest qoinc' back to more Chris-
tian prncip1es, Linuet proposed borrowinc on the experience
of other cultures to find some other solution, civen that he
dismissed the utopian answers criven by the philosophes. For
Linruet men were trapped in their situation. "Natural man"
havinr
 became corrupted into "economic man" was doomed to cycle
after cycle of deradation and suffering
	 s a corollary
lii-es persisted in Linquets political philsophy as nowhere
else; when the Franks invadedCaul they made a compact with the
existinc-r Romano-. allic lite to keep the masses in subjection,
thus Linr-uet reduced the whole problem of noble versus royal
thces to one of lites a ainst masses
	 . The interest in
1ites was nO: confined to Lint ueL, his contemporary, Chastellux
was analysin. Europa in terms of a unified social, political, and
46economic elite
	 . Line uet played the same role in eighteen-
century political thouht as Hobbes had done a century earlier
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in Britain, he reduced prolems to their unsavoury esentia1s.
"11 n'y a cie couvernement par sa nature, ne soit ennemi des
sujets" . The "ciimerical" liberty of one section of society
resulted in the- economic ex?loitation of another
Before his inolvement with the lecal profession, which
C?Used him to make far more pessimistic jud ments about society,
Linuet pror'osed solvin the problem of oppression throuh a
ciepotism of law, such as he imar ined the Ottoman ideal to be. -
He also praised -'-ie Jesuit state of -araguay as a near-perfect
ociety . Thvenau de Norancle quipped that men were equal
only in destituFion
	
Linruet proposed to make all men equal
in society and before the lar by abolishin' rank and property,
this alone could ensure justice and bread for all 50 The most
basic polilical necessity was the absolute obedience of all sub-
jects to le itimate authority 51, a paradox in itself because
for Lincuet authority can only exist de facto never de jure.
In the old re ime he based his hope on the dvots and their a' -
solutism, "Le roi et la loi ne font qu'un" he quoted s4uier
with approval 52•
Liri- ue. based his politics on the "people" as a whole and
on the individual in particular, and not on families or cor
pora-ions. Both these concepLs were outside Lhe usual frames
of reference; the people were usually conidecd bcyond hoje
or help and the individual an unfortunate and lonely creature.
T hp fault be!1ind this thinkinc' was that the qovernxtents In'
Europe were Ihe enemy of the people while LC des,ot.ic c
xnens of Asia were their friend.	 estern iovernments had
reached a situation --:here, "Les vertus et les vices du prince
sont ca1enient funestres aux sujets"	 Liryuet could see a
solution only in startin afresh with a re ime which eschewed
the whole phantom of constitution, political liberty, or social
rank, and which subjected all to an equal despotism of law where
justice -was swift, sure and unvitiated by political intervention
54
The philosophes were horrified by Linguet, who, "pour s'en
carter, at'il	 ohlic de se jetter dans des systmes aussi
sinculiers qu'absurcies. I'i. Linuet ose avaricer que le despot
isme est le couvernement le lus favourable et le plus naturel.
La plume tornbe des mains
	 ivan- cette assertion exe'cra1e"
Grimm called him, "cet iomme si tran-ement fameux, Ce
pancyrc-o z1 ' du .l'otime asiatique, ce dtracteur furleux
d tous ls ouverriernonts libres" 56• In October 1770 the rcure
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cle France devoted a lono and hostile article to Lincuet. He
was attacked on his style, is "ridiculous" ideas on despotism,
the "inconse'quences rvoltantes" of his work, arid for his heret-
ical opr'osi-ion to MontesquJeu. "he Nercure found any freedom
preferable to any slavery. It accused him of tryin to emulate
Tacitus and Rousseau for their ideas on "sava r es" by praisiri
the primitive political structures of the East. :rhe Mercure
finally con-rived to ho.st Linr uet with his own petard: working
within the system (he was pleadinr 'Def ore the bar in 1770) he
had achieved less for justice and humanity than the philosophe
Voltaire had from outside
I Thile orthodox culichtened opinion casticated Lincuet, his
formor dvot: collea ue Fr 'ron praised rum. "i. Lin . uet a loud
une belle chimre", he wrote of-Lincuet's political vision.
Frron pr'cised Line
 uet as he understood him, "de toutes les
formes de couvernements, la meilleure est sans contredit celle
ou Ia jus'-ice est plus prompte et plus e ale, les loix plus
simples et plus respectes, le nom d'hornme plus conside're' dans
la portion la 1us nombreuses d''res qui le portent, le peuple
plus tranquille, les iripots moths ouereux, les vexations çlus
rares et moms impunies, le cro'dit des Jrands moms redoutable,
et leurs caprices moths to1rs ••
Lin uet naturally stood alone, but others of hIs ceneration
were follovin similar lines of enquiry and of attack on the old
rerimes 1'oreau satirised the philosoes in 'Cacowcs' p757)
and believed in judicial reform, Letrosne an1 .ubusson leadin
on to Necker followed Lin'uet's critique or tne rerime, Holbach
and Mably attempted to find sec'ular bases for authority. Liniuet
was crouped with Mercier de la Riviere as an apostle of despotism,
"le despot isme es. le systme la mode", quipped Bachaumorit
when Mercier de Ia Rivire's 'De 1'Ordre naturel e essent3el
des Socte's	 was reviewed in the same month as 'Thc<o-
ne'	 • 1e can hardly speak of Lincue foundinç a sciuool hu'.
in 1777 Mtra reviewed a younç iiriter who, "fait le petit Linuet"
and 'rnincipe' d la L ila-on Uriverselle' (the first book
to hrinr
 liberty, equality and fraternity oether as a political
slo'an) ac1o yleded a debt to Lin uet
	 Darnton inte:rated
Lin uet fully into the Cynical late EnlIghtenment as tne roatesi:
of '-he Crub Street journalists o2
Such, broadly, ras Lin'-uet's intellectual career, Dut in
17b5 he had joined the ur hopin to be aile to .rin his ideas
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to bear directly on society. rfe was spurred on by Voltaire's
success in the Calas affair and by the case of La 3arre wno
was accuc'ed of sacrilere and beheaded and burnt in 1766, a case
vi'-h zhich Lin ue- concerned himself without success. Liri uet
van1ed to help f-xe underdo , and he caiae to specialise in cases
of rrlig1ous vicmisation Ce. .• the plicrit of mixed rrof-esLarit.
and Ca rlic marriages), and cases where a cause celebre had
rejud ed an indHidua1 cuilty. He was a virorous campainer
for leral reform arid a ains le al abuses, 3rissot wrote, "All
Lin uet ect vraxment le premier guI les alt devoiles avec une
saint-c audace", thouci he does accuse Lincuet of bein incoher-
ent and unalariced in his le al ideas °. i-us experience in
arlerien.... alo led 'him to publicise canal buildinc. and uniformity
of weights and measures b4
Lin uet' s first. case was an aftermath of the La 3arre
afair and concerned a mass trial of people accused of sacrile e
at Aobevlle. Lu-i UCL likened the case Lo Lie excesses of
Jy'antino Iconoclastic era and the thirtytvo defendants were
acquitted r rea1in a mass of corruption, bicotry, and injus+ice
amon rlcrnDerr of Abbeville's ctab1ishmenL	 . caves suci as
this won im Voltaire's respect and eventual hospitality in
l77. His third case in 1765 arose from rialadminiffi-ration of
c-rain, aitU Lin uet ShOTS himself a supporter of the physiocrats
at this date; like the parlernent he only cian ed his mind after
seeinc a fr- marke'- jn operation	 AnotIer care aror' fr.n
a rroup of of.ice-holders in Issoudun refusin to comply with
Laverdy's municipal reforms and relinquish their posts
	 A
case in Liis period enabled him to attacc Lie corporate structure
of econouic life, "L'tablissment des communaute's exciusives, des
maitrises clans ses arts et me'tiers est une cane sans contredit"
68, c'ivin !-iim common ground with Turtot.. A dispute in the puo-
1ishin world enabled him to atLacJ the philosopho he .-emony in
litera cure 69
Two cases then came up which il1ustratedto two poles of
Linuet's ler al career, the first. enabled him to implement some
of his doa", the second ee.ns to have sh&en deeply his faith
in the re ime. ile defended a seigneur a ainst the "unjust pre-
i:en jon" of his va c. cals. Lin uct believed the peasantry ciould
adhere	 s ic' i ima-e struc ure c of au aori' y
	
thou i ie
teripered this i-Li1-ude with humanitarianism in attacldng .iort
main 71	 ie illuc 'rates ere Vri's ada e that the ci ii eon f
century ,ar1emcn's hd moved from clefendin r the vassal a ainsc
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seicneur to upholdin'- the seicneur's position 72• The other
case was a dispute between two priests with rival jurisdictions
in the same prrish, Linruet used this case to expose one of the
re-ime's çreatcstaouses, "iour le maiheur des citoyons, soumis
et paisibles, on no volt que trop souvent natre des conflits
entre 1e3 jurisdictions qui doiveht les prot ' er: ces dzats
scandaleux, gui opposent la justice 'a elle-m&ie, anantissent le
pouvoir dos loix, sous le prtexte d respect qu'elles exigent
..."	
. Here, for Lincuet, was Montescjuieu refuted in prctice
- corruption, abuse, and dereliction of duty were the fruits
of his system.
In 1770 Lincuet undertoo'c his most famous case, and the
century's mOSL spec! acular political ria1 when :i uillon i.as
tried before the peers in the parlement of Paris on char es Of
criminal mala..iministraLion in Jrittany brourht. by the Bre..on
maristrates led bj Cha10-ai q . The char r es arose out of road-
builclinr in the province, but the real dispute was one of local
versus royal authority: the power of the crown throuc h the
roverrior and hi q
 de'Duties ac-ainst the parlement and Stales of
Brittany. It would he unfair to say that Linçuet's brief ras
irrelevant to the issues at hand but he widened the scope of
the case in a way '
	
to 2 :illo'	 Lin uc
said in effect that of all tne polit.ical fi r ures in the laLe
century Ai-uillon came closest to implementinc the political ideas
of 'T'<.rc' .
	
hc bric was ccsmncd .o ho burnt by tho . 1c-
ment of ennes as beth'- contrary to the inLerests of the Breton
States and nobility	 .
liarmontel claimed to have inside information on the defence.
The chances of wlnniric the case ac-ain.st the conthineu talents of
the arleraent and States were thau r ht so slicht that all the
leadin advocates in Paris refused the brief. Only a younr
"adveni-urer in des'air" of dubious talents would take the case,
and the defence he produced was "unseemly and absurd" and caused
the duke much dis?leasure. Marmontel then claimed that Aiuillon
ased him i o alter the brief	 , if so Uarmontel failed as badly
as Linruet for, accordinc to Thvenau de I'Iorande, it resulted
in Aiui1lon bein labelled the 'iberius of his ace 76• As the
Case was noer jud ed it ained Lin uet publicity without ca
promisin his orofe-sional reputation. It left two mar}s on
Lin uet's career; he earned ?i uillon's lastin enmitj C 0u h
this ua conponE-ated b; Laric..-Jntoinette's patroria e, which,
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of course, he then forfeit-ed by pleadin in the parlement
Maupeou 77), and he could expec- no place or syrrDa'1y in tne
1770 parlemont of t-aris.
In 1771 he loric of old re-ime poliics made 1'- inevitable
tha' Lin ue ;ou1d ruport Mau000u in the ±eformod parlement.
The complicatin factor o Ai uillon's nostility kCpL. Linuet
outside the court l77l72, but, for all Cruppi's special pleading,
Linç, uet committed himelf to I au;eou's judiciary early in 1772.
He enjoyed i-he patrona'e of the presiden-s Nicolaf and Cn'teau-
çiron 78• i.e pleaded in the ne
	
ar1ement, tooh	 many cau'es
celeres, and in 1773 the Jorn1 Encyc3rdque printed a
'i\ot ice iiiorique de :. de M9u 'ou' by Lin uet irhich coraincd
the no t fu1'-o:e .rdEc? for - ic Chncel1cr and clained hau eou
_	 7Dhad succeeded where -ioiLal had failed '. In tue same year
Rer naud had noted, "Lin'-uet 	 ait un homrne qui lul (iaupeou)
,	 /	 30avait e 1-e et qui lui e-ait encore Lres uLi1 rour son sycteme"
Linuct con c id'-red 'hit' re ru'-a'-ion unf r and unfounded, 	 -
ave a defence of his position in 1774 in a Drief for the c . ' Q(
c'e Bthune: ' h 'orie' (and of course c1eZeriinc AlL ullion) icu
aroused the hos-iliLy of the oid ma is'racy a ainst him, but the
nature of Iaupou's reforms were also repellent to iim and in,
"tue most violent despair ", ho vithdrev from the ijar. As the
only o'-tion available to him, ho ever, he had to return to plead-
in in the me" parlement o1• T o years labor he put forrard the
same argument that he had unjustly been as-ociated ith, "une
rvo1u:ion ionnante", (carried out by "ce'te association rcdou
able" of 1aureou, Terray, and Ai r uillon) on account of his defen
of Aicui].lon. ie claimed to have publicl y disassociated iimse1f
from iaupeou after already losing Aiguillon's patrone 82.
One way or the other - and probably both - Lin uet displayed
some disindenuousness under aupeou. .iis 'No'-ice 1s-origue'
vas proah1y no more ian an exedient to end '-he exile to Char-
tres that Hon-eynard hd imposed on him 	 . Linguet's career
1771-5 illustrates the dilenma faced by all m istrates not
wholly committed to ilaupeou, wheJier Lo hoe for a recall, stick
to the old loialties and principles, and uo-e not to starve in
exile, or whether to throw in their lot ith the new parlements
in order to renain active and solvent. For Liri uet 'ie c.ioice
cn not ha'e been so c'fficult a fever otions '1ere
	
en ..-3
him, nonetheless he did here he could encourare the new courLL
to initiate reforms \riLhoub co.&imi'tin iiri celf. In Octoer 1771
he was ac itaLin for reforms in '-he eneral Farms and on the
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question of mixed marriaies 84 Aiguillon's refusal to pay him,
according to the Journal Llistorigue, forced him into hack writing
and his authorship of Crub Street material was suspected
The chronolocy of Linguet's cases is confused, they seem
to run simultaneously. For the sake of clarity they will be
taken separately and a i in sequence. From 1772-1774 Linuet
defended the vicornte de Bombelles, the- comte de Mprançis, Belle
çarde, and the comtesse de ithune. The Bombelles case had Liri
cuet exiled to Chartres by Monteynard for defending the interests
of the nobility of Gevaudan aainst the c;overnment (see Chapter
for Gevaudan's constitution). The 3thune case draed on
throuch the recall of the old parlements and Linguet's disbar-
	
ment.	 ioran- is was acquitted, 2el1earde condemned.
In none of these cases was the guilt or innocence of the def en-
dant the most important point at issue 87•
In 1772 he outraced the advocaLes, who had decided as a
body to boycott Naupeou's parlements , by pleadin again in
parleraent. In his defence of Morangis he accused the prosecut
ion, "us travaillent surtout'a reveiller dans les coeurs cette
ma1init sci?ete qul se rejouit de l'humiliabion des Grands.
Ayant affaire 'a un homme de distinction, us s efforcent de per-
suader la portion nombreuse et inferieure de la societe, que
leurs intrts sont ceux quiconque n'est point dans une condit-
	
,	 ,ion elevee. Xis n'oublient rien pour faire de leur proces, celui
de ]a bourgeoisie contre le militaire, et de la roture contre
la noblesse" 88, This was a personal statement of faith in the
need to protect persecuted innocence and to uphold structures
of authority, and a specific attack on Haupeou' s apparent desire
to divert public attention away from political reality towards
carefully arranged political scandals.
Bellegarde was quartermaster under Choiseul's patronaçe;
he was accused of corruption and dereliction of duty, presumably
at Monteynard's instigation for the minister took a close inter
est in the case in order to discredit the ChGiseulists in the
army 89, Linguet defended his client by making a savaçe attack
on the ministry and parlement which had brought the case in the
first place. The patriots could not have attacked the parle
ment more stronLly than Lin'uet in his 'Conu1tation pour le
Sleur d Belle-arde'. Hardy wrote that Lincuet, "se permet urie
sortie aussi vive qu'indcen.te coritre ses confrres", of no4-ier
occasion, and recorded the cautioninc! ad finally osIrcising
of Linuet within the parlement 90, The ministry could overlook
399
Linnuet up to 1.773, buthis vicjorous and successful defence of
I3ellecarde - "Le plus sage, peuttre, mais aussi le plus convain
quant. qui ait jamais td' donn" threatened to turn onto the
c'overnment the discredit they had hoped would fall on the Choiseu].
isi-s
Linr"uet's last case was ostensibly internal to the family
of Bthune, with th' countess defendinc'herself against the
count supported by the duc de Bror lie and Lauzun, stretcrxed on
into 1775 and was more important for the oppotunity it ç,ave
Lin-uet to puolicise iimself than for any service it may have
rendered the coutss.	 "Non coeur rpuçne," Lincuet addressed
the parlement, " en chercher les complices dans une compac-nie
que je n' ai	 de res;ecter mal' r 1' injustice de quelquesuns
de ses membres, et d'aimer mal'r ce que j'ai souffert pour en
soutenir l'honneur. lais je crois continuer de bien xnriIer d'
she, en mettant au jour les com?lots rvoltants dans son scm.
Les fluides les p1u urs produisent toujours quelque cuzne
cruand us son ac'ite'" 92 Linr uet used the case to issue
apolo-v for his career to date and to justify his conduct. He
had acrruired -wo poerfu1 enemies .in par lenient:	 Gerbier and
Vercrs. Gerbier, "he calomniatuc-r he plus acharn" arainst Lin'
cuet	 as an An'lophi1e advocate in Conti's pay , who manaqed
the transition to and bacl from Maupeou's parlement. Vere' vas
advocate reneral 1771-4 and a proteeof liaupeou, he issued an
arrt on 11. february 1774 to have Lin-uet's brief btitn l: nd its
author disbarred. This left both the case and Linue.'s career
in him'o, and he spent much of 1774 workinc' on the 'Journal de
Fohiticue et de Literature' iihich appeared at the end of tile year.
The recall of the parlements opened up the possibility of
reinstatement; Linguet put his case before the advocates at a
meetin' on 3 March 1775, where Gerbier led the move for disbar-
ment. Moreau reported that the advocates had had to act as a body
because no inçlividual dared stand aainst him
	
. .erbier, none-
.th1ess, was the focus of opposition and the battle between him
nd r±ng.uet was causing, "the devil of a row". 9t,	 The tone of
his. piscours' implied that disbarment would come as no surprise,
but Lingut lost no time in vi1ifyin his opponents in print.
."Jamais," t told Louis XVI, "un citoyen ri'a reçu un plus sanr
lant outrace, jarnais un homme, un crivain n'a
	 plus cruelle
ment. comromi	 He bewailed his fate in both bO'ervahicrr'
and, in .more detail in a new brief for the comtesse de Bthune,
"Suis-je . donc le seul homme au rnonde pour gui les succes ne s01
ant que des sources de dan' er g , he seul citoyen condamn ' des
c'uerres 'terne1ies, et passer sa vie dans des-an' oises, eon-
vulsions non-interrompues,a arracher journallement par l'vid-
ence des absolutions toujours lude'es par la calomnie, le seul
individu en I aveur de qui les loix, la justice, le voeu pub-
lique, les arrts ne puissent rieri?". Of being disbarred he
declared, "Les cours d'Asie, l'Inquisition ellemme n'Ont rien
d'aussi fIrayant, d'aussi cruel, d'aussi abominable entout sans
que cette procdure"	 . This was the old reoime 1 s polemical
style at its best, .and representative of the -style of public
dispute in the 1770's.
Linc'uet called the Bar, "cet empire oraç , eux" where, "jamais
ii n'y a eii de licue plus odieuse, plus criminelle contre Ia
ocit'. He realised tha i- the advocates re arded him as, "Un/jurisconsulte danaereux et pervprs . . un ecrivain syptematlque,"
who, "a attacrue"dans ses erits le droit naturel, celui des
r ouvernements, le 1roit public de royaume, le droit ecclesiasti-
ouc et les loix civiles. Dans les dfenss des parties, il a/	 /viole les rer les de la moderation, de la decence et de l'honnete"
As a self-confessed fanatic and enthusiast 100 he was un-
repentant, but implacable in his opposition to the way the
inaristracy could abuse its power,
	 his "devil of a row" focused
unwelcome public attention on the liar, and as a dire result
101reforms there were iniited in 1777
The events of 1774-5 when Linuet was disbarred by the ad-
vocates on 22 December, reinstated by the parlement on 1. January,
arid finally re-excluded by the advocates on 3 February put Lin
quet in the limeliaht of public attention. "Tout le monde le
rerarda comme ui-i mauvais citoyen," wrote Recnaud 102, but Frron
believed the public would re r ret his disbarment 103, Mcra re
corded him as a, "caracre fourcrueux et dur", but with a reput-
aion for droppinr
 a matter at the first serious check. In 1'arch
1775 this, "terrible homne", was still hi'h1y newsworthy, "le
su1 de ws avoc'ats qui joiune 'a des talents ccui il1ust'ent le
barreau, des connaissances en littéature". He had caused the
Bar to loose much, face in their self-interested persecution of
him 104, Lin,uet's brief reinstatement in january to February
1775 was attributable to Sguier's patronae; this association '
damned him in philosophical and radida]. patriot eyes and made
i-Iady call him, "un m6chant homme" 105,
Lincuet was already working as a journalist, hut within the
accepted limits of the ret. ime. ae
 period 1774-6 marks the in-
tellectual transition from advocate to hac'. Dunn. these years
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Linuet continued to work on the fringe of the leal profession
civin help and advice io6 His experience at the Lar, his in
s1hts into the re irne, and the encounter of his ideas with
reality were encenderinr a pessimism and cynicism which by 177o
made him as much an inel1ecual as physical outcast of the re
ctime. "Sa plume n4uisab1e" hurned out pamphlets and satires
- one aairistVri1lire likenirirt the minister tOCaliula's
horse 107 He earned the enmity of Tur-ot forhis' attack on the
free market in crain in. '0berva'-ior', arid he claimed that. ur-
cot had tried to buy his silence for 2,0001., a story that the
Espioni Annals confirmed °. Ae complained that the freedorr
of the press allowed by urn'ot helped only the physiocras,
though tie very pu3lica-ion of his -qorkin 1775 in A-aris belies
this	 . )itra heard that hehad applied to Frederick II for
patronace, hut was prudently turned down
France was becomin an uncomfortable environment for Liuet,
though as long as ur:ot remained at the Control Ceneral he was
free to rrite and publish as he saw fit. When turçot fell. th..
May 1776 Linuet's ina1 split with the old re-ime could rio lonç-
er be averted. The pretext for the government to close down the
'Journal' was "the createst irtcicccncc" Lincuet shoied a airist
the cadenie in uly 1776 1114 LinueL b1ievcd Miro2nenu1 had
always borne him malice, and Miromesnul was able to use this
specious opportunity (an insult against Harpe) to turn Verqennes,
Nivernois'and Dura a'irt him 1l2 Iin.ut. ned to Ferney,
which by tacit anreement lay outside France's judicial reach, to
impose himself on Voltaire on tne strength of his early anti-
clerical cases, and pOssibly on Voltaire's support for XIaupeou.
othin. that Lirxc'uet wrote after 1776, even in apparent supp1ia-
tion for reeptarice, could do anythin but widen the breach be
tweeri himself and his society. The old re-'ime had nothinç to
offer him, and he joined the Grub Street Cynicsr in the re:ime's
own terms, politics in Linguet were as bitter and perverted as
was sex in Sade.
Before çointq on to his thought in the 1770's we must remem
ber that Linçuet had worked out , a thorough-oing critique of the
old rer ime in the 1760's; it had been the startin. point for
'Thorie', but before 1776 he had ho2ed it mi:ht be used cons.ruc
tively to promote reform. rhile Linuet had put these ideas,
across in hook form it was as closely ar ued and complex ?olitiC
al thilosophy, he had made no attempt to reach any broader
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readihr public than other philosophes.	 orks such as 'Arinales'
or 'inoIrc ur la 3as l ille' rere to. have a much wider appeal
than 'Th4orie', and reach down to a very different readership
than the rarified atmosphere of Le Monde. Lin uet portrayed a
society there "itled lions" devoured the helpless and depressed
floc}s of i-he peasantry, where a continent-wide lite had enter-
ed into oncordats with the kiri to crush the people, where the
state was still coverned by a constitution which dated from a
time when France had been a vast forest conquered by northern
barbarians. Justice was corrupt, abusive, and tyrannical, serv
mc the interests only of the jude es ll3	 every point society
condoned and reinforced exploitation, whether juridical by the
Great or economic by the middle classes. Linçuet 6ould have
started by abolishing juridical rank arid provincial autonomy -
"Ces titres plus chimriques encore que fastueux" - to ielp the
people 114,
One of Linuet's most intriuin lines of thought was on
the role of women in society. The usual opinion of women as that
they exercised an inordinate influence over men, and enjoyed a
danrerous1y privile ed position ll5 Several writers were con-
cerned to reimpose that traditionally inferior position \iomen
were supposed to be underminin: Re'tif de la Bretonne ordered
them to consider men their "lords and masters", and Aubusson would
have made every roman a minor before the law ll6 Li%uet reject-
ed this absolutely:. women were the slaves of slaves. In the
lower classes they bore the brunt of physical toil tillirir,
- tireshirx, harvestinc, runnin a house, feedinf. the livesLock,
etc. in the upper classes they were kept in a state of "clepen
dence and humiliation" as inferior beings and second class
citizens. Linguet traced this subjuçation to child-bearin g whith
brutalised, exploited, and oppressed their sex, Linçuet accuse4a
society which ondemned harems but condoned convents of bein
• hypocritical. In Linuet's speculative writing the woman appears.
as man's potential equal, a legally autonomous individual, but
in Lin'-uet's day she iremained the most subject of the subjuçated
117
For Liriuet, as for almost every other cormentator, his cen-
tury was one of decay arid dissolution. An outdated social struc-
ture was heine undermined by capital and philosophie. If It
would be impractical to return to the rood old ways, then a dras-
tic restruclurin society - alonc the lines of a despois f
law - would be needed. Linuet analysed the decay since former
403
times, ",.. oi la maristrature, peu riombreuse, mais assidue,
n'avait d'autre ambition que celle de remplix ses devoirs avec
exactitude; o'u le tiers tat simple, conome, satisfait de son
obscurit4, ne connalEsait rn ces moyens destructeurs de s'1ever
rapidemenca la for 4-un', qul y cause de no jours une si rande
frmeritation, ni la manie 1 de s'en servir pour se rapprocher des
rands, et acheter desalliances qui dshonorent une des families
sans honorer l'autre" 11J Like Mirabeau, Linuet looked to
supposed former social virtues fo inspiration, and his belief
in keepin to one's station, in life reflects Rtif de la are-
tonne. 3ef ore Linuet was to analyse society açain he would have
had ten years experience- at the Dar, experience which profoundly
altered is outlook i yithin. the same critical framework.
The 'Journal de Folitique et de Littrature' was not an out
standinr event, it broke no new journalistic r-round, but it as
thorou hly competent. From the aet-e dr France it reprinted
uncontroversial nets 4n deth and detail; i. rined in full
speeches in the rarlement (particularly Suier's) and official
overnzuent material (e.c. on the aftermath of the Flour Tar).
By arid lar-e Linc-uet ras hostile to Turcot's economic policies
(e.. crairl) but favourable to his social reforms (e.ç.. on çuilds).
There was much editorial comment conducted with fairness and
bredti oiZ mind, and some de'-ree of humour, and Line uet invited
readers to write in r ivinj their own -opinions. Althouçh the
frontipice claimed the 'Journal' was printed in russels the
edse .qitn vi'dch it was able to be shut down sur-ests it ras based
inParis. The 'Journal' received public interest rather than ac-
claim, and as it started at the same time as Lin :uet's battle with
the parlement, Linçet was not bein taken seriously as an object-
ive observer. Bachaumont dismissed Lin .uet the journalist: "...
gonfld'de vent, (ii) erofsea son ordirnaire et ne pane que de
lui" 119
'wO influences in exile helped and matured him as a journal
1st. The first, andobvious, wa Voltaire's company at Ferney.
The second was the publication of 'Doutes cur 1'Elouence et le
Sysme,othirues' (Paris ? 1776) by the youri I'iallet du ?an,
iho re' arded Linuet as some kind of hero and had written this
defence and vindication of him in his absence from Fans. he
boo' served as an introduction, nd the two men met and determn
ed to found the best political journal the eime had yet seen.
Just as he had issued 'ceie" s a declarat.ion of inen. be-
f ore enter in te 3ar, Lin' ue t. no stated his cr levances and plans
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in 'Le-tre de ri. LThcuet ' i. le C. de Verr ermes'. in the letter
he roundly condemned the ministers and magistrates of his day
sayinc that the latter in 1771, "r4'unissait la trahison ertvers
le peuple, a la d6sob4issance pour leur roi" 12O Reaction to
this letter was arialaous to the hostility to 'Svstemede la
Nature t ; (r imm called it, "un x1onument si rare d' extrava_ance
et d'amour propre" 12l• M 'tra called it "vomit" ,and its contents
exarcrerated and misplaced 122; Bachaumont believed it was so
extreme that it would j.mperil Linguet's safety 123,
After a brief visit in 1777 to London, which Linçuet dis-
liked, he moved to Brussels and bt^can publication of the 'Annales
Politirtuec, CivloF, et- Li-trair3s du Dix-iui'lm '3ic1c',
which as the best periodical of its time. The *rf1exion pre'
liminaires" in the first vo1um are one of the most extraordinary
documents to come out of the old rec-ime being an accurate pre-
diction of the peasant revolution of 179. The constitution as
defined by 1iontesquieu he called, 'Wes coutumes çrossires, Eon-
dSes sur' les caprices de l'icnorance et de Ia stupidit4'dans
la nuit de l'anarchie foda1e" 124 Just as Gii described cori
stitutioil checks and balances as "aitation perpe'tuelle*, SQ
Linguet saw conE 1ictin, corporations as the battleground with
the people as cannon fodde.r 125, "he CDWP had failed to ascert
its sovereirinty and had therefore become an enemy of every part
of society - it engaged in a perpetual civil war against its
subject. Thile ie 'r .r  the par) ements, and the no' ity
disputed viio was "the nation", their powers ebbin and flowin
in constant political battles, sovereiçnty resided alone in the
nation itself 12o
Society was becominc ever more corrupt and ca1lous At
the same time a 9 industry and learning were expanding rapidly
the poor were dying of hunrer in ever greater numbers. The rich
were shirking more and more of their responsibilities, "L'esence
de la socitest d'exempter le riche du travail". Finance had
run amok completely, the national debt exceeding the value of
the kingdom and taxes runninq at 50% of income for the poor. The
parlements he attacked for their abuse, haarity, pretensions and
dereliction of duty. The army was a constant drain on resources,
a brutalisinc; influence in societF, a stronghold of prejudice,
and a cause of brir.anda-e in peacetiine from its surplus sian
power, unable to readapt to civilian life 127, Linuet hated the
militaires from havin had to work with them in the Norangi
and Bel1eçard cases, and for the militaire ethos, 'i... vielli
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daris Xe espotisme de sa profession, acoutume'a croire quil
n'y a pas d'autres principes dans Xe monde que Xe commandement et
1'oissance" 123w Taking for granted the laxity of the Church,
he condemned the upper c1erry as riddled with philosophie and
the lower he dismissed as politically impotent 129•
Lincuet had attacked British politics before, ut in Annales
he subjected them to close scrutiny. He had to arnit that in
pract.Lcal matters the ua1ity of political life was superior to
that in France; the law, for exariple, was ireatlypreferable
f or the jury system arid the freedom of the press. But the nature
of the British constitution, Ivinc. free re jt.-n to the aristocracy,
meant that society was far more tyrannical, and he believed that
the people were vorse of f. Linuot had already 0ut3.ined his
vision of a continent-wide aristocracy in the old world, with
despair S he recorded the same developments in. the newly indepen-
dent states of america. Lincuet had by now despaired of ref orm
in or of breakinç the power of this aristocracy, and the only
weapon left was knowledce, to show the people the true nature of
the world they were living if. "Le ricieau qui semblait couvrir
les opra'ions politiques et envelopper, soit les cabinets, soit
les arines, s'est enfiri levi", he wrote predictin- world war as
the war of Bavarian Succeon would be joined to 3ritain's col
onial war and to hostilities in the alt.ic 130 This was the
very attitude he had condemned in 'Fanatime'.
At evcrv point it was the poupis and the poor who suffeied
from the faults of the reç.ime. 'Enfln chez nous les pauvres sont
trait4's avec une indiffeence, und4'dain, et souvent sacrificis
avec ure barbarie qui rvolte les coeurs sensiles". They had
to pay hicther prices for bread to satisfy the physiocrats, they
suffered punishment for crimes for 'which the privil4iwoulc1 only
be cautioned, and by the corvc(e ±ey "watered" the roads with
their "blood and tears"
	 If the peasant or casual labourer
could rio loncer make end$ meet he 'would be no worse of f in rebel
lion than in loyalty 132 (Behrens shows this' to be the reçime's
most seriQus flaw.) 133 Given that the authorities were unuike3.
to.he able to take any effective action to help the masses, Lixi-
cuet could see no other answer but revolutio p, "L'Europe n'a
plus prs d'une subvrsiQn totale, d'autant plus terrible que
Xe despoir en sera la cause" 134 Lincuet added that massive de-
population mi rtht ensue with or without a revolution, arid here he
was ar reeinr. with 'Los Vues imples d'un 5ori Homme' wiich predict-
ed the economic breakdown of society from the bottom up if the
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lot of the peasant were riot bettered 135
Linruet was not a utopian revolutionary - just a 's he had
been a nihilist in terms of dSvot politics, so he was still a
nihilist in a revolutionary context. In 1764 he had written,
"Telle est l.a marche invariable des hommes depuis qu'ils existent
successivement barbares et corrumpus" 1, by 1777 he had come
truly to believe this arid to believe that the nay corrupt old re
gime was about to revert to barbarism and a new dark ace after its
destruction by the oppressed. masses. Their very revolution, ac-
cording to Linguet, would cause the people yet more misery
How different the way Linuet coped with the human political con
dition in 1777 to the way Voltaire had reconciled himself to it
in 'Cand 4 de' in 1759, it was the transition from Stoicism to des-
pair. Linguet has been variou1y labelled "socialist" and'nar
chist" 138 but. neither of these descriptions can embrace his
comfortless cynicism.
Before the Annaifs' publication the Annie Litte'raire, now
edited by Frron's sn, had eaçerly awaited them and ç , iven Lin-
çuet encoura' ement, sayinj that journalism was the one area of
literature still urAconquered by phi.ioso?hie. On readinr the
quarterly, however, Frron chanced his mind and cave it a very
hostile review, there was little to qive heart to a c1e.rot in the
,Arina1e 139, Bachaumont acreed with him cal1in, the .Annales "fort
m6charie" l4O The Mercure de France cave a prospectus for the
periodical a scathiri':. and sarcastic review, "N. I,inr uet s pro-
pose de venter dsormais l'humanitdes outra ,es qui la f1tris-
sent, d'&clairer la raison sur les earts qui l.a dshonorent, et
de fixer le jugement de la poste'rit sur les vneients, les loix,
et les moeurs de notre sic1e" 141 For all the Mercure's scep-
ticism the latter comment at least has proved to be true, the
Anra1e is now rearded as a classic critique of its society.
The Mnales re widely read, it was reported that Louis
XVI himself was a rec ular subscriber, thouch it is difficult to
believe that he could have craspeci the depth.of scope of their
attack on i'iis kinc dam 142, Cruppi, however, records that Louis
XVI had approved of Linguet ever since beginning to take an in-
telligent interest in his future realm as Dauphin 143. triie
standard of journalism was far hiher than tnat of the 'Journal';
the man who read Anna les would have been well-informed about
events throughout Euro?e and North merica, and would have assim
ilated much radical comment on his society. Linç,uet lost n
opportunity to print subversive political information from botn
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past and present. )iore specifically, editorial policy in its
first tvo years made the Annale rive cautious support to Kecker,
and supported the Presidial courts as counter-eiçhts to the
parlexuents 144, As a footnote it should be added that Linuet's
experience of ini.prisonment in the 3asti11e caused him to reverse
his ideas about ritain, teachin a wholly practical respect for
British law and civil liberty, which altered his political out-
look from the mid1780's
Lin-'uet has been almost entirely irnored by historians,.
partly because he is impossible to classify, partly because he
blends into his environment, but mostly because only his enemies
have received detailed attention. From this latter stand point
Lonce de Lavergne concludes that Lin r ue possessed, "... assur
ment un esprit bizarre et I aux, une imaçjinton inquite et
malade" 146 Bonno realises that Llnc.uet had developed a detai1
ed attack on Anrlomania, but dismisses it as unimportant 147
study of Linuet in 1969 eins Tith the remark that he, "...
shocked arid unsettled no one, provoked little debate, and was
almost universally disdained, inored, or quickly forgotten" 148,
which is simply not true. Lin' uet's o'in account of his failure
to çain official reconition in his soc:Let.y was the hostile re-
ception of 'Thorie', "...un ouvrar e si indignement, si cruelle-
ment ju', et pour mon onhieur peutLre, si peu lu •.•" l4
Linuet was a man of the Enlightenment who nonetheless saw
the only solution to societys problems in terms ol rfcid struc
tures,of authority, which brought him into the divot sphere of
the old re-me's politics. His practical experience of the recime
throuch its 1ea1 system caused him to lose any political optinr
ism he may have possessed, and, as a Cynic, to deliver a radical
critique of the rerime and to predict its fall. His sinçle most
important idea was the primacy of force as the basis of poliLical
life and historical process, whether as the origin of property
or the ar ent of the old re-line's imminent collapse 150,
At eyery point Linuet went one step beyond the accepted
position of the day. hi1e he stands out as a uniqüe fIure, he
illuminates each part of the old re irne, not only with his own
comments ut also by forcin contemporaries to state the norms
he had violated. rilS intellectual proçress - from the ?hysiocracy
of the 1760's, to considerution of the "decpotism" of 1771-4,
and -on o analysing and exploitinc the new political opportunit-
ies of Louis X1I's rein - is archetya1. Like Letro8ne,he
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moved from Jansenism and Physiocracy in the 1760's to more origin-
al and challenging thinking in the 1770's. There have been recent
suggestions that Linguet should be integrated into his political
culture. Both Grange and Baker show that becker trod the same in-
tellectual path in the 1760's, but reached very different conclus-
ions, and avoided the "error" of despotism 151,
This study of Linguet has been both intellectual and biograph-
ical. Did his ideas have any lasting impact? Linguet's relation-
&ip to the Revolution was analogous to Hobbes' to the English
Civil War. His difficult style made his works remote - but no
more so than 'Contrat Social'. The main problem for Linguet was
his pessimism, which disconcerted both the old regime, the phil-
osophes, and the Revolutionaries. His solution was to accept
despotism wholeheartedly. This was too far out of step with con-
temporary French aspirations.
If we look at him in the wider context of European thought,
he can not be ranked with the greater philosophers, nor can he be
an apologist for the ancien regime. His criticism of "modern"
political and social ideas has been isolated by being linked with
throne and. altar ideoJ ogi e. W mit v1-.iivi to seeing him as a
manifestation of the very peculiar climate of opinion before the
Revolution forced men to choose between monarchy and change and
development as two incompatible alternatives.
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APPENDIX III
LO"SAY
- The old regime riot only abounds with technical terms whicn
need explanation 1 but also possesses the problem of words vhich
have caançed their meaninrs s or can not be taken at face value.
Anglicisations ha\'e been taken, in order of prference, from:
contemporary British usage (eg. Plumes Quill), current British
usage (eg.) Baillis Bailie), and simple translation (eg. Avocat4
Advocate).
AISOLtJTISM
ABtJS:
AGENT-GENñRAL;
AIDES:
ANIRAUTE:
NOBLI
ARISTOCRACY:
ARRET:
ARETE:
A1RONDXS$EMEN;
Royal uthority up to, ut not béyond.. rifrinç'-
ing on the lives and property of subjects; the
question of property through off ice-holdin put
the parlernents outside absolute rule. It impli
ed administration conducted in consultation it
the Council rather than by ratification by the
States General. (nb. term not coined till l9t!
century).
ABUS, a pr.actice deterimentally decayed away
from its oriInal pur;ose..
President of the General Assembly of Clergy, a
post held for five years and answerable only
to thc Assombly.
AIDS, a fiscal jurisdiction, the Court o Aids
was a court of fiscal appeal independent of the
parlement; the Aids themselves were the intern-'
al customs duties levied by the Farmers GeneraX
ADMIRlLTY (COURT), court with criminal juris-
diction over land in riaval ownership.
One who has boucht an.ennobling office, first
c!eneration noble.
Owing to the old regime's social structure, th
nobility embraced all tlosewho could be defined
axistocracy; butnotall nOties were aristocrats.
e .	-	 j.A ruling by a court or cpuncil with the force,
of law, also used as a qualification to an d.ct
not requirin'; re1stration.
A ruling by a court or council without the
force of law to serve as precedent.
Admjnistrative unit consisting of several parish-
es.
AVO CAT:
VOCATCENERAL:
BAILLI;
BAILLLE:.
BZN EARIEE-
BAN):
BANAL ITE i
BOURGEOIS
BUREAU
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ASSEMBLEE GENERALEGENERAL ASSEMBLY OF CLERGY, meetincj as both
DU CLERGE;	 a Corporation and .Order the clerçy assembled
every five years to vote the Don.Gratult and.
consider administrative, political, and. theo
1.oicai issues. this was the .oid reçime's
most autonomous institution.
ADVOCATE, a barrister entitled to plead before
the Bar of a Soverei n Court or Superior Coun
cii, a limited arid exclusive Corporat4on.
ADV0cArE GENE1AL.
AILI2, the chief functionary of a Bailiwick,
also a more general title for an off ical. as
in the Order of St. cohn.
BAILrtIcK, a medieval jtrisdiction beXowit pro
vince still exercisirir some powers under the
parlernents in l3th cien*ury.
The feudal military levy based on the Pief.
3ANALITY, a seicneurial riht to a monopoly
in millinç, baicinr, pressin, etc - one of
the central preroçatives of the Seineurie.
J townsman not working with his hands
A sub-division f a Department of State, usuai'
ly staffed by kasters of Requests.
BURGUNDY (WKE OF This was a croup of' political, thinkers who were
BURGUNDY'S ClRjE):athered around the duke in an effort to pro-
duce a blue-print of pe'fect overrunent. This
rroup consisted of: Fne'1on, oisuillebert,
Boul],a jrivjlljers, St-Pierre, and Vauban. They
inspired the 1698 survey of the realm which
remained the basic information for political
ref orm to 1789. Between their several and varied
outloocs emer , ed a programme for: a reformed
fiscal system based on a s,incle, universal 10%
tax on income, and a relaxation of Coibert's
mercantilism to allow reaer freedom of trade
and stimuiatiod of agriculture. The roup laid
down all the major lines of' thouçht in dmin-
istrative reform for the remainder of th re-
gime.
CAJIEI DE DOLEANCES; 1ETITION OF CRIEVANCE, the riçht to pre
sent one belorir ed only to the assemblies of
4,9
CANTON:
CAPITA INE DES
GARDES i
CAPITA F ION:
CENS:
CUAMBRE:
CHAMBRE DE
FORFEITURE:
C1iM3RE 1)23 PAIRS:
cHAN CEL IEX
CHAR(z
CHATEAU:
HATELET
CITOYEN:
cLASSEs
COLONEL:
COMMANOANT (-EM-
States (provincial or Ceneral); the possible
contents of a national Petition. of Lrievance
was an important reason for not convodn the
States .)eneral.
Sub-division of a province used both as a vaue
locality and.as a specific unit of reformed
provincial administration' between province arid
arrondissement •
CAPTAIN OF TH3 GUARDS, a colonel of one of the
three Household recixnents whose command con-
ferred voting richts in the parlement.
A çraduated polltax paid as a supplement to
the Taille.
A Seineurial tax.
aiAMBER, sub-division of a Soverei r n Cour. o
Superior Council.
cHMiBER OF FOREIVURE, a body bf peers and
senior ma istrates designed to regulate the
conduct of the parlement (never implemented),
CHiBER OF PEERS, the peers as a separate body
set above the parlement (never implemented).
•CHANCELLO, the head of the judiciary and a
Qreat Officer of State the last feudal posit
ion retaining çreat political importance.
Generally synonymous with Office, but it could
ref er specifically to a non-venal Office revo-
able to the crown,
Mid-way between British castle and manor house
usually a seat. of seigneurial jurisdiction.
A Chamber in the parlement 'with criminal juris-'
diction.
CITIZEN, a member of the political nation.
Subdivision of an Order or Corporation.
A section of the robe based on ennoblin munic"
,ipa.l Offices.
Commander o a regiment, a post important be-
cause it was owned a.
	
erty and conferred
j'uriädfôtion over ther obIes. It was a theme
o the late century to-ensure that only
(v-.) were colonels.
The third post in a ouvernemerit with coznpet
ence over civilian admthitration only (after
1776).
CONSEIL PRIVE/DES
EART lESs
CONS ETh PRO VIIiCIAL;
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CO?fl4ISSAIRE DEXAi'I: Generally synonym for Intendant, but also
used of a maçistrate dispatched to the pro
vLnces on a pecifi brief
COMPE RENDIJ: An account of actions, finances, policies,
etc. nade by a Ninister to the kinc - only
Necker's o 1781 was made public.
COMPrESs	 ACCOUNTS, a fiscal jurisdiction, the Court
of Accounts as a court of fiscal appeal i-n
dependent of the parlement.
CONNETABLE:	 CONSTABLE,a defunct. Creat Officer of State
with jurisd±ction over internal policing,
his funct.ions were exercised by the I1arshals
in the eihteenth cent.ury.
CONSEIL;	 cOUNCIL, body with the prerogative of being-
consulted by the kinç, under an absolutG
monarchy the kin was under no obliça tion to
heed a Council or accept. its majority
decision.
CONSEIL D'ETAT;
	 COUNCIL OF SATE, more cenerally referred to
as "The Council", made up of the 1Zinisters
of State. This was the senior Council with
special respon.cibi].ity for forein affairs.
CONSEIL DES DEEcHES: COUNCIL OF DISFATciES, the Council with
responsibility for internal administration
through the Iiitendants.
CONSEIL DE DIRECTIOtt/COUNCIL OF F1ANC2S, the Council with resp pn-
DES FINANCES:	 éibility for taxation arid public works, the
- CONSEIL SUPEIUEUR:
Minister of State in chart'e of the Council
of Finances might also be Prime Minister.
PRIVATE COUNCIL, the Council acting as a
court of executive appeal, hence with compet-
ence over internal administration.
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL, a norrsovereijn court
of appeal, also the coordinatincy executive
body in a. reformed provincial administration
SUPERIOR COUNCIL, a non-sovereiçn court ot
appeal 1771-4.
CONSEILLER:	 COUNSELLOR, a member of a council or court.
CONSUL:	 A type of judce or municipal official, chief
functionary of a Consulate, also the term
for judçes in a reformed judiciary.
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CONSULA
CONTROLE CENERALE:
CONTROLEUR GENERAL:
COQ DU VILLAGE:
CORPS:
CORPS INTEi2,iEDIARE:
CORV.EE:
COUR DES PAIRS:
COUR S OtIVERA INE:
cotTrtn4E
CULT IVATEUR:
DEARAT ION:
DEGE:
CONSULATE, type of municipal jurisdiction,
lendi' their name to a cenêral structure off
reformed judiciary.
?ONTROL GENERAL, in effect, though not in nate,
th!s was the Department bf State responsible
for finances. and some internal administration.
CONTROLLER GENERAL, the Minister in chare of.
the Control General (not always promoted 'co
ein a Ninistr immediately).
Peasant notable, t;e largest non-noble, rion
bourç.eois land owner in a community?
CORPORATION, an autonomous body with the right
to assemble without the pernission of the kifl.
Even if Onlr as a meñiber of a parish asmbly,
every subject under the old. recime was expect
ed to be a member of' a Corporation and to ei
joy some attendan.t privilee or preroative.
INTERMEDIARY BODY, any Corporation able to
limit the monarchy by imposing itself between
the JUnr and his subjects, specifically the
parlements' pretension to form a constitutiorr
al check through the ownership of its Offices
and the Registration of Edicts.
Forced labour, most often used of peasants
on roads orç,anised by the Intendants.
COURT OF PEERS, the Iar1ement of Paris in
pleiary session with the peers present.
SOVEREICN cOURT, an autonomous court of appeal
able to reçjulate its Own composition and Con-
duct (see also VENALITY).
CUSTOM, çeneratly a political practice sane"
tioned by. antiquity, specifically an unwrit"
ten leral coded
CULTIVATOR, anyone tilling the soil with his
own hands.
A supplement or qualification toan Edict.
DEGREE, (of nobility) the number of generat
ions of nobility on the male side only the
basic conea1o;icl reckonin in the old regime4.
DEMOCRACY *	 Rule by mob.
DEPARTELNT (D'ETAT): DEARTliEN (OF STATE), one of the Four
(five 1763-80) divisions of covernment ru h'-
DIOCESE:
DISTRICT:
DIXME/DINE RGYALE:
DOMAINE ROYALE:
DON GRATUIT:
DROIT DE SEIGNEtIB:
ECHEVIN:
ECONOMIE:
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a Secretary of State; they were in order of sen-
iority: APPAIRES ETRANGERES (FOREIGN AFFAIRS),
cuaa (wAit), MAILINE (ADMIRALTY), MAISON DU ROt
(KING'S NOUsEHOLD), and the fifth responsible for
agriculture and. communications. Each Department
was also responsible for a quota of Generalities.
DEROGEANCE:	 DEROGATION, deprivation of nobility for conduct
unbecoming to the rank of noble.
ESPOTISM:	 Absolute rule extending over the lives and. property
of subjects. Bu].e by caprice without law.
DEVOT:	 Specifically in this period., a political opponent
of the Choiseulists or queen's Party, using the de-
fence of institutionalised religion as a political
weapon. (It embraced. all those who could be descr-
ibed. as "devout" Catholics).
(Secular) .A sub-division of a States Country - es-
pecially Languedoc.
Area of a reformed provincial administration,
equivalent to a Canton.
10% universal tax on income from all sources.
ROYAL DOMAIN, land owned directly by the crown and.
outside the jurisdiction of other agencies of gov-
ernment.
An institutionalised tax paid. by a Corporation in
place of Ordinary taxation, serving to reinforce
its autonomy.
Seigneur's right to sleep with a vassal on her wed-
ding night almost certainly extinct by the 18th
century, but an abuse deeply embedded in popular
consciousness.
Municipal magistrate.
The eradication of mismanagement, vested. interest,
and abuse in finances with implied reform.
ECONQNISTE	 ynonyin for Physiocrat.
EDIT: jDICT, legislation promulgated by the crown re-
quiring Registration by the parlements. Almost
all legislation was initiated by Edicts, which
could only be promulgated by the Crown.
ELECTION: Administrative fiscal unit (approximately a Canton)
for the collection of the Tai].le and the Capitatiori
in the Continental provinces (Pays d'i1ection).
FORCE DES CHOSES a
FRANC FIEF:
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ELU:
ENQUETES:
E'EEz
STAT: -
E,wrsa
ETHOCRACY:
"IL:
EXAORDINA IRE a
FAUSSE NOBLESSE:
FEODZLs
FERME GENERAL:
FER2IEE:
FIEF:
;FflANcE:
Chief functionary of an Election.
INQTJESTS, a j.inior Chamber in the parlement,
reputedly the most radical.
SOR, nobility of birth or race disclaimin
Robin. oriçins,. specifically the ship-board
officer corps in the navy.
Synonym ofOrder.
STATES, assembly of the three Orders of soc
iety, either GENERAL (ie. national) or I'RO-'
VINCIAL.
Government by secular mores.
EXILE, banishment to, and detention in, a
remote rural area.
EXTRAORDINIRY, (of taxation) governmental
activity not ratified by the States General.
FALSE NOBILITY, çenerally gained by purchas-
ing a noble estate and ta3cin9 its title to
usurp the privileges and prerocatives of the
SecQnd Order,
FEUDAL, the remnants of the feudal reime
which haçl decayed into juridical Frbperty,'
GENERAL FARZVI, the forty-six financiers (SEN
ERAL FARMERS), who contracted to collect Irr'
direct taxation on behalf of the crown . any
•money raised above the contract (Th1)
kept by the Farmers. Taxes collected included:
Gabelle, Tabac and Aids.
RESOLUTION.
Land çranted by the crown to a noble in re
turn for military service, ie. feudal land
holding. This persisted, as a type of Sei
neirial jurisdiction in 18th century (see
Frank Fief).
The financial establishmept displaying abuse
and vested interest.
Inertia caused by vested interest and admin-
istrative inefficiency
FRANK PIES', a taz paid by commoners buyinj
noble land.
GABELLE a
	
A tax on salt 'evied by the tax Farmers ad
ministered serately Erom other taxes and
varying çreatly from one province to another.
HUISSIERs
INTENDAN't':
JANSENISIE:
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GENERAL ITE t
GENS.DU ROl;
GENT IIHONME:
GOUVERNBUENT t
GOUVERNEUR;
GRAND:
GRANZ) CONSEILi
GRAND DPUThTIONi
GEiERALITY, the jurisdiction of an Intendant,
the basic ádzninfstrative unit of the Admin-
strative monarchy.
KING'S PEO-, the professional staff of a
law court holding non-venal charges.
Noble of three or more decrees of nobility.
Jurisdiction of a (overnor,the basic milit-
ary administrative unit based on the medie-
val provinces.
GOVERNOR, the chief furict ionary of a ouverne-
ment.	 -
CREAT, princes, peers, and members of the
Order-of the Holy host * the poiiical and
genealogical Lute.
GRAND COUNCIL, S overeiçn Court independent
of the parlement.	 -
Official deputation of magistrates fror,i the
parlement of Paris to the Court to present
a-Remonstrance.
GRANfl D'ESFACNE: 	 A noble 'enjoying reciprcal honours rith
the Spanish court, equivalent rank to a duc-
non-pair - oniyfinalised by the Fami3y
-Compact.
GRAND OFFICE D'ETAT: GREAT OFFICE OF STATE, an inalienable
Office at Courii conferring the preroative
of direct access to the King.
GREFFIER:
HABITANT:
HAUTE NOLESSE:
HEUREUX $
H.)1.C.M. (G)
I HOBEREAU:
cLER.
One who enjoys membership of a community,
its corporations, and local privilees
the category below Citizen.
synonym for the Great.
FELICITOUS.
I{IS I'-IOST cHRISTIAN is'rr( 'S GOVERN2'IENP )
(literally a small falcon) poor provincial
noble of 100+ year3+ derrees) of nobility
tillinçj the soIl with his own hands
SERANT. -
chief functionary of a Generality,- usualy
a laster of Requests.
JANSENIS11, nebulous relicv ious
 
doctrIne bos-
tile to ultramontane and Caeseropapalist
doctrine associated with the arlementar
opposition to the crown.
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JEStJIT:
JOURNAL IE 2:
JOYEUX AVENEMENT:
L.AB0URBU1:
LETTRE DE CA cT:
LETTRE DE cYUISS ON:
LETT'RE PATENTE:
LIEUrEKANT-GENZRAL:
LIT DE JT3STI
LIVEs
LOD3 E' VENTS:
LOX FONDA22NThLE:
LtJXE	 -
MAC IS TVtT
TESUIT, politically a supported of Uniçeni-
tus (qv.), Absolutism, and susequent3.y of
2'iaupeou, an enemy of the Jansenists.
CASUAL LA3OURER.
JOYO ACcESSION, a tax desiLned to cover
the cost of coronation - waived in' 1774.
Peasant owning his on equiment, though not,
necessarily land, and producing surplus foOc,
Sealed instructions dth the authority of
the crown used çenerally either for the reçju-'
lation of assemblies or for the imprisonment
of individuals (usually in a nob.e family)
sicned y the Secretary of State for the
1ing's Household. At its worst a lettre de
cachet allowed one un-named person. to impr.s
on another for an unspecified offence for an
unspecified period. This was the old re,ime'5
worse abuse.
IJUS S IVE LETTER, royal order commanding a
Registration.
LETTER PATENT, open instruction or announce-b
ment with the authority of the crown.
Ooernor's deputy with JurIsdiction exclus
ively over military affairs (after 1776)
Personal appearance in a parlement by the
King or his viceroy to force the Reistrat
ion of an Edict,
The basic accounting unit of the old reç.ime;
its equivalent in specie was the Franc Tour
riois. Its value was approximately that of
a mId 20th century dollar.
A Se.igneurial tax on the transfer of property.
FUNDAENTAL LA , political customs limiting
the Monarchy.
SURFLUITY, the conspicuous production and
consumption of non-essential goods.
LGISTRATE, eneral1y anyone from the King
downwards with leçal or adctinistrative corn-
petence, specificall r
 a Counsellor in a
parlement. The cateç,ory is important because
the old reime made no differentiation be-
tween judicial and executive administrators.
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MAINMORTE:	 MORTMkIN, serfdom,
}IAISON Dii ROl:	 KING'S HOUSEHOLD, this Department had particular
responsibility for the Court and Capital.
MAITRE DES REQUETItS: MASTER OF REQUESTS, fixed at 80 in 1751, these
non-venal magistrates formed the majority of
the Administrative Monarchy's senior ad.minis .-
trat ore.
NAITRESSE EN TITRE: TITULM( MISTRESS, the King's Mistress, who had
to be a married woman, who had. been presented
at Court and. possessed the prerogative of ex-
ercising political patronage.
MAITRISE:	 GUILD, usually an employers' association fre-.
uently defending restrictive practices.
?IARECHAL:	 MARSHAL, the highest military post whose holders
formed a separate Corporation with extensive
jurisdictions.
MARECHAUSEE:
?IESALLXANCE:
METATAGE:
MILICE:
NILITAIRE:
MINISTRE D'ETAT:
?IOEURS
M&RSHALCY, the mounted. cons tabularly.
MISALLIANCE, a genealogically miscegenous marr-
iage for money.
SHARE-CROPPING.
MILITIA, this Was raised exclusively from the
peasantry and by ballot. There was no fixed term
of service. It was a major and disruptive abuse
in the country-side. Reformers attempted to turn
it into a form of outdoor poor relief.
A noble of 100+ years (3+ degrees) of nobility or
holder of an ennobling military rank. This "classe"
was composed. both of noblesse de race, de naisance,
and. of former robins (or even roturiers), who could
meet these requirements. It was also used within
the nobility as the antithesis of "robin".
MINISTER OF STATE, member of the Council of btate,
usually the 8-9 most senior administrators includ-
ing the Secretaries of State and the Controller
General. Only the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs was a Minister by right.
MORES, political customs generally limiting the
monarchy.
MONARCEIB ADMINIS- ADMINISTRATIVE/ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, the structure
TRATIVE/ABSOLUE:	 of government rationalised by Colbert lasting 1660-
1789, based on the Intendants in the provinces and
the Councils and. Departments of State in the centre.
4Z7
MONARCHIE AUTORITAIU: AUTHORITAEIAN MONARCHY, the monarchy as prac-
tised under Naupeou 1771-4 with the implied vio-
].ation of Fundamental Laws.
MONARCHIE LIMITEE/ LIMITED/FEUDAL MONARCHY, the monarchy as limited
FEODALE;	 by its medieval institutions: the General Assemb].y
of Clergy, the Great Officers of State, the States
General, and the parlenients. This style of Mon-
archy declined after the last convocation of the
States General in 1614 and the setting up of the
Administrative Monarchy after 1660.
MONARCHIE MECANIQUE: MECANISTIC NONARCHY the monarchy reformed to cre-
ate a self-regulating administrative machine based
on provincial devolution of power and limited re-
presentative democracy with constitutional checks
and balances and a career of talents, but retaining
scope for constructive royal initiatives.
NONNAIES:	 MONEYS, a fiscal jurisdiction, a court of fiscal
appeal independent of the Parlement.
NOBLE:	 One enjoying the honours of the Second Order,
specifically the son of an anobli.
NOBLE LAND: Land held by a Noble, or reietered as a l'iaf, t
the drawing up of a cadaster and whose income was
subsequently exempt from commoner taxation.
NOBLESSE:	 NOBILITY, this was gained either "in the night of
time'1 , or by direct ennoblement from the King, or
by holding or purchasing an ennobling Office or
rank, or by Letters Patent legitizaising a false
title. All nobility was hereditary.
NOBLESSE DE NAISSANCE: NOBILITY OF BIRTH, a noble who could trace his
nobility to a specific date after 1400.
NOBLESSE DE RACE:	 NOBILITY OF RACE, a noble whose nobility predated
1400 , conferring the right of presentation at Court.
NOBLESSE DORMANTS: The Breton practice of setting aside nobility while
-trading.
NOTABLE:	 A local leader, usually a Seigneur or municipal
official.
OFFICE:	 A post, usually legal or administrative, purchased
and held as Property (see also SURVIVANCE and
VENALITE).
OFFICIER-GENERAL:	 GENERAL OFFICER, the commander of a division -
a strategic unit of the army, this was an import-
ant political appointment.
ODaE:
PAIR;
PARCOURS:
PAiLEMEN
PARTICULIER:
PATRIOTE;
PAYS ABONNE *
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OtNAIRE	 ORDINARY, çovernmentàl activity raific by theState General.ORDONNANcE	 ODINANcE a royal decree not requlrinç Leg-
istration, usually confined to military
affairs.
ORDa, generaUy one of the three juridical
divisions of society: Clergy (First), 1'.oility
(Second), and Commoners (Third). For the sake
of clarity its snonyni "States' is applIed
only to the Orders in political assembly.
Specifically an. Order was any body not entit-
led to assemble without the permission of 'the
King.
PEER, in general a juridical equal, specifical'
ly the highest common denominator of privi1ee
- the right to be judged before those dukes
entitled to sit and vote in the parlexnen.
Right of way across agricultural land irres-
pective of its crop.
A Sovereign Court of appeal. "The Parlement"
refers to that of aris. The Parlements' poUt-
ical importance derived from their prerogative
to Register Edicts before they became la' and
their 1retensiort to be able to concez1 thenr
selves with "grands objects". They served as
the depositary of laws. Holding/buying a Coun
sllorship conferred nobility.
INDIVIDUAL, someone not a member of a Corpora
tion.
PATRIOT, an opponent o I'Iaupeou - no othr
meaning than this and that of the OE is used
in this study.
A province enjoying a minimal level of fiscal
autonomy.
PAYS CONQUIS:	 Synonym for Pays ci' Imposition.
PAYS D' ADMINI3TRATION AIINISTRATIVE COIJNTRY, a province refornr
ed after Letrosne's scneme 1778-9.
PAYS D'ELcTION	 A province under the direct rule of the centra'
government where taxes \ere levied through
the Elections.
PAYS .
 D'ETATS
PAYS D' flOSITIONx
STATES COUNTRY, a province with an asserly
of its Orders and consequent fisca,l autoomy
The eastern provinces rc.ainir some fisc3.
and administrative autonomy midvay between
Pays d'ilection and Pays d'Etas.
PHILOS0E:
PHY'3 IOCiATE:
ruYxOcaTIE:
thE:
POLICE:
PORNOCRATIE:
PRAETO; -
?REFECD
PIMIE: NINISP?;
T rs'	 1
.	 4	 -' J, .
PRESflDENT
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PENS ION:	 Payment front çovernment funds for holdin a
sinecure or post at Court, or for service to
the state, or as reward for political patron-
age.
Any contributor to the Enhiçhtermtent.
WYSIOCR, a follouer of Physiocracy.
PHYSIOCRCY, rule by nature, the theory postu
lated by Quesnay that land was the sole source
of wealth and that goverhmexit should concern
itself only with policies to encouraçe agric-
ulture. The idea extended to embrace a free
market economy and freedom of the press.
QUILL, the shore-based robin nobility in the
navy.
All matters relating to the !nternal regula-
tion of a society.
PO1NOcRAcY, rule by harlots, specifically used
of when the Titular 2Ustress dominated polit-
ics.
Titles given to hypothetical administrators
in reformed provintal administration.
flIE MINISTER, the head of the Council of
finances when empowered to meet the Courisell-
ors of State without reference to the Kind.
1'IST R2I2N, chairmen of a 3overein
Court appointed by the crown.
Leader of a Chamber in a law court, or chair
xnan-cuui "Speaker" of an assembly of States.
PRESIDENT A MORTIER: Counsellor entitled to wear a mortar board,
junior to a First President, a Venal Of
PRESIDLbaL:	 A provincial court of no apj7eal responsible
to the Grand Council.
PRETENTION:	 PRETENSION, a disputed prerogative or privi
PREVOT:
PREVOT:
PRIVILEGE:
PRIVILEtE
ROCES VER3PL:
lege.
PROVOST, chief functinary of aPrvt.
A municipal jurisdiction.
An exemption from a tax, service, or reçula-
tion held by members of an Order, Corporation,-
or Community.
Anyone exerciin a privileçe.
THE official minutes of an assembly, more of
RECEVEUR:
REGISTRATION
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an extended comniuniqu having the force of
lai4 for precedent than verbatim account.
EROCt3REUR:	 PIWCURATOR, equivalent to an attorney.
PROcU2EUR-GNERAL: 1ROCtJATOR GENELL, Equivalent to an attorneX
general or Dtrector of iublic prosecutions.
PROPERTY	 Under the old regime this was as much juridical
as real and included Off ices, or Feudal riØ'it.
Under the Absolute Monarchy Property was invio-
late.
QL7ARTIER:	 QUA1TERING, the reckoning of nobility on
both the male and female sides.
QUESTION:
1NONS TRANCE:
REN'VRE:
REPRESENTATION:
Leçal torture of an accused person, confined
in the 18th .century to seeking out accomplices,
REEIVE, a collector of the Taille.
The consideration of an Edict in the arie
ments primarily to check i against precedor
and subsequently to publicise it. Without Rer
istration no Edict could become law, and this
prerogative alloiied the ar1ements to involve
themselves in the governmental process.
Request b' a Parlement for the çovernmen to
reconsider an Edict, a theasure rot frequent.,ty
invoked, which the government could only
couziter with atit de Thsice.
A Counsellor exiled 1771-4 who resumed his
functions in 1774.
A request for the alteration or reconsiderat-
ion of an Edict but without prejudicing
Registration.
REQUE TEE:	 A chamber in the Pariement of Paris.
EQUISIiOIR3:	 •An indictment aa1nst printed material, a
secular anathema.
• RESSORT:
RESTANT:
ROSE:
ROl:
The geographical jurisdiction of a law court.
A Counsellor wh served under Maupeou 177l4 ,
The nobility based o the law courts, speifi-
cally the holders, and their descendants, of
ennobling offices of the parlements.
iXNG, the role of the crovn in the old regime
was described thus by the Encyclopedia, "Le
pouvoir de faire de nouveUes ordonnances,
£'djts, ou dSclaratioris, de les changer, rnodi-
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ROMAN LA'i:
ROTURIE 2
SArnT-Es PRIT:
fier, n'appartient en France u'au Roi, dans
lequei. seul rSsicle tout i.e pouvoir i6isiat-
ive". (Encyclopedia: "Ordonnance"). This, com
bined dth the absolute authority to appoint
Linisters, made the King the sine qa non of
all leis1ative, executive, and judicial
activity.
The written law based on Codex Justinium prac-
tised in the southern provinces.
coiMONE, any member of the Third Order.
(Order of the) HOLY CHOSP, a body whose member
ship corresponded to the Great or Haute
Noblesseo
SEET2-IR D'ETAT: SECRETARY OF STATE, one of the four (five i.763-
80) men in charge of a Department of state,
usually also a '1inister of State, the highest
poljtical a)?ointments in the Administrative
1ionchy.
SECRETAIRE DTJ ROX: IiNG' SECRETARY, an ennob1inj venal sinecure.
S21'NEUa;
SEICNBt3RX:
SENATI
SEKECHL;
The "lord of the manor", usually floble, who
owned the juridical prerogatives and privi
leesof a Seicrxleurie.
"1anor", the jurisdiction of a Seiçneur com
prisiri: hunting rights, fishing,rights,Bana
lities, various taxes and serivces, various
honours, and precedencies, and the homage of
is vassals. The administration of this juris-
diction by the Seigneur (usually- as both liti
gant/defetidant, judge, jury, and executioner)
formed the most local law court.
The contemporary term, borrowed from Venice,
for rule by aristocracy.
SENEScHAL, the chief functionary of a Senes
chalcy.
SENEAUSSEE:	 SEN SCI-IALC, medIeval jurisdiction, with some
pouers extant in 18th century, subordinate to
a parlexnnt and gouvernement.
SENS IDLE:	 NOTIcEABLE, or PERCETIBLB, or PERSPICATIOtJS.
SU3DELEATION g
	Sub-division of a Generality equivalent to a
Canton or District.
SUDELEGUE;	 SU3DELATE, chief functionary of a Subdele..,a
tion subordinate to the Intendant.
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StWPLIATION:	 2,lilder version of a Representation.
SURVIVANcE:	 The usually patrimonial, diposal of an Office
as private property, the next stage on from
Venty in the evolution of Offices.
SYNDICI	 A parochial official.
TA3AC:	 The ta'te of monopoly of tabacco leased to
the General Farmers.
TAflT:	 The basic direct tax levied On land, which
could be:
TAILLE PZRSONLL: paid by head by all comrnoxers livinj on the
land, çenerally in the Continental provinces
Each community was assessed at a lump sum through
the C-enerality aid/or Election and the proport-
ions paid by individuals were settled at an
annual villaçe assembly.
TAThLE ELLE:
	 paid on all commoner land, even if ovned by a
TAILLE TAR IFEE
TERRIER:
TOURIWLLE:
TRESORIERt
UNIGENITU$z
UNITE DE
	 ASSES:
noble, sometimes rac1uated and sometimes levIe4
on a cadaster, çenerally in the Oceanic pro-
vinces.
A graduated tax paid on income from property.
A feudal l.and retister for Seineurial taxes.
THIRD, generally the Third Order (ie. all
commoners), -specifically the middle-classes as
a political forces
'rITLE, a ran' of noi1ity, the were, Sn 6e
cending order of political seniority: Prince
of the Blood, Due et Pair, Due-non-Pair and
Grand d'Espane, 1iarquis, Coznte, Vicomte, Barort.
Below Baron- came the untitled nobility, probab-
ly the majority of the Second Order, styling
themselves Chevalier or Ecuyer. Only the titled
nobles were entitled to sit in assemblies o
States (Brittany excepted).
a Chamber ixi the Par lement .of Paris,
TREASURER, local fiscal functionary generally
in Oceanic provinces.
Papal Bull of 1713 forbidding- any but priests
to read the Bible, this became the focal oin
of the Jansenist opposition to the.Absolite
1Ionarthy prior to its political expression
after the 1750's,	 -
The Pretension that the Pariements formed a
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VAIN3 ATURE:
VENAL ITE;
giriçle CorporatiOn by implication equal to
ths 1ing and trustee of the States' General
constitutional preroqatives, approximately
operative 1750-1771.
VACANT EASTURE, the right to craze livestoc
in ieids and orchards after the harvest,
irrespective of other agricultural use.
VENALITY, the practice whereby the crown sur-
rendered the right to appoint holders of
Office in return for cash payment, with particr
ular reference to the Counsellors in the Parle
merits. These Offices became Property. The irr
de?erldence and a1ton.omy this institution con-
ferred on the par i.ernents as examined by 1Lontes-
quieu 'rihence it was developed into a theory
of a Corporatior 1imitin the monarchy and on
to the Pretension of a constitutional check t
the government.
TNTI3T?I, an Extraordinary tax of 5% on all
incomes levied or specified periods as an
Edict requiring Registrat).on, more than one
Twentieth could run concurrently.
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APPENDIX IV: BIOGRA.PHY MID ThTRONAGE
Wherever possible people mentioned in this study are list-'
ed below in alphabetical order of the name they were known by
(eg. '11ontesquieu' rather than 'Secolidat') under two main head-
ings of patronage (Court Party and Choiseulists) and three
lesser headings (xing's Party, Philosophes, and. 1Teckerists),
The criteria for inclusion have been made as wide as possible,
to include not only those actIve on the political scene, but
also those quoted in the bibliography who were alive during
the period.
The bishop are listed separately because o .he contp1exit
'of their 'patronaçe and allec:iance ' Obvious poiitic1 fiUres
(e Lonie ce 3rine) have been listed .rnder their paronzie,
but most- hisho	 political h&iaviou as dictated by the see
they held. Ecclesiastical peers were divot in Court and parle
ment because only a dvt position uaranteed their unique dual
role of ishos and peers. On he other hand any bishop ith
administrative czrdpetence was forced to support proinciaL
(Oceanic) autonomy aa Inst the government; hence Luzerne
dvot in Paris and Choielist in tn're. On to, of this most
bishops had sortie family coniectiori Vith the rea factions. h4
intendaflts have been listed by patronace, arid then placed in. a
tabl of eneralitie. ?inally those who do n.t fit Into any
category either because of their apolitical.positiofl or be-
cause they were figures from the recent past still very relevant
lake cnti'ry ththin - are 1itd	 t.i. fltt.sh nd
Mierican diploma ta/spies have also been listed if they played
a rl in internal French politics.
There are tiro main sources for the bioçjraphical infornation;
'Dictonnaire de 3ioTa?hie Franise' alteau et alia raris
l933 - (still in publication), and 'Dictionnaire de la i:oS1ee'
de la Chenaye des Boi g .et alia. 3rd edition. 19 vols.
?aris l863-76. These have been supplemented by standard bio
craphicai. works of reference and from scattered details throuh
out the secondary ources consulted. This till leaves many
'aps and prbahle inaccuracies which it lies beyond the scope
of this study to xectify. This appendix can be taken only as
indietive, not as definitive. The single most important
source for irtroriation on aronae	 the Jritis1 embass7
research desiç;ned to enable the Forin 3ecretaries in 3t.
'ames's to ses the io1itical import or eh ne apO.inLtct
in yeri1Xe o Paris; without this rk an ana1ysis of
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patronage would be a near impossible task. Again, the complex-
ity of patronage and the shIftng patterns of allegiance make
it impossible to produce a .definitive account, This information
is also only accurate etveen, iia and 177d, after that date
the growing power of the House of Orlans introduces a new
element, to say nothing of the grQwing political turnoil t0
wards 17879.
.Eveh given these reservations, however, definitive patterns
emerge • The choiseulists (or. Queen' s Party) and th Court of
Parr1ormed two large stable factions which maintained their
membership in the exercise or expectation of high office. The
philosophes formed a more coherent çroup with a degree of intell
ectual cohesion denied to the parties based solely on ainin
power. The philosohe patrons link their prot:is to the Ch3is'-
eulists, and this group is politically a sub-section of the Choiseul
lets. The Choiseulists remained supreme 1768-73 until the
Court Party's triumph. Cond6 then made a brief attempt to est
ablisha new faction. The Court iarty, horever, disinteçrated
as an effective political faction with the personal animosity
between the "triumvirate" and AiguiUan' attempt 17734 t
rally the choiseu.ists and parlement to his patronage.
The mantle of leadershjp of the Court party had fallen to
Beaumont even before Louis XVI's accession, but the party never
recovered its balance after 1774. The Choiseulists on the
other hand believed that the cueen's patronage would ensure their
triumph after 1774. In the event Louis XVI would countenance
neither a Choiseulist nor a. de'vot ministry, and this forced a
new pattern on the regime. The.most important development was
the formation of a Icing's Party as a reaction (from high office)
to the Queen's Party. •This party was composed of men who wou]4
otherwise Ie classified as Choiseulists, but who were either
prepared to compromise to gain power or 'were more royalist than
the pre-1771 par3.ementaires had appeared to be (eg. Sartines,
iIiromesnil). An ad hoc faction developed around Necker; this
was a subsection of the (ing's Party and was.composed of philo
sophes despairing of anyone better,, of CI'toiseulists dispirited
by failure, and of robin administrators prepared to follow a
reforming minister. There was the potential of Necker rallying
the reforming elements of the Court Party•
To give some simplicity and clarity to the welter of
names and titles vith which some nobles vere endowed some
'enerai principles have been borro',e4 from Chenaye's dictioriaryt
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Prench Christian names are hyphenated. The particules, both
"de" and "i.e", are ignored for alphabetical purposes. Ti1es
ciiven are those relevant to 176878, and previous or suture
tt1es have general1' not been given. 'there different members
of the same family are important in their own right they are
listed separately (eg. Harcourt and Lillebonne) but with the
relationship indicated, where the family is important because
of the exercise of, for example, a peerage itsmembers are
listed together (ego Brissac andCoss).
KEY: p.
b.
X.	 os.
b. 1720
d. 1780
B.
peer
bishop (see separate list)
executed or died violently *
only birth, date known
only date of death known
member of duke of Burgundy's circle.
With bishops the relevant diocese and date of
appointment is given.
* many of those recorded as dying 1789-94 may have
been executed but were not recorded as such in
genealogical sources.
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COUW PART'Y
Armand-Desir du Plessis-Richeljeu dc d'A4nois 1761-1800
(Aiguiuon's son).
Jean-Baptiste 1au1in d'Acueseau e Frsnes 1701-84.
p.2nimanue1-rmand de cignerot due d 1 ir l1bn 1720-88.
Jean-Baptiste marquis d'1berths 1716-90.
Armand-Joseph comte d'Allonville 1764-18.32.
Pedro-Pablo Abaraca y Bolea oomte d'Aranda i71-99 (Spanish
ambassador).	 -
Joseph-Henri Bouchard d'Esparbs de Lussan marquis d'Auheterre
1714-88.
p.LOuisNarie-Augustin duc d'Aumont 1709-82.
Guillaume-Joseph Dupleix de accuencourt 1727-94.
Jeanne çu comtesse du Barry (several variations) 1744-93x.
.Guillaume conthe du 3arry 1732-1811.
Frarçois de 3astard 1722-80.
b.p.Betimont (due de St-Cloud).
Henri-Lonarc1-Jean-Baptiste ertin cornte de Botxrdeilles 1719-92
Louis-Jean 3erticr do Sauvir'ny 1709-88.
Louis-Benigrie-'rariois ]3ertier do uv±iny 1737-89x.
p.Maximi1ien-ntoine-Armand due de Ethune 1730-75.
p.Armand-Joseph due do Bthur-chargst1738-18OO.
p.Loujs-Antojne de Gontaut marchalduc de ?Iron 1701-88,
Pierre-tienne Boureois deBoine (Or Boynes)1719-83.
Franoi-Caude marejuis do )3oui1l1739-1$00.
'P.har1es-Godefroy de la 'rour dergne due do Bouillon 1706-71.
p. Char1es-Timo1on-Loujs de Coss' due de Brissac 1693-1770.
p.Loujs-Hercu1e-Tjmolon due de cosse'1734-70,&c de rissac i77o-
92x.	-•-.	 -
British embassy staff.
Frariojs-Aflrie-pjerre-Loujs de Brocthet de St-Prest de V(ri'-:ny
 1735-'
84.
Charles Broch9t do 3t-Pres 1736-94.
	 -
Victor-François marcha]. duo do Broqlie 1718804.
Charles-ranFois coxnte de Bro4ie 1719-81 (borther of the duke,
transferred a11iance to the Queen's Party 1774).
Char1es-Eune-Gabrje1 de Ia Croix marquis/due de Castries (or
Castres because the 'i' not pronounced) 1727-1801. (transferred
a11ecmce to Choiseuj. 1770).
Anto.ne-Louis-Frarois le Fvre de Cauntartin 1725-1803.
Aucuste-Fe1jcj tS'1e
 Frste comte do Chtoauiron 17262,
438
pJlichel-Ferdinand d'Albret-d'Ailly duc de Chaulnes 1714-6.
p.1arie-JosephLouis d'2Ubret-d'Ailly duc de ccuiny 1741-69, du
de Chaulnes 1769-92.
Charles-Antoine-Claude de Cha "era (Vicomte d 'Aubuson?) 1729-1824.
Renaud-Csar-Louis icornte de Choieu1 1735.89 (raslin's son).
p.Gaspard marquis/ciuc cle Clermont-Tonnerre 16881781.
	
Cosse', see rissac.	 -
Louis-Athanase-Boniface de Berton abbe"de crillorz 1718-96.
Emmanuel prince/duc de Cray 171C-4
Gaspard de Curan de Ra1 (or Ra1 de curban 1668-1774.
Claude-Joseph Dorat 1734-80.
Charies-Louis-Joachim de hastellier-Durne-ni1 1700-64.
Ecclesiastical peers.
William Eden baron Auciclarid 1744-1814.
Esparbs, see Aubeaerre.
LouisCharles comte d' 1701-75.
.Charles duc de Fitz-Jan 	 1712-87.
Jacques de F1ese11es 172189x.
I	 IE1ie-Cather.ne Freron 1718/9-76.
Loujs-Stanxslaus Prerori 176-1802.
JearrPranois abbeTheor r 1 1731-1813 (allegiance o1lowed prince
Louis de Rohan).
Gesvres, see Tresmes.
Roger-François Gi1brt. des Voisins ).690-3.767.
	Pierre-LouisChar1e	 1726-1827.
Louis-Valentin Coezrnzin 3730-94x.
Pare ehri Griffet 1693-1771.
p.Anne-?ierre duc dHarcourt 1701-83.
Antoine de Ricouart comte d'H&rouville 1713-83,
0mer-Louis-Franois Jo1y de Fleury(jnr.) 1743-84.
N. de 1'Espinasse chevalier de Laniac 1748-1839 (natural son of
S t-Plorentin).	 -
Dorninique-ui11aume Lebel 1696-1768.
Char1es-Franois Lebrun (duc de Plaisance) l79-i824.
Jacques Lefranc marquis de Pompignan (tefranc de r-ornp frnan) 1709
84.'
b.Lefrac de Thmpignan.
	
Legitimate princes. 	 -.
PrançoisGaston marquis/due de Levis 1720-87.
ierre-Narc(,aston duc de L-ris 1764-1830.
E'rançois-Etenri cointe/cluc de LilleSonne .72684 (arcourt's son).
Cuy-Michel de Durort marcha1 due de Lorqe et de Randan 17O4
1773.
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p.Marie-Claude-Louis duc de Luyries et Chevreuse 1717-1771.
Marie-Louise de Rohan-Soubise Nme. de Marsa b. 1720.
Ren-Char1es Maeou 1688-1775 (Vice-Chancellor).
Ren-Nicho1as-char1esAugustin Nsu:eou 1714-92 (chancellor).
b. 1746.
Louls-Sebastien iercier 1748-1814.
}iesclarnes.
acob-Nicho1as Moreau 1717-1803.
Lous-Franois marquis de onteynard b.1716.
irançois-0ominique de Reynaud comte de Iont1oer 1755-1738.
p.Jean-Victor de Rochechouart duc de 'or'-eart 1712-80.
Louis-Nicholas-Victor de Piix comte du
	 1711-75 (but not
allied to !aupeou).
Aimar-Charles-Francois de NicolaT l73794x.
A1mar-har1es-Marie de ?co1ai 1747-94x (brother of the above).
Marie-François de Paule i.e ivre marquis d'Ormessori 1710-75
(intendant of finance.)
Louis-François de Paule i.e Fvre marquis d'Ormesson 1718-8
(parleinentaire)
Heriri-François de Paule marquis d'Ormesson 1751-1807 (Controller
General).
Christophe iaiotdei'archeval b. 1724.
Charles P1isot ce iOntenoy 1730-1814.
Pecquiny , see chaulnes.
Louis-Jearr'i•arie duc de nhivre (Is) 1725-93x.
Gabriel-Marie comte de Pri rvord 172&95.
Livin-onaventure abbe de Proyart 1734-1808.
p.Armand du .lessis jnarcha1 duc de 1che1ieu 16941788.
p.Charles Lennox duc d'Aubicny et de Richmoid (duke bf Richmond)
1735/7-2806. British peer with a French peerage aftet 1777,
never exercised his vote.
?dmery-Louis-Rocer corttte de Rochechuart 1744-91.
LouisArmandConstantin chevalier de iohan 173294x.
b.Prince Louis de Rohgri (Court party aster 1770).
b.Prince Ferdinand cle Rohari.
Gaspard-Louis ?.oui11, d'Orfeuil.
oya1 Family except for Artois and MarieAntoinette.
p.Pau1-iippo1yte cle Beauvilliers duc de St-.;icnan l6841776.
$t1orentin, see Vrj11i're.
p.Charles de Rohan rnaré'chal prince de ubise (duc de Rohan-Rohan)
1715-87.
ean-Louis çiraud oulavie 1752-1813.
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p.Ncimilien-ritoine-Arrnand de 3thune due de Sully b.1730.
Joseph tarie abb Perrav- 171578.
Antoine-ean Terray
 175894x. (nephew of above).
p.Louis-Lon Potier duo de '1resrnes i65l774/6.
p.Louis-Joachirn-Paris Potler due de CeFvre3 1733-74/6, duo de
Vresmes 1774/6-4.
p.Honor-Camille-XAonore Grimaldi duo deValentirioi (prince de
2ionaco) 1720-95.
p.Antoine-Paul-Jacques de QuSlen duc de la Vauuyon 1706-72,
cuninique de Vercs b. 1736.
Louis-Alexanc1re-C1este duc de Villeciruier
 1736-82, due d'Aumont
1782-1814.
Louis Phlypeau (or Phypeaux) comte de St-Floreftin 1705-70,
due de la Vrill.ere 1770-77.	 -
CHOTSEULISTS OI tEEi'S
	 TY
• Administrative bishops.
Narie-Frariois-Bruno comte d'A ry 1722-1805.
Etierme-Rrançois marquis (1777) d'Alicre 1727-98.
American deleçation.
Artois
Jacques-Mathieu Au-eard 1731-1805.
Ayen, ee Noai11e.
Charles-Just prince de Beauvau 1720-93x.
	 -
Charles Fouquet marcha1 due de Belle-Isle 1684-1761.
François-Joachim cardinal de 3erni 1715-94.
Pierre-Victor baron de Besenva]. 172294.
• LouisCui11aume d Blair de Boisemont 1716-78.
Jean-Joseph marquis de la orde (Lahorde) 172494x,
Claude-François Bertrand de Boucheporn 174194x.
p.Louis duc de Brancas-Villars b. 1714.
Louis-Aucust Letonne1ier baron de Breteuil 173018O7
Louisarie-Anathase de LomSnie corate de Brienne 1730-90.
Louise-Ju1ie-Coistance de Rohan-Rochefort, Eme. de Brionti b.l734
Comte de Broclie from 1774.
Louis-Gabriel comte de Buat-ançay 1732-87.
Charles-Alexaridre Calbrrne 1734-1802 (hut associated with iuU
in Brittany).
Jeanne-Louise lienriette enet, Lzae. de Camn 1752-1822.
Castries from 1770.
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CasparcLouis Caze de la BDve 1740-1o24.
Louis2ene' Caradeuc de la Chalotais 1719-85.
Daniel-Marc-Antoine Chardon 17311803.
(Probably) LouisFranpis Charette d la Colinire 1731-92x.
FlorentLouis-Marie maquis/duc de Ch'te1et 1727-93 (probably
Voltaire's son).
Antoine Chaumont de 1aGa1aisire g l727-.812.
Franpois-Claude marquis de Chauvelin 1716-73.
p.Etienne-Franç!ois duc de Choi'eu1'Stainville 171985s
Anne-Louis de Bourhon-Condcornte de C1erorit 1709-71 (Resent
Bourbon's brother).
Marie-Frariois-I{enr1 de Franquetot marechal chic de Coigy 1737-
i&21.
Louis-Geor9esErasme mare'chal duc cle Coritades 1704-93.
Char1es-Andr de la re' 1720-34.
Anne-Louis de Quengo marquis de Creio1les 1734l624
Louis Thiroux de Crosr 1736-94x.
Jean-Franois-Claude Perrin de Cy'p ierre baron de chevilly l727-8i
MariusJean-Baptiste{cholas Dame 1730-1804.
Moufle Dan-eryille a1794.
Ed-1ranois (or ean-François Darirrand 1735-71.
Jean-Sanunuel Depont 1725-1805.
Diplomatic Corpse
Pierre-Franois (or François-Pierre) Ducluzel de la Chabreie
1734-83.
Char les-Fraripis umourier 1739-1823.
Emmanue1-F&1icit de Durort anareclial duc de Diras 1715-89.
Jean-Jacques Duval d'Er&rneni1 1746-94x.
Jean-Baptiste-Charles comte d'Estainrr (or . Estain) 1729-94x.
Valentin-Ladislaus conte d Esterhazy 1740-1805.
Antoine Mrec .'Etir!ny 171967.
(Probably) Louis-joseph de Facs b. 1736.
Jean-Louis Pavier 17284.
Charles-'Henrj Feydeau de Brou 17441&02.
Financial Estab1ishziient
p.Berriadin de Rosset due de Fleury 1715-88.
Freemasons.	 -
p.Louls-Antoine-Sophie de Plesis-Rithe1ieu duc de Fronsac 173669
(Rithe1ieu' san).
Charles-Jean-Baptiste des a1ois dela Tour.
Stephanie-F1icié"Ducreste de tAbin, hne. de çenhis l74-13.
P1erre-Jean-Ba?tiste erhier 1725-88.
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Char1esAntoine-Armand duc de Gontaut b. 1708.
A].exisFrançoisJoeph. de Gourues 1725-1819.
Amaury marquis de Govon b. 1717.
Antoine-Antoriiri. duc de Gartiont b. 1722.
Beatrice cle Choiseul, duchesse de Cramont 1731-94x.
Jean-Baptiste,Gribeauval 1715-89.
Henri-Louis-Marie de Rbhan prince de Guneri 174-1807.
Adrien-Louis de Bonnires comte/duc de Guines 1735-1606.
Simon-Prosper Hardy 1728-91.
Etienne Maynon d'Invau (or Invault) b. 1721.
b.Jarente.
Jean-0mer Joly do Fleurv 1715-1810 (president '
 mortier).
Jean-Frariçois Jol y de 1eur ce la Valette 171&1802 (Controller
General).
Antoine-Jean--Baptiste-lexandre Jull ien x1794.
1'iare-Joseph marquis cle Lafayette 1757-1834.
p.Charles de Lorraine prince de Larnbec (and 1beuf) 1751123,
Lous-LonPeiicit de Brancas comte de Lauraruais 1733-lo24.
(]3rancass son).
Armarid-Loula de Gontaut due de Lauzuri 174793x.
Anne-A1exandre-Marie-Supplice-7oseph duc dO Lava 3. 1747-1817.
C1merit-Char1eg-Franois de Laverd'r (or L'lwerdy) de Nizeret 1723'
9 3x.
Charles-Joseph prince de Lirrne 1733-1814.
b.Lomnie de Brierine.
Anne-1aui-Emmanue1-S igismund chevalier de Montmorency-Luxembourq
b.1742.
p.LouisJosephCharles-Amable duc (1771) de Lu ynes et thevreuse
1748-1807.
CsarHenri comte de la Luzerrie 1737-99.
Yves-Marie Desmarets conte de Iiai11ebois 1715-94x.
Gui11aumeChrtienne Lamoignon de 1alesherhes 1721-94x.
Louis-Char1esen( comte de arboeuf 1712-&6.
Mazarin: LouiseJearuie duchesse de)azarin &nherited the title
from her father and her iusband LouisNarie-Guy d,'Aumont marquIs
de Villequier tooc the title duc de Mazariri b. 1732.
JeairBaptisterançciis turey de IIeinires 1705-87.
Florimund comte deMercyArçentau 1727-94 (Austrian ambasador),
ean-3aptist'-Franois de la Porte de Mel y b.1743.
.	 -	 p	 aAlezandre-Marie-Leonore de StMauris prance de Montbarey (severaX
variations), 1732-% (to 1777).
b.Nontazet.
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p.Jules-HerculeMeriadec de Rohan duc de Mortbazon 17261800
(retired from public life).
	 •.
Charlotte-eanne Be'au.d de la Hale de Riou marquise de Monteqon
17371806. (0rian' rnistress).
House of IontrnorencZ-LaVa1Luxembour. 	
-
Armand-Iarc comte de Mon!rnor in-St rent 1745-92x.
Jean-Baptiste-Antoine Aurret de Nontyon i7331820.
Philippe conte de Moailles marchal de Nouch y 1715-94x.
Simon Nicron de Bertv 1702-74.
p.Louis-Ju1es-3arbon Mancini-Mazarini dud cle Nivernois 17l6'98..
p.Louis xnar4'chal duc de Ioai11es 1713-93.
JeanLouisFranois-Pau1 de Noallies duc d'Aven 1739-1824 (Noah-
1e'son).
Pierre-François Oiier.
Narc-Ren Voyer marquis do Paulnw 1722-82.
Armand-Ju1es-rançois duc (1780) de Poli rcnac 1745-1817, Gabrie11e
Yolande-Claude Nartine de ?olastron duchesse de Polina
1749-93.	 -	 .	 -
Philippe-Louis--llarc-Antoine de Noailles prince de 2oix 17521C19.
eanne-Antoinette Thlsson, Nine. c1'toi1es, rnarquise de loznpadour
1721-64.
p.Gabriel de Choiseul duc de ?ra1in 1712-5
rinces of the lood (except ia Narche).
Jacques-Franois-Maxixe de Chastenet marquis de Puvur 17.162.
erre--ierine P riiud 1736-1$20..
Jacques-Etienne Guau. de Rev.rseux 170fr94x.
Anne-LouisAlexandre de Nontmorericy prince de Robeca b.1724.
House of Rocheambeau.
House of Rochechouart.
b.Prince Louis de ohan (to 1770).
p.Loui8-Narie-Bretagne-Dominic due de Rohan-Chabot 1710-180].
(known as duo ce Rohan)
Nichel-Etienne i.e Peletier comte de St-Far"eau 1736-78.
Pau1-Franois de Qu1en de Stuer de Caussade.marquis de StN4rir
1146-72, duc de la Vauuyon 17721828.
Jeaiv-Ernrnanuel Guijnard comte de St-Priest.
Prançois-Eznmariuel Guinard comte de St-Priest 1735-1821 (son
of above).
Raymond de t-Saveur 	 -
Xthilippe-Henri marquis de 3ur 1724-1O1.
Louis-Phili?pe cointe de 3r-ur 1735-1C30 (son of above).
t.abriel Snac de Nei1hn 1736-1$03 (under atr.ronge of Noai3.ies).
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b.Talleyrand.
GurJean-Baptiste rarcet 1733-loOl.
Antoine-Lonard Thomas 1732-85.
CIar1es-'rançois-'christiari de Nontmorency-Luxembourg prince de
Tinr (due de eauu1ont 1769) b,.1713.
RenPrançoisAndrë'comte de laTour du Pin 1715-78..
p.Jean-Eretaçne-'CharlesGodefroy duc de la Tr&.ouil1e b. 1737.
p.Franois-Emrnanue1 de russoL due d'Uz?s b.1728.'
p.Louis-Csar is Blanc-de-la-Baume due de Ia Vai1ir 170380.
Louis-Philippe de Rigaud de Vauc3reuil 1724-102.
Nel de Jourda coxnte de Vawc 17O5-88,
Nathieu-acques abbe de Vermont b.1735.
p.Gabriel-Louis-François de Neufville ducde Villeroi 173194.
PH IL OS OFHS
Joseph-Franç!ois-Ideiphonse Raymond d'Albert 1722-90.
Claude-Camille-François dAlbon prince d'Yvetot 1753-88.
Jean le Rond d'1ember 1717-83.
rie-Louise-ElizabethNieoie de la Rochefoucauld duchesse 6'
1nvi11e (or nvi11e) 1716-94.
Charles-Augustin de Ferriol comte d'rgenta1 1700-88.
Louis Petit de Bacaint 16901771.
Nicholas abb4'Bauciau 1730-92.
Lous-C1aude Biot de te-Cr3ix 1744-1803.
Pierre-Fran9ois 3oricer 1745-94.
Jean-Nicholas cornte de Bou11oriqe 1726-87.
Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville 1754-93x.
Edmund Burke 1729-97.
.ean-Franois marquis de chastellwç 1734-88.
Etienne Bonnot de CondiilaQ 1715-80.
Antoine-Nicholas Caritat marquIsde Condorce.t 174394x (suicide)..
Gahriel-Prançois abbS Cover 17Q782.
Nariede Vichy chaxnrond marquise du Deffand 1097-1780.
PjerreSamuei Du,ont de Neinours l7391o17.
Nicho1as-Pranois Durede SMaur 1685-1774.
Nicnolas Dure d St-1aur 1731-91.
rari9oisJean Orceau marquis de Fontette l7194.
Ferdinancb dc Galiani 172N87.
Narie-Therse de offrin 1699-1777.
A45•
Richard des 1annires'.
Jean-Claude-lIar ieliricent de C ournay 1712-59.
Erde'ric-Ne1chio.r -rir.n 1723-1O7.
N. Crober cle	 uhen'11 (nothinc knoyn)..
acques Antoine d.po1yte de Ouibert 1743-90.
Jean-?rançois de l.a 1-arpe4 1739-1303.
Claude-Arien He1vtiu g
 17171771.
au1-Henri Thiry baron d'Holbach 1723-89.
Franois-A1exandre duc de l.a Rochefoucauid--Liancourt 1747-1827.
Jacques abbS de Li1e (or Delille) 173i813.
Gabriel 3onn3t abbde iab1 y 1709-85.
1Ia1esherbeg.
Tacques a11&: du Pan 1749-1800.
eari-Pau1 Marat 1743-93x.
Jean-Prançois riorie1 1723-99.
Paul-Pierre le Hercier de l.a ivire 1719-93.
au1ian Offray de l.a fl&.trie 1709-50.
Victor de Riquettl marquis cle Mirabeau 1715-89.
Montyon.
Andre abbflore11et 1727-1819.
t1aqes-Andr( Nai'-on 173Z-110.
Nivernois.
Dr. François Quenay 16941774.
Guillauzne-Thomas-François abbde Rayn1 171:3-96.
p.Louj -21exandre ciuc d Ia Rochcfoucau1d-iivi11c et de 1 oche
Guyon 1743-92x.
Pierre-oseph-Andr oubaud 1730-91.
JeanJacques Rousseau 1712-78.
Pierre-rhilippe Rot.issel de la Pour.
Claude-Louis conte de t-Germain 1707-78.
Anto-ixie-Joseph-Michel Servan.
Emmanuel-Joseph abbe comte de Si y s 1748-136.
Charles Thevenau de rorande 174C-].303.
aniei-char1es Truda1re 1703-69.
Jean-Char1es-Phj1jbert Trudaine de Monticny 1733-77 (sofl of above.
nne-Robert-Jacques Turot baron de 1'Aulne 1727-81...
Joseph-Alphonse abb?de Vri 1724-99.
rar1isiarie Arouet de Voltaire 1694-1778.
Wa1o1e.
Prthur Youn't 1741-1320.
Target.
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icN 'S P.RY
Adrien Lefvre d'rnecourt b. 1720.
Antoine-Jean Arnelot de Vhaillou d. 1795.
PierreAuustin Caron de aurarchai 173299.
Bertin.
Jean-Etienne-l3ernard de Clucrriy de Nuits 172976,
liarie-Anne--Jacqueline de 1lassori (Mme. de Cassii ?).
pr4uesni1.
Gerbier.
Gui11aumeFrariçoi-Louis Jolv de F1eurr 1.701-87 (procurator
general).
1ierre Lerioir 1732-l07.
Jeatrrederic Ph1yeau cornte de Naureas 1701-81.
Armand-Thornas Hue' de Nlrornesnil 1723-96.
)lontharey (after 1777). 	 *
Claude-Jean Rigoley baron d'0gn.
House of . Ormesson.	 -
A1exandre-FrdricJacques Nasson marquis de Pesa v (several
variations) 1741-77.
Eugne-Hercu1e-Cami11e de Rohan-Rochefort b. 1737 (Prince Crnii1
deohan.	 -
b.Prince Louis de RohE'rl.
Antoine de arines comte d'Alby 1729-1CO1 (clandestine
Cnoiseulist).
Antoine-Louis S'uier 1726-92.
SoLibise.
Louis-Cabriel Taboureau de Reati 171882.
Charles L-ravier comte de Verrcennes 1717-87.
NECIERISTES
François-Louis Latthinant do Eainvi1i.e b.171'7.
Beauvau.	 -
Blair.
Castries.
Coyer.
Nicel-Frarois Jailly 1724-1800.
Bertrand Dufresr'e 1736-j.201.
Nichel 3ouvard do Foureux 171-89.
Lrimm.
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Harpe.
1Joly de Fleury de laValette.
Lerioir.
tetrosrie.
ai11ebois.
Iarmonte1.
Maurepas.	 . -
E1i (or JearrLouis) lioreau deBeaurnont 1715-85.
7acques Necer 17321804.
Nivernois.
resay.
Raynal.
outhefoucau1d.
Anne-Louise-Cermaine Necker, barorine de Sta1-Holstein 1766-1.81.7
(]ite. de S1) (Necker's daughter).
Antoine Valdec de Lessrt 1742-92x.
JearrPranois du Four de Villerieuve 1735-81.
THE SIHOPS
Ecc1esiatica1 peers
charles de ro'1ie (Noyon 1766) 1734-77.
Antoine-Elonore-Lon i.e Clerc de Ju1rny (or Juicrn) de Neuçhe11e
(Ch1ortg 1764, Xaris 1781) 1728-1811.
Csar-Guil1aurne de l.a Lurne (Lap'rres 1770) 17381821.
charles-Antoine de l.a I ochea yrnon (Rheims 1762) 1697-1.777,
Jean-Frariçais--:Toseph de l.a Rochec'ouart (Laon 1741) 1708-78.
Franois-Joseph de la Rochefoucauld-aayers (Beauvais 1772) 1735-
92x.
rhilosophe and Adrninistraive Bishoi.
I	 S	 S	 STean-de-Dieu Raymond de Boisc'elinde Cuce CALX 1770) 17321804.
Terme-Marie Cham,ion_de C1c '
 (Rhodez 1770) X735-1810.
Lopo1d-Char1es de Choiseul. (Cambray 1.764) 172474 (created duke
1766).
-FranoisCitade11a (Nebbio 1772) 1740-75.
ouis-rançoi--Ii1aire de Conzi (rras 1769) 1732-1804.
)1iche1-rançois Couet de Vivier de Lorry ('arbes 1769) 1727-1.803.
Arthurithard cle Di110 (:arbozme 1752) 1721-1806.
Henri-I,arie aeradin de Roset de Ceithes de '1eur y (Canibray 1774)
b.r718.
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Franois i3arreau de Girac (Renries 1763) 1732-90 (particularist
rather than administrative).
François-athieu Cuasco (Nebbio 1770) 1720-72
Louis-Sextius de areri de la Bruyre (0r34'ans 1758) b.1706
(Folio of 3enef ices to 1771).
Henri-Gaston de Lvis-Leran (Pamiers 1741) b.1713.
Etienne-Charles Lornie cle rienne (Toulouse 1763> 172794x.
Luzerne
Narc-Antoirie de	 (Lescar 1763) 1724-1802.
Georçes-Louis h1y ea (oirges 1757) 17287.
char1esiaurice de a11evrandIrigord (prince de &nvent)
(atitun 1788) 1754-1838. (nb Agent-General 1780).
0ther
Paul d'Airet comte de Montfort (Sens 1753) b.1703.
.Christophe de Beaumont (tans 1745) 1703-al (archhisop of Paris
automtica1ly lay duc et pair de St-Cloud).
Jean-Louis uisson de Beau!evil1e (Alais 1755) b.1708.
Jean-de la croix de cas':rie (Varbres 1764) 1716-96.
François de Corr'i (Tours 1774) 173595.
Louis-Joeh de 11ontmorency de Laval (Metz 1760) b. 1724.
Jean-Ceorges Lefranc de Pom,inan (Vienrie 1774) 1715-90.
Yves-Alexandre de arbeouf conte de Lyor (Autun 1767) b.1732.
ntoine de Malvin de ontazet (Lyon 1758) 1713-88 (leading
ansenisL).
Louis-1arie de Nicoli (Cahors 1776) b.1729.
Pierreu1esCsar de Rochechouart (Bayeux 1753) b.1698.
Louis-Rene-Edourd de Rohan (coadjutor Strasbourg 1760) (Frince
Louis ce Rhan 1734-103.
Ferdirand-Naxirnilien-heriadec de Rohan (Bordeaux 179) (prince
Ferdinand de Rohan) 1738-1813.
OT1S iTI0NED
Henri-Franois d'Aueseau (chancellor) 16681751
Ren '-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy marquis d'rcenson 1694-1757.
Marc-ierre de Voyer de au1my come d r-enn 1695-1764 (broth
of above).
hi1iDeUcUste de 3te-'Foix chevalier d':rçc (or Arc) 172i-9.
Pierre-rnaud d'Aubusson 1717-97 (nb. not. the viscount),
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JeazrFranois chevalier de la 3arre 174766x.
Louis Cassier de )e11ecrde 172392 (?).
Gufllaume Lamoic,non de laricesni1 (Chancellor) i.6831772.
b.?ierre le Pesant de Boiç.zi1&zert 1646-173.9.
ic. vicomte de Boxith11,
Louiscuillaume Bon £tarqu'is de St-iiilaire b.1715.
James Bosiell 1740'95.
b.Henri de Bouilainvi3.liers comte de Stsaire 1658-1722.
Pau1-sprit-iarie de Ia. ourdonnaye de B1as	 17161800.
Joseph Balsaino "cointe" de Cac1iostro 174395. 	 -
Jean Calas 1693-1762x.
Dominique marquis de Caracciolil7l5-39 (Neapolitan ambassador)
charles _11S l7O9-3.
JacquesVincent Delacroix 1743-1332.
	 -
Gabriel-Issac Douetde la 3oulla' b.1734.
Jean-Baptiste abbé' Dus 1570-1740.
Charles inot Duclos 173472,
cle Beaumont
chevalier d'	 17281810.
A3.exandre de Gauclechart comte d'Esevi1le C?)
Louis-Char3.es de Tellier duc d'2stres 1597-1771.
Louise de Peysac Hrne. de pars de Fausselandry (Fars-Fausselaridrj
1750-1330.
b.Prançois de Saligriac de la 1othe Fne'1on 1651-1715.
Andr4'Hercule cardinal de Fleury 1653-1743,'
Gaspard-?ranois-Arine chevalier de Forbin 1718-80.
Louis-Henri chevalier de Gaillard (governor of Gozo 174262).
ean3enoit Cachet de Garnerans.
Joseph-Nicholas Cuot 1728-1316.
Le President He'riault l58-l77O.
John Lar 3.6711729.
'S
Narie-Therese-Louise de Cariç.nan priicesse .de Lamballe i749-92ç.
Louis le ie1etier de iorefon'aino.
Simon-Henri-Nicholas Lin'.uet 1736-94x.
Jean-aptiste 11achau1t comte d'Arnouville 170V94.
Frde'ric-.Antoine lesmer 3.7331C15.
Charles-Louis Secondat de 1iontescruieu baron de 1a ' Srde 1689'l755i
Pascal aoii 1725-1825.
RocheAntoine 1-e1icsry.
Nicho1asEdmRtff (or Resti) de Ia Bretonne 1734-1806.
Narie-des-Neiçes-aean-Enunanuel de Rohan-Po1u (Bailli de Rohai)
17257 (Grand Master p the Order o St. John l77697).
I.e President Ro13. prid d. 1794x.
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Donatien-Alphonse-Frariçois marquis de Sade 17401814.
b.char1es-Irene Castel abbe cle StPierre 1653-1743.
Louis de Rovroy duc de
	 Cimon 1675-1755.
Julie de Fauris marçuise c StVincent.
Jean Iioreau cle 3eychel1e- (Controller Cenerai. 1754-56).
Etienne de Silhouette 17O-67.
b.Sebastien le Prestre de Vau'Dan 1633-1707.
RITISII !M3SY 22D FORCIG! 0FFI2 STAFFU
John baron de 31anguiere 1732-1812.
TTilliam Eden baron Auckland 1744-1814.
Simon earl of Harcourt 1714-77 (referred to throuçhout as ord
Harcourt' to avoid confusion with the French branch of the family.)
1-Torace St-Paul (1menetrab1y obscure).
David Murray viscount S tormont 1727-96.
Rooert Walpole (imenetraiy obscure).
Paul Wentctorth (impenetrably obscure).
AMER CIA DL2P PI0
Silas eane 1737-89.
Benjamin Franklin 1706-90.
Arthur Lee 1740-92.
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TH TIENDMS 1768-78.
PAR IS
lENS
SOISSONS
ORLEANS
• BOTJCE3
LYON
DOMBES
LA !OCHELtE
R 10)1
POITIES
L IY.ES
43ORDEAUX
AUcI ET BYorE
'MOUTAUBAN
cHAMPAGNE
0UN
CTN
ALENCON
B1TTANY
AIX
LANGUE DO C
PERPIGNAN
BURCUNDY
cHE-cOMTE
RENO3L
METZ
ALSACi
Bertier de Sauvicriy (father and son) (father
retired 1776).
Dupleix de Bacquencourt* 176671. Açay 17719g.
Le Peiet'eir de Mortefontaine 1765-84.
Cypierre 1760-90.
Dupr de St-Maur 1764-76. Fejdeau de Brou 1776
80. •	-
Fiesselles 1767-84.
Garnerans 1762-1775 (Generality abolished).
SSnac de Meilhan* 1766-73. Nontyon 1773-81.
Depon 1765-77, Reverseaux 1777-81.
Chazerat 1767-90.
La Bourdonnaye de 1ossac 1750-83.
Turgot 17o1-74. Dame 1774-83.
Fags* 1766-70. Esmançart 1770-5. Duprd
St-Maur 1775-85.
Ducluzelk
 1756-83.
Journet 1767-76. Douet. de la Boullaye 1776-84,
Courgues 17,61-73. Terray 1773-83.
Roui11 d'Orfeuil 1764-90.
Crosne 1767-77 (intendant of Lorraine as well
1777-85).
Fontete 175275.
	
Esmartgart 1775-R3.
Jullien* 1766-90.
Agay 1768-71. DupleIx de 2acquencourt 1771-4.
caze de la Bove 1774-84.
La 'rour de Glené'e 1744-71. Montyon 1771-3.
Snac de Neilhan 1773-5. Calois de i.a Tour 1775
90.
NM. de St-Priest (two generalities, Toulouse and
Nontpellier, two intendants but one administrat-
ive unit) 1751, 176486.
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Le Fevre de Caurnarin 1756-78.
Taboureau des Reaux 1764-75. Senac de Xieilhari,
1775-90
chaurnorit de la Ga1a.sires 1758-1777. Crosne
1777-85.
chardon 1768-71 Pradines 1771-5. Boucheporn
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1766.
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T?hjle archive material is listed separately, document.
quoted frequently aid extensively will be quoted açain in the
contemporary material. A great many books .iave been used, aria
quoted, from the long ana'lytical reviews (sometimes up to 10,
00 words) in literary journals (fufl reference in thefootnotes);
between 1768 and 1773 the literary journals reviewed some 500
books, the sin'le 1arçest category of which was reliçious'.
(The comprehensive survey of contemporary periodicals covered
approximately 950 volumes).
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(for the embassy of irince Louis de Rohan).
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1565. Dauphine (retane) 1770-4.
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1618. Zsle de France 17714.
1650. Laz,ruedo 1749-73.
1651. tanguedoc 1774-89.
1740. Proverice 17G4-'74.
1748. Roussil.lon l7484.
These archives show a coss-section of governmental activity.
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Series H. (!rovincal goverrunent).
A.NH. 34-5. Artois 1771-7.
A.M.H. 29 — 32, 143-4. 3urçundy (iricludinci i3resse, Bgey,
Gex) 1767-1779.
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Series K (overnment).
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A.NK. 685-6. Corsica 1772-6.
IAN. 692.. aconnais.
A.IK. 624. Peera:e.
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Bib1ioh'eque Natioriale. I'lanuscrits Franais. 6570-2.
aupeou's papers 177489, inc1udin 'Comte iendu'
B.N.	 Fr. 6828-9, 6832. Fitz-James apers.
6680-7. 'Mes Loisirs ou Journal ci' Evneaents'.	 P. Hardye
7505. Peerace,
75D9. Collection Castries,
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pendent Xe 1e Sic1e'. Vo1s 1720-89. (Vol.1 1720-1777).
13733-5. 'Histoire des Evneents Arrivs en France'
P-E. Recnaud.
1440a-1. 3rittany. constitution, and politics 1776-7.
Bibliothque Nationale. Manuscrits Français. Nouvelles
Acquisitions 4386-90. 'Jourxal des Nouvelles'. Albertas.
Collection Joly de Fleury.
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ba M. d'Alembert' 1 May 1781.
B N. Add. Mss. 34412-62. Aucc1and Papers.
Public Record Off ices
rublic Record Office. State aper 78 (France) 276-306,
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Archve q
 of -e Order of t. John of erusa1em
St..Tohn Series 2. Libe Conci1iarwt 155-9.
Series 3. Liber Consi1i di Stato 272-3.
9erie9. Correspondance 1236-40 (1767-1777).
(AU docuiuent$ reer,ed Fn are in French and refer either
to France or to French knights.)
456
PRIMARY PRINTED MATERIAL.
Conten:Dorzr r eriodica1s:
'Anri Lt-raire, ed. Frron (father and son). monthly
'E:Dhcm:ides du Citoyeri'. 1onthly. Paris l767].773
aete d&France'. (ed. Roer to 1771, iarin 1771-4,
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c'ues sur cue1ques ouverriements de 1uroe'.
3 vols. Neuchte). 1779.
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.
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"Cosmopolis" 1776.
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(? Paris) 1771.
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Paris 1730.
'Te Voeu . de 1 Nation'. Versailles 1771.
'La Nobiee 1ii1itaire' • Paris 1758.
'çonicirations ur le cuverriernent xcien et
Pr c eri de la Frarce'. Amsterdam 17G5 and 3.784w
See separate biblio;raphy charter VII note 74.
'Mioire S2crets'. Earis 1866.
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LR. Belleval.
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F-C. Eoui1i..	 otres
	
Paris 1821.
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